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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
TRACY TUCKER, JASON SHARP, NAOMI
MORLEY, JEREMY PAYNE, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,

Supreme Court Case No. 43922

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, in
his official capacity as Governor ofldaho; HON.
LINDA COPPLE TROUT, DARRELL G. BOLZ,
SARA B. THOMAS, WILLIAM H. WELLMAN,
KIMBER RICKS, SEN. CHUCK WINDER, and
REP. CHRISTY PERRY, in their official capacities
as members of the Idaho State Public Defense
Commission,
Defendants-Respondents

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE SAMUEL A.HOAGLAND

RICHARD EPPINK
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
CALLY YOUNGER
DANIEL J. SKINNER

BOISE, IDAHO

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS
BOISE, IDAHO
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User: TCWEGEKE

Case: CV-OC-2015-10240 Current Judge: Samuel A. Hoagland
Tracy Tucker, etal. vs. State Of Idaho, etal.

Judge

Date

Code

User

6/17/2015

NCOC

CCGRANTR

New Case Filed - Other Claims

Richard D. Greenwood

COMP

CCGRANTR

Complaint Filed

Richard D. Greenwood

SMFI
MOTN
AFFD

(9) Summons Filed

Richard D. Greenwood

(5) Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission

Richard D. Greenwood

Affidavit of Jeremy Payne

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCGRANTR
CCGRANTR
CCGRANTR
CCGRANTR

Affidavit of Naomi Morley

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCGRANTR

Affidavit of Jason Sharp

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD.

CCGRANTR

Affidavit of Tracy Tucker

Richard D. Greenwood

AFFD

CCGRANTR

First Affidavit of Richard Eppink

Richard D. Greenwood

MOTN
AFSM

CCGRANTR
CCGRANTR

Motion for Class Certification

Richard D. Greenwood

Affidavit of Jason D Williamson In Support Of
Motion for Class Certification

Richard D. Greenwood

AFSM

CCGRANTR

Affidavit of Kathryn M Ali In Support Of Motion for Richard D. Greenwood
Class Certification

AFSM

CCGRANTR

Affidavit of Andrew C Lillie In Support Of Motion
for Class Certification

Richard D. Greenwood

BREF

CCGRANTR

Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification

Richard D. Greenwood

CCBARRSA

Affidavit Of Service (06/17/15)

Richard D. Greenwood

CCWRIGRM

Acceptance Of Service (06/19/15)

Richard D. Greenwood

CCWRIGRM
CCMYERHK

Acceptance Of Service (06/19/15)

Richard D. Greenwood

7/6/2015

AFOS
ACCP
ACCP
MODQ

Richard D. Greenwood

7/8/2015

MOTD

TCLAFFSD

Motion For Disqualification Of Judge Without
Cause
Motion To Dismiss

MEMO

TCLAFFSD

Memorandum In Support of Motion To Dismiss

Richard D. Greenwood

ORDR
CJWO

TCPATAKA

Order for Disqualification of Judge Without Cause Richard D. Greenwood

TCPATAKA

Change Assigned Judge: Disqualification W/0

NOTC
ORDR

TCPATAKA
CCMEYEAR

Notice of Reassignment

Melissa Moody

Recusal Under 40(d){4)

Melissa Moody

CHJS

CCMEYEAR

Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification

Cheri C. Copsey

DISF

CCMEYEAR

Disqualification Of Judge - Self

Cheri C. Copsey

NOTR

CCMEYEAR

Notice Of Reassignment

Cheri C. Copsey

NOTS

CCGARCOS

Notice Of Service of Discovery Requests

Cheri C. Copsey

NOHG
HRSC

CCBOYIDR
CCBOYIDR

Notice Of Hearing

Cheri C. Copsey

Hearing Scheduled {Motion to Dismiss

Cheri C. Copsey

8/3/2015

MODQ

CCGRANTR

8/5/2015

ORDQ

CCMURPST

6/19/2015

7/28/2015

7/31/2015

Richard D. Greenwood

Melissa Moody

Cause

08/20/2015 02:30 PM)
Cheri C. Copsey
Motion For Disqualification of Judge Without
Cause
Order for Disqualification of Judge Without Cause Cheri C. Copsey
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Date
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8/5/2015

CJWO

CCMURPST

Change Assigned Judge: Disqualification W/0
Cause

Samuel A. Hoagland

CCMURPST
CCMASTLW

Notice Of Reassignment - Samuel A. Hoagland

Samuel A. Hoagland

8/17/2015

NOTR
HRVC

Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled
on 08/20/2015 02:30 PM: Hearing Vacated

Cheri C. Copsey

8/21/2015

MOTN

CCGRANTR

Motion for Protective Order Staying Discovery
Pending Decision on Motion to Dismiss

Samuel A. Hoagland

CCGRANTR

Memorandum in Support of Motion

Samuel A. Hoagland

8/24/2015

MEMO
HRSC

TCHARDSL

Hearing Scheduled (Status/ADR 08/26/2015
10:00 AM)

Samuel A. Hoagland

CCGRANTR

Notice of Status Conference 8.26.15 @ 1O AM

Samuel A. Hoagland

8/26/2015

NOTC
DCHH

TCHARDSL

Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Samuel A. Hoagland
on 08/26/2015 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Christy Olesek
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100

HRSC

TCHARDSL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion For Protective Order Samuel A. Hoagland
10/02/2015 10:00 AM)

HRSC

TCHARDSL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss
12/16/2015 03:00 PM)

Samuel A. Hoagland

MINE
ORDR

TCHARDSL

Minute Entry and Scheduling Order

Samuel A. Hoagland

TCHARDSL

Order Granting Motion for Pro Hae Vice
Admission (Bret H. Ladine)

Samuel A. Hoagland

ORDR

TCHARDSL

Order Granting Motion for Pro Hae Vice
Admission (Andrew C. Lillie)

Samuel A. Hoagland

ORDR

TCHARDSL

Order Granting Motion for Pro Hae Vice
Admission (Jenny Q. Shen)

Samuel A. Hoagland

ORDR

TCHARDSL

Order Granting Motion for Pro Hae Vice
Admission (Jason D. Willamson)

Samuel A. Hoagland

ORDR

TCHARDSL

Order Granting Motion for Pro Hae Vice
Admission (Kathryn M. Ali)

Samuel A. Hoagland

9/3/2015

MOTN

CCHOLDKJ

Motion for Injunction and Motion to Amend Class Samuel A. Hoagland
Action

9/4/2015

STIP

CCGRANTR

Stipulation and Motion to Amend Briefing
Schedule

Samuel A. Hoagland

9/11/2015

MISC

CCGRANTR

Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion for
Protective Order Staying Discovery Pending
Decision on Motion to Dismiss

Samuel A. Hoagland

CCGRANTR

Second Affidavit of Richard Eppink

Samuel A. Hoagland

9/16/2015

AFFD
ORDR

TCHARDSL

Order Denying Motion for Injunction and Motion to Samuel A. Hoagland
Amend Class Action

9/18/2015

RPLY.

CCVIDASL

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants
Motion for Protective Order Staying Discovery
Pending Decision on Motion to Dismiss

8/31/2015

Judge

Samuel A. Hoagland
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Date

9/21/2015
9/23/2015

Code
MOTN
MOTN
CONT

CCMARTJD
CCMYERHK
TCHARDSL

ORDR

User

Judge
Motion to Appear by Telephone

Samuel A. Hoagland

(Unopposed) Motion For Pro Hae Vice Admission Samuel A. Hoagland
Continued (Motion For Protective Order
10/16/2015 10:00 AM)

Samuel A. Hoagland

TCHARDSL

Order Granting Stipulation and Motion to Amend
Briefing Schedule

Samuel A. Hoagland

TCHARDSL
TCHARDSL

Notice of Hearing (10/16/2015@ 10 AM)

Samuel A. Hoagland

9/29/2015

NOTC
ORDR

Order Granting (Unopposed) Motion for Pro Hae
Vice Admission

Samuel A. Hoagland

TCHARDSL
CCGARCOS

Order Granting Motion to Appear by Telephone

Samuel A. Hoagland

10/8/2015

ORDR
NOTC

Notice of Substitution of Counsel (David W.
Cantril! for William H. Wellman and Sara B.
Thomas)

Samuel A. Hoagland

10/16/2015

DCHH

TCPATAKA

Hearing result for Motion For Protective Order
scheduled on 10/16/2015 10:00 AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Christy Olesek
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 50 pages

Samuel A. Hoagland

10/20/2015

TCHARDSL

Order Governing Discovery

Samuel A. Hoagland

TCLAFFSD

Notice Of Service

Samuel A. Hoagland

CCBARRSA
CCBOYIDR

Notice Of Service

Samuel A. Hoagland

11/23/2015

ORDR
NOTS
NOSV
RSPN

Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion to
Dismiss Filed July 8, 2015

Samuel A. Hoagland

CCBOYIDR
CCBOYIDR
CCLOWEAD

Affidavit of Ian Thomson

Samuel A. Hoagland

Second Affidavit of Richard Eppink

Samuel A. Hoagland

11/24/2015

AFFD
AFFD
MISC
RSPN

CCLOWEAD

Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss filed July 8, 2015

Samuel A. Hoagland

MEMO

CCTAYLSA

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants
Motion to Dismiss

Samuel A. Hoagland

OBJT

CCTAYLSA

Defendants Objection and Motion to Strike Notice Samuel A. Hoagland
of Hearing (12/16/15@ 3pm)

HRSC

CCTAYLSA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss
12/16/2015 03:00 PM)

Samuel A. Hoagland

12/9/2015

RSPS

TCLAFFSD

Response To Defendants' Objection And Motion
To Strike Filed December 4, 2015

Samuel A. Hoagland

12/11/2015

NOTC

CCMARTJD

Notice of Substitution of Counsel (Skinner for
Cantrill)

Samuel A. Hoagland

12/14/2015

REPL

CCZUBEDK

Reply In Support of Defendants Objection and
Motion to Strike

Samuel A. Hoagland

12/15/2015

NOTC

CCLOWEAD

Notice of Telephonic Appearance

Samuel A. Hoagland

11/10/2015
11/12/2015

12/4/2015

Errata (Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion Samuel A. Hoagland
to Dismiss)

000004

Date: 3/23/2016

Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

Time: 09:57 AM

ROA Report

User: TCWEGEKE

Case: CV-OC-2015-10240 Current Judge: Samuel A Hoagland

Page 4 of 4

Tracy Tucker, etal. vs. State Of Idaho, etal.

User

12/16/2015

Code
DCHH

DCELLISJ

Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled
Samuel A Hoagland
on 12/16/2015 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Christy Olesek
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 200 pages

1/20/2016

MEMO

TCHARDSL

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting
Motion to Dismiss

Samuel A Hoagland

1/21/2016

JDMT
CDIS

DCABBOSM
DCABBOSM

Judgment

Samuel A Hoagland

Civil Disposition entered for: Bolz, Darrell G,
Defendant; C L Butch Otter, Defendant; Huskey,
Molly Hon, Defendant; Perry, Christy Rep,
Defendant; Ricks, Kimber, Defendant; State Of
Idaho, Defendant; Thomas, Sara B, Defendant;
Wellman, William H, Defendant; Winder, Chuck
Sen, Defendant; Morley, Naomi, Plaintiff; Payne,
Jeremy, Plaintiff; Sharp, Jason, Plaintiff; Tucker,
Tracy, Plaintiff. Filing date: 1/21/2016

Samuel A Hoagland

STAT·
NOTA
APSC
NOTC

DCABBOSM
CCBARRSA
CCBARRSA
TCWEGEKE

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Samuel A Hoagland

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Samuel A Hoagland

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Samuel A Hoagland

Date

1/25/2016
3/22/2016

Judge

Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court No. Samuel A Hoagland

43922
I
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JUN 17 2015
Jason D. Williamson
AMERICAN CML LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION
iwilliamson@aclu.org
125 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004
(212) 284-7340
(212) 549-2654 (fax)
Pro hac vice application pending
Richard Eppink
AMERICAN CML LIBERTIES UNION
OF IDAHO FOUNDATION
reppink@acluidaho.org
·P.O. Box 1897
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 344-9750, ext. 1202
(208) 344-7201 (fax)
Idaho State Bar no. 7503

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CHRISTOPHE:R D. RICH, Clerk
Andrew C. Lillie
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
By TENILLE GRANT
andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com
DEPUTY
One Tabor Center, Suite 1500
1200 Seventeenth Street
Denver, CO 80202
303-899-7300
303-899-7333 (fax)
Kathryn M. Ali
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com
555 Thirteenth Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 637-5600
(202) 637-5910 (fax)
Bret H. Ladine
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
bret.ladine@hoganlovells.com
3 Embarcadero Center #1500
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 374-2300
(415) 374-2499 (fax)
Jenny Q. Shen
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
ienny.shen@hoganlovells.com
4085 Campbell Ave., Suite 100
Menlo Park, CA 94025
650-463-4000
650-463-4199 (fax)
Pro hac vice applications pending

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TRACY TUCKER, JASON SHARP, NAOMI
MORLEY, and JEREMY PAYNE, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated,

Case No.

CV

oc

151024·0

--------

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR
INJUNCTIVE
AND DECLARATORY
. .......
RELIEF

STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER,
in his official ca acit as Governor of Idaho;
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 1
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,:
HON. MOLLY HUSKEY, in her official
capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public
Defense Commission; DARRELL G. BOLZ,
in his official capacity as a member of the
Idaho State Public Defense Commission;
SARA B. THOMAS, in her official capacity
as a member of the Idaho State Public Defense
Commission; WILLIAM H. WELLMAN, in
his official capacity as a member of the Idaho
State Public Defense Commission; KIMBER
RICKS, in his official capacity as a member of
the Idaho State Public Defense Commission;
SEN. CHUCK WINDER, in his official
capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public
Defense Commission; and REP. CHRISTY
PERRY, in her official capacity as a member
of the Idaho State Public Defense
Commission,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
1. More than five years ago, the State ofldaho asked the National Legal Aid and Defender

Association ("NLADA") for a report on its public-defense system. That report found,
unequivocally, that "none of the public defender systems in the sample counties are
constitutionally adequate." Specifically, the report identified a number of specific areas of
concern with respect to trial-level indigent-defense delivery in Idaho. These include the
widespread use of fixed-fee contracts; extraordinarily high attorney caseloads and workloads;
lack of consistent, effective, and confidential communication with indigent clients; inadequate,
and often nonexistent, investigation of cases; lack of structural safeguards to protect the
independence of defenders; lack of adequate representation of children in juvenile and criminal
court; lack of sufficient supervision; lack of performance-based standards; lack of ongoing
training and professional development; and lack of any meaningful funding from the State.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF -2
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I

,

2. Five years later, the State has failed to fix this 'unconstitutional system. The Governor's
Commission passed the buck by recommending that the Legislature create a special study
committee. That legislative committee then passed the buck by establishing yet another
commission to make recommendations to the legislature. In January 2015, the Governor
acknowledged in his State of the State address that "the courts have made it clear that our current
method of providing legal counsel for indigent criminal defendants does not pass constitutional
muster." Astoup.dingly, the State failed yet again in the recently concluded 2015 legislative
session to fund or improve its public-defense system. Because the executive and legislative
branches refuse to take the necessary actions to fix Idaho's public-defense system, it falls on this
Court to ensure that "[c]onstitutional rights, as well as this Court's duty to faithfully interpret our
constitution and the federal constitution, do not wane before united efforts of the legislature and
the governor." 1
3. Plaintiffs Tracy Tucker, Jason Sharp, Naomi Morley, and Jeremy Payne bring this civilrights class-action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of themselves and all those
similarly situated. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief for defendants haled before state
courts throughout Idaho from the ongoing injuries and harm caused by the continuing failure of
Defendants (the "State") to provide effective legal representation to indigent criminal defendants
across the State ofldaho, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, of Article 1, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution, and Idaho statutes and
regulations.
4. Plaintiff Tracy Tucker was arrested in Bonner County on March 6, 2015, after being
charged with attempted strangulation and domestic battery in the presence of a child. Although

1 Miles;.

Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,640 (1989).
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he was assigned a public defender, Mr. Tucker was not represented by counsel at his initial
appearance, during which the court set his bail at $40,000. Without the guiding hand of counsel
at that initial proceeding, Mr. Tucker was unable to make any arguments to the court to justify a
reduction in the bail amount. Since Mr. Tucker could not afford to post bail, he remained in the
Bonner County Jail for the next three months. During his time in custody, Mr. Tucker met with
his attorney just three times, for a total of approximately 20 minutes. Two of those "meetings"
occurred in court, during Mr. Tucker's subsequent court appearances. In addition, during his
three months in jail, Mr. Tucker attempted, unsuccessfully, to reach his attorney by phone more
than 50 times. As of 10 days prior to Mr. Tucker's trial date, his attorney's demanding schedule
had prevented him from conducting any meaningful investigation into Mr. Tucker's case,
reviewing and explaining to Mr. Tucker the relevant discovery materials, or discussing trial
strategy with Mr. Tucker. On June 2, 2015, Mr. Tucker pleaded guilty to attempted
strangulation, at which time he was released from jail. Mr. Tucker is scheduled to be sentenced
on August 3, 2015, and faces up to 15 years in prison.
5. Plaintiff Jason Sharp was arrested in Shoshone County on May 16, 2014, pursuant to a
warrant charging him with burglary and grand theft. Although ~e was assigned a public
defender, Mr. Sharp was not represented by counsel at his initial appearance on May 20, 2014,
during which the court set his bail at $50,000. Mr. Sharp was unable to make the necessary
arguments to the court to justify a reduction in the bail amount at that initial proceeding. Since
Mr. Sharp could not afford to post bail, he remained in the Shoshone County Jail for
approximately two weeks. Without the help of his lawyer, Mr. Sharp was subsequently able to
convince the court that his bail amount was inappropriate because it was based on the erroneous
belief that he was on probation at the time of his arrest. The court eventually agreed and reduced

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF -4
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his bond to $5,000. Unfortunately, Mr. Sharp was still unable to afford to pay his bail. Fearing
that he would lose his job if he remained in jail, Mr. Sharp contacted his employer, who agreed
to write a letter to the court vouching for Mr. Sharp and recommending his release. The court
released Mr. Sharp from custody after receiving the letter of support from his employer. Over
the course of the last year since his release, however, Mr. Sharp has been unable to communicate
effectively with his attorney regarding the status of his case. For instance, despite repeated
requests from Mr. Sharp, his attorney has not yet provided him with a copy of the discovery
materials in his case, leaving Mr. Sharp unclear about what evidence the State does or does not
have against him, and making it impossible for Mr. Sharp to participate meaningfully in the
development of his defense. Moreover, aside from several motions to continue his jury trial, Mr.
Sharp's ,attorney has not filed any substantive motions on his behalf. Even the court's decision
to reduce Mr. Sharp's bond to $5,000, and ultimately to release him on his own recognizance,
was the .result of Mr. Sharp's own advocacy in court and his employer's willingness to support
him, rather than a response to any motion filed by his attorney. Mr. Sharp is scheduled to go to
trial on July 14, 2015, and faces up to 30 years in prison if convicted on both counts.
6. PlaintiffNaomi Morley was arrested in Ada County on March 14, 2014, following a
serious single-car accident in which she was severely injured. Ms. Morley, who was 56 years
old at the time of her arrest, was charged with driving under the influence and possession of a
controlled substance after officers purportedly discovered prescription medication and drug
paraphernalia. Although an Ada County public defender was present during Ms. Morley's initial
appearance by video, Ms. Morley did not have an opportunity to speak with that lawyer and,
ultimately, the Ada County Public Defender's office determined that it had a conflict of interest
in representing Ms. Morley. The Court set Ms. Morley's bail at $15,000 at her initial

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 5
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appearance. Since she could not afford bail, Ms. Morley remained in the Ada County Jail until
her bail was reduced three weeks later, notwithstanding the recent serious injuries she had
sustained. Since then, Ms. Morley's attorneys have been unable to provide her with adequate
representation. For instance, Ms. Morley was told that if she wanted to retain an expert to
challenge the State's contentions regarding the alleged presence of drugs in her system at the
time of the accident, and/or to do any outside testing to challenge the prosecution's allegations,
she would have to pay for such services herself. Also, despite informing her lawyer that another
person would confess responsibility, it was only through Ms. Morley's own efforts that she
recently obtained a sworn affidavit from the person acknowledging responsibility. On
information and belief, Ms. Morley's lawyer's caseload has been so large, and his resources so
few, that he has been unable to review Ms. Morley's extensive comments on the police reports in
her case or to investigate the vehicle involved in the accident before the state scrapped it,
destroying that evidence. Further, Ms. Morley has been unable to communicate effectively or
consistently with her attorney, and is concerned that her attorney is pressuring her to plead guilty
because he does not have the time or resources to prepare sufficiently for trial. Most recently,
Ms. Morley turned down a plea offer that would have required her to spend 10 years in prison.
She is scheduled to go to trial on June 29, 2015, and faces over 15 years in prison if convicted on
all counts.
7. Plaintiff Jeremy Payne was incarcerated at the Payette County Jail on January 25, 2015,
after being arrested for possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia. Although
Mr. Payne was assigned a public defender, he was not represented by counsel at his initial
appearance, during which the court set his bail at $30,000. Since he was not able to afford bail,
Mr. Payne remained in jail pending resolution of his case. Mr. Payne was released from Payette

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF -6
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County Jail on June 9, 2015, after the State failed to take the case to trial in a timely fashion.
Unfortunately, during the five months he was in custody, Mr. Payne was unable to communicate
with his attorney on a consistent basis. In light of the many other felony cases assigned to his
attorney, Mr. Payne only met with counsel twice at the County Jail, both for very short periods of
time. Aside from those brief meetings, Mr. Payne has only met with his attorney in court-for
even shorter periods oftime-just prior to his court appearances, and has been unable ·to contact
his attorney by phone despite repeated attempts. Indeed, Mr. Payne has spent a total of
approximately 30-45 minutes with his attorney since the inception of his case. Moreover, to
date, Mr. Payne's attorney has been unable to conduct any meaningful investigation into his
case, review the relevant discovery with his client, or share with Mr. Payne his thoughts with
regard to trial strategy and related matters. Mr. Payne's preliminary hearing was waived and his
trial has now been continued three times. Mr. Payne is now scheduled to go to trial on July 21,
2015, ~nd faces up to seven years in prison if convicted.
8. Sadly, the circumstances surrounding the named Plaintiffs' representations are not unique
to them. Rather, they exemplify the experiences of thousands of indigent defendants across the
State, who have been denied their right to effective counsel as a result of the State's failure to
provide the necessary resources, robust oversight, and specialized training required to ensure that
all public defenders can handle all of their cases effectively and in compliance with state and
federal law.
9. Despite amendments to Idaho's public-defender statutes that were passed in 2014 through
a bill enacted as the "Idaho Public Defense Act," the current, patchwork public-defense
arrangement in Idaho remains riddled with constitutional deficiencies and fails, at all stages of
the prosecution and adjudication processes, to ensure adequate representation for indigent
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defendants in both criminal and juvenile proceedings in Idaho. Although the State has been
keenly aware of this failure to provide for the basic rights of indigent criminal defendants for
years, without a guiding state-wide scheme, the majority of Idaho counties have failed to
implement standards and requirements that satisfy either statutory or constitutional mandates.
This has created a flawed system that forces many inexperienced and inadequately trained
attorneys to juggle too many cases without enough resources. The result is constitutionally
deficient representation of indigent defendants across the state.
10. Certainly, if public-defense attorneys in Idaho had their way, they would be well
equipped with the resources and training necessary to do their jobs effectively at all stages of the
proceedings against their clients. But, due to the State's pervasive and persistent constitutional
and statutory failures-including, but not limited to, the State's failure to provide adequate
funding or relevant state-wide directives-public defenders are not able to provide the zealous
representation constitutionally required of them in all of their cases.
11. Indigent defendants in most Idaho counties, including the named Plaintiffs, are not
represented by counsel at their initial appearances, during which a number of critical events often
occur, including bail determinations, setting of pretrial release conditions, waivers of rights,
entry of pleas, sentencing, and off-the-record discussions between the prosecutor and the
defendant-and sometimes the presiding judge-regarding the defendant's case.
12. Because public defenders in most instances do not have the staff or resources to be
present at initial appearances, indigent defendants are most often left to fend for themselves
during these critical proceedings, without the assistance of counsel. Counsel at this stage is
especially important to, among other things, presenting reasoned legal arguments to reduce bail
(including, but not limited to, arguments related to the strength of the State's case, as well as the
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defendant's income, ability to pay, and ties to the community), advising their clients about how
to plead, and negotiating with prosecutors regarding potential plea agreements and pretrialrelease terms. Further, the absence of counsel at initial appearances causes or contributes to the
unnecessary detention of indigent defendants-sometimes for extended periods of time-who
may otherwise have been released while they await resolution of their cases; limited ability of
indigent defendants to interact with their lawyers, provide and review case materials, and assist
in the evaluation of their cases and preparation of their defenses; significant impact to indigent
defendants' work and family lives; insincere, uninformed, or uneducated pleas entered, partly or
entirely, in order to obtain immediate release; and other adverse impacts, many times with
lifelong consequences.
13. Even after counsel has been appointed, indigent defendants in many counties, including
defendants not in custody, lack sufficient access to the public defenders assigned to their cases.
For example, defendants frequently do not have the opportunity to meet with their public
defenders for purposes of receiving and reviewing the discovery materials related to their cases.
Under such conditions, it is nearly impossible for defendants to assist in their own defenses or to
understand and remain abreast of developments in their own cases .

.

14. Moreover, in many Idaho counties, there are disincentives for public defenders to engage
experts ·or investigators because such costs may not be covered by public-defender contracts.
Accordingly, public defenders routinely forgo the use of investigators and experts to carry out
basic tasks, such as identifying and interviewing witnesses, and reviewing and analyzing
evidence. In most instances, defense counsel must request additional resources from the court to
hire an investigator or an expert, and, upon information and belief, such requests are rarely made,
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in part because some public defenders believe that the available resources are so limited that the
requests should be reserved only for extraordinary situations.
15. These disincentives are caused, in large part, by the fixed-fee contract structure used in a
number of Idaho counties, under which contracting attorneys are paid a flat fee in exchange for
their representation of indigent defendants, irrespective of the number of clients the attorney may
be assigned during the term of the contract, or the nature of those clients' criminal charges. A
recent county-by-county survey revealed that at least 19 Idaho counties continue to use a fixedfee contract system to secure legal representation for indigent defendants, even though the Idaho
Code expressly prohibits it. Such a system creates significant conflicts of interest by creating
powerful incentives for the contracting attorney to spend as little time and money as possible on
any given case-to the obvious detriment of indigent clients.
16. In addition, public-defender caseloads in counties across the state are significantly higher
than the national standards, making it difficult, if not impossible, for attorneys to provide their
clients with the zealous representation to which they are entitled. According to a December 2014
analysis conducted by Idaho's Legislative Services Office ("LSO"), in at least six Idaho
counties, individual public defenders are responsible for handling more than twice the work that
one attorney should ever take on. Individual public defenders in an additional 19 Idaho counties
are responsible for handling the work of more than one attorney (but fewer than two). 2
17. On information and belief, the current caseloads carried by public defenders in most
Idaho counties are only slightly better, if not worse, than those highlighted in the National Legal
Aid and Defender Association 2010 report ("NLADA Report") on Idaho's public-defense
system. For instance, in Kootenai County, identified in the NLADA Report as one of the few

Legislative Services Office - Report on 2013 Caseloads, available at
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2014/interim/pdefl 028 lso.pdf.

2 Idaho
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bright spots with respect to public-defense services in Idaho, public defenders continue to work
under crushing caseloads. In 2014, four of the office's 15 attorneys handled well over 400 cases
each, the bulk of which were felonies and misdemeanors. Another four defenders handled over
300 cases in 2014, including a mixture of felonies, misdemeanors, juvenile cases, and other
proceedings for which the Public Defender's Office is responsible. Such caseloads are well
above national standards and impossible for one person to handle effectively.
18. The issues associated with the overwhelming caseloads of Idaho public defenders are
made worse by the fact that at least 26 Idaho counties permit contract public defenders to
maintain a private practice, often without tracking the number of private cases being handled by
the contracting attorney at any given time. Most of those counties (22 of them) also rely on
fixed-fee contracts. This creates an even greater economic incentive for public defenders to
deprioritize their indigent clients in favor of their paying clients.
19. Further, many Idaho counties do not have the resources or expertise to provide the kind
of specialized training or supervision to ensure that representation of indigent defendants is
consistent with the State's constitutional mandates. According to a recent state-wide assessment
by the Idaho State Public Defense Commission ("PDC"), "a significant number of indigent
defense attorneys in the State are not receiving adequate training hours in areas directly relevant
to the representation of their indigent clients." 3
20. These deficiencies are further exacerbated by the lack of true independence afforded to
public defenders across the state. Under the current supervisory structure, public defenders
report to their respective county commissioners, many of whom are not attorneys or are
otherwise unqualified to oversee a legal practice-let alone one requiring specialized knowledge

3

Idaho State Public Defense Commission, 2015 Report to the Legislature, 9.
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of criminal law. For example, in Bonner County, the commissioners hold degrees in
History/Business Systems Management, Aeronautics, and Education, respectively. None has any
formal legal training or practice experience. The same is true in Bingham County, where it
appears that only two of the three commissioners attended college, and none has a background in
the law. Yet in some counties, commissioners have extensive authority related to criminal-law
matters, including the authority to approve or reject requests for additional resources, and to
terminate or choose not to renew the public defender's contract, leaving the defenders beholden
to the often-uninformed whims of their supervisors.
21. All of these deficiencies have combined to create a constitutional crisis with respect to
indigent defense delivery in Idaho-a crisis that federal and state law require the State to address
in a meaningful, expedient, and substantive way.

BACKGROUND
22. The State of Idaho has a long history of recognizing the right to counsel for those
criminal defendants who are unable to afford an attorney. As early as 1864, Idaho law required
that a defendant "be informed by the court that it is his right to have counsel before being
arraigned," and that he "be asked if he desires the aid of counsel." 4
23. In 1887, the Idaho legislature went a step further, passing a law requiring trial courts to
advise defendants of the right to counsel during arraignments on criminal charges, and to appoint
counsel if the defendant requested an attorney but was unable to afford one. 5

4

Cr. Prac. 1864 § 267.

5 See

R.S., R.C., & C.L. § 7721 (1887); LC.§ 19-1512 (1967).

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 12

000017

1,

,,
I

24. Once the appointment was made, defense counsel were to "be paid out of the county
treasury, upon order of the judge of the court, such sum as the court may deem reasonable for the
services rendered." 6
25. Following achievement of statehood in 1890, Idaho lawmakers included the right to
counsel in the state constitution. Specifically, Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution
states that criminal defendants have a right to "appear and defend in person and with counsel."
26. Since then, the Idaho judiciary has consistently interpreted this constitutional provision,
as well as related statutes, as requiring the provision of counsel to indigent defendants at public
expense.7
27. By the time the United States Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright 8 in 1963,
some 37 states-including Idaho-had already committed to providing counsel for indigent
defendants, upon request, in all felony cases. Indeed, then-Idaho Attorney General Frank
Benson was one of22 attorneys general to sign on to an amicus brief submitted to the U.S.
Supreme Court in support of the plaintiffs claims in Gideon.
28. After Gideon, the U.S. Supreme Court continued to expand the right to counsel in
significant ways. The Court has extended the right to counsel to children in juveniledelinquency proceedings, see In re Gault; 9 probationers in probation revocation proceedings, see
Mempa v. Rhay; 10 and indigent defendants charged with misdemeanors, see Argersinger v.

6

LC. § 19-1513 (Repealed).

7 See

State v. Montroy, 217 P. 611, 614 (1923)

8 372

U.S. 335 (1963).

9 387

U.S. 1 (1967).

10

389 U.S. 128 (1967).
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Hamlin. 11 More recently, the Court found that the right to counsel attaches for all defendants at
their initial appearances, see Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Tex.; 12 and that plea bargaining
constitutes a "critical stage" of any criminal proceeding, thereby requiring the effective
assistance of counsel in connection with plea negotiations, see Lafler v. Cooper 13 and Missouri

v. Frye'. 14
29. Idaho, on the other hand, has taken several steps backward in the half-century since

Gideon. Rather than making good on its early efforts and serving as a model for other states to
follow, the State of Idaho has failed to ensure-through lack of sufficient oversight, training, and
funding-that people accused of crimes within its borders who are unable to afford an attorney
are provided with constitutionally adequate legal assistance. As a result, Idaho has become the
epitome of an indigent-defense system in crisis, notwithstanding the 2014 amendments to the
public-defense statutes, which have done very little to address the underlying causes of the
State's indigent-defense problem.
National Legal Aid and Defender Association Analysis of Idaho's Indigent-Defense Services
30. In its 2007 management audit ofldaho's State Appellate Public Defender, the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association ("NLADA") concluded that the caseload problems plaguing
Idaho's appellate public defenders at that time could likely be addressed by improving trial-level
'

indigent defense services across the state.

11

407 U.S. 25 (1972).

12

554 U.S. 191 (2008).
'

13

132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).

14

132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
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31. Following the release of the audit, the Idaho Criminal Justice Commission ("CJC")created by Executive Order in 2005-and composed primarily of various State officials involved
in the criminal-justice system-authorized the NLADA to conduct a comprehensive study of the
State's trial-level indigent-defense system.
32. In January 2010, the NLADA released its evaluation of trial-level indigent-defense
services in Idaho ("NLADA Report"). The Report included an assessment of services being
provided to both adults and children in the criminal justice system, and focused specifically on
seven counties. 15
33. The NLADA's assessment was rooted in the American Bar Association's Ten Principles

of a Public Defense Delivery System, promulgated in February 2002. According to the ABA, the
Ten Principles are an interdependent set of standards that "constitute the fundamental criteria
necessary to design a system that provides effective, efficient, high quality, ethical, conflict-free
legal representation" to indigent defendants. 16
34. The NLADA found that, for thousands of defendants across Idaho, the constitutional
requirements of Gideon and its progeny have been left unfulfilled, and the standards set forth in
the ABA' s Ten Principles have gone largely unmet. 17

15

The counties highlighted in the NLADA Report are Ada, Blaine, Bonneville, Canyon,
Kootenai, Nez Perce, and Power Counties.
16

ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System (Feb. 2002), at Introduction,
available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_s
claid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf
17 NATIONAL LEGAL

AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, THE GUARANTEE OF COUNSEL:
ADVOCACY & DUE PROCESS IN IDAHO'S TRIAL COURTS: EVALUATION OF TRIAL-LEVEL INDIGENT
DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN IDAHO 2-3 (2010).
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35. The NLADA Report further asserts that, in direct contravention of the Ten Principles, the
State has failed to ensure adequate training and supervision for public defenders, making it
nearly impossible to assess whether public defenders are meeting the standards established by

Gideon and its progeny. 18
36. The State has foisted this essential function on each of its 44 counties without providing
any monetary or supervisory support to the counties for trial-level public defense, aside from the
limited funds allocated by the Public Defense Commission in 2014 to create additional, nonmandatory training opportunities for individual defenders who choose to take advantage of them.
As the NLADA found, "[b]y delegating to each county the responsibility to provide counsel at
the trial level without any state funding or oversight, Idaho has sewn a patchwork quilt of
underfunded, inconsistent systems that vary greatly in defining who qualifies for services and in
the level of competency of the services rendered." 19 The 2014 amendments to the public-defense
statutes failed to remedy this deficiency.
37. The NLADA identified a number of specific areas of concern with respect to trial-level
indigent-defense services delivery in Idaho, many of which are still of concern today. These
include the widespread use of fixed-fee contracts; extraordinarily high attorney caseloads and
workloads; inadequate, and often nonexistent, investigation of cases; lack of structural
safeguards to protect the independence of defenders; lack of adequate representation of children
in juvenile and criminal court; lack of sufficient supervision; lack of performance-based

18

Id. at 67-73.

19

Id. at 2.
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standards; lack of ongoing training and professional development; and lack of any meaningful
funding from the State. 20

Recent Amendments to Idaho's Public-Defense Statutes
38. In March 2014, despite several years of research and study by the Idaho Criminal Justice
Commission and a legislative study committee, and in recognition of the need for reform, Idaho
enacted only meager amendments to its public-defense statutes, found mainly at sections 19-848
through 19-866 of the Idaho Code.

39. The 2014 amendments (1) establish a public-defense commission, along with its powers
and duties; 21 (2) clarify the duties of law-enforcement officers and/or the courts to notify
criminal defendants of their right to counsel;22 (3) identify the various methods by which
counties are permitted to provide indigent-defense services; 23 and (4) encourage parity in
compensation between public defenders and county prosecutors. 24

40. Under the amended statutes, counties may provide indigent-defense services by either (1)
establishing and maintaining an office of public defender; (2) joining with the board of county
commissioners of one or more counties within the same judicial district to establish and maintain
a joint office of public defender; (3) contracting with an existing office of public defender; or (4)
contracting with a defending attorney, provided that the terms of the contract do not include any

20

Id. at iii-viii; 3-9.

21

I.C. §§ 19-849 (2014) and 19-850 (2014).

22

I.C. § 19-853 (2014).

23

I.C. § 19-859 (2014).

24

I.C. § 19-860 (2014).
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pricing structures that charge or pay a single fixed fee for the services and expenses of the
attorney. 25
41. Of Idaho's 44 counties, seven have established an office of public defender, 26 while just
two have partnered to form a joint office of public defender. 27 One county neither maintains a
public-defender office nor a contract for the provision of indigent-defense services, choosing
instead to have the court appoint attorneys on an ad hoc basis, even though the 2014 amendments
eliminated such a system from the list of acceptable options. 28 The remaining 34 counties
provide indigent-defense services pursuant to a contractual agreement with a defending attorney
or law firm, 19 of which operate under fixed-fee contracts. 29
42. Under the amended statutes, a county must "annually appropriate enough money to
administer the program ofrepresentation that it has elected under section 19-859, Idaho Code[,]"
but the State is still not required to contribute any funding toward the provision of trial-level
indigent-defense services. 30
43. The PDC, established in 2014, is responsible for promulgating rules related to training
and data-reporting requirements for defense attorneys across the state. 31

25

See LC. § 19-859 (1}-(4).

26

These are Ada, Bannock, Bonner, Bonneville, Canyon, Kootenai, and Twin Falls Counties.

27

These are Minidoka and Cassia Counties.

28

This is Washington County.

29

See Idaho State Publi9 Defense Commission, 2015 Report to the Legislature, 5-7.

30

LC.§ 19-862(1) (2014).

31

LC.§ 19-850(1)(b).
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44. The PDC is further responsible for making recommendations to the Idaho legislature,
including an initial round ofrecommendations that was due by January 20, 2015, regarding a
number of issues, including core requirements for indigent-defense contracts, qualifications and
experience standards for defending attorneys, enforcement mechanisms, and funding. 32 Yet, as
of the date of this Complaint, the PDC has failed to make any such recommendations.
45. Despite the State's acknowledgement that significant reform is necessary in this arenaby, among other things, the creation of various virtually powerless committees, including the
establishment in 2010 of a public-defense subcommittee of the Criminal Justice Commission, the
establishment in 2013 of a special committee of the legislature to recommend legislative reforms
to the public-defense system, and the 2014 statutory amendments and formation of the PDC-the
State has done little to meaningfully address the myriad problems plaguing Idaho's indigentdefense system.
46. Critically, the State still does not provide any funding or supervision to any of the
counties with respect to the delivery of indigent-defense services at the trial level.
47. Each county is still currently responsible for providing indigent-defense services to all
criminal defendants within the county who are charged with misdemeanor or felony offenses and
who are unable to afford an attorney. Yet, counties must do so without any meaningful funding,
oversight, or training from the State.
48. Despite the PDC's responsibility to promulgate rules related to training and datareporting requirements for defense attorneys across the state, no such rules have been
promulgated to date.

32

Id.
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49. Despite the PDC's responsibility to make recommendations to the Idaho legislature
regarding the core requirements for indigent-defense contracts, qualifications, and experience
standards for defense attorneys, enforcement mechanisms, and funding, no such
recommendations have been made to date.
50. Moreover, even if the PDC had promulgated certain rules or made specific
recommendations, it has no authority to reprimand or sanction counties or individuals that do not
abide by such rules or recommendations.
51. For instance, upon information and belief, at least 19 of the 34 Idaho counties that use a
contract system currently operate under a fixed-fee pricing structure, despite express statutory
prohibition against such contracts.
Defendants' Ongoing Failure to Provide Indigent Defendants with Constitutionally Adequate
Legal Representation
52. In addition to the State's failure to meet the minimal requirements of the public-defense
statutes, it has also failed to sufficiently address the many state and federal constitutional issues
identified in the NLADA Report.
53. According to a recent study conducted by the Pre-Trial Justice subcommittee of the
Criminal Justice Commission, only five ofldaho's 44 counties provide counsel to indigent
defendants at their initial appearance before a judicial officer, in violation of Idaho law. Only
one of the named Plaintiffs had counsel present at her initial appearance-and that counsel
ultimately had a conflict of interest preventing counsel from representing her.
54. As a result of the State's failure to create and enforce a constitutionally consistent scheme
that ensures representation for indigent defendants at initial appearances, many defendants,
including the named Plaintiffs, are unable to effectively seek bond reduction or release from
custody. As such, many defendants unnecessarily spend prolonged periods of time in pretrial
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detentio.n or feel coerced to plead guilty to charges against which they have a valid and
potentially effective defense, merely to get out of jail and avoid losing a job or meaningful
contact with their children and families.
55. Public-defender caseloads in counties across the state continue to exceed national
standards, in some cases by more than double. 33
56. As a result of their crushing caseloads and lack of support, Idaho public defenders do not
have the time or resources to communicate with all of their clients consistently and effectively.
57. The State's failure to commit sufficient resources to indigent defense has also made it
impossible for public defenders to investigate and otherwise prepare all of their cases thoroughly
and effectively.
58. Moreover, the State does not provide public defenders with the specialized training and
ongoing supervision necessary to ensure zealous and effective representation for indigent
defendants.
59. In failing to remedy these deficiencies, the State has caused harm to the Plaintiffs, and
those similarly situated, by constructively denying them their 'Sixth Amendment right to
competent counsel and their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. 34
60. Pursuant to federal and state law, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a class of
similarly situated individuals, seek declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants to

Idaho Legislative Services Office - Report on 2013 Caseloads, available at
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2014/interim/pdefl 028 lso.pdf.

33

34

See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).
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remedy the rampant denial of constitutional rights to which Idaho's indigent defendants are
subjected on a daily basis. 35
JURISDICTION & VENUE

61. This Court maintains original, subject-matter jurisdiction over this action under Section
1-705 of the Idaho Code.
62. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Section 5-402 of the Idaho Code because the
State of Idaho is named as a defendant in this action, and Ada County encompasses the capital
city of Boise. Additionally, the decisions that have caused the failures ofldaho's indigentdefense system were made in Ada County.

PARTIES

A.

Plaintiffs

Tracy Tucker

63. Plaintiff TRACY DON TUCKER is and at all times pertinent herein has been a resident
of Sandpoint, Idaho. Mr. Tucker was taken into custody on March 6, 2015, after he was charged
with attempted strangulation and domestic battery in the presence of a child, exposing him to
over 15 years in prison. Mr. Tucker was not represented by counsel at his initial appearance,
during which the court set his bail at $40,000. Mr. Tucker could not afford to post bail, and as a
result, he remained in Bonner County Jail until June 2, 2015.

35

Through this Complaint, Plaintiffs do not, at this time, challenge the components ofldaho's
indigent-defense system served by the State Appellate Public Defe~der (see Sections 19-867
through 19-872 of the Idaho Code), which pertain primarily to felony criminal cases on appeal.
Rather, this Complaint is focused on the State's failure to provide an adequate criminal-justice
system for indigent defendants represented by overloaded and under-resourced defense attorneys
at the trial level, and in misdemeanor and other appeals not handled by the State Appellate Public
Defender.
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64.1?onner County relies on contract attorneys, who are paid an annual fixed fee, to represent
indigent criminal defendants being prosecuted within its jurisdiction.
65. Although Mr. Tucker was assigned a public defender prior to his next court appearance,
his attorney did not appear on his behalf at his arraignment on March 18, 2015. Instead, his
public defender sent a substitute attorney who had no prior knowledge of Mr. Tucker's case or
even of the charges that Mr. Tucker faced. On information and belief, the substitute attorney
failed to seek a bond reduction or otherwise advocate on Mr. Tucker's behalf.
66. Given the demands of his caseload, Mr. Tucker's attorney has met Mr. Tucker only on
three occasions: once when his attorney came to Bonner County Jail and met with Mr. Tucker
for approximately 10 minutes, and two additional times when he saw him in court. Mr. Tucker's
attorney did not meet with him prior to either of those court proceedings-not even in the
courtroom prior to the proceedings. Mr. Tucker has spoken with his public defender on the
phone only on two occasions, both for approximately five minutes. Generally speaking, Mr.
Tucker has also been unable to contact his attorney by phone. Between March 18, 2015, and
June 1, 2015, Mr. Tucker attempted-unsuccessfully-to reach his attorney by phone on at least
50 occasions.
67. On information and belief, despite the fact that Mr. Tucker's trial was originally set for
June 8, 2015, as often days prior to trial, his attorney had not had the chance to conduct any
investigation into the case, contact or summon any witnesses, hire an investigator, review and
explain the relevant discovery materials, or discuss trial strategy with Mr. Tucker. In total, on
information and belief, Mr. Tucker has spent less than 20 minutes with his attorney throughout
the course of his representation. Moreover, other than a bail reduction motion, Mr. Tucker's
attorney never filed any motions on his behalf.
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68. After remaining in jail for three months while unable to discuss a possible defense with
his attorney, Mr. Tucker pleaded guilty to attempted strangulation on June 2, 2015. He is
scheduled to be sentenced on August 3, 2015.
Jason Sharp
69. Plaintiff JASON MONROE SHARP is and at all times pertinent herein has been a
resident of Kellogg, Idaho. Mr. Sharp was taken into custody on May 16, 2014, after he was
charged with burglary and grand theft, exposing him to as much as 30 years in prison. Mr. Sharp
was not represented by counsel at his initial appearance in court, during which his bail was set at
$50,000. Mr. Sharp could not afford to post bail, and as a result, he remained in the Shoshone
County Jail for approximately two weeks.
70. On information and belief, Shoshone County relies on contract attorneys, who are paid an
annual fixed fee, to represent indigent criminal defendants being prosecuted within its
jurisdiction.
71. On information and belief, attorney caseloads in Shoshone County vastly exceed national
standards and are among the heaviest of any county in Idaho.
72. Although Mr. Sharp was assigned a public defender at his initial appearance, he has had
minimal contact with his attorney. Mr. Sharp had to advocate on his own behalf-without the
assistance of his lawyer-in favor of a bond reduction. On information and belief, the court first
agreed to reduce Mr. Sharp's bail to $5,000, after Mr. Sharp explained that he was not on
probation at the time of his arrest, as the court had previously believed. Then, after receiving a
letter of support from Mr. Sharp's employer vouching for him and recommending his release, the
court released Mr. Sharp on his own recognizance. Neither the bail reduction, nor the court's
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ultimate decision to release Mr. Sharp, were the result of any efforts undertaken by his public
defender.
73. Given the demands of his attorney's caseload, Mr. Sharp has only been able to meet with
his attorney for approximately 90 minutes-total-throughout the 13 months during which his
case has been pending. On information and belief, most of those meetings have occurred in or
just outside the courtroom prior to a hearing. Mr. Sharp also has been unable to review the
discovery in his case, despite repeated requests.
74. Although Mr. Sharp is scheduled to go to trial on July 14, 2015, and faces up to 30 years
in prison if convicted, on information and belief, his attorney has not had the chance to conduct
any investigation into the case, contact or summon any witnesses, hire an investigator, review
and explain the relevant discovery materials, or discuss trial strategy with Mr. Sharp.

Naomi Morley
75. Plaintiff NAOMI HELEN MORLEY is and at all times pertinent herein has been a
resident of Garden Valley, Idaho. Ms. Morley was taken into custody in March 2014, following
a serious single car accident on an Ada County roadway.
76. Ada County relies on an institutional public-defender office to represent indigent criminal
defendants being prosecuted within its jurisdiction. In the event that the public-defender office is
unable to represent a defendant due to a conflict of interest, the County relies on conflict counsel
to provide representation.
77. Although Ms. Morley was assigned a public defender at her initial appearance before the
court, she had no opportunity to actually confer with the public defender at that initial
proceeding, during which her bail was set at $15,000. Ms. Morley could not afford to post bail,
causing her to remain in jail for three weeks until her bail was reduced. It was later discovered
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that the public defender's office could not represent Ms. Morley due to a conflict of interest.
Conflict counsel was subsequently appointed.
78. Ms. Morley's attorneys-both her public defender and her conflict attorney-have been
unable to adequately investigate the charges against her. Her current attorney has encouraged
her to accept a plea deal that Ms. Morley understands would require her to spend 10 years in
prison, despite her claims of innocence. ~hen Ms. Morley inquired about the poss~bility of
retaining an expert to dispute the findings of any blood sample analysis, she was told that, if she
wanted to do so-or do any other outside testing to challenge the prosecution's allegations-she
would have to pay for the testing herself. Given her indigent status, this is an expense that Ms.
Morley cannot afford.
79. Moreover, Ms. Morley has attempted to discuss the case with her attorney several times,
but has been unable to do so in any meaningful way. Although Ms. Morley told her attorney
about a witness who would testify that the controlled substances allegedly found were the
witness's and not Ms. Morley's, it was only through her own efforts that Ms. Morley was able to
obtain a signed affidavit from the witness, who acknowledged, under oath, that any controlled
substances allegedly found belonged to the witness. Furthermore, when Ms. Morley tried to
discuss certain discrepancies in the police report, her attorney was apparently so overloaded with
cases that he did not have the time to engage with her, and her concerns went unheeded. On
information and belief, had her attorney had a manageable caseload and thus the time to discuss
the facts of her case, as well as her medical history, in greater detail, he would have recognized
immediately that she had a valid defense that required thorough investigation. Ms. Morley is
scheduled to go to trial on June 29, 2015.
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Jeremy Payne

80. Plaintiff JEREMY MICHAEL PAYNE is and at all times pertinent herein has been a
resident of Payette, Idaho. Mr. Payne was taken into custody on January 25, 2015, after he was
charged with driving without a license, as well as possession of a controlled substance and drug
paraphernalia, exposing him to over seven years in prison. Mr. Payne was not represented at his
initial appearance in court, during which his bail was set at $30,000. Mr. Payne could not afford
to post bail, and as a result, he was remanded to the Payette County Jail, where he remained until
being released on June 9, 2015, when the State postponed his trial date for the third time.
81. Payette County relies on contract attorneys, who are paid an annual fixed fee, to represent
indigent criminal defendants being prosecuted within its jurisdiction.
82. Although Mr. Payne was assigned a public defender at his initial appearance, he did not
have any contact with his attorney until the minutes leading up to his next court appearance on
February 6, 2015. In the months that followed, Mr. Payne went before the court three more
times and again met briefly with his attorney either in court just prior to the proceedings, or in
jail the day before the court appearance. Given the demands of his caseload, Mr. Payne's
attorney only met with him at the Payette County Jail on three occasions. Mr. Payne has also
been unable to contact his attorney by phone. During the two-week period between May 12 and
May 26, Mr. Payne left at least six phone messages for his attorney, none of which were
returned.
83. At Mr. Payne's pretrial hearing on April 17, 2015, his attorney informed him that in order
to move forward with his jury trial in June 2015, he would have to waive his right to a speedy
trial. However, his attorney failed to adequately explain the consequences of the waiver, and the
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fact that Mr. Payne's refusal to waive his speedy trial right could result in his release from
custody.
84. On information and belief, despite that Mr. Payne's trial has now been rescheduled three
times, Mr. Payne's attorney has not had the chance to conduct any investigation into the case,
nor has the attorney reviewed and explained the relevant discovery materials or discussed trial
strategy with Mr. Payne. In total, Mr. Payne has only spent approximately 30--45 minutes with
his attorney throughout the course of his representation.

B. Defendants
85. Defendant STATE OF IDAHO has violated and continues to violate the Idaho and
federal constitutions, which require it to ensure that adequate indigent-defense services are
provided to Idaho's poorest citizens. The State Capital and center of State government is in Ada
County.
86. Defendant C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER is the Governor of the state ofldaho and is subject to
this lawsuit in his official capacity as to all claims herein. As the chief executive of the state,
Governor Otter bears ultimate responsibility for the provision of constitutionally mandated
services to the people of Idaho. In 2005, the CJC was created by Executive Order and tasked
with addressing "important criminal justice issues and challenges." Governor Otter maintains
supervisory authority over the CJC.
87. Defendants Hon. Molly Huskey, Darrell G. Bolz, Sara B. Thomas, William H. Wellman,
Kimber Ricks, Sen. Chuck Winder, and Rep. Christy Perry are all of the members Idaho's Public
Defense Commission. They are subject to this lawsuit in their official capacities as members of
the Commission. The Commission is responsible for promulgating rules related to training and
data-reporting requirements for defense attorneys across the state, and making recommendations
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to the legislature regarding core requirements for indigent-defense contracts, qualifications, and
experience standards for defending attorneys, enforcement mechanisms, and funding.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

88. Plaintiffs bring this class action lawsuit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on
behalf of all indigent persons who are now or who will be under formal charge before a state
court in Idaho of having committed any offense, the penalty for which includes the possibility of
confinement, incarceration, imprisonment, or detention in a correction facility (regardless of
whether actually imposed) and who are unable to provide for the full payment of an attorney and
all other necessary expenses of representation in defending against the charge.
89. The Plaintiffs in this case represent a class (the "Class"), and this action should be
certified as a class action under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
90. Every day, hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals who are unable to afford an attorney
and who depend on the State ofldaho to provide them with effective legal representation are
criminally prosecuted in Idaho. 36 As such, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impractical.
91. There are important questions oflaw and fact raised in this case that are common to the
Class, including:
a. Whether the State is required under the United States and Idaho Constitutions,
and under Idaho law, to provide indigent defendants with effective legal
representation, including at the time of initial appearance;
b. Whether the State is currently providing constitutionally sufficient representation
for indigent defendants in their respective jurisdictions;

36

Idaho Legislative Services Office - CFY 2014 Budget & Policy Analysis, Figure 3.0,
available at http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2014/interim/pdefl 028_ hoskins.pdf.
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c. Whether the State has violated the United States and Idaho Constitutions by
failing to implement, administer, and oversee adequate public-defense systems;
d. Whether, by abdicating its responsibility to fund, supervise, and administer
indigent defense services to the counties, the State has failed to ensure that
indigent defendants are provided with effective legal representation, all in
violation of the United States and Idaho Constitutions;
e. Whether the State's failure to adequately fund and supervise the delivery of
indigent-defense services impedes the provision of effective legal representation
to indigent defendants; and
f.

Whether the State's failure to develop uniform workload and performance
standards for public-defense attorneys in Idaho impedes the provision of effective
legal representation to indigent defendants.

92. The claims of the Class representatives are typical of the claims of the Class as a whole.
Like all of the Class members, the Class representatives are being denied their right to counsel,
in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 13, of the
Idaho Constitution, as a direct result of State's ongoing failure to adequately fund, supervise, and
administer indigent-defense services in Idaho.
93. The Class representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class.
The interests of the Class representatives are not in conflict with the interests of any other
indigent defendant, and the Class representatives have every incentive to pursue this litigation
vigorously on behalf of themselves and the Class as a whole. Moreover, the Class
representatives are being represented by experienced, well-resourced counsel in this matter,
including the American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho, the national American Civil Liberties
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Union's Criminal Law Reform Project, and the law firm of Hogan Lovells US LLP, whose
attorneys possess substantial expertise in prosecuting class action lawsuits generally, and in
indigent-defense reform litigation in particular.
94. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a
risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class,
which would establish incompatible standards of conduct, exacerbating the differing and
inadequate public-defender programs currently in place in various counties in the State. Such a
risk is of particular concern in this case since the lack of uniform performance standards is
central ~o the Plaintiffs' allegations.
95. The common questions of law and fact articulated above predominate over any casespecific questions that may arise out of any of the individual Class members' criminal cases. As
such, a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of this matter.
96. Defendants have failed to adequately fund, supervise, and administer indigent- defense
services in Idaho, thereby violating the rights of poor defendants across the state. As such, these
Defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class,
thereby making it appropriate for this Court to issue final injunctive and declaratory relief for all
Class members.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Overview of the Current State ofIndigent-Defense in Idaho

97. The State ofldaho leaves the responsibility for providing trial-level legal representation
to indigent criminal defendants to each of its 44 counties.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 31

000036

,,

98. Yet the State does not provide any funding, training, or supervision to support the
delivery of indigent-defense services at the trial level.
99. According to the NLADA Report, as well as the more recent county-by-county surveys
conducted by the Idaho Criminal Justice Commission and the ACLU, respectively, no county in
Idaho is currently providing indigent-defense services that meet state or federal legal standards.
100.

State officials themselves have recognized the current constitutional crisis

regarding indigent defense services in Idaho. In August 2013, the Chief Justice of the Idaho
Supreme Court noted that "our system for the defense of indigents, as required by Idaho's
constitution and laws, is broken." And Governor Otter acknowledged in his 2015 State of the
State address that, despite the 2014 amendments to Idaho's public defense statutes, "our current
method of providing legal counsel for indigent criminal defendants does not pass constitutional
muster."
101.

These constitutional and statutory deficiencies manifest themselves in myriad

ways, including (1) failure to provide counsel to indigent defendants at their initial appearance;
(2) extended and unnecessary pretrial detention; (3) excessive caseloads that far exceed national
standards; (4) lack of sufficient investigation; (5) lack of sufficient expert analysis and
testimony; (6) lack of consistent, effective, and confidential communication between indigent
defendants and public defenders; (7) continued use of fixed-fee contracts for attorneys providing
indigent-defense services; (8) lack of public-defender independence; (9) lack of sufficient
training in the field of criminal defense; (10) lack of informed and consistent oversight of the
provision of indigent-defense services throughout the State; and (11) lack of sufficient
supervision and evaluation.
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102.

Each of these deficiencies is directly linked to the State's longstanding and on-

going failure to provide the funding, supervision, and training necessary to meet its legal
obligations in the area of indigent defense.
Lack of Representation at Initial Appearance
103.

Under Idaho law, "[e]very defendant, who according to law is entitled to

appointed counsel, shall have counsel assigned to represent the defendant, from initial
appearance before the magistrate or district court, unless the defendant waives such
appointment."37
104.

Section 19-852 of the Idaho Code guarantees that an indigent person "under

formal charge of having committed, or [] being detained under a conviction of a serious crime .
is entitled to be represented by an attorney." 38
105.

Section 19-851 (d) defines "serious crime" as "any offense the penalty for which

includes the possibility of confinement, incarceration, imprisonment or detention in a
correctional facility, regardless of whether actually imposed."39
106.

An initial appearance is defined by Idaho Criminal Rule 5(a) as "the first

appearance of the defendant before any magistrate," during which the judge or magistrate may,
among other things, set bail and take a plea from the defendant. 40

37

LC.R. 44(a).

38

LC. § 19-852.

39

LC. § 19-85l(d).

40

See LC.R. 5(a)
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107.

In 2014, the Pre-Trial Justice subcommittee of the CJC conducted a survey of all

44 Idaho counties to determine, among other things, the number of counties that provide counsel
for indigent defendants at their initial appearance before a judge or magistrate.
108.

According to the CJC survey, only five Idaho counties provide counsel for

indigent defendants at their initial appearances, despite the critical nature of such proceedings.
109.

None of the named Plaintiffs was represented by counsel at his or her initial

appearance.
110.

Plaintiff Tucker was not represented by counsel at his initial appearance, even

though he was charged with a serious felony and had his bail set at $40,000. Because he could
not afford to pay his bail and had no attorney available to argue for a bond reduction on his
behalf, Mr. Tucker remained in jail for three months before pleading guilty.
111.

Plaintiff Sharp was not represented by counsel at his initial appearance, even

though he was charged with two serious felonies and had his bail set at $50,000. Because he
could not afford to pay his bail and had no attorney available to argue for a bond reduction on his
behalf, Mr. Sharp remained in jail for two weeks until he was able to convince the courtwithout the assistance of his attorney-to reduce his bond.
112.

An attorney from the Ada County Public Defender's office was present during

Plaintiff Morley's initial appearance, but Ms. Morley did not have an opportunity to discuss her
case with counsel at that time, and that office soon after determined that it had a conflict of
interest and could not represent Ms. Morley. Ms. Morley's bail was set at $15,000 at her initial
appearance. Because she could not afford to pay his bail and had no attorney available to argue
for a bond reduction on her behalf, she remained in custody for three weeks until her bail was
reduced.
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113.

Plaintiff Payne was not represented by counsel at his initial appearance, even

though the proceeding included the court's decision to set Mr. Payne's bail at $30,000. He could
not afford to pay his bail and had no attorney available to argue for a bond reduction on his
behalf. Mr. Payne remained in jail until June 9, 2015, when the state asked the court to postpone
Mr. Payne's trial for a third time.
114.

On information and belief, criminal defendants in Bingham County routinely

enter pleas at their initial appearances without having had the opportunity to consult with an
attorney. Indeed, at initial appearances held on May 28, 2015, defendants were asked to enter a
plea to the charges against them without counsel present and without having affirmatively
waived their right to counsel or even having been informed by the judge of their right to counsel.
More than half pleaded guilty and were sentenced without counsel present.
Unnecessary and/or Extended Pre-Trial Detention
115.

Due in part to the lack of legal advocacy available to indigent defendants at their

initial appearances, bail is often set at unnecessarily high amounts that low-income defendants
cannot afford. For instance, Plaintiff Sharp's bail was originally set at $50,000, without any
discussion between the court and Mr. Sharp regarding his ability to pay, employment status, or
other relevant factors, including the fact that Mr. Sharp was not on probation when he was
arrested, as the court originally believed. It was not until two weeks later that the court agreed to
reduce Plaintiffs bond, after Mr. Sharp was able to explain to the court that he was not on
probation at the time of his arrest and to have his employer write a letter to the court in support
of his request for pretrial release.
116.

The attendant consequences for spending time in jail are severe. According to

research studies conducted or cited by the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice
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Assistance and the Arnold Foundation, among others, whether or not a criminal defendant is held
in pretrial custody can have a tremendous impact on the outcome of the case. For instance, in its
review of outcomes for more than 150,000 defendants in Kentucky during 2009-2010, the
Arnold Foundation determined that "[w]hen other relevant statistical controls are considered,
defendants detained until trial or case disposition are 4.44 times more likely to be sentenced to
jail and 3.32 times more likely to be sentenced to prison than defendants who are released at
some point pending trial." 41 Similarly, in New York City, "the citywide conviction rate for cases
with no pretrial release was 92%. By contrast, the conviction rate for cases in which the
defendant was at liberty from arraignment to disposition was 50%."42
117.

Aside from the impact pre-trial detention can have on the defendant's criminal

case, it can also significantly affect a defendant's employment or other obligations that he/she is
unable to fulfill while in custody. For instance, prior to Plaintiff Tucker's arrest, he received a
traffic ticket, which he intended to pay prior to the due date. Following his arrest, however, Mr.
Tucker was unable to afford bail and remained in pretrial detention for over three months.
Consequently, Mr. Tucker failed to resolve his traffic ticket on time and had his driver's license
suspended while he was in custody. If it were not for his employer's uncommon willingness to
write to the court on his behalf, Plaintiff Sharp likely would have remained in jail pending trial
and lost his job as a result. And Plaintiff Morley remained in jail for two weeks prior to posting
bond, despite suffering from severe injuries in connection with a serious car accident that
occurred on the day of her arrest.

41

Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., Laura and John Arnold Foundation, Investigating the Impact
of Pretrial Detention on Sentencing Outcomes 10 (Nov. 2013).

42

Mary Phillips, N.Y.C. Crim. Just. Agency, Pretrial Detention and Case Outcomes 32 (Nov.
2007).
"'
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118.

Pre-trial detention can also serve as an inappropriate incentive to obtain a guilty

plea in exchange for release from jail. Such an incentive can and has been used even if a
defendant has not yet spoken to a lawyer and notwithstanding the person's innocence or the
availability of viable defenses to challenge the State's case. As noted above, Plaintiff Tucker,
who spent three months in jail proclaiming his innocence and hoping-in vain-for a thorough
investigation of his case, recently pleaded guilty after being told that he would be released from
custody pending his sentencing.

Excessive Caseloads and Workloads
119.

In 1973, under the direction of the U.S. Department of Justice, the National

Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals developed national caseload
standards for the first time. According to NAC Standard 13.12: "The caseload of a public
defender attorney should not exceed the following: felonies per attorney per year: not more than
150; misdemeanors (excluding traffic) per attorney per year: not more than 400; juvenile court
cases per attorney per year: not more than 200; Mental Health Act cases per attorney per year:
not more than 200; and appeals per attorney per year: not more than 25."43

43

It should be noted that, in recent years, experts in the field have suggested that the NAC
standards are outdated and fail to account for the added complexities that have been infused into
criminal defense practice over the last 40 years, including the introduction of sexually violent
offender commitment proceedings, persistent offender or "three-strikes" statutes, significant
collateral consequences resulting from convictions, and a growing recognition of the unique
nature of juvenile defense. As such, commentators have argued that the NAC standards are
themselves too high. See Norman Lefstein, Securing Reasonable Caseloads: Ethics and Law in
Public Defense 43-48 (2011).
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The NAC standards do not contemplate a mixed caseload. In other words, an

attorney who handles felony cases should carry no more than 150 such cases during the course of
a year, and nothing else. 44
121.

In August 2009, the American Bar Association released its "Eight Guidelines of

Public Defense Related to Excessive Workloads" ("Guidelines") in an effort to set forth a
"detailed action plan ... to which those providing public defense should adhere as they seek to
comply with their professional responsibilities." 45 Among other things, the Guidelines include
assessment of "whether excessive workloads are preventing [public defenders] from fulfilling
performance obligations"; supervision and monitoring of workloads; training with regard to an
attorney's ethical duties in the face of excessive workloads; and the need for those managing the
public defense system to determine whether excessive workloads exist. 46
122.

Due in part to these excessive caseloads, and the resulting lack of time and

resources available to public defenders, Plaintiffs were not represented at their initial
appearances, were unable to communicate effectively with their attorneys on a consistent basis,
and did not have their cases adequately investigated (if at all), or otherwise prepared in advance
of trial. Moreover, as a result of their heavy caseloads, the public defenders representing
Plaintiffs did not have the time or support necessary to file appropriate pretrial motions with the
court.

44

"The standards are disjunctive, so if a public defender is assigned cases from more than one
category, the percentage of the maximum caseload in each should be assessed and the combined
total should not exceed 100%." Justice Denied, Chapter 2, at 66 n. 102 (citing National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: Courts 276 (1973)).
45

ABA Eight Guidelines of Public Defense Related to Excessive Workloads, 1.

46

Id.
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123.

Based on recent court observations, public defenders in Kootenai, Nez Perce,

Payette, Bannock, and Bonneville counties, among others, have so many cases assigned to them
that they are unable to even identify their clients until minutes before the defendants' court
appearances.
124.

Moreover, excessive caseloads can negatively impact the relationships between

attorneys and their clients. During court proceedings in Bonneville County on May 28, 2015, for
instance, one defendant met with his lawyer in open court, just next to and within hearing
distance of prosecutors, the judge, court personnel, other defendants, and members of the public
attending court. On information and belief, after a heated exchange between the defendant and
his attorney-which could be overheard throughout the courtroom-the public defender stated
that she had "too many cases" and as a result, could not "deal with this right now." On
information and belief, the defendant then indicated that he wished to "fire" his attorney and
represent himself instead. As a result of trying to speak with his lawyer to understand his case,
the defendant's own attorney then summoned the marshal to escort the defendant out of the
courtroom.
Lack of Effective or Consistent Attorney-Client Communication

125.

In many instances, indigent defendants in Idaho have insufficient access to their

assigned public defenders and are unable to communicate with their attorneys for weeks or
months at a time, due in large part to the extremely heavy caseloads public defenders are forced
to handle, the lack of sufficient support staff to help attorneys manage their contacts and
relationships with their clients, and the fixed-fee contracts used in many counties, which provide
economic incentives to spend as little time as possible on any individual case. This lack of
communication makes it virtually impossible for indigent defendants, including the named
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Plaintiffs, to understand developments in their case or to assist in their own defense in any
meaningful way.
126.

Because of public defenders' heavy caseloads, lack of support, and contractual

obligations, and the resulting lack of consistent communication between them and their clients,
many indigent defendants, including those who are not in custody, are unable to access the
discovery materials in their cases. Indeed, Plaintiffs Payne, Tucker, and Sharp all have been
unable to access the discovery materials in their cases.
127.

Because Idaho's public defenders are overextended and lack sufficient resources,

they often fail to receive or follow up on suggestions made by the defendant or the defendant's
family with regard to possible witnesses, alibis, or other potentially exculpatory evidence. For
instance, Plaintiff Morley urged her public defender to obtain a statement from a witness who
could provide exculpatory testimony to prove Morley's innocence. No such statement was
obtained by her attorney. As a result of Ms. Morley's own efforts, however, she recently
received a signed affidavit from the witness, confessing responsibility for the alleged crimes and
apologizing for the harin that she has caused Ms. Morley.
128.

As illustrated by the named Plaintiffs' experiences, when indigent defendants-

particularly those in custody-do get the opportunity to speak with their attorneys, the meetings
are usually very short and often take place in open court or other areas of the courthouse that lack
the privacy necessary for truly confidential and privileged discussions. This kind of interaction
makes it difficult to establish a meaningful attorney-client relationship in which defendants can
ask questions and gain a clear understanding of what is happening in their case and in which
public defenders can answer their clients' questions thoroughly and gather all the information
they need to advocate effectively.
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129.

Plaintiffs Payne and Tucker, both of whom spent substantial time in pretrial

detention before being recently released, tried to contact their public defenders repeatedly while
in custody but received no response. Each also alleges that he met with his attorney for a total of
less than an hour since he was arrested.
130.

While they are not currently in custody, Plaintiffs Sharp and Morley allege that

they are unable to communicate effectively with their attorneys. Specifically, both indicate that
that their questions and suggestions go routinely unanswered by their attorneys; and that they are
unclear about developments in their cases, or the implications of such develo.P,ments.

Lack of Investigation and Expert Analysis and Testimony
131.

In counties across the state, having a publicly funded investigator or expert

assigned to a case is a luxury that is most often reserved for indigent defendants charged with
particularly serious felonies.
132.

Of the 34 counties that use a contract-defender model, the vast majority do not

increase the amount of the contract to account for the cost of investigators and experts. Rather,
contract attorneys must make special requests to the court or the local county's board of
commissioners, on a case-by-case basis, to obtain the resources necessary to retain an
investigator or expert.
133.

On information and belief, public defenders often choose not to make such

requests at all, given the very limited funds available to meet them. Indeed, Plaintiff Morley has
been told that if she wanted to have an expert analyze the drug evidence in her case and be
prepared to testify at trial, she would have to pay for it herself. Ms. Morley is unable to pay for
the expert on her own, and therefore could be prevented from having expert testimony to aid in
her defense.
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134.

On information and belief, all of the Plaintiffs' appointed lawyers have been

unable to investigate Plaintiffs' cases in any meaningful way, making it difficult to prepare
defenses likely to succeed at trial-or in the context of plea negotiations, for that matter.
Use of Fixed-Fee Contracts

135.

There are currently at least 19 Idaho counties utilizing a fixed-fee contract system,

notwithstanding the fact that such contracts are prohibited by statute.
136.

For instance, in Payette County, the current public-defense contract provides that

the County will pay the contracting attorney $560 for each "Public Day" that the attorney works.
A Public Day is defined in the contract as "any day in which CONTRACTOR must appear in
Court for a client he is appointed to under this Agreement, or any day in which CONTRACTOR
works for 5 or more hours on clients he is appointed to under this Agreement." While the
contract goes on to state that "[t]here is not a limit to the number of days that CONTRACTOR
may use as Public Days in any given month," the fixed daily rate creates a disincentive to spend
any extended amount of time in court, or to spend more than the minimum five hours working on
indigent-defense cases. This is especially problematic given that the public defense contractors
in ~ayette County are still permitted to maintain a separate private practice. Moreover, the
contract states explicitly that it "does not include any costs of transcripts, or any expenses of
trial, investigation or appeal for which the Court may approve expenditures." In order to access
any additional funds, the contractor must first obtain "advance approval for such expenses from
the district judge or magistrate having jurisdiction over the case."
137.

Upon information and belief, the 2010-2011 public-defense contract in Gem

County, which is the most recent contract to be made publically available by the County,
provides that the County "shall pay the sum of One Hundred Eighty Thousand Dollars
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($180,000) for Public Defense services" during the contract period, and that that sum is to be
paid in twelve installments of $15,000 each. In the event that an indigent defendant in Gem
County is charged with a "special-circumstance offense" (i.e. murder), the contracting attorney
must negotiate with the County for certain "extraordinary expenses," such as "psychological
evaluation and expert testimony, ballistics and forensic scientific testing and expert testimony,
change of venue expenses, and conflict-of-interest attorneys." It appears that, for all other
alleged crimes, such expenses would have to be taken out of the fixed $180,000 fee, along with
all expenses associated with salaries, insurance, equipment, and office space.
138.

The fixed-fee contract system in Gem County may also explain a disturbing

occurrence during court proceedings held on May 27, 2015, during which the public defender
appeared to ignore a clear conflict of interest. The case in question involved co-defendants-one
adult, one juvenile-charged with various drug crimes. While the two defendants were
represented by different attorneys, upon information and belief, both lawyers work in the office
of the contracting attorney. This was particularly noteworthy since one of the defendants had
already pleaded guilty, while the other considered whether or not to do the same. Indeed, at
various points during the proceeding, both defendants and both attorneys were present in the
courtroom while their individual circumstances were discussed. Since the Gem County
contract-like most other fixed-fee contracts in Idaho-requires the public defender to pay for
conflict counsel out of the lump sum payment they receive from the county, there is a powerful
disincentive to ignore or attempt to work around clear conflicts of interest.
139.

In Custer County, the current public-defender contract states that the contracting

attorney shall receive an annual sum of $50,000 for services rendered, and an additional $65.00
per hour for ariy time spent on indigent defense cases exceeding 50 hours in any given month.
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However, upon information and belief, the current Custer County public defender is based in
Blackfoot, Idaho, approximately two hours from the county seat in Challis. Nevertheless, the
contract states that "the Attorney shall not charge Custer County for the travel expenses."

140.

Fixed-fee contracts create a serious conflict of interest for defending attorneys

because they encourage the attorney to spend as little money and time as possible on each case in
order to maximize the amount of money and time that can be used to cover other cases, and other
expenses, including compensation for the contracting attorney and any staff to assist with
representation.

141.

To make matters worse, upon information and belief, at least 26 of the 34 counties

operating on a contract system permit public defenders to maintain a private legal practice.
Indeed, the Franklin County public defense contract states explicitly that "[a]ttorneys providing
services under this Agreement may undertake representation of person charged with a crime in
this or any other jurisdiction for a fee."

142.

Plaintiff Payne was arrested and charged in Payette County and was assigned a

public defender. Due, in part, to the fixed-fee contract in effect in Payette County, the
contracting attorney who represented Plaintiff Payne had limited incentive to spend the money
and time necessary to locate and interview witnesses, secure expert testimony, or otherwise
explore ways of challenging the criminal charges at issue. Indeed, the defender had substantial
incentive not to engage in any defense activity or strategy that is not absolutely required.
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Lack of Independence

143.

The first of the American Bar Association's ("ABA") Ten Principles is to ensure

that "the public defense function, including the selection, funding, and payment of defense
counsel, is independent."47
144.

In many counties, the loc'al board of commissioners retains the authority to hire

and fire the public defender at will, even though few, if any, of the commissioners has any
experience working as attorneys, let alone supervising attorneys.
145.

The board of commissioners also typically controls the amount of funding that

will be extended to the public defender, and in some cases, will make the final decision as to
whether a request for an investigator or expert will be approved.
146.

Upon information and belief, at least 17 counties require public defenders to

request additional resources from either the court or the county commissioners to pay for an
investigator or an expert in a given case.
147.

Upon information and belief, at least 10 counties require public defenders to

request additional resources from either the court or the county commissioners to pay for
laboratory testing.
148.

Given the vast authority that boards of county commissioners maintain over

public defenders and the day-to-day operations of the public-defender office, there is a real fear
ofretribution among public defenders. On information and belief, public defenders working in
institutional offices, as well as those working under contract, are concerned that they will lose
their jobs or contracts, or be otherwise disciplined, if they run afoul of the commissioners'

47

ABA Ten Principles of A Public Defense Delivery System no. 1, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_s
claid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf.
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expectations. As a result, many of Idaho's public defenders are beholden to their commissioners
and therefore lack the independence necessary to do their jobs effectively.
149.

Indeed, Defendant Otter recently approved, and the State of Idaho enacted,

changes to Idaho's indigent-defense statutes that removed a two-year-minimum term
requirement for public defenders in institutional offices. Removing the two-year-minimum term
requirement severely undercuts any independence those public defenders might hope to have, as
it leaves them vulnerable at any time to termination for no reason or for unjustified reasons. The
removal of the minimum term requirement was done over the expressed objection of public
defenders.
150.

The State's failure to set standards regarding the commissioners' ability to hire

and fire public defenders without justification results in, among other things, less zealous
advocacy on the part of the defending attorneys, including a reticence to seek supplemental
funding for investigators, experts, or other necessary resources.
Lack of Sufficient Supervision and Evaluation

151.

While independence is essential, the last of the ABA Ten Principles also requires

that public defenders be "supervised and systematically reviewed for quality and efficiency
according to nationally and locally adopted standards." ABA Ten Principles, no. 10.
152.

The State currently plays no role whatsoever-either by way of directly

supervising or setting guiding principles regarding the same-in supervising or evaluating the
work done by public-defense offices and contractors in the various counties.
153.

The limited supervision that does exist is often deficient since it is carried out by

local county commissioners with little or no experience overseeing the work of an attorney.
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154.

Moreover, because the State has not established uniform performance standards,

there is very little reliable data available for managers to evaluate the work of the attorneys they
oversee, whether it be related to overall workloads, the extent and nature of client contact,
motion practice, adequacy of investigation, or level of preparation for hearings and trials.
Harm to Plaintiffs
155.

All of the above-mentioned issues have combined to cause tremendous harm to

Plaintiffs and to the Class as a whole.
Plaintiff Tracy Tucker
156.

Plaintiff Tracy Tucker was not represented by counsel at his initial appearance,

resulting in his inability to make any arguments as to the amount of his bail, which was
ultimately set by the court at $40,000. Because he was not able to afford bail, Mr. Tucker
remained in jail for three months pending the resolution of his case. Throughout the duration of
his case, Mr. Tucker has been unable to communicate effectively or consistently with his public
defender, making it virtually impossible for him to participate in the development of his defense.

In addition, Mr. Tucker's attorney was unable to conduct any meaningful investigation into his
case, review the relevant discovery with his client, or share with Mr. Tucker his thoughts with
regard to trial strategy and related matters. Mr. Tucker ultimately pleaded guilty after spending
three months in jail. He is scheduled for sentencing on August 3, 2015.
PlaintiffJason Sharp
157.

Plaintiff Jason Sharp was not represented by counsel at his initial appearance,

resulting in his inability to make any arguments as to the amount of his bail, which was
originally set by the court at $50,000. Since Mr. Sharp could not afford to post bail, he remained
in the Shoshone County Jail for approximately two weeks until, without the help of his lawyer,
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Mr. Sharp was able to convince the court that his bail amount was inappropriate given the
circumstances. of his case. He was subsequently released pending trial. Throughout the duration
of his case, however, Mr. Sharp has been unable to communicate effectively or consistently with
his public defender, making it virtually impossible for him to participate in the development of
his defense. In addition, Mr. Sharp's attorney was unable to conduct any meaningful
investigation into his case, review the relevant discovery with his client, or share with Mr. Sharp
his thoughts with regard to trial strategy and related matters. Mr. Sharp is scheduled to go to trial
on July 14, 2015~ and faces up to 30 years in prison if convicted on both counts.

PlaintiffNaomi Morley
158.

Although counsel from the Ada County Public Defender's office was present with

Plaintiff Naomi Morley at her initial appearance, Ms. Morley had no opportunity to consult with
that lawyer at that time, resulting in her inability to make any arguments as to the amount of her
bail, which was ultimately set by the court at $15,000. In any event, that office soon after
determined it could not represent Ms. Morley due to a conflict of interest. Because she was not
able to afford bail, Ms. Morley remained in jail for

two weeks before having her bail reduced and

posting bond-all while recovering from serious injuries sustained in a car accident on the day of
her arrest. Throughout the duration of her case, Ms. Morley has been unable to communicate
effectively or consistently with her public defender, making it virtually impossible for her to
participate, in any meaningful way, in the development of her defense. In addition, Ms.
Morley's attorney has been unable to conduct any meaningful investigation into her case, review
the relevant discovery with his client, or share with Ms. Morley his thoughts with regard to trial
strategy and related matters. Ms. Morley is scheduled to go to trial on June 29, 2015, and faces
more than 15 years in prison if convicted.
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PlaintiffJeremy Payne

159.

Plaintiff Jeremy Payne was not represented by counsel at his initial appearance,

resulting in his inability to make any arguments as to the amount of his bail, which was
ultimately set by the court at $30,000. Because he was not able to afford bail, Mr. Payne has
remained in jail pending resolution of his case. Throughout the duration of his case, Mr. Payne
has been unable to communicate effectively or consistently with his public defender, making it
virtually impossible for him to participate, in any meaningful way, in the development of his
defense. In addition, Mr. Payne's attorney has been unable to conduct any meaningful
investigation into his case, review the relevant discovery with his client, or share with Mr. Payne
his thoughts with regard to trial strategy and related matters. Mr. Payne is scheduled to go to
trial on July 21, 2015, and faces up to seven years in prison if convicted.
160.

The State ofldaho has not provided Plaintiffs, or those similarly situated, with the

representation to which they are constitutionally and otherwise legally entitled. They have not
been provided with adequate representation at every critical stage; have not had sufficient
opportunity to discuss their cases with their attorneys, to participate in building a defense against
the charges they face, or to make informed decisions about the disposition of their cases. Upon
information and belief, the State of Idaho will continue to fail to provide Plaintiffs with the
representation to which they are entitled.
161.

The representation provided to Plaintiffs is illustrative of the patterns of

representation provided to indigent defendants throughout the State of Idaho and results from the
structural and systemic failings that were identified in the 2010 NLADA Report and subsequent
studies carried out over the last five years.
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State Liability

162.

The United States Supreme Court has made clear that pursuant to the Sixth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, it is the states' constitutional duty to provide for the
effective assistance of counsel for criminal defendants who are unable to afford an attorney.
163.

The State ofldaho has failed to provide any significant funding to support the

provision of indigent defense services across the state.
164.

The State ofldaho has failed to provide any supervision over the provision of

indigent defense services across the state.
165.

The State ofldaho has failed to establish or adopt any consistent, statewide

caseload standards for public defenders in the state.
166.

The State of Idaho has failed to establish or adopt any consistent, statewide

performance standards for public defenders in this state.
167.

In light of the NLADA's 2010 report, the ongoing work of the CJC and other

committees tasked with studying indigent defense issues in Idaho, and the amendments to the
public defense statutes in 2014, the State ofldaho has been on notice for more than half a decade
that its public-defender system is failing to provide constitutionally sufficient representation.
168.

Despite being on notice of the many failings of Idaho's indigent defense system,

the State has failed to take sufficient action to remedy the deficiencies.
169.

The State's failure to take sufficient steps to remedy the deficiencies ofldaho's

indigent defense system is the proximate cause of the harm suffered by indigent criminal
defendants throughout ldaho--including the named Plaintiffs and the Class they represent.
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CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
First Claim for Relief
Violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(All Plaintiffs and the Class against All Defendants)

170.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the

allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires the State of

171.

Idaho to ensure that all indigent criminal defendants receive meaningful and effective legal
representation at all critical stages of their cases.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for suit against the government for constitutional

172.
violations.

The State of Idaho has violated the Sixth Amendment because it has failed to

173.

ensure that all indigent criminal defendants receive meaningful and effective legal representation
at all critical stages of their cases, including at initial appearances, resulting in the constructive
denial of counsel.

Second Claim for Relief
Violation of Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution (Right to Counsel)
(All Plaintiffs and the Class against All Defendants)

174.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the

allegations of all preceding paragraphs.
175.

Article 1, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution requires the State ofldaho to

ensure that all indigent criminal defendants receive meaningful and effective legal
representation.
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176.

The State ofldaho has failed to ensure that all indigent criminal defendants

receive meaningful and effective legal representation at all critical stages of the case, including at
initial appearance, in violation of Article 1, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution.
, Third Claim for Relief
Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
(All Plaintiffs and the Class against All Defendants)

177.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the

allegations of all preceding paragraphs.
178.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution requires the State of Idaho to ensure that all indigent criminal defendants receive
meaningful and effective legal representation.
179.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for suit against the government for constitutional

violations.
180.

The State of Idaho has failed to ensure that all indigent criminal defendants

receive meaningful and effective legal representation at all critical stages of the case, including at
initial appearances, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
Fourth Claim for Relief
Violation of Article 1, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution (Due Process)
(All Plaintiffs and the Class against All Defendants)

181.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the

allegations of all preceding paragraphs.
182.

Under Article 1, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution, the State ofldaho is

required to ensure that all indigent criminal defendants receive meaningful and effective legal
I

representation at all critical stages of the case, including at initial appearances.
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183.

The State ofldaho has failed to ensure that all indigent criminal defendants

receive meaningful and effective legal representation at all critical stages of the case, including at
initial appearances, in violation of Article I, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution.
RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:
A) Certify this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure·' 48
'

B) Declare that the State of Idaho is obligated to provide constitutionally adequate
representation to indigent criminal defendants, including at their initial appearances;
C) Declare that the constitutional rights ofldaho's indigent criminal defendants are being
violated by the State on an ongoing basis, and provide a deadline for the State to move
this Court for approval of specific modifications to the structure and operation of the
State's indigent-defense system;
D) Enjoin the State from continuing to violate the rights of indigent defendants by providing
constitutionally deficient representation;
E) Enter an injunction requiring the State to propose, for this Court's approval and
monitoring, a plan to develop and implement a statewide system of public defense that is
consistent with the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution and laws of the State ofldaho;
I

F) Enter an injunction that requires the State to propose, for this Court's approval and
monitoring, uniform workload, performance, and training standards for attorneys
representing indigent criminal defendants in the State of Idaho in order to ensure
accountability and to monitor 'effectiveness;
G) Enter an injunction barring the use of fixed-fee contracts in the delivery of indigentdefense services in the State of Idaho;
H) Award Plaintiffs and the Class reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred during the
course of this litigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, LC.§ 12-117, the Private Attorney
~eneral doctrine and other applicable law; and
I) Grant any other relief the Court deems necessary and proper to protect Plaintiffs and the
Class from further harm.

48

Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, along with their supporting brief, have been filed with
this court in conjunction with this complaint.
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ubmitted this 17th day of June, 2015.

Jason D. Williamson
ACLU Foundation
Andrew C. Lillie
Kathryn M. Ali
Bret H. Ladine
Jenny Q. Shen
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TRACY TUCKER, et al., on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,
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Case No. - - - - - - - -

Plaintiffs,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, et al.,

AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMY PAYNE

Defendants.
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AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMY PAYNE

STATE OF IDAHO )
County of Gem

: ss.
)

I, Jeremy Michael Payne, having been duly sworn upon oath, depose and say:
1.

My name is Jeremy Michael Payne. I am an adult and I live in Emmett, Idaho,

Gem County.
2.

I was arrested in Payette County on January 25, 2015, and charged with driving

without a license and possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia.
3.

I was not represented by counsel my initial appearance, at which time the court

set my bail at $30,000. I could not afford that bail amount, and as a result, I remained in custody
until June 9, 2015.
4.

I have only been able to meet with my attorney for a total of approximately 30-45

minutes since my case started. Most of those meetings occurred in or just outside the courtroom
just prior to my court appearances.
5.

I have repeatedly tried to reach my attorney by telephone, but have not been able

to do so on any consistent basis. Between May 12 and May 26, 2015, I left at least six voice
messages for my attorney, none of which were returned.
6.

My lawyer hasn't been able to review discovery materials in my case with me.

7.

Even though I am scheduled to go to trial on July 21, 2015, it is my understanding

that my attorney has not had the chance to conduct any investigation into my case, contact or
summon any witnesses, hire an investigator, review and explain the relevant discovery materials
to me, or discuss any trial strategies with me.
8.

Everything I have stated in this affidavit is a fact I know personally. I will testify

in person and under oath about these facts before this Court if I am called as a witness.
AFFIDAVIT OF JEREMY PAYNE - Page 2

000061

DATED this

l Sctay of June, 2015.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN
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DATED this~ day of June, 2015.

Richard Eppink, ACLU of Idaho Foundation
Kathryn M. Ali
Jenny Shen
Bret Ladine, Hogan Lovells US LLP
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
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themselves and all others similarly situated,
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Plaintiffs,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO, et al.,

AFFIDAVIT OF NAOMI MORLEY

Defendants.
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AFFIDAVIT OF NAOMI MORLEY
STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
)
County of Boise
I, Naomi Morley, having been duly sworn upon oath, depose and say:
1. My name is Naomi Morley. I am an adult and I live in Garden Valley, Idaho, in Boise

County.
2. I was arrested in Ada County on March 14, 2014, following a serious single-car
accident in which I was seriously injured.
3. I have been charged in Ada County with driving under the influence and possession of
controlled substances and paraphernalia.
4. I was assigned a public defender, and I am currently represented by an appointed
conflict attorney.
5. Although I think there was a lawyer at my initial appearance on these charges, I do not
remember having any opportunity to consult with that lawyer. The court set my bail at $15,000
at that time. I could not afford that bail amount, and so I remained in the Ada County Jail until
my bail was reduced three weeks later, even though I had been severely injured in the car
accident.
6. My appointed lawyers have been unable to provide me with adequate representation.
If I want to retain an expert to challenge the State's contentions about the alleged presence of
drugs in my system at the time of the accident, or any other outside testing, I have to pay for such
services myself, I was previously informed.
7. I also have had to track down my own witnesses. Despite informing my lawyer that
another person would confess responsibility, it was only through my own efforts that I recently
obtained a sworn affidavit from the person, acknowledging responsibility.
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8. Also, after preparing an extensive analysis of discrepancies in the state's investigation,
I gave it to my lawyer but was informed that he did not even look at it. And the vehicle involved
in the crash was apparently scrapped by the state, and my lawyer did not inspect it before it was
destroyed.
9. I have also been unable to communicate effectively or consistently with my lawyer. I
am worried that my lawyer is pressuring me to plead guilty because he does not have the time or
resources to prepare sufficiently for trial. I have turned down a plea offer that would have
required me to spend 10 years in prison. I am scheduled to go to trial on June 29, 2015.
10. Everything I stated in this affidavit is a fact I know personally. I will testify in
person and under oath about these facts before this Court if I am called as a witness.
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DATED this -J3aay of June, 2015.
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NaiMorley'S
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e State of Idaho
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Residing at:
My commission expires:
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DATED this~ day of June, 2015.

Richard Eppink, ACLU ofldaho Foundation
Kathryn M. Ali
Jenny Shen
Bret Ladine, Hogan Lovells US LLP
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

TRACY TUCKER, et al., on behalf of
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CV .oC 1 51 0 2 4 O
Case No. - - - - - - - -

Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, et al.,
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Defendants.
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AFFIDAVIT OF JASON SHARP
STATEOFIDAlIO )

: ss.
County of Shoshone )

I, Jason Momoe Sharp, having been duly gworn upon oath, depose and say:
1.

My name is Jason Monroe Sharp. I am an adult and 1 live in Kellogg, Idaho,

Shoshone County.
2.

I was arrested in Shoshone County on May 16, :2014, and chargEld with burglary

and grand :theft.
3.

I was not represented by cotmSel my initial appearance on May 20, 2014, at which

time the cowt set my bail at $50,000. l could not afford that bail. .amotmt, and as a result, .r
remained in custody until May 29, 2014.
4.

After I e,gplained to the court, without the assistance of my lawyer, that I was not

on probation at 1he time ofmy arrest, as the judge believed, the court reduced my bail to $5,000.
I still was unable to afford to pay my bail, however, and remained in custody.
5.

Fea:ringthatI might lose my job ifl retnai.uedm.jail, I contacted my employer,

without the assistance of my lawyer, and asked that he write a letter to the court supporting my

employer, the comt released me fromjail on my own recognizance.
6.

I have only been able to meet with my attorney for a total of approximately one

hour throughout the 13 months during wbich my case has been pendm.g. Most of the meetings l

have had with my lawyer have occurred :in or just outside the courtroom prior to my coutt
appearances.
7.

I have also has been unable to 1·eview the discovery in my case, despite repeated

requests to do so.
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8.

RECEIVED

06/16/2015 E!B:52AM

F~om: Fax 411 pa Paul E~erett

Page: 12/16

Even though I am scheduled to go to trial on July 14, 2015, it is my understanding

that my attorney has not had the chance to conduct any investigation into my case, cont.act 01·
summon any witnesses, hl.1:e an investigator, review and explain the relevant discovery materials
to :me, or discuss any trial st,rategies with me.
9.

Everything I have stated in this affidavit is a fact I know personally. I will testify

in pe.rson and under oath about these facts before this Corut if I am called as a witness.

DA'IED this 16 day of June, 2015.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this LL:t_ day of June, 2015,

Notary

blic fOl."
ofidaho
Residing ; Mu.U...t1..\
My commission expires: lD }:).sit '1

DATED this 16day of June, 2015.

U of Idaho Foundation
Jason D. Williamson, ACLU Foundation
Kathryn M. Ali
Jenny Shen

B:ret Ladine, Hogan Lovells US LLf'

Attorneys for the Plaintiffi
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Richard Eppink
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
OF IDAHO FOUNDATION
reppink@acluidaho.org
P.O. Box 1897
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 344-9750, ext. 1202
(208) 344-7201 (fax)
Idaho State Bar no. 7503
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Andrew C. Lillie
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP Cl-lRISTOPHl:.R 0. RiCH, Ciork
andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com
ByTENILLE GRANT
One Tabor Center, Suite 1500
DEPUTY
1200 Seventeenth Street
Denver, CO 80202
303-899-7300
303-899-7333 (fax)
Kathryn M. Ali
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(202) 637-5600
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Bret H. Ladine
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(415) 374-2300
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Jenny Q. Shen
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themselves and all others similarly situated,
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vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, et al.,
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From:East Bonner Co. Library

2082638320

06/15/lu15 12:49

#868 P.001/003

AFFIDAVIT OF TRACY TUCKER

STATEOFIDAHO )
: ss.

County of Bonner

)

I, Tracy Don Tucker, having been duly sworn upon oath, depose and say:

1.

, My name is T,racy Don Tucker. I am an adult and I live in Sandpoint, Idaho,

Bonner County.
2.

I was arrested in Bonner County on March 6, 2015, and charged with attempted

strangulation and domestic battery in the presence of a child.
3,

Although I was appointed a public defender at my initial appearance before the

court on March 9, 2015, I was not represented by counsel at that appearance, at which time the
court set my bail at $40,000. I could not afford that bail amount, and as a result, I remained in
the Bonner County Jail until June 2, 2015.

4.

The attorney assigned to my case did not appear on my behalf at my arraignment

on March 18, 2015. Instead, a substitute attorney with no prior knowledge of my case or even
the charges against me. The substitute attorney failed to seek a bond reduction at my
arraignment.
5.

My appointed lawyer has been unable to provide me with adequate representation.

Between March 9 and June 1, 2015, I was only able to meet with my attorney on three occasions:
once, when my attorney came to Bonner County Jail and met with me for approximately 10
minutes, and two additional times when
I saw my lawyer in court My attorney.did not meet
,
with me prior to either of those court proceedings-not even in the courtroom prior to the
proceedings.
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6.
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06/15/~u,5 12:50

#868 P.002/003

During the three months I was in custody, I spoke with my public defender on the

phone only on two occasions, both for approximately five minutes. Between March 18, 2015
and June 1, 2015, I attempted, unsuccessfully, to reach my attorney by phone at least 50 times.

7.

As of June 8, 2015, ten days prior to my original trial date, it is my understanding

that my attorney had not conducted any investigation into my case, contacted or summoned any
witnesses, or hired an investigator. My attorney also did not review or explain the discovery
materials in my case, or discuss potential trial strategies with me.
8.

On June 2, 2015, l pleaded guilty to attempted stranguladon and was released

from custody the same day. I am scheduled to be sentenced on August 3, 2015.
9.

Everything I have stated in this affidavit is a fa.ct I know personally. I will testify

in person and under oath about these facts before this Court if I am called as a witness.
DATED thish£' day of June, 2015.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this/u'day of June, 2015.

Notary Public for the State of Idaho
Residing ~t: ..8~~~.. l-.D
My comm1ss1on expires: 0
~~

¥ Oo/ / ?
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DATEDthis~dayofJune,2015.

06/15/cJ15 12:so

#868 P.003/003

~
~ A C L U of Idaho Foundati
Jason D. Williamson, ACLU Foundation
Kathryn M. Ali
Jenny Shen
Bret Ladine, Hogan Lovells US LLP

AtlorneJ:~for the Plaintiffs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA_

TRACY TUCKER, et al., on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

0.
C\/ 0C 1 5 10 24

Case No. _ _ _ _ _ _ __
FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD
EPPINK

vs.

...

STATE OF IDAHO, et al.,
Defendants.
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FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD EPPINK
STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss.
County of Ada
)
I, Richard Eppink, having been duly sworn upon oath, depose and say:
1. I am one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in this case.
2. Exhibit A to this affidavit is a true copy of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission,
2015 Report to the Legislature, obtained from Ian Thomson, Executive Director of the
Public Defense Commission.
3. Exhibit B to this affidavit is a true copy of the Payette County Public Defender Contract
for 2014-2016, obtained through a Public Records Law request on about October 6, 2014.
4. Exhibit C to this affidavit is a true copy of the Gem County Public Defender Contract
for, obtained through a Public Records Law request on about October 2, 2014.
5. Exhibit D to this affidavit is a true copy of the Custer County Public Defender Contract,
obtained through a Public Records Law request on about October 22, 2014.
6. Exhibit E to this affidavit is a true copy of the Franklin County Public Defender
Contract, obtained through a Public Records Law request on October 21, 2014.
7. Exhibit F to this affidavit is a true copy of a report I received from Justin Curtis, an
attorney who I understand works in the office of the Idaho State Appellate Public
Defender and is a member of a subcommittee of the Idaho Criminal Justice Commission
that is investigating pre-trial justice in Idaho. I understand from Mr. Curtis that this list
represents the results of a survey he conducted for the subcommittee about which Idaho
counties provide counsel at the time of arraignment to defendants who cannot afford an
attorney. I received this list by email from Mr. Curtis on April 21, 2015.
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8. I have reviewed the current clients, former clients, and other matters I am handling and
have handled in the past to determine whether I may have any professional conflict of
interest or potential conflict of interest that might inhibit my ability to represent a class of
all indigent defendants in Idaho. I have also considered the information that I am aware
of, including confidential and privileged information, concerning the named plaintiffs and
proposed class representatives of that class to determine whether there may be a conflict
of interest or potential conflict of interest between class representatives or between any
class representative and any absent class member. I have not identified any potential
conflict of interest that I believe would prevent me from fairly and adequately
representing the class or that would prevent the proposed class representatives from
serving as class representatives for the absent class members.
9.

I am admitted to practice before Idaho state courts, the U.S. District Court for the
District ofldaho, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I have served as
lead counsel or the only handling attorney in major litigation in areas of significant public
interest or developing law, in both state and federal court, including in class actions. I am
currently the Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho Foundation
and practice exclusively in the areas of constitutional and civil rights law and policy with
major societal significance.
DATED this 16th day of June, 2015.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME this 16th day of Ju e, 2015.

~j_

........... ·--~~-

INGRID ANDRULIS
Notary Public
·
State o(ldabo
.1

1

.

'

···;

,'

Nota . Public for Idaho
Residing at: ~/5v
My commission expires: /.j ..

22 ""2/)/t/
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I.

SUMMARY

The State Public Defense Commission (PDC) was recently established 1 as a
means to improve the delivery of indigent legal defense services throughout Idaho.
The mission of the Commission is to seek and preserve freedom for all by vigorously
safeguarding Constitutional rights. In the words of Thomas Jefferson, "The price of
freedom is eternal vigilance." In that effort, the Commission aims to:
(A) serve as a clearing house of information for relevant stakeholdei·s;

(B) maintain standards to ensure that defending attorneys have adequate
training and resources to fulfill their Sixth Amendment obligations;
(C)promulgate rules for public defender training and data collection
regarding indigent defense services;
(D)inform the legislature of any Sixth Amendment issues.

In a very short period, the Commission has established an office, held regular
meetings, begun to assess the collection of relevant data, and identified its
immediate priorities for its first year of operation. Consequently, the members of
the Commission are engaged in developing recommended model contract terms and
constructing rules and
regulations regarding
public defender training
and qualifications.

I

)
• GATHER INFORMATION
• PROVIDE TRAINING
• ISSUE RULES & STANDARDS
• INFORM LEGISLATURE

1 For a brief discussion of the relevant background leading to the creation of the State Public
Defense Commission, see Supplemental Material at pp.13· 15, included at the end of this
report.
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II.

APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS

According to statute, all appointed members of the Commission are voluntary
and serve part-time. The following Commissioners were appointed upon the
creation of the Commission in July of 2014:

Appointment Authority

Term

Sen. Chuck Winder
Senate

President Pro Tempore of
Senate

Elected Term
:S 2 years

Rep. Jason A. Monks
House of Representatives

Speaker of the
House of Representatives

Elected Term
:S 2 years

Chief Justice of
Supreme Court

2 years

Comm. Kimber Ricks
Idaho Association of Counties

Governor

3 years

William H. Wellman, Esq.
Owyhee County Public Defender

Governor

3 years

Sara B. Thomas, Esq.
State Appellate Public Defender

Governor

3 years

Darrell G. Bolz, Vice-Chair*
Idaho Juvenile Justice Commission

Governor

3 years

Member

Hon. Molly Huskey, Chair*
District Court Judge, Third District

* Both the Chair and Vice·Chair serve terms of a single year.
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III.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE COMMISSION

The Commission met for the first time on August 27, 2014. Given the obvious
challenges in creating a new agency and meeting its statutory obligations, the
Commission has met a total of nine times in the intervening four and a half months.
In that time the Commission has selected a chair and vice-chair for its first year of
operation, drafted bylaws, and adopted a mission statement, vision statement and
statement of values.
In accordance with statute, the Commission
hired a full-time Executive Director, Ian Thomson,
to handle the day-to-day operations of the
Commission. He began working for the
Commission in October. Prior to joining the

Hard at Work

Public Defense Commission, Mr. Thomson worked

• Establishing a new state agency
from the ground-up

in the Capital Litigation Unit at the Idaho State

• Forming sub-committees

Appellate Public Defender. Previously he worked
as a trial-level public defender for several years.
The Commission also obtained office space and
hired a part-time administrative assistant. In
establishing a new state agency, the Commission
has contracted with other state agencies and
private contractors to provide necessary services

-Model Contracts
-Training & Qualifications
•Assessing public defense services
in each county
•Assessing current public defender
training and continuing legal
education

and support for the creation and maintenance of
the office.
The Commission identified its statutory priorities and formed two primary
subcommittees: one to explore model contract terms for use by the various counties,
and the other to devise administrative rules regarding public defender training and
qualifications. The entire membership of the Commission also agree4 to work on
data reporting requirements throughout the first year.
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Public Defense Delivery Assessment
The Commission has made a complete assessment of the way in which each
county in Idaho provides for indigent defense services. Accompanying that
information, the Commission has generated a comprehensive public defender roster,
consolidating contact information for every institutional public defender, contract
defending attorney, and contracted conflict public defender across Idaho.
By statute there are four
approved means for providing Sixth
Amendment counsel to those who
qualify2: (1) a county can establish
and maintain an institutional public
defender office, (2) more than one

county can jointly establish and
operate an institutional public
defender office, (3) a county can
contract with the public defender
Cassia County Courthouse

office of another county for services,

or (4) a county can choose to contract with private practitioners to act as the
defending attorneys for those who qualify.
The following is a brief synopsis of the methods of delivery being used in the
various counties throughout Idaho.

INSTITUTIONAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES

Seven (7) counties have now chosen to establish and maintain a public

defender office. (Ada, Bannock, Bonner, BonnevilleB, Canyon4, Kootenai, and Twin
Falls counties.)
2 Idaho Code §19·859(1)·(4).
a Bonneville County also created a separate Office of the Conflict Public Defender in 2014,
which employs two full·time attorneys to handle cases conflicted out of the primary office.
4 The Canyon County Public Defender was only established in 2014, and began operation on
October 1st.
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Those offices currently employ a combined total of 115 full-time attorneys to
handle the majority of the indigent cases in their respective counties. Between those
offices, the PDC has identified another forty-one (41) attorneys that are used to
handle conflict cases.

JOINTLY OPERATED PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES

Only two (2) counties have opted to enter into a joint operating agreement, in
order to pool resources together and establish an office of the public defender.
(Cassia and Minidoka counties.) A joint management board, with members from
each county, has been arranged to handle the finance and maintenance of the office.
The Mini-Cassia Public Defender currently employs five (5) full-time public
defenders and operates a small office in each respective county.

COUNTIES CONTRACTING WITH OUTSIDE PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES

No county in Idaho is currently contracting with an outside institutional
public defender office to provide Sixth Amendment representation.

COUNTIES WITH PRIVATE ATTORNEY CONTRACTS

Thirty-four (34) counties are currently under contract with one or more
attorneys in private practice to provide representation for those who qualify.
(Adams, Bear Lake, Benewah, Bingham, Blaine, Boise, Boundary, Butte, Camas,
Caribou, Clark, Clearwater, Custer, Elmore, Franklin, Fremont, Gem, Gooding,
Idaho, Jefferson, Jerome, Latah, Lemhi, Lewis, Lincoln, Madison, Nez Perce,
Oneida, Owyhee, Payette, Power, Shoshbne, Teton, and Valley ~aunties.)
Between those thirty-four (34) coJnties, there are fifty·thlee (53) separate
contracts involving sixty-seven (67) diffe~ent attorneys who are engaged in
providing services. The Commission haJ also identified an additional six (6)

attorneys that have conflict·specific conJacts in those counties,land another two (2)
who frequently serve as a conflict attornly without the benefit of a contract.
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There is one county (Washington) that has neither a public defender office
nor an existing contract for the provi~ion of indigent defense services. The
Commission has identified seven (7) attorneys who are most frequently appointed
by the sitting judge to handle those cases on an ad hoc basis.
Type of Service

Number of Counties

Number of Attorneys

County Institutional Public
Defender Office

7

115

Jointly Operated Public
Defender Office

2

5

Contract Defending Attorney

34

67

Contract Conflict Defending
Attorneys

10

47

Felony and capital appeals in forty-three (43) counties are handled by the
office of the State Appellate Public Defender.6 The State Appellate Public Defender
currently employs a staff of sixteen (16) attorneys, and uses the services of three (3)
private appellate lawyers to handle felony conflicts. According to the Commission's
most recent assessment, there are 136 full-time attorneys employed at institutional
public defender offices at the trial and appellate level in Idaho. Another sixty-seven
(67) work under a contract with one or more counties, and another fifty-nine (59)

serve as either contract conflict-defense attorneys or are frequently used as
appointed attorneys to handle similar matters.
The Commission has also discovered that half of Idaho's counties (twentytwo) are being served by contract defending attorneys whose principal office is
located outside of the county. (See figure below.)

Six counties with institutional public defender offices, along with four contract counties,
have entered into specific contracts for conflict services.
s All counties, except for Jefferson County, have chosen to participate and contribute to the
state funds which qualifies them for these services.
5
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BOUNOARY
Bon ers Ferry

Office Location of County
Public Defenders
Legend
•

Office Locations and/or
County Seats

- - Distance to Courthouse
Judicial Districts

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

0

25

SO Miles

OWYHEE

Legal Education and Training Assessment
The Commission has undertaken a concerted effort to identify those
attorneys who are in the greatest need of additional training, support, and
resources. In anticipation of planning training programs for public defenders, the
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4.

Commission has completed an initial assessment of the amount and source of the
mandatory continuing legal education (MCLE) credit hours obtained by each public
defender in their current reporting period. That initial assessment confirms that a
significant number of indigent defense attorneys in the State are not receiving
adequate training hours in areas directly relevant to the representation of their
indigent clients.
The Commission has joined 186 attorneys serving as public defenders in
Idaho to the National Association for Public Defense (NAPD), which provides
attorneys with significant online resources. Particularly for attorneys who practice
alone, or are located in more remote areas, online resources can provide a
substantial and cost-effective method to provide guidance and support.

IV. IDENTIFIED PRIORITIES OF THE PUBLIC
DEFENSE REFORM INTERIM COMMITTEE
During its first few months of operation, the Commission was tasked with
certain clear priorities by the joint Public Defense Reform Interim Committee.
Those objectives included the development of model contract terms to serve as
guidelines to the counties with private contracts, and the provision of relevant
training to public defenders in the current fiscal year.
The Commission has adopted the priorities of the Interim Committee, and
due to limited time and resources the State Public Defense Commission is not
submitting any legislative recommendations for public defense reform at this time.
The Commission feels strongly that signihcant reforms in the absehce of clear and

reliable data and information would be a !disservice to all of those i~volved. The
Commission will be looking toward the implementation of Odysse~ (the statewide
court technology software) to provide betJer information on caseload and workload

of those attorneys representing defendants at county expense. Tha} program
represents a $21 million investment by tle State into improving effective case
management throughout the criminal juJtice system. However, as ~dministrative
9JPage
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District Judge Richard Bevan recently reported to the House Judiciary, Rules &
Administration Committee, the statewide implementation of Odyssey is not likely to
be completed until 2017.

Model Contract Terms and Public Defender Standards
The Commission has undertaken a serious study of the nature and
composition of contracts being used by counties throughout Idaho. They have begun
their review of other model contracts, and are progressing quickly in identifying
those terms that are necessary to ensure that counties can provide representation
with financial or ethical conflicts, and still take into consideration the particular
circumstances of the individual counties. At the same time these contract provisions
should provide the attorney with adequate protections and financial compensation
for the work being provided to their clients.
The Commission expects to present recommended model contract terms in
the upcoming year and to have those available to the counties by the time existing
contracts expire in the fall of 2015. In addition, the Commission will be submitting
proposed rules for adoption and approval regarding the qualifications of contracted
public defenders and training requirements for those attorneys handling indigent
appointments.

Full Utilization of Trustee and Benefit Payments
The Commission is fully aware th{t its trustee benefit patent allocation
has been set-aside specifically for the training of indigent defense attorneys across

the state. In addition to providing attorn!ys with online resom,s through the

NAPD, the Commission is planning to h+t and sponsor three distinct training
conferences before the end of the 2015 fiscal year, at little or no Jost to those who
attend. A primary conference for trial- aJd appellate-level public defenders is
scheduled for June 4-5 in Caldwell, whic! will accommodate up o 155 attorneys. An
additional capital training will be held iJ Coeur d'Alene on June 12th for up to
10 I Page
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twenty-five (25) attorneys. Furthermore, a specialized training for attorneys who
handle juvenile and child-protection cases is planned in Boise on May 29th for
another twenty (20) attorneys. Those trainings are expected to fully exhaust the
money allocated for trustee benefit payments in the current year.

Outreach and Education
Finally, the Commission is engaged in important information gathering and
public education with respect to the public defense function. In accordance with
those aims, representatives of the Commission have already made considerable
efforts to meet with chiefs of the institutional public defender offices across the
state, several contract attorneys, county commissioners, and a limited number of
prosecuting attorneys. The Commission will continue to strive to inform the
relevant stakeholders about the Commission's role, the guidance it can provide to
county commissions, and the support it can offer to defense attorneys representing
Idaho's indigent population.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The State Public Defense Commission is determined and committed to
improving the quality and effectiveness of indigent representation in every county
of Idaho. The Commission also acknowledges that there is clear room for reform and
improvement. Although an assessment has begun, given the diversity of the current
public defense system and the diffuse nature of its administration, the challenges
faced in collecting data from each county, and the difficulty in implementing model
contract terms, a more robust analysis of each county's system will take a
considerable amount of time. Consequently, the Commission believes that it will
require additional time and study before making legislative recommendations
involving substantive and systemic reform.
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SUPPLEMENT AL
MATERIALS
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE IDAHO STATE
PUBLIC DEFENSE COMMISSION
In 2008 the Idaho Criminal Justice Commission (CJC), along with the
Juvenile Justice Commission, requested the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association (NLADA) conduct a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the
provision of indigent defense across the state of Idaho at the trial-level. Over the
course of a year, the NLADA sent evaluators to seven representative counties
throughout the state, including Ada, Blaine, Bonneville, Canyon, Kootenai, Nez
Perce, and Power.
The NLADA issued their final report in January 2010, entitled, The
Gua1·antee of Counsel: Advocacy & Due P1·ocess in Idaho's T1'ial Cou1·t (Evaluation
of Trial-Level Indigent Defense Systems in Idaho. The report concluded
[T]he state of Idaho fails to provide the level of representation required
by our Constitution for those who cannot afford counsel in its criminal
and juvenile courts. By delegating to each county the responsibility to
provide counsel at the trial level without any state funding or oversight,
Idaho has sewn a patchwork quilt of underfunded, inconsistent systems
that vary greatly in defining who qualifies for services and in the level
of competency of the services rendered. While there are admirable
qualities of some of the county indigent defense services, NLADA finds
that none of the public defender systems in the sample counties are
constitutionally adequate.
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At the same time the NLADA was conducting their analysis of Idaho's
system, the CJC created its own Subcommittee on Public Defense in December of
2009. The CJC's subcommittee included representatives from the Idaho Association
of Counties, the state court system, the Attorney General's office, county
prosecutors, judges and magistrates, legislators, attorneys, public defenders, and
the Department of Corrections. That group undertook its own study of the public
defense system over the course of three and a half years.
The CJC's subcommittee made several legislative recommendations,
including (1) a revision of state statute addressing the definition of indigency, and
clarifying when a person or child qualifies for legal representation at county
expense, (2) a clarification of when a single attorney can serve as a guardian and
attorney in the same matter, (3) the establishment of standards for juvenile
representation, and (4) the creation of a legislative Interim Committee to explore
public defense reform. Largely in response to those recommendations, the joint
legislative Public Defense Reform Interim Committee was created in the 2013
session and was extended through 2014.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
STATE PUBLIC DEFENSE COMMISSION
During the 2014 session the Legislature established the State Public Defense
Commission, as a self-governing agency of the Executive branch. The Commission's
charter is codified in Idaho Code §19-848 through § 19-850. The <;:ommission was
established on July 1st, 2014.

r

1

The statutory mandate and authori!y of the PDC was cleatly set forth in LC.
§19·850(a) and (b). The PDC has been chal.ged with the followingi
(1) Promulgate rules with regards to
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a. Training and continuing legal education requirements (CLE) for
indigent defense attorneys, including criminal, capital, post-conviction,
juvenile, abuse and neglect, civil commitments, and civil contempt;
b. Uniform data reporting requirements for the annual reports that
indigent defense attorneys must submit to their county commissions
and administrative judge, including caseload, workload and
expenditures.
(2) Make recommendations to the Idaho legislature regarding the public defense
system (by January 20 of each year), including
a. Core contract requirements for counties to use when engaging services
of private attorneys (including model contracts);
b. Qualifications and experience standards for indigent defense
attorneys;
c. Enforcement mechanisms;
d. Funding issues, including for trainings, data collection and reporting,
and handling conflict cases.
The Legislature approved an initial annual budget of $300,000. Of that
$119,900 was appropriated for personnel costs, $74,200 was dedicated to general
operating expenses, and $105,900 was dedicated as trustee benefit payments for
public defender training costs.
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OFFICE OF

Clerk of the District Court
FOR PAYETTE COUNTY, IDAHO

BETTY J. DRESSEN
CLERK AND EX-OFFICIO
AUDITOR AND RECORDER

1130 3RD AVENUE N,, ROOM 104
PAYETTE, IDAHO 83661-2473

October 6, 2014

American Civil Liberties Union
Jason D Williamson
125 Broad St., 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
Dear Mr. Williamson:
In reply to your public records request dated September 26, 2014 we have
enclosed the closed contracts and the new contracts for Public Defense. If
you have any questions please contact my office at 208-642-6000.
Sincerely,

~;JJ~
Betty J. Dressen
Payette County Clerk
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.iQJ,P<EMENT BETWEEN PAYETTE COUNTY, I D ~ PHILLIP B.
FOR
PROVISION OF SERVICES OF PUBLIC D~FENDER

HEE'\~ THE
t,. ~,

The County of Payette, State ofldaho, a political subdivision authorized to enter into
agreements and contracts by Idaho law, acting by and through its Board of Collilty Com.missioners
enters into the following agreement with Phillip B. Heersink, Attorney at Law ofFruitland, Idaho, for
the purpose of providing legal representation to indigent persons in Criminal and Quasi-~al cases
in Payette County, for the period of October 1, 2014 to September 30, 2016.
Hereinafter, Payette County will be referred to as the "COUNTY" and Phillip B. Heersink
will be referred to as the "CONTRACTOR11 • The parties agree as follows:
1 This agreement shall be for all services and expenses of a public defender for Payette
ColUlty for the calendar years stated above, excluding extraordinary expenses as may be determined
by the parties to this agreement. Such extraordinary expenses shall be determined through negotiations
between the parties and shall be authorized only upon written agreement of both parties or in
accorda,nce with Paragraph 11.

2.

The COUNTY agrees to pay to the CONTRACTOR for the term above described, sums to
be payable as follows:
A.
CONTRACTOR agrees to dedicate whatever days per month are necessary to provide
the full services required hereunder to worldng on matters he is appointed to under this Agreement.
The days that CONTRACTOR performs under this Agreement will be defined as ''Public Days." A
Public Day is any day in which CONTRACTOR must appear in Cmut for a client he is appointed to
under this Agreement, or any day in which CONTRACTOR works for 5 or more hours on clients he is
appojnted to under this Agreement. There is not a limit.to the number of days that CONTRACTOR .
m.ayuse as Publlc Days :in an.y givenmonth, due to the requirement of CONTRACTOR to providethe.
·
legal services _agreed to herein.
B.
ForeachPublicDaythatCONTRACTOR works, theCOUNTYwillpayhim$560.00.
C.
The CONTRACTOR shall provide an invoice on the first day after the 14th of each
month that the Courts are open in the COUNTY ("Worldng Day"), and another on the first Worldng
Day after the 281h of each month. That invoice will identify the Public Days worked in the period after
the last invoice.
1
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D.
The COUNTY shall pay the amounts claimed in said invoice within seven (7) days of
receipt of the :invoice.

3. CONTRACTOR hereby agrees that h~ shall practice law independently of any contractor
under a separate public defender contract with Payette County (hereinafter "SEPARAIB
CONTRACTOR"), in order to avoid conflicts in representations of their respective clients. The
County shall be responsible for paying no other amounts except as provided for under the terms ofthis
contract.
4. In exchange forthepaymentbythe COUNTY the CONTRACTOR agrees to be available
full time and provide the criminal and quasi-criminal defense services for those persons determined
by the Court to be indigent in the following cases:

A.

All felony cases, including felony probation violations. This paragraph shall
not include cases where the CONTRACTOR has a conflict due to a prior
appointment under this contract or the previous agreement.

B.

All misdemeanor cases in which the SEPARATE CONTRACTOR has a
conflict in representation, including p~obations violations.

C.

All juvenile charges in which the SEPARAIB CONTRACTOR has a conflict
in representation, including probation violations.

D.

Representation of at least one indigent parent, if necessary, or the Guardian ad
Litem, in Child Protective Act, including those child protection cases currently
assigned to CONTRACTOR. ·

E.

All probation violations where, in the discretion of the
Court, the Public Defender should be appointed to represen~ the
probationer rather than the attorney who represented the defendant
in the prior criminal proceedings in which the probation was entered.

F.

In all ot;her cases in which the State of Idaho is a party, in which it is the
determination of tµe trial court that it is appropriate that an attorney pe
appointed to represent an indigent party.

2
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G.

Appeals from the Magistrate Court to the District Court.

H.

Post Conviction cases as assigned by the Comi.

I.

All cases which are currently assigned to CONTRACTOR pursuant to any
previous agreements/

J.

All services not herein listed but which are listed in specificati.on.s for bids
which were- submitted to Betty Dressen, County Clerk in response to her
solicitation for such bids in 2008.

5. CONTRACTOR shall maintain an office in Payette County. The CONTRACTOR shall be
responsible to pay CONTRACTORS own expenses, i.e., office space; telephone service; necessary
supplies; Workman's Compensation Insurance, malpractice insurance and the like. CONTRACTOR
shall keep the above referenced office generally open to the public from 9:00 a.m. to noon and 1:00
'

p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Mondaythm Thursday and Fridays from 9:00 am. to 12:00 noon excepting holidays
observed by Payette County. Further, CONTRACTOR agrees to be generally available at the above
referenced office dUl'itig regular business bouts except as the court calendar, vacation, illness, and
other absences may preclude.
6. All ptofessional legal personnel assisting the CONTRACTOR in performing under this
contract shall be employees or contract personnel with the CbNTRACTOR They shall not be
empioyees ofPayette County and no benefits shall be expended for them by the County. It is clearly
understood and agreed by both parties to this contract that the relationship established by this contract
is that of independent contractor. The CONTRACTOR agrees that he is an independent contractor

and as such has the sole employment and personnel relationship with any professional legal staff
serving him and performing the services under this contract

3
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except to the extent that said conflict exists due to CONTRACTOR'S private practice. To the extent
CONTRACTOR cannot represent a Defendant in any particular matter where the public defender is
appointed due to a confli~t that exists due to CON1RACTOR' S private practice, the expenses for
such representation shall be deducted from the monthly payments provided for herein as they are
incurred.
8. The CONTRACTOR shall provide to the COUNTY, in timely fashion, all reports required
by the Idaho Code, and shall further file any other reports relating to the operation of his office
reasonably requested by the County in its efforts to maintain an efficient criminal justice system.
It is understood by both parties to this agreement that the reports requested by the COUNTY shall not

include information which would violate the individual constitutional rights of the indigent persons
being represented by the CON1RACTOR.
9. Should this contract not be renewed, all cases which have b~en assigned to the
CONTRACTOR by the end of the Contract term, i.e., September 30, 2014, and which cannot be
reasonably assigned to a new attorney, shall be handled as a "Hold-Over" case by the
CONTRACTOR at the rate of $85.00 per hour. On each case which is a "hold-over" upon
completion of the contract the CONTRACTOR will bill and itemize services performed. Any
case which is open at the end of the contractual term but which is open only for the purpose of
awaiting sentence or entry of fmal plea will not be included as a billable, "hold-over case" and
there will be no extra charge made by the CONTRACTOR. Provided, however, if the contract is
not renewed but not assigned to another attorney, the contract shall automatically renew on a
month. to month basis.
4
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10. The parties to the contract agree that in the event a special circumstance offense arises
the two parties will negotiate to determine whether a supplemental agreement is necessary. For
these purposes a "special circumstance"' offense would be a homicide case wherein the state seeks the
death penalty. In such case, where perhaps more than two or more separate attorneys would have to
become involved, extraordinary expenses might be necessaiy.
11. This contract does not include any costs of transcripts, or any expenses of trial,
investigation or appeal for which the Court may approve expenditures

It is understood by

CONTRACTOR that there are limited funds placed in other budget line items that have been created
by COUNTY which may be drawn upon by CONTRACTOR for such expenses, or other expenses
related to the defense of indigent clients, such as investigators, expert witnesses, or necessary travel
expenses. CONTRACTOR may draw on such funds by obtaining ad.vane approval for such expenses
from the district judge or magistrate having jurisdiction over the case; provided, however, that in no
event shall COUNTY be liable or responsible for any costs or expenses for any appeals for other
proceedings that fall within the jurisdiction of the State Appellant Public Defender's office pursuant
to Idaho Code 19,..867, et. Seq., and as amended.
12. This agreement can be terminated by either party at any time during the term thereof by
giving thirty (3 0) days notice of such intention in writing and delivered by certified mail. Provided,
however, this agreement may be modified or cancelled should the state or federal legislatw:e or courts

ofproper Jqrisdiction requh'e a modification of Payette County's public defender services. Further, if
it becomes clear to CONTRACTOR that these terms do not provide adequate resources for him to
perform his full duties hereunder, he may seek to renegotiate the said terms with the COUNTY by
scheduling a meeting with the Board of County Commissioners.
5
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13. Wherefore, in the interest of providing for Payette County the most efficient possible
defense services for those indigents declared to be needy of criminal defense services by the Courts,
the COUNTY and the CON1RACTOR enter into the above agreement.
Dated this J.5

~ of August, 20 if

AITEST:

Payette ounty Commissioners

~

Coun of Payette, State ofldaho

,J,l

.Q~'l..:.t

Dated tbis..2.:f'" day of August, 26-:t:3".

~
PIIlLLIP B. HEERSINK, Attorney at Law
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SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE PAYETTE COUNTY
PUBLIC DEFENDER CONTRACT .
lt shall be the duty of the Payette County Public Defender(s) to provide
representation for the following matters:
1. All city and county misdemeanors

2. All felonies
3. Representation of the parent, or both parents if there is no conflict, and the

child/guardian ad litem in child protection actions

4. Persons held on mental holds
5. Juveniles

6. Post coflviction relief

7. Conflicts for one (1) co-defendant in all misdemeanot and felony cases
8. All appeals which originate in magistrate or district court, subject to the

jurisdiction of the State Appellate Public Defender

9. All. cases and matters pend:ihg with the current Payette Colll\ty Public
Defender at the time the new contract period begins
10. Second chair in any capital case (The second chair shall not be compensated

any additional funds)

Other duties:
Ceitain Administrative Duties: In order to provide the raw data for the statutorily
required annual report, (pursuant to :Cdaho Code, Section 19-864) the contl'act
holder must submit to the County and the Administrative District Jucige an
~ocounting of its books i;m.d records appertaining to the public defendet1s work on
the last day of January for eacp. contract yeat and mote often if requested by the
County and the Administrative District Judge.
Qualifications:
Any person submitting a proposal must be qualified and able to practice law :iµ the
State ofidaho. Flui.her ail applicant must be qualified, or capable and willing to
Public Defender Specifications 1
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become qualified to sit second chair in a capital case by the time such
qualifications ~ay become necessary.
Pursuant to Idaho Code, Sections 19-859, 19-860, 19-861 and any other
applicable laws of the State of Idaho, those entities or individuals responding to
this Request for Proposal must demonstrate their qualifications and compliance
with these statutes. Any chosen contract public defender shall be subject to
periodic reviews by the Administrative District Judge and the Board of County
Commissioners to ensure that services are being provid~d as contracted for and
that complaints as to the service provided are corrected in due course.
Payette County will provide funds to compensate and sh?ll find ·additional counsel for the
following matters:
=i. Lead counsel in capital cases.
2. Additional attomeys in matters involving three (3) or more co-defendants,

when

the co-defendants must be represented by separate counsel.

3. The second parent appearing in a child protection case, when the 9ourt orders
that each parent shall be represented by r:,eparate counsel, and one pareut is .
already represented by the Payette County Public Defender or his/her
designee.
4. Additional expenses, such as DNA tests, or investigative services shall be paid

by the County upon prior application and approval to the district judge and/or
county commissioners for those defendants qualifying for the public defe:q_der.
Your proposal should include the following:
1. How you propose to manage the above requirements.

2. The dolla.r amount of the service. Your final cost must include rental space,
copy service, office supplies, secretarial service, additional employees and
overhead costs.

/

I

I

I

3. Any other information or proposed terms not specifically addressed may be
submitted.

·1

I

:

I;>µe t9 the conflicts and the number. of defendants qualifying for the public defendey; it
will be necessary for at least two (2) persons to contract .with the County to fulfill the above
Public Defender Specifications 2
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requirements or for the recipient of the contract to subcontract a portion of the con1J:act. The
final decision as to whether the contract will be awarded to two (2) persons or will be
mibcontracted by the party awarded the contract will be made by the Board of County
Commissioners, upon recommendation from the District Judge.
·
It is NOT a requirement that the Payette County Public Defender be full-time, however, it
is required that the contract recipient maintain an office located in Payette County which keeps
regular business hours form at least 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Monday
through Thursday and 9:00 am. to 12:00 p.m. on Fridays, and further that the contract recipient
be generally available dUl'ing those office hours and devote sufficient time and resources to the
position to fulfill all terms listed above. If a matter is cale11.dared for the Payette County Public
Defender in the Payette County Court, that matter shall have priority above any matters arising
· from the contract recipient's private caseload. IT SHALL BE THE DUTY OF TIIB PAYETTE
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENQER TO PAY THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH APPOINTING
ADDITIONAL COUNSEL WHEN HE/SHE HAS A CALENDARING OR ETHICAL
CONFLICT, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR ABOVE.
'the Payette County Commissioners reserve the right to reje.ct any and all proposals.
Upon award of the contract, the contract recipient(s) will have 30 days in which to negotiate any
additional terms,and to endorse the contract. Additional contract tenns will be added. Previous
contracts may be reviewed upon request. The contract will begin October 1, 2008 and expire
September 30, 2010. However, in the event of emergency, the contract recipient must be
prepared to asswne all responsibility upon award.
All proposals are to be sealed and delivered to Betty Dressen by September 22, 2008
at 5:00 p.Iil. The award will be made on or about September 25, 2008.

Upon submission of my proposal, I agree to the above terms and conditions.

Signature: - - - - ~ ~ - - -

Please print name: - - - - - - - -

Public Defender Specifications 3
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AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAYETTE COUNTY, IDAHO AND KELLY
WHITING FOR THE PROVISION OF SERVICES OF PUBLIC DEFENDER
The County of Payette, State ofldaho, a political subdivision authorized to enter into
agreements and contracts by Idaho law, acting by and through its Board of County Commissioners
enters into the following agreement with KELLY WHITING, Attorney at Law of Fruitland, Idaho, for
the purpose of providing legal representation to indigent persons in Criminal and Quasi-criminal cases
in Payette County, for the period of October 1, 2014 to September 30, 2016.

Hereinafter, Payette County will be refe1Ted to as the "COUNTY" and KELLY WHITING
will be referred to as the "CONTRACTOR". The parties agree as follows:
1 This agreement shall be for all services and expenses of a public defender for Payette

County for the calendar years stated above, excluding extraordinary expenses as may be determined
by the parties to this agreement. Such extraordinary expenses shall be dete1mined through negotiations
between the parties and shall be authorized only upon written agreement of both parties or in
accordance with Paragraph 11.
2. The COUNTY agrees to pay to the CONTRACTORforthetermabove described, sums to
be payable as follows:
A.
CONTRACTOR agrees to dedicate whatever days per month arenecessmyto provide
the full services required hereunder·to working on matters he is appointed to under this Agreement.
The days that CONTRACTOR performs under this Agreement will be defined as "Public Days/' A
Public Day is any day in which CONTRACTOR must appear in Court for a client he is appointed to
under this Agreement, or any day in which CONTRACTOR works for 5 or more hours on clients he is
appointed to under this Agreement. There is not a limit to the number of days that CONTRACTOR
may use as Public Days in any givenmoilth, due to the requfrement of CONTRACTOR to provide the
legal services agreed to herein.
B.
For each Public Day that CONTRACTOR works, the COUNTY will pay him $560.00.
C.
The CONTRACTOR shall provide an invoice on the first day after the 141h of each
month that the Courts are open in the COUNTY (''Working Day"), and another on the first Working
Day after the 28th of each month. That invoice will identify the Public Days worked in the period after
the last invoice.
1
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D.
The COUNTY shall pay the amounts claimed in said invoice within seven (7) days of
receipt of the invoice.
. 3. CONTRACTOR hereby agrees th.at he shall practice law ind_ependently of any contractor
under a separate public defender contract with Payette County (hereinafter "SEPARATE
CONTRACTOR''), in order to avoid conflicts in representations of their respective clients. The
County shall be responsible for paying no other amounts except as provided for under the terms ofthis
contract.
4. In exchange for the payment by the COUNTY the CONTRACTOR agrees to be available
full time and provide the criminal and quasi-criminal defense services for those persons determined

by the Court to be indigent in the following cas~s:

· A.

All tnisdemeanor charges, including criminal appeals to the district court and
probation violations. This paragraph shall not include cases where the
CONTRACTOR has a conflict due to a prior appointm.eni,underthis contract
or the previous agreement.

B.

All felony cases in which the SEPARATE CONTRACTOR has a conflict in
l'epresentation, including probations violations.

C.

All juvenile charges.

D.

Representation of at least one indigent parent, ifnecessary, or the Guardian ad
Litem, in Child Protective Act, including those child protection cases currently
assigned to CONTRACTOR.

E.

All probation violations where, in the discretion of the
Court, the Public Defender should be appointed to represent the
probationer rather than the attorney who represented the defendant
in the prior criminal proceedings in which the probation was entered.

F.

In all other cases ii;i which the State has an interest, in which it is the
determination of the trial court that it is appropriate that an attorney be
appointed to represent an indigent party.
2
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G.

Appeals from the Magistrate Court to the District Court. .

H.

Post Conviction cases as assigned by the Court.

I.

All cases which are currently assigned to CONTRACTOR pursuant to any
previous agreements/

J.

All services not herein listed but which are listed in specifications for bids
which were submitted to Betty Dressen, County Clerk in response to her
solicitation for such bids in 2008.

5. CONTRACTOR shall maintain an office in Payette County. The CONTRACTOR shall be
responsible to pay CONTRACTORS own expenses, i.e., office space; telephone service; necess~
supplies; Workman's Compensation Insurance, malpractice insurance and the like. CONTRACTOR
shall keep the above referenced office generally open to the public from 9:00 a.m. to noon and 1:00
p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Monday thru Thursday and Fridays from 9:00 am. to 12:00 noon excepting holidays
observed by Payette County. Further, CONTRACTOR agrees to be generally available at the above
referenced office during regular business hours except as the court calendar, vacation, illness, and
other absences may preclude.
6. All professional legal personnel assisting the CON'DlA.CTOR in performing under this
contract shall be employees or contract personnel with the CONTRACTOR. They shall not be
employees of Payette County and no benefits shall be expended for them by the County. It is clearly
tmderstood and agreed by both parties to this contract that the relationship established by this contract
is that of independel).t contractor. The CONTRACTOR agrees that he is an independent contractor
and as such has the sole employment and personnel relationship with any professional legal staff
serving him and performing the services under this contract.

3
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7. The COUNTY shall provide representation for additional conflicts should they occur,
except to the ~xtent that said conflict exists due to CONTRACTOR'S private practice. To the extent
CONTRACTOR cannot represent a Defendant in any particular matter where the public defender is
appointed due to a conflict that exists due to CONTRACTOR'S private practice, the expenses for
such representation shall be deducted from the monthly payments provided for herein as they are
incurred.
8. The CONTRACTOR shall provide to the COUNTY, in timely fashion, all reports required
by the Idaho Code, and shall further file any other reports relating to the operation of his office

reasonably requested by the County in its efforts to maintain an efficient criminal justice system.
It is understood by both parties to this agreement that the reports requested by the COUNTY shall not
incl~de infonnation which would violate the individual constitutional rights of the indigent persons
being represented by the CONTRACTOR.
9. Should this contract not be renewed, all cases which have been assigned to the

CONTRACTOR by the end of the Contract term, i.e., September 30, 2014, and which cannot be
reasonably assigned to a new attorney, shall be handled as a ''Hold-Over" case by the
CONTRACTOR at the rate of $85.00 per hour. On each case which is a 11hold-over 11 upon
completion of the contract the CONTRACTOR will bill and itemize services performed. Any
case which is open at ~e end of the contractual term but which is open only for the purpose of
awaiting sentence or entry of final plea will not be included as a billable, "hold-over case 11 and
there will be no extra charge made by the CONTRACTOR. Provided, however, if the contract is
not renewed but not assigned to another attorney, the contract shall automatically renew on a

month to month basis.
4

000108

..... -

••••• - ... I

.,

10. The parties to the contract agree that in the event a special circumstance offense arises
the two parties will negotiate to determine whether a supplemental agreement is necessary. For
these purposes a" special circumstance" offense would be a homicide case wherein the state s¢eks the
death penalty. In such case, where perhaps more than two or more separate attorneys would have to
become involved, extraordinary expenses might be necessaty.

11. This contract does not include any costs of transcripts, or any expenses of trial,
investigation or appeal for which the Court may approve expenditures

It is understood by

CO~CTOR that there are limited funds placed in o~er budget line items that have been created
by COUNTY which may be drawn upon by CONTRACTOR for such expenses, or other expenses
related to the defense of indigent clients, such as investigators, expe1t witnesses, or necessary travel
expenses. CONTRACTOR may draw on such funds by obtaining advance approval for such
expenses from the district judge or magistrate having jurisdiction ovetthe case; provided, however,
that in no event shall COUNTY be liable or responsible for any costs or expenses for any appeals for
other proceedings that fall within the jurisdiction of the State Appellant Public Defender's office
pursuant to Idaho Code 19-867, et. Seq., and as amended.
12. This agreement can be terminated by either party at any time during the term thereofby
giving thirty (30) days notice of such intention in writing and delivered by certified mail. Provided,
however, this agreement may be modified or cancelled should the state or federal legislature or courts
ofproper jurisdiction require a modification of Payette County's public defender services. Further, if
it becomes clear to CONTRACTOR that these terms do not provide adequate resources for him to
perform his full duties hereunder, he may seek to renegotiate the said terms with the COUNTY by
scheduling a meeting with the Board of County Commissioners.
5
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13. Wherefore, in the interest of providing for Payette County the most efficient possible
defense services for those indigents declared to be needy of criminal defense services by the Courts,
the COUNTY and 1he CONTRACTOR enter into the above agreement.
Dated this~ day of

Ji;!~ .µw

~~
;;s

ATTEST:

.
..Ji.\
/HS)<!+; .,ef
Dated this UJ day of .R:tt'J', ~

~n
Payette County Commissioners
County of Payette, State ofldaho

t.o )~ \ ~

KELLY WHITING, Attomey at Law

.

. ..
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SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE PAYETTE COUNTY
PUBLIC DEFENDER CONTRACT
It shall be the duty of the Payette County Public Defender(s) to provide
representation for the following matters:

1. All city and county misdemeanors
2. All felonies
3. Representation of the parent, or both parents if there is no conflict; and the

child/guardian ad litem in child protection actions

4. Persons held on mental holds
5. Juveniles

6. Post conviction relief
7. Conflicts for one (1) co-defendant in all misdemeanor and felony cases

8. All appeals which originate in magistrate or district court, subject to the
jurisdiction Qf the State Appellate Public Defender

9. All cases and matters pend.ihg with the current Payette County Public
Defender at the tlrr!.~ the new -contract period begins

I 0. Second chair in any capital case (The second chair shall i:iot be compensated
any additio:p.al funds)

Other· duties:
· Certain Administrative Duties: In order to provtde the raw data for the statutorily
required aJJ11ual report, (pursuant to Id$o Cod~, Section 19-864) ilie contract
4older must submit to the County and the Administrative District Judge a11
accounting ofits books and records appertaining to the public defender; s work on
the last day of January for each contract year and more often if requested by the
County and the Administrative District Judge.
Quaii:fications:

Any persqn submitting a proposal must be qualified and able to pr~cp.ce law 4i the
State ofldaho. Further an applicant must be qualified, or capable and willing to
Public Defender Specifications 1
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Pursuant to Idaho Code, Sections 19-859, 19-860, 19-861 and any other
applicable laws of the State of Idaho, those entitle~ or individuals responding to
this Request for Proposal must demonstrate their qualifications and compliance
with these statutes. Any chosen contract public defender shall be subject to
periodic reviews by the Administrativ.e District Judge and the.Board of County
Commissioners to ensure that services are being prbvid¥d as contracted for and
that complaints as to the service provided are corrected in due course.
Payette County Will provide funds to compensate and shall find additional counsel for the
following matters:
1. Lead counsel in capital cases.

2. Additional attorneys in matters involving three (3) or more co-defendants,
when the co-defendants must be represented by separate col,lllSel.
3. The second parent appearing in a child protection case, when th<;: co_urt otders
that each parent shall be represented by ~eparate counsel, and one parent is
already represented by the Payette County Public Defender or his/her
designee.
4. Additional expenses, such as DNA tests, or investigative services shall be paid
by the County upon prior application and approval to the district judge and/or
county commissioners for those defendants qualifying for the public defender.

Your proposal should include the following:
1. How you propose to manage the above requirements.
2. The dollar amount of the service. Your final cost must include rental space,
copy service, office supplies, secretarial service, additional employees and
overhead costs. ·
3. Any other information or proposed terms not specifically addressed may be
submitted.

])µe to the conflicts and the n1:1mber of defendants qualifying for the public defender, it
will be necessary for at least two (2) persons to contract with the County to fulfill the above
Public Defender Specifications 2
000112

•• •• • • •• • •

I

.

or

requirements for the recipient of the contract to subcontract a portion ofthe contract. The
final decision as to whether the contract will be awar4ed to two (2) persons or will be
subcontracted by the party awarded the contract will be made by the Board of County
Commissioners, upon recommendation from the District Judge. ·
It is NOT a requirement that the Payette County Public Defender be full"time, however, it
is required that the contract recipient mamtain an office located in Payette County which keeps
regular business hours form at least 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Monday
thr~mgh Thursday and 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on Fridays, and further that the contract recipient
be genel'ally available dUl'ing those office hours and devote sufficient time and l'esottrces to the
position to fulfill all terms listed above. If a matter is calendared for the Payette County Public
Defender in the Payette County Court, that matter shall have priority above any matters arising
· from the contract recipient's private caseload. IT SHALL BE THE DUTY OF THE PAYETTE
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER TO PAY THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH APPOINTING
ADDITIONAL COUNSEL WHEN HE/SHE HAS A CALENDARING OR ETHICAL
CONFLICT, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR ABOVE.
!he Payette County Commissioners reserve the right to reject any and ~1 proposals,
Upon award of the contract, the contract recipie11t(s) will have 30 days in which to negotiate any
additional tem1s and to endorse the contract. Additional cpntract terms will be added. Previous
contracts may be reviewed upon request. The contract will begin October 1, 2008 and expire
September 30, 2010. However, in the event of emergency, the contract recipient must be
prepared to assume all responsibility upon award.
All proposals are to be sealed and delivered to Betty Dressen by September 22, 2008
at 5:00 p.m. The award will be made on or about September 25, 2008.

Upon submission of my proposal, I agree to the above terms and conditions.

Signature: - - - - - ~ - - - Please print name: - - - - - - - -

Public Defender Specifications 3
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AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAYETTE COUNTY, IDAHO AND KELLY
WIDTING FOR THE PROVISION OF SERVICES OF PUBLIC DEFENDER
The County of Payette, State ofidaho, a political subdivision authorized to enter into
agreements and contracts by Idaho law, acting by and through its Boal.'d of County Commissioners
enters into the following agreement with KELLY WHITING, Attorney at Law of Payette, Idaho, for
the purpose-of providing legal representation to indigent persons in Criminal and Quasi"criminal cases
in Payette County, for the period of October 1, 2012 through September 30, 2014.
Hereinafter, Payette County will be referred to as the 11 COUNTY 11 and KELLY WHITING
will be referred to as the "CONTRACTOR". The parties agree as follows:
1. This agreement shall be one of two contractual provisions for all services and expenses of a
public defender's office for Payette County for the calendar years stated above, excluding
exll'aordinary expenses· as may be determined by the parties to this agreement. Such extraordinary
expenses shall be determined through negotiations between the parties and shall be authorized only
upon written agreement of both parties.
2. The COUNTY agrees to pay to the CONTRACTOR for the term above described, said sum
to be payable as follows:
$10,000 to be paid on the Wednesday after the second Monday of each month during the
term of this contract, commencing October 1, 2012.
3. CONTRACTOR hereby agrees that he shall practice law independently of any contractor

llllder a sepal'ate public defender contract with Payette County (hereinafter "SEPARATE
CONTRACTOR"), in order to avoid conflicts in representations of their respective clients. The
County shall be responsible for paying no other amounts except as provided for under the terms ofthis
contract.
1
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4. In exchange for the payment by the COUNTY the CONTRACTOR agrees to be available
full time and provide the criminal and quasi-criminal defense services for those persons determined

by the Court to be indigent in the following cases:
A.

All misdemeanor charges filed on or after October 1, 2012, including criminal
appeals to the district court and probation violations. This paragraph shall not
include cases where the CONTRACTOR has a conflict due 1:o a prior
appointment under this contract or the previous agreement.

B.

All felony cases in which the SEPARATE CONTRACTOR has a conflict in
representation, and which are arraigned in the District Court on or after
October 1, 2012 including probations violations.

C.

All juvenile charges filed on or after October I, 2012.

D.

Representation of at least one indigent parent, ifnecessary, or the Guardian ad
Litem, in Child Protective Act cases filed on or after October 1, 2012,
including those child protection cases currently assigned to CONTRACTOR.

E.

All probation violations filed on or after October 1, 2012, where, in the
discretion of the Court, the Public Defender should be appointed to represent
the probationer rather ~an the attorney who represented the defendant in the
prior criminal proceedings in which the probation was entered.

F.

In all other cases in which the State has an interest, and which are filed on or
after October 1, 2012, in which it is the determination of the trial court that it
is appropriate that an attorney be appointed to represent an indigent party.

G.

Appeals from the Magistrate Court to the District Court.

H.

All cases which are currently assigned to CONTRACTOR pursuant to his
previous subcontractor's agreement with Phillip B. Heersink.

I.

All services listed in speei:fications for bids which were submitted
to Betty Dressen, County Clerk in response to her solicitation for such bids in
2008, and which is attached hereto.

5. CON1RACTOR shall maintain an office in Payette County. The CONTRACTOR shall be
responsible to pay CONTRACTORS own expenses, i.e., office space; telephone service; necessary
2
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supplies; Wol'kman' s Compensation Insurance, malpractice insurance and the like. CONTRACTOR
shall keep the above referenced office generally open to the public from 9:00 a.m. to noon and 1:00
p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Monday thru Thursday and Frid8:ys from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon excepting holidays
observed by Payette County. Further, CONTRACTOR agrees to be generally available at the above
referenced office during regular business hours except as the court calendru.\ vacation, illness, and
other absences may preclude.
6. All professional legal personnel assisting the CONTRACTOR in performing under this
contract shall be employees or contract personnel with the CONTRACTOR. They shall not be
employees of Payette County and no benefits shall be expended for them by the County. It is clearly
understood and agreed by both parties to this contract that the relationship established by this contract
is that of independent confJ:actor. The CONTRACTOR agrees that he is an independent contractor
and as such has the sole employment and personnel relationship with any professional legal staff
serving him and pe1forrning the services under this contract.
7. The COUNTY shall provide representation for additional conflicts should they occur,
except to the extent that said conflict exists due to CONTRACTOR'S private practice. To the extent
CONTRACTOR cannot represent a Defendant in any particular matter where the public defender is
appointed due to a conflict that exists due to CONTRACTOR'S private practice, the expenses for
such representation shall be deducted from the monthly payments provided for herein as they are
incurred.
8. The CONTRACTOR shall provide to the COUNTY, in timely fashion, all reports required
by the Idaho Code, and shall further file any other reports relating to the operation of his office
reasonably requested by the County in its efforts to maintain an efficient criminal justice system.
3
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It is understood by both parties to this agreement that the reports requested by the COUNTY shall not

include information which would violate the individual constitutional rights of the indigent persons
being represented by the CONTRACTOR.
9. Should this contract not be renewed, all cases which have been assigned to the
CONTRACTOR by the end of the Contract t~rm, i.e., September 30, 2014 and which cannot be
reasonably assigned to a new attorney, shall be handled as a "Hold-Over" case by the
CONTRACTOR at the rate of $85.00 per hour. On each case which is a "hold-over" upon
completion of the contract t~e CONTRACTOR will bill and itemize services performed. Any
case which is open at the end of the contractual term but which is open only for the purpose of
. awaiting sentence or entry of final plea will not be included as a b~lable, "hold-over case" and
there will be no extra charge made by the CONTRACTOR.
10. The parties to the contract agree that in the event a special circumstance offense arises
the two parties will negotiate to determine whether a supplemental agreement is necessary. For
these purposes a "special circumstance" offense would be a homicide case wherein the state seeks the
death penalty. In such case, where perhaps more than two or more separate attorneys would have to
become involved, extraordinary expenses might be necessary. Other special circumstance, but such
are unpredictable and unable to be determined at this time. In the event that such special
circumstance case occurs, the parties shall discuss whether a case qualifies as a special circumstance,
~d shall discuss expenses for unknown projections of change of venue, psychological evaluations of
defendants, living expenses fol' change of venue,. expenses for conflicts of interest attorneys necessary
beyond all of the attorneys available either in the Contractor's office or in his conflicts of interest
offices and other unforeseen expenses which cannot be considered by the contracting parties at this
4
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time. In the event the parties are unable to agree the extraordinary expenses shall be determined by a
District Judge of the Thlrd Judicial District not currently assigned to Payette County.
11. This agreement can be terminated by either party at any time during the term thereof by
giving thirty (30) days notice of such intention in writing and delivered by certified mail.

l'.?, Wherefore, in the interest of providing for Payette County the most efficient possible
defense services for those indigents declared to be needy of criminal defense services by the Courts,
the COUNTY and the CONTRACTOR enter into the above agreement.
Dated'thls 2°d day of July, 2012.

Rudy Endrik ,
Payette County Inill1Ss10ners
County of Payette, State of Idaho

ATTEST:

&te'fi~
Betty~'bressen, Clerk
VJ

J')j

Dated this 2. day o f ~ 2012.

KELLY WHITING, Attorney at Law

5
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AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAYETI'E COUNTY, IDAHO AND PIDLLIP B.
HEERSINK FOR THE PROVISION OF SERVICES OF PUBLIC DEFENDER
The County of Payette, State of Idaho, a political subdivision authorized to enter into
~ements and contracts by Idaho law, acting by and through its Board of County Commissioners
enters into.the following agreement with PHILLIP B. HEERSINK, Attorney at Law of Payette, Idaho,
for
the purpose ofproviding legal representation to indigent persons in Criminal and Quasi-criminal cases
in Payette County, for .the period of October 1, 2012 through September 30, 2014.
Hereinafter, Payette C0tmtywill be referred to as the "COUNTY" andPIIlLLIP B. HEERSINK
·will be referred to as the "CONTRACTOR". The parties agree as follows:
1. This agreement shall be one of two contractual provisions for all services and expenses of a
public defender's office for Payette County for the calendar years stated above, excluding
extraordinary expenses as may be determined by the parties to this agreement. Such extraordinary
(

expenses shall be deter.mined through negotiations between the parties and shall be authorized only
upon written agreement of both parties.
2. The COUNTY agrees to pay to the CONTRACTOR for the term above described, said sum
to be payable as follows:
$8,000 to be paid on the Wednesday after the second Monday of each month during the
term of this contmct, commencing October 1, 2012.
3. CONTRACTOR hereby agrees that he shall practice law independently of any contractor
under a separate public defender contract with Payette County (hereinafter "SEPARATE
CONTRACTOR"), in order to avoid conflicts in representations of their respective clients. The

1
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County shall be responsible for paying no other amounts except as provided for under the terms ofthls
contract

..•
4. In exchange for the payment by the COUNTY the CONTRACTOR agrees to be available
full time and provide 1he criminal and quasi ~criminal defense services for those persons determined
by the Court to be indigent in the following cases:
A.

All felony charges filed on or after October 1, 2012, including probation
violations. This paragraph shall not include cases where the CONTRACTOR
has a conflict due to a prior appointment under this contract or the previous
agreement entered into in 2012.

B.

All misdemeanor cases in which the SEPARATE CONTRACTOR has a
conflict in representation, including criminal appeals to the district court and
probation violations, and including probations violations.

C.

All mental commitment petitions/hearings filed on or after October 1, 2012.

D.

Representation of at least one indigent parent, if necessary, or the Guardian.ad
Litem, in Child Protective Act cases filed on or after October 1, 2012,;
including those child protection cases currently assigned to CONTRACTOR.

E.

All probation violations filed on or after October 1, 2012, where, in the
discretion of the Court, the Public Defender should be appointed to represent
the probationer rather than the attorney who represented the defendant in the
prior criminal proceedings in which the probation wa:s entel'ed.

F.

In all other cases in which the State has an interest, and which are filed on or
after October 1, 2012, in which it is the determination of the trial court that it
is appropriate that an attorney be appointed to represent an indigent party.

G.

Appeals from the Magistrate Court to the District Court.

H.

All cases which are currently assigned to CONTRACTOR pursuant to his
previous public defender agreement with the County.

I.

All services listed in specifications for bids which were submitted
to Betty Dressen, County Clerk in response to her solicitation for such bids in
2008, and which is attached hereto.
2
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5. CONTRACTOR shall maintain an office in Payette County. The CONTRACTOR shall be
responsible to pay CONTRACTORS own expenses, i.e., office space; telephone service; necessary
supplies; Workman's Compensation Insurance, malpractice insurance and the.like. CONTRACTOR
shall keep the above referenced office generally open to the public from 9:00 am. to noon and 1:00
p.m. to S:00 p.m. Monday thru Thursday and Fridays from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon excepting holidays
observed by Payette County. Further, CONTRACTOR agrees to be generally available at the above
referenced office during regular business hours except as the comt calendar, vacation, illness, and
other absences may preclude.
6. All professional leg~l personnel assisting the CONTRACTOR in performing under this
contract shall be employees or contract personnel with the CONTRACTOR. They shall not be
employees of Payette County and no benefits shall be expended for them by the County. It is clearly
understood and agreed by both parties to this contract that the relationship established by this contract
is that of independent contractor. The CONTRACTOR agrees that he is an independent contractor
and as such has the sole ~mployment and personnel relationship with any professional legal staff
serving him and performing the services under this contract.
7. The COUNTY shall provide representation for additional conflicts should they occur,
except to the extent that said conflict exists due to CONTRACTOR'S private practice. To the extent
CONTRACTOR cannot represent a Defendant in any particular matter where the public defender is
appointed due to a conflict that exists due to CONTRACTOR'S private practice, the expenses for
such repl'esentation shall be deducted from the monthly payments provided for herein as they are
incurred.

3
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It is understood by both parties to this agreement that the reports requested by the COUNTY shall not

include information which would violate the individual constitutional rights of the indigent persons
being represented by the CONTRACTOR.
9. Should tbis contract not be renewed, all cases which have been assigned to the
CON1RACTOR by the end of the Contract term, i.e., September 30, 2014 and which cannot be
reasonably assigned to a new attorney, shall be handled a~ a "Hold-Over" case by the
CONTRACTOR at the rate of $85.00 per hour. On each case which is a "hold-over" upon
completion of the contract the CONTRACTOR will bill and itemize services performed. Any
case which is open at the end of the contractual term but which is open only for the purpose of
awaiting sentence or entry of final plea will not be included as a billable, "hold-over case" and
there will be no extra charge made by the CONTRACTOR.
10. The parties to the contract agree that in the event a special circumstance offense arises
the two parties will negotiate to determine whether a supplemental agreement is necessary. For
these purposes a "special circumstance" offense would be a homicide case wherein the state seeks the
death penalty. In such case, where perhaps more than two or more separate attorneys would have to
become involved, extraordinary expenses might be necessary. Other special circumstance, but such
are unpredictable and unable to be determined at this time. In the event that such special
circumstance case occurs, the parties shall discuss whether a case qualifies as a special circumstance,
and shall discuss expenses for unknown projections of change of venue, psychological evaluations of
defendants, living expenses for change of venue, expenses for conflicts of interest attomeys necessary
beyond all of the attomeys available either in the Contractor's office or in his conflicts of interest
offices and other unforeseen expenses which cannot be considered by the contracting parties at this
4
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and shall discuss expenses for tmknown projections of change of venue, psychological evaluations of
defendants, living expenses for change of venue, expenses for conflicts of interest attorneys necessary
beyond all of the attomeys available either in the Contractor's office or in his conflicts of interest
offices and other unforeseen expenses which cannot be considered by the contracting parties at this
time. In the event the parties are unable to agree the extraordinary expenses shall be determined by a
District Judge of the Third Judicial District not currently assigned to Payette County.
11. This agreement can be terminated by either party at any time during the term thereof by
giving thirty (30) days notice of such intention in writing and delivered by certified mail.

12. Wherefore, in the interest of providing for Payette County the most efficient possible

defense services for those indigents declared to be needy of criminal defense services by the Courts,
the COUNTY and the CONTRACTOR enter into the above agreement.
Dated this 2nd day of July, 2012.

R ~
Payette County Commissioners
County of Payette, State ofldaho

ATTEST:
~.Qc~

e'i.Ysen, Clerk

i~

Dated this~ day of

, 2012.
PHILLIP B. HEERSINK, Attomey at Law

5
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CONTRACT FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION
OF INDIGENTS
THIS CONTRACT is made and entered into between the County of Gem, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, by and through its representative, the Board of County
Commissioners, hereinafter called "County", and Mimura Law Offices, PLLC, hereinafter called
"Public Defender."
WHEREAS, the aforementioned County has the legal obligation to provide for legal
representation of indigent persons within its boundaries, and
WHEREAS, it is mutually agreed by the parties to this Contract for Legal
Representation of fudigents that the term of this Contract shall be from October I, 2007, to
September 30, 2008, subject to renewal, by written agreement, for an additional one-yeaiterm at an
agreed upon amount to be determined no later than July 1st 2008; and
WHEREAS, the continued contracting for public defender services is in the best
interest of the County in promoting the efficient administration of justice, continuity for the indigent
clientele needing legal services, and conforms to the highest standard of due process of law
guaranteed by our State and Federal constitutions; and
WHEREAS, the County Commissioners of the aforementioned County have
mutually agreed to contract with Public Defender, to provide such representation in the County.
NOW, WITNESSETH:
The County has employed, and does hereby contract with Public Defender to
hereafter, for the term of this contract, act as counsel to any needy or indigent person who has a
legal right to court appointment of counsel to represent him or her and who shall come within the
jurisdiction of the courts of this County, as herein provided. Specifically included, but not limited
to, any needy or indigent person who is being detained by a law enforcement officer, or any person
who is under formal charge of having committed or is being detained under a conviction of a
serious crime as defined in Idaho Code Section 19-851; proposed patients in commitment
proceedings, parents or children under the jurisdiction of the Child Protective Act, the Termination
of Parent and Child Relationship Act or the Juvenile Corrections Act; and all other persons for
whom the County has a legal obligation to provide legal representation, with the exception of any
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or any proceeding under the Post Conviction Relief Act.
The Public Defender shall provide for such needy persons all legal services to which they are, or
may become, entitled under the Constitution of the United States or the laws of the State ofldaho.
It is understood that Gem County will participate in the Idaho Capital Crimes
Defense Program and the State Public Defender Appellate Program. ·
CONTRACT FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENTS - Page 1
Dl 10-23-07/ reviewed 10-23-2007; modified w/DH changes 10-25-2007
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Iti~ understood and agreed by the parties that the court concerned ,vith the foregoing
matters shall detertnin~ whether. _a p~rson desirjng se~ces of the Public Defender is a "needy or
indigent person" \Vlthin the meaning of the statute autliorizing the appointment.
It is further understooa. 'and agreed that Public Defender sh.ail at all times during this
agreement be, and remain, Professioµal Liprited :pa~ility G~mpany whose current managing
members a,re licensed to practice law in this state, and that any attorney(s) providing services under
this Contract will-be 9ompetent to counsel an1 represent~ indigent person in legal proceedings.

:a

,

Gem County shall pay the sum of One Hundred, Eighty-One Thousand, Five
Hundred dollars and no cents.($ 181,500.00) for Public Defender services from October 1, 2007,
to September 30, 2008, to Pu,blic" Defe11der. This .amount shall be paid in twelve (12) equal
monthly :mstallments of Fifteen Thousand,- ·one Hundred and Twenty-Five dollars and no cents
($ 15,125.00) 'aue' and payable on e>r before the last bu~iness day of each month.
.

-

. , It is further understood that the Public Defender shall maintain a lawyer's
professional li~bility insurance poµcy for' the~sel~e·s and their staff covering representation of
clients assigned by the ·court for representation by the Office of the Public Defender. The Public
Defender further agree_s to hold the County h~ess for any claims of malfeasance or misfeasance
,brought against ilie Coimty by any person for whom representation is provided by the Public
D~fender under direction of the court.
It is further' understood and agreed that Public Defender shall submit a report to the
Board of C<?tlllty Commissioners of the County on or about June 1, 2008, for informational
purposes to plan for the following fiscal year's budget. ,

· It is further understood and agreed that Public Defender shall file an affidavit of
attorneys fees, or orally advise the Court of any fees earned in appointed cases in which it provides
legal services and will seek an order of reimbursement on behalf of the County where appropriate.

In the event that an ethical conflict exists as a result of the Public Defender's
representation of any client, the Public Defender shall notify the court, the court shall appoint
alternate counsel. The Public Defender shall pay the first said alternate counsel compensation for
attorney's fees and costs incurred by alternate counsel at the rate of $70.00 per hour as per
Administrative Order; or the amount provided by any change in Administrative Order during the
term(s) of this Agreerµent. The Public Defender shall also be responsible for payment of any
additional conflict counsel appointed by the Court in any proceedings brought under the Child
Protective Act. With that exception, the County shall be responsible for contracting with and
paying any conflict counsel beyond the first conflict counsel appointed by the Court in any
particular ,case -during the term of this contract. The Public Defender agrees that any conflict
Public Defender shall be licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho and competent to defend and
represent indigent persons in legal proceedings and will obtain from each so qualified conflict
coun~el a written 8;greement to pold tb,e Coup.ty harmless from any claims of malfeasance or
misfeasance brought against the County by any person for whom representation is provided by any
CONTRACT FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENTS- Page 2
Dl 10-23-07/ reviewed 10-23-2007; modified w/DH changes 10-25-2007
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conflict Public Defender appointed by the Court.

It is agreed that Public Defender will maintain an office and staff in Emmett, Idaho.

.

The parties understand and agree that an actual business office shall be established and shall be
open for business between the hours of approximately 9:00 am through 12:00 pm and 1:00 pm
through 4:00 pm Monday through Thursday, and shall be available by telephone between
approximately 9:00 am through 5:00 pm on Fridays. The Public Defender may be closed for
federally recognized and County holidays.

'

It is further understood by the parties of this Contract that in the event a specialcircumstance offense arises, the two parties will negotiate to determine a supplemental agreement.
For these purposes, a "special-circumstance" offense is where the offense of murder js charged,
whether with one or with multiple defendants. Where a defendant is accused of murder, one or
more attorneys may need to be involved and extraordinary expenses, which are unpredictable and
cannot be determined at this time, may become necessary. These extraordinary expenses may
include, but ·are not limited to, attorney's fees, psychological evaluation and expert testimony,
ballistics and forensic scientific testing and expert testimony, change of venue expenses, and
conflict-of-interest attorneys. In the event the parties are unable to agree, the extraordinary
expenses shall be determined by a committee consisting of the Chairman of the Board of Gem
County Commissioners, the sitting lawyer-magistrate for Gem County, and a representative of the
Gem County Prosecuting Attorney's Office. Special-circumstance expenses shall be utilized only
by the approval and order of the district court and these expenses shall be paid by the County.
This agreement may be terminated by either party at any time during the term
thereof by giving thirty (30) days' notice of such intention in writing and delivered by certified mail.
This agreement is binding on the heirs, executors, administrators, successors and
assigns of the parties hereto, but nothing herein shall be construed to permit a substitution of parties
without consent of all parties hereto.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands on the day and
year set forth below.

G E M _ ~ OF COMMISSIONERS

lfnw
Michele Sherrer, Chairman

/{- 7-JiOOJ
Date

ATTEST:

GEM COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
CONTRACT FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENTS - Page 3
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Mimura Law Offices, PLLC
Susan Lynn Mimura, Chairman
'* .,

•.,
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. THIS CONTRACT i~ ~ade and entered into between th~ County· 9f Gem, a
political subdivision of the State o{Idaho, by and through its representative, the Board of County
Commissioners, hereinafter called ,iComity", and Mimura Law Offices, PLLC, hereinafter called
"Public Defender."
··

•

•
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. · OF INDIGENTS

.

WHEREAS, it is mutually agreed by the parties to this Contract for Legal
Representation of Jndigents that the term of this Contract shall be from October 1, 2010, to
30, 2011,
subject
to renewal, by written agreement, for an additional
one-year term at an
. September
.,
.. .
.
.
agreed upon ~ount to be determined no later than July 1, 2011; and

.~

(.

•

-.

WHE~AS, the aforementioned County has the legal obligation to provide for legal
representation of iniligent persons :vvithin its boundaries, and

•.
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WHEREAS,' contracting for public defender se~ices is in the best interest of the
County in promoting the efficient administration of justice, and conforms to the highest standard of
due process of law gu~anteeq. by our ~tate and F~deral constitutions; and

'· ..

· WHEREAS, the County Commissioners of the aforementioned County have
mutually agreed to cong-act with Public Defender, to provide such representation in the County.
NOW, WI1NESSETH:
The County· has employed, and does hereby contract ·with Public Defender to
hereafter, for -µie term of this contract, act as counsel to any needy or indigent person who has a
legal right to court appointment of counsel to represent him or her and who shall come within the
jurisdiction of the courts of this County, as herein provided. Specifically included, but not limited
to, any needy or indigent person who is being detained by a law e.nforcement officer, or any person
who is under formal charge of having committed or is being detained under a conviction of a
serious crime as defin~d. in Idaho Code Section 19-851; proposed patients in commitment
proceedings, parents or children under the jurisdiction of the Child Protective Act, the Termination
of Parent and Child Relationship Act or the Juvenile Corrections Act; and all other persons for
whom the County has a legal obligation to provide legal representation, with the exception of any
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or any proceeding under the Post Conviction Relief Act.
The Public Defender shall provide for such needy persons all legal services to which they are, or
may become, entitled under the Constitution of the United States or the laws of the State ofldaho.

It is w:iderstood. that Gem County will pru:ticipate . i~ .tJ:i~ Idaho Capital Crimes
Defense Program and the State Public Defender Appellate Program.
It is understood and agreed by the parties that the court concerned with the foregoing
matters shall determine whether a person desiring services of the Public Defender is a "needy or
indigent person" within the meaning of the statute authorizing the appointment.
CONTRACT FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENTS - Page 1
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. . . It is further understood and agreed that Public Defender shall at all times during this
agreement 'be, ~d remafu., ···a ..P,rofessional. Limited Li~bility Company whose current managing
members :ate licensed to practice law in, this state, and _that any attorney(s) provifug services UJ;J.der
this Contfact will be competent to _counsel and represent an indigent person in legal pro~eedings .

.

Gem County shall pay the sum of One Hundred Eighty Thousand Dollars

($180,000) for Public Defender services from October I, 2010, to September 30, 2011, to Public
Defender:· This amollilt ·shall 1:fo paid in t~elve (12) equ~ monthly installments. of Fifteen
Thousand Dollars ($15,000) due and payable on the last business day of each month..
.
.
-.-

...
,
It is further understood that th_e Public Defender shall maintain a lawyer's
professional liability insurance policy for themselves and their· staff covering representation of
clients assigned by the court for representation by the Office of the Public Defender. The ·Public
. Defender further agrees to hold the County. hannless for any claims or'malfeasance or misfe~ance
· · brought ·against the ·county by ~y,person· for whom rypresentation. i.s provided by the P~blic
. , Defender under dire9tion of the court. .
~

~·s ~;

'-

••

;
It is _further ~derstood ·and ~greed that Public Defende~ shall submit a report to the
Board. of Cqunty Commissioners of the County on or about June 1, 2011, for infonnational
purpose's to plan. for the following :fispal year's budget.
· It is further understood and agreed that Public Defender shall file an affidavit of
attorneys fees earned in every case in which they provide legal services and seek an order of
reimbursement on behalf of the County in each case.

· In the event that an ethical conflict exists as a result of the Public Defender's
representation of any client, the Public Defender· shall notify the court, the court shall appoint
alternate counsel. The Public Defender shall pay the first said alternate counsel compensation for
attorney's fees and costs incurred by alternate counsel at the rate of $75.00 per hour· as per
administrative order. The Public Defender shall also be responsible for payment of any additional
· conflict ·counsel appointed by the Court in any proceedings brought under the Child Protective
Act. With that exception, the County shall be responsible for contracting with anp paying any
conflict counsel beyond the first conflict counsel appointed oy the Court in any particular case
during the term of this contract. The Public Defender agrees that any conflict Public Defender
shall be licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho and competent to defend and represent
indigent persons in legal proceedings and will obtain from each so qualified conflict counsel a
written agreement to hold the County hannless from any claims of malfeasance or misfeasance
brought against the County by any person for whom representation is provided by any conflict
Public Defender appointed by the Court.

It is agreed that Public Defender will maintain an office and staff in Emmett, Idaho.
The parties understand and agree that an actual business office shall be established and shall be
open for business between the hours of approximately 9:00 am through 12:00 pm and 1:00 pm
through 5:00 pm Monday through Thursday, and between approximately 9:00 am through 12:00
CONTRACT FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENTS - Page 2
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' . · · •. lt is further µnde:rstood by the parties of-this Contract ·that in the 'event a special~
circumstance offense arises,''the two parties vvill negotiate to determine a supplemental agreement.
For these purposes, a ''special-circumstance" ·offense is· where the offense of murder is charged,
wheth~r with one or with multiple· defend?JltS. Where a defendant. is accused of murder, one or
more attorneys may need to be involved and extraordinary expenses, which are unpredicJable and
cannQt be determined at this time, may become necessary. These _extraordinary expenses may
in,clude," out' are !IOt limited to: attorney's fees; psychological -evaluation and 'e:xperf tesfun~ny,
ballistics and forensic scientific testing and expert testimony, change of venue expenses, and
conflict-of-interest attorneys. . In the event the parties are unable to agree, the extraordinary
expenses shall be determined by a committee consisting of the Chairman of the Board of Gem
County Commissioners, the sitting lawyer-magistrate for Gem County, and a representative of the
Gem County Prosecuting Attorney's Office. Special-circumstance expenses shall be utilized only
by the approval and order of th~ district court and these expenses shall be paid by the County.

- ,.

.

This agreement may be terminated_ by either party at any time during the term
• thereof by giving thirty (30) days' .notice of such intention in writing and delivered by certified mail.

.

.
,
This agreement is _binding on the heirs, executors, administrators, successors and
assigns· of the parties hereto, but nothing herein shall be construed to permit a substitution of parties
without consent of ~I pm-ties her~to.

IN 'WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands on the day and
year set forth below.
GEM COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

Lan Smith, Chairman

Date

ATTEST:

Shelly Gannon, Gem County Clerk
GEM COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

Mimura Law Offices, PLLC

Date

CONTRACT FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENTS - Page 3
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PUBLIC DEFENDER CONTRACT
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ThiS agreement is entered into this ~'day o ~ r , ~ ' by and between Custer
County, State ofldaho, a political subdivision of the State ofidaho, hereinafter "COUNTY", and
David Cannon, attorney at law, who is licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho, hereinafter
"ATTORNEY".
WITNESSETH

WHEREAS, the County_ of Custer, State ofldaho, desires to contract with the above
attorney at law for legal services to be provided to Custer County and for the legal representation
of indigent persons who are charged with criminal offenses and who are eligible for the services
of a court appointed attorney, and for the legal services as set forth hereafter, and
WHEREAS, the Attorney desires to accept the responsibilities and benefits described in
this agreement;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements contained
in this document, the parties to this agreement hereby stipulate and contract as follows:
1
DUTIES
The Attorney agrees to perform as a Public Defender and shall perform all the duties
required by law of a Public Defender, as listed in Idaho Code § 19-852, including the following:

--......

1. Representallindigent persons who are under formal charge, of having committed or
being detained under a conviction <;>fa serious crime, when appointed by a court of law.
2. Represent all indigent persons in Juvenile Corrections Act (Idaho Code § 20-50 I et.
seq.) proceedings and any other juvenile proceedings when appointed by a co~ of law.
3. Represent all indigent persons sentenced from Custer County, when those persons file
Uniform Post Conviction proceedings when appointed by a court of law.
4. Represent all indigent persons who are involved in involuntary civil commitment
proceedings, when appointed by a court of law.
5. Represent all indigent persons who are involved in Appeals, at all levels, to higher
courts, except the Idaho State Court of Appeals, the Idaho Supreme Court, and Federal Courts,
when appointed by a court of law.

6. Represent all indigent persons who are charged with probation violations, when
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appointed by a court of law.
7. Represent children, indigent parents, guardians, or others in Child Protection Act
(Idaho Code§ 16-1602 et seq.) proceedings, when appointed by a court of law.
8. The Attorney shall not be required to represent any persons who are involved in
guardianship or conservatorship unless appointed by a court of law and unless said Attorney is
provided additional compensation for the perfol'11)ance of those functions; said compensation
shall be paid from the contingent District Court Fund provided this purpose and other purposes
set forth in this document.
9. The Attorney shall be paid extra compensation at the rate of$65.00 per hour and
reasonable expenses for defenses of the following: ·
a) Capital Offenses;
b) Potential Capital Offenses
c) Attempted Capital Offenses

II
LIMITATIONS
It is agreed the Attorney inay engage in the private criminal and civil practice of law as
provided in the Canons of Ethics of the Idaho State Bar and the American Bar Association as
long as said private practice does not violate said canons of ethics.

III
ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES
.. The Attorney shall assume all of the responsibilities required of a Public Defender , when
appointed by a Court, beginning July 1, 2012. It is specifically agreed t}?.at the Attorney shall
assqme the responsibility to represent all indigent persons who are eligible for a court appointed
attorney ori or subsequent to July 1, 2012, ,and he shall also be responsible for the representation
of indigent persons who have cases pending and who have been represented by a court appointed
attorney prior to July 1, 2012. A few select indigents who already have appointed counsel other
than the Attorney and whose best interest would be served by the continuation of the present
appointed counsel shall continue as such outside the terms of this agreement.

IV
TERM OF CONTRACT
It is specifically agreed that the term of this contract and the agreements and provisions
whi.ch are the subject to this contract, shall be in effect from July 1, 2012 through July 1, 2017.
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V
COMPENSATION

It is specifically agreed that Custer County shall pay to the Attorney who has executed
this agreement, during the term of this contract, the sum of FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN DOLLARS ($4,167.00) per month, FIFTY THOUSAND
DOLLARS ($50,000) per year, with the first payment to be made on the last day of the month of
July, 2012, and equal monthly installments to be made on the last day of each month thereafter. It
being further understood that the contract will·be reviewed at regular intervals to determine the
need for upward adjustment and contract·modification based on economic factors at the time .
. However, under no circumstances will the County pay less than the amount setforth herein. The
first review shall take place during the regular County Commissioners meeting in July, 20'13 and
regular reviews to be held at one year intervals thereafter. It being understood by the parties
hereto that if the Attorney shall exceed, fifty (50) hours per month, such additional time spent
shall be compensated at the rate of SIXTY-FIVE DOLLARS ($65.00) per hour. It being further
understood that the Attorney shall not charge Custer County for the trav~l expenses. H_owever,
should the County be unable to increase the payment to compensate for said additional time
being expended on behalf of this contract, the contract may be terminated by the parties hereto
without further penalty or liability. At the time of termination, those cases which are currently
being served by the Attorney to this agreement shall continue at the current Seventh District
Court appointed attorney fee rate. Each installment payment shall be paid to the Attorney on or
before the last day of each month, provided that the Attorney shall file with Custer County on a ·.
monthly basis a claim form indicating the services provided pursuant to this contract.
VI
COMPENSATION INCLUSIONS

The compensation provided for in the preceding paragraph is the total compensation
which shall be paid to the Attorney and includes all compensation that may be paid to any
assistant or other attorneys· who may be employed as independent contractors or otherwise by the
attorney. The compensation is also the total compensation which shall be provided for clerks,
stenographers, secretaries, paralegals and other persons that the Attorney may hire, and the
compensation shall also include the total compensation for appropriate office facilities, furniture,
equipment, books, postage, paper supplies, other facilities and supplies and travel expenses,
which are required to perform the terms and provisions of this contract, except that it is
specifically agreed that the total compensation listed in the preceding paragraphs with that title
shall not include compensation which may be provided to the Attorney for extraordinary services
which may be provided and which may be compensated from a contingent District Court fund
specifically establjshed for the purpose of providing compensation to Public Defenders for
extraordinary services that are provided to indigent persons pursuant to court appointment.
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VII
EXTRAORDINARY COMPENSATION

It is specifically agreed that a District Court fund shall be established for the purpose of
providing compensation to the Attorney for the performance of the extraordinary duties required
of a Public Defender and when he is required to pursue any appeal to the District Court which
requires the filing of necessary appeal pleadings, the preparation and printing and filing of an
appeal brief or briefs. It is also agreed that additional compensation shall be provided when the
Attorney appointed by the Court to represent indigent persons in guardianship, conservatorship
and child protection proceedings. It is also specifically agreed that additional compensation shall
be paid for actual out-of-pocket expenses, which are incurred by the Attorney, in handling the
items set forth in this paragraph, said expenses shall include but not be limited to the following:
1. Expenses for printing, binding and mailing of briefs.
2. Investigations, experts and/or psychiatric and medical examinations.
It is further agreed that the additional compensation provided for the performance of the
extraordinary services set forth above shall be claimed and paid, based subject to a determination
of reasonableness by the Custer County Commissioners. It is further agreed that the out-ofpocket expenses which are incurred for the performance of extraordinary services as set forth
above·, shall be claimed and paid when properly verified and considered reasonable by the Custer
County Commissioners.

VIII
CONFLICTS

It is specifically agreed that the Attorney is not required to employ other attorneys, who
are competent and qualified to practice law within the State of Idaho, for the performance of the
services required of a Public Defender when the party to this agreement has a conflict of interest
and is unable to represent a particular indigent defendant. It is further agreed that in the event
there is such a conflict which cannot be handled by the attorney, additional compensation shall be
allowe~ to other attorneys who are required to be employed and appointed by the Court for the .
representation of indigent persons. The compensation required for the payment of attorneys who
handle these additional conflicts shall be paid from the contingent District Court fund. Any and
all fees to be paid for compensation to attorneys who handle these co¢1icts will be set and paid
by the Court. The parties to this agreement hereby authorize any District Court Judge or
Presiding Magistrate of the Seventh Judicial District of the State ofldaho to approve the
appointment of reasonable counsel in conflict situations that cannot be handled by the Attorney
and the parties to this agreement further authorize the Custer County Commissioners to rule upon
compensation paid to those attorneys who handle such additional conflicts. The parties to this
agreement further agree that a motion for the appointment of legal counsel because of a conflict
may be made by the Attorney at any time. It is further agreed that the motion must be granted,
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prior to the incurring of any expenses by separate appointed counsel in all cases.

IX
RECORDS
In addition to the requirements set forth in the Idaho Code and the terms and provisions
of this contract, the Attorney agrees that he shall prepare and make available to the office of the
County Commissioners of Custer County, on a periodic basis subject to a timely and reasonable
request, a statement of all financial expenditures that have been made by the Attorney, certifying
the dollar amounts spent during the previous record keeping period in fulfilling the terms of this
contract. These records shall be available to the Custer County Commissioners, following a
timely and reasonable request, for an inspection of said records. The Custer County
Commissioners specifically agree that all records kept by the Attorney shall be kept confidential,
for all purposes, except for calculations necessary for future Public Defender contracts .
.X

COOPERATION
The Attorney agrees to cooperate with the Courts and with Custer County and Custer
County agencies in the procuring of financial information from the indigent persons for whom
the Attorney shall provide court appointed legal services. This cooperation is understood to mean
that the Attorney may question and examine each indigent person whom he is appointed to
represent for the purpose of obtaining financial information which shall disclose the assets and
liabilities of the indigent client. It is specifically agreed that the Court system shall require at least
one financial statement, under oath, for an indigent client, prior to the time the Court makes a
determination that the indigent person is eligible for the services of Court appointed legal
counsel, or within a short period of time following the appointment by the Court. The Attorney
further agrees to supply to Custer County and Custer County Court system, upon reasonable
request, an estimate of the time spent and the effort expended in the representation of any
indigent client so that the Court may order the indigent to reimburse County for the expense of
the Public Defender representation.
XI
NOTIFICATION
The Attorney agrees that he will do everything within reason to notify the trial court and
the Custer County Prosecuting Attorney at the Court Clerks of proposed changes in Court
schedules or jury trial schedules or other Court appearances, as necessitated for any reason, at
least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the scheduled trial or other Court appearance.
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This contract for the performance of the duties required of the Public Defender, and for
the compensation and benefits that are agreed to in consideration of the performance of those
2012, by the parties whose signatures appear
duties, is entered into this~ day ofT.;

ld . . ,

below.

J_~~Q

David Cannon

nty hainnan
Board of County Commissioners

I
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. Clerkoi'tfu(court
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CUSTER COUNTY CONFLICT PUBLIC DEFENDER CONTRACT
WHEREAS, Custer County is required by statute or court order to furnish legal representation to certain
needy, indigent, minor, and incapacitated persons at county expense,
WHEREAS, Custer County finds that from time to time the attorneys who are employed to provide such
representation may have a conflict or may not have the qualifications to handle a crime which is a
capital offense,
WHEREAS, it behooves Custer County to contract with an attorney to handle such cases and to
contract with said attorney for a certain prescribed hourly amount prior to representation,
WHEREAS, Mr. Fred Snook is an experienced attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho
and is competent to counsel, advise, and represent persons to whom other representation may not be
available,
THEREFORE, Custer County and Fred Snook, Esq. hereby agree to the following:
1. Representation. Fred Snook agrees to represent the individuals, to the best of his ability, to
whom Custer County owes a duty to provide legal representation and to whom Custer
County is unable to provide services for under the current public defender contract.
2. Term. The term of this agreement shall be from the 1st day of October, 2014 through the
291h day of September, 2015.
· ·
3. Compensation. Custer County agrees to pay Fred Snook at the hourly rate of $80 and
mileage of .50¢ per mile to and from scheduled Court hearings.
4. Additional Costs and Representation. The compensation set forth in Paragraph 3 does not
include payment or reimbursement to Fred Snook for additional costs of expenses of
transcripts, expert witness fees, investigator fees, fees for preparation of reports ad
evaluations, or other costs and expenses incurred in investigation, preparation, trial, or
appeal. If such additional expenses need to be incurred and Custer County is required by
. statute to provide the items, then Fred Snook shall obtain advance approval for the
expenditure by both the presiding judge and the Custer County Commissioners by making a
. written Motion for advance approval of the expenses by the presiding judge and, to the
extent required by law, shall give advance written notice of the hearing to the prosecuting
· attorney and the Custer County Commissioners.
5. Description of Services. Fred Snook shall use his best efforts to represent any person to
whom the county is required by law or statute to provide legal representation, whom it is
ordered to represent by the courts in Custer County, and whom may not be represented by
current contract public defenders due to a conflict. Fred Snook. Fred Snook shall not
charge the person whom he represents any fee in addition to the fees paid to Fred Snook by
the county under this agreement.
6.. Performance of Contract. Fred Snook is solely responsible to ensure that the services
which are the subject of this contract are performed in a professional, competent manner,
consisted with the rules promulgated by the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Bar
Commission. Custer County may terminate this contract if Fred Snook establishes a pattern
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of rendering ineffective assistance of counsel to needy persons under this contract or fails to
abide by other rules of Professional Conduct.
7. Substitution. Fred Snook shall not delegate his responsibilities under this contract o
attorney other than those named in this contract. Nor shall he delegate his responsibilities
under this contract to legal interns under Rule 221 of the Idaho Bar Commission Rules,
without the prior written approval of the County Commissioner as adopted by resolution.
8. Assignability. This contract is non-assignable, unless upon the prior written approval of the
Count Commissioners as adopted by resolution.
9. Private Practice. Nothing in this contract shall be construed to prohibit Fred Snook from
practicing law privately in addition to rendering t~e services qa.lled for under this contract.
may contract to provide similar serviced to ·other counties and individuals.
1O. Meeting with Clients. Fred Snook shall make reasonable efforts to meet (in person or
by phone) each client in advance of the date and time· set for each hearing to discuss the
details of the case and/or purpose of the hearing with the client. This requirement shall not
apply when the defendant and the attorney have previously met and agreed up on a course
of action to be taken and no additional information is available so that no purpose would be
served meeting prior to the scheduled hearing. The primary purpose of this provision is to
avoid delays in starting a court hearing, avoid anxiety in clients caused by not having any
information about what is expected to occur at upcoming hearing, and to avoid the payment
by the. county of unnecessary expense of witness travel when matters can be easily
resolved but are not due to the lack of communication between lawyer and client.
11. Evaluation. The county will conduct evaluations of Fred Snook to determine whether the
provisions of this contract are being met. This may be in the form of written questionnaires
or interviews to clients and other relevant persons. Lawyers shall be informed of the results
of any evaluation and given notice and an opportunity to respond and/or rebut any
· information obtained through he evaluation process.
12. Termination of Contract. This contract may be terminated by the parties upon mutual
agreement or by either party upon the material breach of the terms of the contract by the
other party. The county or Fred Snook may cancel this contract a any time without
cause upon ninety (90) calendar days written notice specifying the date of termination. The
contract shall terminate on September 29, 2015.
13. Employment Status. Fred Snook shall have and maintain the status of independent
contractor.
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CUSTER COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS:

Chairman

Date

Commissioner

Date

Commissioner

Date

This contract is scheduled for signature October 29, 2014.
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CUSTER COUNTY COMMIS~IONERS
POBOX385
CHALLIS, ID 83226
(208) 879-2360
(208) 879-5246 (fax)

October 22, 2014

To Whom It May Concern:

To follow is the report submitted by the contract public defender in July,
2014. At that time he was informed that he needed to submit more
information in the future as per Idaho Code 19-864(2). Our County Attorney
will reiterate this instruction in correspondence to the public defender.

~~;,'~
Custer County Commissioners
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STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL EXPENDITURES
JULY 1, 2013 THROUGH JUNE 30, 2014
CUSTER COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER CONTRACT

AMOUNT
INSURANCE
LEGAL LIBRARY
MAINTENANCE & REPAIRS
COMPUTER REPAIRS
OFFICE SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT
PROFESSIONAL FEES
RENT
SECRETARY SALARY
TELEPHONE
UTILITIES
GASOLINE

$435.00
69.13
70.50
540.89
235.15
178.75
10,500.00
10,000.00
794.89
479.17
1960.00

TOTAL

$25,263.48
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FRANKLIN COUNTY
Clerk of the District Court -Auditor -.Recorder

·;,

October 21, 2014
Jason D Williamson
American Civil Liberties Union
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 100·04
Mr Williamson,
Enclosed is the information you requested. The contract with our Public Defender is
attached. The contract is good through September, 2017.
We do not have any drafts of contracts, position announcements or other requests
seeking services for the provision of indigent defense services to criminal defendants
entitled to representation at public expense.
We do not have any reports at this time.
If there fa anything else that you need, please feel free to contact me.

~~~
Shauna T Geddes
Franklin Co Clerk

...,
Shauna T. Geddes, Clerk, 39 West Oneida, Preston, Idaho 83263
208-852-1090 (office)• 208-852-1094 (fox)• email: stgeddes@plmw.cmn

EXHIBIT
E
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AGREEMENT FOR INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DIS'IRICT OF IDAHO
FRANKLIN COUNTY
THIS AGREEMENT this agreement is made between Don Marler, Marler Law Office,
hereinafter referred to as the "Office of the Public Defender": and Franklin County, hereinafter
referred to as ''Franklin".

IT IS AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Office.ofThePublic Defender.

The Office of the Public Defender shall consist of such attorneys and employees of the
Marler Law Office, as may be designated by the Public Defender. The Office Of The Public
Defender shall be responsible to provide conflict counsel, except where the interest of a Franklin
County Defendant is in conflict with another Franklin County Defendant. Conflict counsel shall be
provided for by Franklin County, by way of separate contract of agreement.
2. Services Covered.

The Office Of The Public Defender shall provide legal services for indigent person in the
following categories or cases:
(a) Felony Cases.
(b) Juvenile court pro.ceedings including:·
( l) Proceedings under the Juvenile Justice Act.
(2) Proceedings under the Child Protective Act.
(3) Involuntary termination proceedings wherein the State ofldaho or any agency
of the State is a moving party.
(c) Extrndition proceedings.

Pagel of9
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(d) All indigent defendants who have filed Post Conviction proceedings.
(e)

Appeals of all categories of cases listed above through the final appeal, through
District Court. This shall not include appeals to the Supreme Court, or the Court of
Appeals, as they are now handled by the State Appellate Public Defender's Office,
Boise, Idaho.

(f)

All indigent defendants charged with probation violations.

(g) All criminal proceedings pursuant to Criminal Rule 35 and other related motions and
proceedings including jury trials wherein the Public Defender is appointed to represent
indigent defendants.
(h) All misdemeanor proceedings in Franklin County.

3. Services Excluded.
The following services are excluded from the contract:
(a)

Civil Contempt Proceedings.

(b) Adoption proceedings.
(c)

Involuntary tennination proceedings except as specified in paragraph 2(b)(3).

(cl), Appeals to the United States Supreme Court and Court of Appeals; and all

Federal Court Proceedings.
(e)

Parole revocations procee~ings, and hearings or proceedings of any kind before the
Idaho Commission of Pardons and Paroles.

(f)

Civil indigence claims.

(g) Civil claims or defense of civil claims by or against clients of the Office Of The
Public Defender, except as otherwise specifically provided in the Agreement.

Page 2 of9
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(h) Defense of any criminal charges against clients of the Office Of The Public Defender
charged or arising outside Franklin County, except that the Office Of The Public
Defender may cooperate and assist proper officials in other jurisdictions in resolving
such criminal charges as part of a common agreement regarding joint disposition of
such other charges and those matters in which the client is represented by the Office
Of The Public Defender.
(i)

Conflict cases involving First Degree Murder, where the death penalty is sought (i.e.,
capital cases).

(J) Cases involving First Degree Murder, non - de~th penalty cases or capital cases to be

paid to the Public Defender by Franklin County as we see forth in Paragraph 9 herein.
(k) Conflict cases as set forth herein above.
4. Representation.
Representation will be made at all stages of the proceedings until completed. The Office
Of The Public Defender shall include necessary representations of such indigent person in matters
of investigation, trial preparation, preparation and filing of motions, arguments of motions, and
motions, briefing and argument on appeals and any re-trails following an appeal. This includes
preparation of all briefs, documents, letters, research and any and all things regarded as necessary
to adequately represent the indigent person.
Representation will at all times comply with the standards mandated by the United States
Constitution of the State ofldaho, the Jaws of the State ofldaho, and ethical standards of the
America Bar Association and the Idaho State Bar,

Page 3 of9
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5. Indigent Persons.

An indigent person shall include any person determined by a judge within Franklin County
to be entitled to legal representation at public expense, pursuant to the laws and the Constitution
of the State ofldaho and United States Constitution. The County agrees to provide personnel and
standards for the screening of persons requesting counsel, with recommendations to go to the
judges of the Sixth District for final determination.

6. Interview Schedule.
For clients who are in custody, the Office Of The Public Defender shall attempt to
provide initial contacts with clients personally, by telephone, or email within ninetyMsix (96)
hours, or whenever possible within five (5) working days of notification of appointment.
For clients who are not in custody, the Office Of The Public Defender shall attempt to
make initial contact with clients within ten ( l 0) working days for the purpose of discussing the
client's case,
7. Conflict Oflntcrest.

If at any time after an appointment has been made, the Office Of The Public Defender
determines that be.cause of conflict of interest, assignment of qualified legal counsel outside the
Office Of The Public Defender is necessary to provide adequate and competent representation in
a particular matter or matters, the Public Defender may immediately notify the court making the
assignment in which the matter is pending, the County Attorney, and the County Commissioners
of Franklin County. If the court finds that such conflict requires appointment of counsel outside of
the Office Of The Public Defender, these cases shall be referred to conflict counsel. The court shall
appoint con'flict counsel to act in such matters, pursuant to Idaho Code § l 9M856 and § 19M
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860 and other applicable laws on such terms and conditions as may be appointed by the court.
8. Terms of this Mreement.
The duration of this Agreement shall be from October 1, 2012, through September
30, 2017. Further, the Office Of The Public Defender and Fl'anklin County shall be entitled to
exercise and additional five yeru- option under the terms of the same Agreement for continuation
of legal services through the year 2022, subject to renegotiation of the compensation for said
contract.
9. Payment For Services.
The appropriation for the Office OfThe Public-Defender shall be a total sum of five
thousand dollars and no cents ($5,970.25) per month, for the fiscal year beginning October 1,
2012, through September 30, 2017.
That in addition to the foregoing sums, the defense of any defendant charged with First
Degree Murder shall be evaluated and negotiated on a case by case basis with regard to hourly
rates, necessary resources, and a maximum amount per defendant.
All payments shall be due on the last working day of each month, and shall be paid
by the 1st day of each month, beginning with November 1, 2012,· for services provided for the
proceeding month.
Fmthermore, there shall be an automatic cost of living increase in the monthly amount
of Three Percent (3%) for each year of the contract, commencing October 1, 2013, and each year
therea"fter.
10. Costs and Expenses.
The Office Of The Public Defender shall pay for all costs, fees and expenses incurred in
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providing services pursuant to this Agreement, except for the following, which shall be paid by
Franklin County, unless otherwise ordered to be paid by the State, or County:
(a)

Witness fees and expenses, including expert witnesses.

(b) Depositions.
(c)

Transcripts.

(d) Service of Process fees.
(e) Costs of medical and psychiatric evaluations when ordered or approved by the Court.
(f)

Costs of investigative services and for evaluations of evidence when ordered or
approved by the court.

11. Malpractice Insurance.
The Office Of The Public Defender shall carry malpractice insurance, at its expense,
during the entire the entire period of the Agreement, in the amount of at least Five Hundred
Thousand Dollars and no/100 ($500,000.00) for each attorney.
12. Non-Privileged Information.
All clients served by this Agreement shall be advis~d by the appointing judge that
information regarding their financial circumstances which would be probative or determining
indigence is not privileged information and will be disclosed to any judge, the prosecuting attorney
of this District, or Office Of The Public Defender, upon appropriate request. The Office Of The
Public Defender shall have no duty to investigate the financial circumstances of any client served
by this Agreement, nor to disclose such information in the absence of a specific request by a judge

or prosecuting attorney of this District.
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13. Record Keeping and Reporting:.

The Office Of The Public Defender shall maintain individual case records on each
appointed client which shall be available for inspection by the Administrative Judge for the
judicial district of the trial court administrator or the trial court administrator, upon request.
14. Notice To The Office Of the Public Defender.
All notices of appointment of clients for representation by the Office Of The Public
Defender, shall be made by contact with the Marler Law Office, P.O. Box 6369, Pocatello, Idaho
83205M6369. Notification of appointment to represent clients should be made by telephone to

(208) 478M 7600, and/or fax to (208) 478M7605.

All subsequent notices should be provided directly to the attorney of record representing
the particular client, or when no attorney appears of record, by notice to the Office Of The Public
Defender at the above address.
15. Authorization For Private Practice.
Attorneys providing services under this Agreement may undertake representation of person
charged with a crime in this or any other jurisdiction for a fee. Attorney's providing services
under this Agreement who are independent ofMarler Law Office, may unde1take representation
of persons charged with a crime for a fee, provided that such representation does not conflict
with the representation of indigent clients. Private representation of clients for a fee shall not be
accepted by an attorney providing services under this Agreement where any repres.entation is
reasonably likely to lead to a conflict of interest with a matter arising under this Agreement which
would require of counsel outside of the Office Of The Public Defender.

Page 7 of9

000149

,.

16. Modification.
Any modification of the Agreement shall be in writing and approved by all parties. There
are no parole agreements accompanying this Agreement.
17.

Ai::reement Disputes.

Any dispute relating to this Agreement shall be resolved through recourse first with

the District Judges of the Sixth Judicial District, who shall act collectively as a body in any
determination with regard to the dispute and second by appropriate legal remedies, if necessary.
18. Termination of Agreement.
Franklin may terminate this Agreement with the Office Of The Public Defender
immediately fo~ good cause shown at any time. All cases assigned prior to termination for cause
shall be completed pursuant to the Agreement unless representation is ass'ijmed by its successor
attorney with approval of the appropriate court; provided that all services provided after the date of
termination shall be compensated a~ a rate as may be agree upon, or in the event of no agreement
then at the rate as established by prior agreement between the county and The Office Of The
Public Defender, utilizing current counsel's current hourly rate as a basis for the rate.
"Good Cause" required for immediate termination shall mean failure of the Office Of The
Public Defender to comply with the terms of this Agreement to the extent that the delivery of
services to clients is impaired or rendered impossible, or willful disregard by The Office Of The
Public Defender oft!1e rights and best interest of the clients resulting in impairment of the rights
and interests of the clients. Individual actions of the Office Of The Public Defender, or any one
attorney taken in connection with one case alone, shall not necessary constitute •good cause 11 for
removal.
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The Office Of The Public Defender may withdrawal from this Agreement at any time
without penalty if for any reason the Office Of The Public Defender determines that it is unable
to provide adequate and co~petent representation to the clients assigned under this Agreement,
provided that the Office Of The Public Defender shall give at least one-hundred twenty (120) days
written notice of its intent to withdraw and the reason therefore, and provide further that the Office
Of The Public Defender will not be allowed to withdraw from any case assigned under the terms of
this Agreement in which the rights of interests of clients would be impaired. Withdrawal shall be
deemed a termination of this Agreement as of the effective date of the notice of withdrawal.
.

:/-

DATED this ~ d a y of October, 2012.
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Counties where defendants are represented at arraignment:
Yes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Ada
Bonner (usually)
Camas (usually)
Canyon
Jerome (usually)·
Twin Falls

No:
7. Adams
8. Bannock
9. Bear Lake
10.Benewah
11.Bingham
12. Bonneville
13. Boundary
14.Butte
15.Caribou
16.Cassia
17. Clark
18. Clearwater
19.Custer
20.Elmore
21. Idaho
22.Fremont
23. Franklin
24.Gem
25.Gooding
26. Kootenai
27. Latah
28.Lemhi
29.Lewis
30.Madison
31. Minidoka
32. Nez Perce
33.0neida
34.0wyhee
35.Payette
36.Shoshone
37.Teton
38. Washington

EXHIBIT F
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V

No Information:
39.Blaine
40.Boise
41 . Jefferson
42.Lincoln
43.Power
44.Valley
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LA WREN CE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586
MICHAELS. GILMORE, ISB #1625
W. SCOTT ZANZIG, ISB #9361
Deputy Attorneys General
Civil Litigation Division
Office of the Attornel General
954 W. Jefferson, 2n Floor
P. 0. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-4130
Fax: (208) 854-8073
steven.olsen@ag.idaho.gov
mike.gilmore@ag.idaho.gov

CALLY YOUNGER, ISB #8987CH1'tlSlOPHER o. flllCH Cl k
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
By STACEY LAFFERTY' er
·
DEPUTY
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID, 83720-0010
Telephone: (208)-334-2100
Cally. younger@gov .idaho. gov
Attorney for Defendant C.L. "Butch" Otter

Attorneys for Defendants State ofldaho, Hon.
Molly Huskey, Darrel G. Bolz, Sara B.
Thomas, William H. Wellman, Kimber
Ricks, Sen. Chuck Winder, and Rep.
Christy Perry
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

TRACY TUCKER, et al., on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

)
) Case No. CV OC 1510240

~

MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

)
)
STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, in his
)
official capacity as Governor ofldaho; HON. MOLLY
HUSKEY, et al., in their official capacities as member )
)
of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission,
)
_ _ _ _ _ _D_e_fe_n_d_an_t_s._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ )
Defendants (1) the State of Idaho, (2) the Governor of Idaho, the Hon. C.L. "Butch"
Otter, and (3) the seven members of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission hereby move
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) to dismiss the Class Action Complaint for
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief. This Motion to Dismiss is supported by an accompanying
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss.
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DATED this 8th ,day of July, 2015.
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

By~
MICHAEL

.

A .- ~

{~R

ILMORE

Deputy Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants other than
Governor Otter

Attorney for Governor Otter

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of July, 2015, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:
Richard Eppink
American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho Foundation
P.O. Box I 897
Boise, ID 83701

ffu.s.Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Facsimile: 208-344-7201
~ Email: reppink@acluidaho.org

Jason D. Williamson
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
125 Broad St.
New York, NY I 0004

@'lJ.s. Mail
D Hand Delivery
Q._,,Facsimile: 212-549-2654
~ Email: jwilliamson@aclu.org

Andrew C. Lillie
Hogan Lovells US LLP
One Tabor Center, Suite 1500
1200 Seventeenth Street
Denver, CO 80202

@U.S.Mail
D Hand Delivery
0..,,Facsimile: 303-899-7333
Email: andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com

CJ

Kathryn M. Ali
Hogan Lovells US LLP
555 Thirteenth St. NW
Washington, DC 20004

Er'

Bret H. Ladine
Hogan Lovells US LLP
3 Embarcadero Center #1500
San Francisco, CA 94111

D Hand Delivery
D Facsimile: 415-374-2499
~ Email: bret.Iadine@hoganlovells.com

Jenny Q. Shen
Hogan Lovells US LLP
4085 Campbell Ave., Ste. I 00
Menlo Park, CA 94025

@"u.s. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D acsimile:
E ail: jenny.shen@hoganlovells.com

~.S.Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile: 202-637-5600
Email: Kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com

D
D

izr-u.s. Mail

\

MOTION TO DISMISS - 2

000155

:
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586
MICHAELS. GILMORE, ISB #1625
W. SCOTT ZANZIG, ISB #9361
Deputy Attorneys General
Civil Litigation Division
Office of the Attornel, General
954 W. Jefferson, 2° Floor
P. 0. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-4130
Fax: (208) 854-8073
steven.olsen@ag.idaho.gov
mike. gilmore@ag. idaho. gov
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CALLY YOUNGER, ISB #8987 JUL O6 ?01~
OFFICE OF THE GOVERN~ISTOP
HERD. AICH, Clerf,
P .O . Box 83720
By STACEY LAFFERTY
Boise, ID, 83720-0010
DEPUTY
Telephone: (208)-334-2100
Cally. younger@gov .idaho .gov
Attorney for Defendant C.L. "Butch" Otter

Attorneys for Defendants State of Idaho, Hon.
Molly Huskey, Rep. Darrel G. Bolz, Sara
B. Thomas, William H. Wellman, Kimber
Ricks, Sen. Chuck Winder, and Rep.
Christy Perry

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TRACY TUCKER, et al., on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, in
his official capacity as Governor of Idaho; HON.
MOLLY HUSKEY, et al., in their official capacities as members of the Idaho State Public Defense
Commission,
Defendants.

------------------

")
) Case No. CV OC 1510240
)
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
) MOTION TO DISMISS
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants (1) the State of Idaho, (2) the Governor of Idaho, the Hon. C.L. "Butch"
Otter, and (3) the seven members of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission file this Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss the Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief. This Memorandum first reviews the Complaint, then explains why no relief
can be granted against any of the named Defendants.
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REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT
The Complaint is brought for the purpose of vindicating rights to the effective assistance
of counsel under the Federal and State Constitutions. Complaint,~~ 3, 25, 59, 92, 162, 171, 173,
175, 178, 180, 182, 183. It names four Plaintiffs that it proposes as class representatives. All
four named Plaintiffs appeared in court in response to a criminal complaint accusing the Plaintiff
of a crime for which he or she could be imprisoned if convicted. Complaint,

~~

4-7. Although

each of the named Plaintiffs alleged that he or she could not afford bail, none of them alleged
that he o~ she was indigent for purposes of appointment of counsel; one of them alleged indigence in the context of not being able to afford an expert. Id., ~ 78. 1
The first named Plaintiff is Tracy Tucker. The Complaint alleges: (1) Mr. Tucker was
arrested in Bonner County, had bail set at $40,000 at an initial appearance in which he was not
represented by counsel, could not afford to post bond, was held in jail awaiting trial, was represented at arraignment by a "substitute" attorney who was unfamiliar with his case and who did
not advocate in his favor, was able to contact his public defender only three times for a total of
20 minutes before a scheduled trial, eventually pleaded guilty rather than go to trial, and awaits
sentencing; and (2) Bonner County pays its public defenders under a fixed fee annual contract.
Complaint,~~ 4, 63-67, 110, 117, 118, 126, 129, 156.
The second named Plaintiff is Jason Sharp. The Complaint alleges: (1) Mr. Sharp was
arrested in Shoshone County, had bail set at $50,000 at an initial appearance in which he was not
represented by counsel, could not afford to post bond, later had bail reduced to $5,000, again
could not afford to post bond, was later released from jail while awaiting trial through the efforts
of his employer and without the assistance of the public defender, has been unable to obtain
discovery materials from his public defender, has not been able to persuade his public defender
to file substantive motions in his behalf, has met with his public defender for only 90 minutes
It would not be productive to dwell on the lack of allegations of indigence entitling Plaintiffs to the
services of appointed counsel because it seems likely that this omission can be cured. If Plaintiffs file
affidavits of indigence or an Amended Complaint alleging indigence before oral argument on the Motion
to Dismiss, Defendants will not raise any procedural objections to treating the Complaint as though it had
alleged that the named Plaintiffs were indigent for purposes of appointment of counsel.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 2
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over 13 months, and is scheduled to go to trial; and (2) Shoshone County pays its public defenders under a fixed fee annual contract. Complaint,~~ 5, 68-74, 111, 115, 126, 130, 157.
The third named Plaintiff is Naomi Morley. The Complaint alleges: Ms. Morley was arrested in Ada County, had a public defender present at her initial video appearance when bail was
set at $15,000 (but had not been able to speak with the public defender, who later determined that
he had a conflict of interest and could not represent her), could not afford to post bond, remained
in jail for three weeks until her bail was reduced, was told by her conflict counsel that she would
have to pay for expert drug testing services herself, obtained on her own (and without the assistance of conflict counsel) an affidavit from another person indicating that drugs found in Ms.
Morley's car were not Ms. Morley's, has been unable to communicate with conflict counsel
about her comments to the police investigation or about her scrapped car, and fears that conflict
counsel will not be able to adequately prepare for trial because of his workload. Complaint,~~ 6,
75-79, 112, 117, 127, 130, 133, 158.
The fourth named Plaintiff is Jeremy Payne. The Complaint alleges: (1) Mr. Payne was
jailed in Payette County, had bail set at $30,000 at an initial appearance in which he was not represented by counsel, could not afford to post bond, remained in jail for over four months until the
State faqed to timely take his case to trial, met with his public defender outside of court only
twice during that time, has not been able to discuss discovery or strategy with his public defender, who in turn has not been able to meaningfully investigate his case, and is scheduled for trial
after waiving his preliminary hearing; and (2) Payette County pays its public defenders under a
fixed daily rate contract. Complaint,~~ 7, 80-84, 113, 126, 129, 136, 142, 159.
The named Defendants are: (1) the State of Idaho, Complaint,~ 85; (2) Governor C.L.
"Butch" Otter,~ 86; and (3) the seven members of the Idaho Public Defense Commission,~ 87.
The Defendants are more fully described as follows:
(1) The State of Idaho is a sovereign State. Idaho Admission Act, 26 Stat. L. 215, ch.
656. Se.ction 1 of that Act "declared Idaho to be a State of the United States of America ... admitted into the Union on equal fo~ting with the original States" and "the constitution which the
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people of Idaho have formed for themselves ... is hereby accepted, ratified and confirmed."
Article XVIII of the Idaho Constitution that was accepted, ratified and confirmed by Congress
was titled "County Organization"; § 5 of Article XVIII provided for the Legislature to establish a
system of County government; § 11 provided that "County, township, and precinct officers shall
perform such duties as shall be prescribed by law." Section 22 of the Idaho Admission Act provided that "All acts or parts of acts in conflict with the provisions of this act, whether passed by
the legislature of said territory or by Congress, are hereby repealed."
(2) The Governor, who is sued in his official capacity, holds a constitutional office in the
'

Executive Department of Idaho State Government. The supreme Executive Power is vested in
the Governor. Idaho Constitution, Article IV,§§ 1 and 5.
(3) The Idaho Public Defense Commission, whose seven members are sued in their official capacities, is an agency of the Executive Department created by statute and located in the
Department of Self-Governing Agencies. 2 The Public Defense Commission has a duty to promulgate rules for criminal defense attorney training and data reporting and to make recommendations to the Legislature for legislation regarding public defender issues. 3
2

Idaho Code § 19-849( 1), a section of the Idaho Public Defense Act, creates the State Public Defense Commission and provides that it consists of the following members:
§ 19-849. State public defense commission. -(1) There is hereby created in the department of self-governing agencies the state public defense coi:nmission. The commission
shall consist of seven (7) members as follows:
(a) Two (2) representatives from the state legislature that shall include one (1) member from the senate and one (1) member from the house of representatives;
(b) One ( 1) representative appointed by the chief justice of the Idaho supreme court;
and
(c) Four (4) representatives appointed by the governor and confirmed by the senate as
follows:
(i) One ( 1) representative from the Idaho association of counties;
(ii) One (1) representative who has experience as a defending attorney;
(iii) One (1) representative from the office of the state appellate public defender; and
(iv) One (1) representative from the Idaho juvenile justice commission.
3
Idaho Code§ 19-850(1), another section of the Idaho Public Defense Act, imposes the following
duties on the Commission:
§ 19-850. Powers and duties of the state public defense commission. - (1) The
state public defense commission shall:
(a) Promulgate rules in accordance with the provisions of chapter 52, title 67, Idaho
Code, establishing the following:
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Statute provides for the Boards of County Commissioners to provide for indigent criminal defense. 4 No statute gives the Governor or the Public Defense Commission supervisory
authority over persons who provide indigent public defender services or the County officers who
are required by statute to provide for such services. Perhaps that is why the Complaint does not
seek injunctive relief against the Governor or members of the Public Defense Commission.
Excluding the Complaint's requests for class certification, attorneys' fees and "any other" relief,
the Complaint has the following Prayers for Relief against the State (or against no one in parti(i) Training and continuing legal education requirements for defending attorneys, which shall promote competency and consistency in case types including,
but not limited to, criminal, juvenile, abuse and neglect, post-conviction, civil
commitment, capital and civil contempt; and
(ii) Uniform data reporting requirements for the annual reports submitted pursuant to section 19-864, Idaho Code. The data reported shall include caseload,
workload and expenditures.
(b) On or before January 20, 2015, and by January 20 of each year thereafter as
deemed necessary by the commission, make recommendations to the Idaho legislature
for legislation on public defense system issues including, but not limited to:
(i) Core requirements for contracts between counties and private attorneys for
the provision of indigent defense services and proposed model contracts for
counties to use;
(ii) Qualifications and experience standards for the public defender and
defending attorneys;
(iii) Enforcement mechanisms; and
(iv) Funding issues including, but not limited to:
1. Training and continuing legal education for defending attorneys;
2. Data collection and reporting efforts; and
3. Conflict cases.
(c) Hold at least one (I) meeting in each calendar quarter.
4
Idaho Code § 19-859, also a section of the Idaho Public Defense Act, imposes upon County Commissioners the obligation to provide for indigent criminal defense and prohibits "fixed-fee" contracts:
§ 19-859. Public defender authorized - Joint county public defenders. - The
board of county commissioners of each county shall provide for the representation of indigent persons and other individuals who are entitled to be represented by an attorney at public
expense. The board of county commissioners of each county shall provide this representation by one (I) of the following:
(1) Establishing and maintaining an office of public defender;
(2) Joining with the board of county commissioners of one (1) or more other counties
within the same judicial district to establish and maintain a joint office of public defender
pursuant to an agreement authorized under section 67-2328, Idaho Code;
(3) Contracting with an existing office of public defender; or
(4) Contracting with a defending attorney, provided that the terms of the contract shall
not include any pricing structure that charges or pays a single fixed fee for the services and
expenses of the attorney. The contract provisions of this subsection shall apply to all contracts entered into or renewed on or after the effective date of this act.
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cular), not against the Governor or the members of the Public Defense Commission:
B) Declare that the State of Idaho is obligated to provide constitutionally adequate representation to indigent criminal defendants, including at their initial
appearances;
C) Declare that the constitutional rights of Idaho's indigent criminal defendants
are being violated by the State on an ongoing basis, and provide a deadline for
the State to move this Court for approval of specific modifications to the
structure and operation of the State's indigent-defense system;
D) Enjoin the State from continuing to violate the rights of indigent defendants
by providing constitutionally deficient representation;
E) Enter an injunction requiring the State to propose, for this Court's approval
and monitoring, a plan to develop and implement a statewide system of public
defense that is consistent with the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution and
laws of the State of Idaho;
F) Enter an injunction that requires the State to propose, for this Court's approval
and monitoring, uniform workload, performance, and training standards for attorneys representing indigent criminal defendants in the State of Idaho in order to ensure accountability and to monitor effectiveness;
G) Enter an injunction barring the use of fixed-fee contracts in the delivery of indigent defense services in the State ofldaho;
Complaint, p. 53.
For the reasons explained in the following Argument, none of these Prayers for Relief can
be granted against any of the named Defendants, so the Complaint should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against any of the named Defendants.

ARGUMENT
First, Defendants acknowledge the seriousness of the issues that Plaintiffs describe in
their Complaint. The rights of indigent criminal defendants to the effective assistance of counsel
provided at public expense are recognized by case law under the State and Federal Constitutions
and underlie the Idaho Public Defense Act. Those rights are judicially enforceable in individual
criminar defendants' cases. The Complaint, however, proposes a judicially unmanageable and
unenforceable solution to the problems that it identifies. That is why Defendants move to dismiss. This Argument first explains why the Federal claims against these Defendants should be
dismissed, then why the State law claims against these Defendants should also be dismissed.
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I. The Complaint Does Not State a Claim Upon Which Relief May
Granted Under Federal Law
The Sixth Amendment, which is part of the Bill of Rights, does not directly apply to the
States. "[T]he Bill of Rights curtail[s] only activities by the Federal Government, see Barron v.

Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1833), but the Fourteenth Amendment subjects
state and local governments to the most important of those restrictions .... " Oliver v. United

States, 466 U.S. 170, 187, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1746 (1984). The Sixth Amendment, which provides
indigents a right to effective assistance of counsel, applies to prosecutions in State courts through
the Fourteenth Amendment. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S.-,-, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012).
The second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is the vehicle through
which the Sixth Amendment is _applied to the States:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the law.
Section 1 does not itself create a right to sue to vindicate Federal rights; § 5 gives that
power to Congress, which "shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted pursuant to Congress's
power under§ 5. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 28, 112 S.Ct. 358, 363 (1991). Section 1983 is the
presumptive vehicle under which persons may sue to vindicate their Federal rights.

City of

Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 119-120, 125 S.Ct. 1453, 1458 (2005).
Indeed, Plaintiffs sued under§ 1983, Complaint~~ 3, 172, 179, which provides in relevant part:
§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... , subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless
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a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable ....
(Emphasis added; provisions relating to the District of Columbia and the Territories omitted.)
Section 1983 is a powerful vehicle for vindicating Federal rights, but its reach does· not go beyond what it authorizes.

A.

The State of Idaho Is Not a "Person" Subject to Suit Under§ 1983, So the Federal
Claims Against the State Must Be Dismissed
Section 1983 authorizes suits against a "person." A State is not a "person" and cannot be

sued under § 1983: "We find nothing substantial in the legislative history that leads us to believe
that Congress intended that _the word 'person' in § 1983 included the States of the Union." Will

v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311 (1989). Thus,
Will affirmed dismissal of a suit against an agency of the State of Michigan because a State is not
a "person" who can be sued under§ 1983. Id. at 71, 109 S.Ct. at 2312. See also Miller v. Idaho
State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856,862,252 P.3d 1274, 1281 (2011) (same).
Will and Miller were suits for damages, not for declaratory and injunctive relief. However, Wills reasoning that the State is not a "person" who can be sued under § 1983 did not depend on whether the suit was in law or equity, and the same reasoning applies to suits for injunctive and declaratory relief. "When a litigant seeks injunctive relief [under § 1983] that involves a
state agency's unlawful or unauthorized act, he must sue some individual in authority at that
agei:icy, not the agency itself." Leachman v. Dretke, 261 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tex.App. 2008),
citing Will, 491 U.S. at 71, n.10, 109 S.Ct. at 2312, n.10. "Plaintiff's prospective federal claims
under § 1983 and § 1988 seek only declaratory relief and attorney fees. These claims must,
however, be asserted only against 'persons' within the meaning of § 1983. The state itself is not
such a person." Lucchese v. State, 807 P.2d 1185 (Colo. App. 1990), citing Will. Thus, the State
of Idaho is not a person who can be sued under § 1983, and the Federal claims against it must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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B.

The Governor and the Members of the Public Defense Commission Are Not Persons
Against Whom the Requested Relief Under the Federal Claims Can Be Granted, So
the Federal Claims Against Them Must Be Dismissed
Wills seemingly harsh rule that the State is not a "person" who may be sued under§ 1983

is ameliorated by its footnote 10, which stated: "Of course a state official in his or her official
capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State." Will, supra, 491
U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. at 2312 (internal punctuation omitted), citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
150. 167, n.14, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3106, n.14, and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-160, 28 S.Ct.
441, 453-454 (1908). However, the ability to sue some State or local state actors in their official
capacities for injunctive relief under § 1983 does· not mean that this Complaint has sued the
proper officials. As Leachman noted, a plaintiff "must sue some individual in authority in the

agency," not merely any State officer. None of the Defendants sued here are an "individual in
authority" for the task of providing public defender services for the indigent.
To begin, the Complaint does not allege any acts or omissions in which the Governor was
personally involved that resulted in a denial of effective assistance of counsel to any of the four
named Plaintiffs. See Complaint,

,r 86, which contains only legal conclusions that the Governor

"bears ultimate responsibility for the provision of constitutionally mandated services to the people of Idaho" and has supervisory authority over the Idaho Criminal Justice Commission. As
explained in the following pages, these legal conclusions are incorrect. 5 The same is true for the
members of the Public Defense Commission - the Complaint has no allegations of fact that any
one of them was personally responsible for acts or omissions that resulted in a denial of effective
assistance of counsel to any of the four named Plaintiffs. See Complaint ,r 87 (summarizing the
Commission's statutory duties under Idaho Code§ 19-850(1), supra, n.3).

s

On a motion to dismiss for failure state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Defendants accept the Complaint's allegations of fact, but are not bound by its conclusions of law. Owsley v. Idaho
Industrial Comm'n, 141 Idaho 129, 136, 106 P.3d 455,462 (2005) ("to survive a 12(b) motion to dismiss,
it is not enough for a complaint to make conclusory allegations ... the non-movant is entitled to have his
factual assertions treated as true, ... this privilege does not extend to the conclusions of law the nonmovant hopes the court to draw from those facts").
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 9
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Of course, the Governor and Commission members have political or governmental interests in improving Idaho's indigent defense system, but they have no legal authority to address

the system as requested in the Complaint. The Complaint implicitly concedes this point because
its Prayers for Relief do not ask for the Governor or Commission members to be enjoined at all.
The Complaint was wise not to seek injunctive relief against the Governor or the Commission
~members. That is because individual state officers sued for injunctive relief in their official
capacities under § 1983 must have some connection with the enforcement of the laws at issue.
Complaints under § 1983 frequently sue Governors for injunctive relief, and Governors
are dismissed almost as frequently because they usually have no direct connection to enforcement of the law in question. E.g., when the Governor of California was sued over a statute that
made it illegal to sell foie gras produced by force feeding ducks, the Governor was dismissed as
a defendant because he had no direct connection with enforcement of the law:

Ex Parte Young ... allows citizens to sue state officers in their official capacities for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief ...
for their alleged violations of federal law. The state official must
have some connection with the enforcement of the act. That connection must be fairly direct; a generalized duty to enforce state
law or general supervisory power over the persons responsible for
enforcing the challenged provision will not subject an official to
suit. Here, Governor Brown is entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity because his only connection to § 25982 is his general
duty to enforce California law.
Association des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir.
2013), cert. denied- U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 398 (2014) (internal punctuation and citations omitted;
two paragraphs reformatted as one).
Although Governor Brown's dismissal was based upon Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit, not upon failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the result is the
same: If the Governor had been involved in enforcing the law in question, there would have
been no Eleventh Amendment immunity against suit in Federal Court, and the Court would have
proceeded to the merits to address whether the Complaint stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted. But no relief was possible because the Governor did not enforce the law in question,
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...
and an injunction against him would not have benefited the Plaintiffs. See also Ariz. Contractors
Ass 'n v. Napolitano, 526 F.Supp.2d 968, 983 (D. Ariz. 2007) ("[t]he Act does not charge the
Governor with any specific duty, and her general duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed is not sufficient to make her a party to this challenge"), aff'd on other grounds, 558 F.3d
856 (9th Cir. 2008), aff'd, -

U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1968 (2011); Snoeck v. Brussa, 153 F.3d 984,

986-987 (9th Cir. 1998) (members of judicial discipline commission could not be sued over
Nevada Supreme Court rules prohibiting disclosure of facts in complaints against judicial officers and allowing Supreme Court to hold persons who disclose such facts in contempt because
commission members had no power to change the rules and no contempt power). In the cases
just cited there were no injuries in fact caused by or redressable by the defendants; these essential
elements of standing were absent. In short, the defendants were legal strangers to the controversies and .were named simply as placeholders for the State, a pleading devise that attempted to
circumvent the principle that States are not persons under§ 1983.
Like the Governors in Canards and Arizona Contractors and the judicial discipline commissioners in Snoeck, Governor Otter and members of the Public Defense Commission do not
directly control, regulate, administer, or otherwise bear responsibility for provision of public defender services, and they have no ability to provide the requested relief. They are legal strangers
to the Federal claims. The Federal claims against them should be dismissed.

II. The Complaint Does Not State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be
Granted Under State Law
There are Federal cases directly or very nearly on point because Federal case law has developed in thousands of published opinions under § 1983. In candor, the State law issues that the
Complaint presents are open questions, and the parties will be arguing from cases that are less
than perfect analogies. For that reason, this part of the argument will address policy as well as
law in order to flesh out the bare constitutional text.
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A.

Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the District Court Does Not Have
Authority to Enjoin the State

Statute provides for Counties to administer indigent defense programs. See Idaho Code

§ 19-859, n.4, supra. The Complaint's Prayers for Relief, however, see page 6, supra, ask the
Court to entangle itself in the actions of another branch of government by enjoining, approving
and monitoring policy changes that can only be achieved by legislation, namely, by the Court:
•

"provid[ing] a deadline for the State to move ... for approval of specific modifications to
the structure and operation of the State's indigent-defense system," Prayer C;

•

enjoining the State "to propose, for this Court's approval and monitoring, a plan to
develop and implement a statewide system of public defense," Prayer E; and

•

enjoining the State "to propose, for this Court's approval and monitoring, uniform workload, performance, and training standards for attorneys representing indigent criminal
defendants," Prayer F.

There are no statutes requiring what these Prayers request or tasking any officers to do what
these Prayers request; the only way to achieve the requested relief is by new legislation.
Thus, this case could present serious separation-of-powers issues concerning the District
Court's authority to enjoin the "State," which would require the Court in effect to enjoin the
Legislature to pass new statutes "for this Court's approval." Happily, the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure make it unnecessary to reach these separation-of-powers issues, and the Court need
not address them. This is consistent with the principle of constitutional avoidance. "The general
rule of constitutional avoidance encourages courts to interpret statutes so as to avoid unnecessary
constitutional questions." Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856, 864, 252 P.3d 1274, 1282
(2011 ). By analogy, the principle of constitutional avoidance should also apply to Court Rules.
The Civil Rules in question are 3(b) and 65(d). They provide:
Rule 3(b). Designation of party

... Provided, all civil actions by or against a governmental
unit or agency, ... shall designate such party in its governmental ...
name only, and individuals constituting the governing boards of
governmental units . . . shall not be designated as parties in any
capacity unless the action is brought against them individually or
for relief under Rules 65 or 74.
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Rule 65(d). Form and scope of injunction or restraining orde.r

Every order granting an injunction . . . shall be specific in
terms; shall describe in reasonable detail ... the act or acts sought
to be restrained; and is binding only on the parties to the action,
their officers, agents, servants, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them, who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
(Emphasis added.)
Weyyakin Ranch Property Own_ers 'Association, Inc. v. City of Ketchum, 127 Idaho 1, 896

P.2d 327 (1995), holds that the general rule that suit is brought against a government entity in the
name of that governmental entity and not against its officers does not apply when the suit is for
an injunction. To obtain an injunction, Rule 3(b) requires the Complaint to name specific officers to be enjoined; naming only the governmental entity violates the rule.
This action for injunctive relief pursuant to I.R.C.P. 65 ... sought
to enjoin the "City of Ketchum" from taking any further action to
complete the proposed annexation. Tlte designation of the "City
of Ketchum," rather titan the elected officials individually, violates I.R.C.P. 3(b). Because the temporary restraining orders failed
to name the elected officials individually, the trial court never obtained jurisdiction over them, and therefore did not have the authority to find them in contempt.
127 Idaho at 2-3, 896 P.2d at 328-329 (emphasis added).

It is obvious, despite the Complaint naming as Defendants the Governor and members of
the Public Defense Commission, that neither the Governor nor the Commission have statutory or
constitutional authority to tell the County officers who operate Idaho's indigent defense system
how to operate the system. The only State entity that can change the system in the way requested
by the Prayers for. Relief is the Idaho Legislature, which is not named as a Defendant and which
under Rule 65(d) would not be bound by any injunction entered by the District Court. 6 Pursuant
6

It is almost certain that an injunction requiring the Legislature to pass legislation on a specific topic
that would be subject to the District Court's approval and monitoring would violate separation of powers.
Article II,§ 1, of the Idaho Constitution provides:
§ 1. Departments of government. - The powers of the government of this state are
divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person
or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others,
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..
to Rules 3(b) and 65 and Weyyakin all requests for injunctive relief against the State should be
dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 3(b).

B.

The Court Does Not Have Authority to Issue a Declaratory Ruling Against the State
Because There Is No Justiciable Controversy Between Plaintiffs and the State
The Civil Rules' prohibition against issuing an injunction against the State leaves open

the issue _of whether declaratory judgment can be entered against the State. The availability of
declaratory judgment alone against the State is not explicitly addressed by the Rules or in the
case law.· The Court may assume without deciding that there may be cases in which a District
Court can enter declaratory judgment against the State and/or the Legislature, e.g., when the
Constitution itself imposes an affirmative legislative duty upon the State. See Article IX, § 1 ("it
shall be the duty of the legislature of Idaho, to establish and maintain a general, uniform and
thorough system of public, free common schools"); Idaho Schools for Equal Educational

Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 850 P.2d 724 (1993) (Legislature among defendants sued
for decla~atory and injunctive relief under Article IX, § 1).
Plaintiffs' state law claims here are based upon Article I, § 13, which is constitutionally

except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
The Legislative Power includes the power to decide what legislation will be considered or enacted.
"§ 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 1723-1724 (1966).
An injunction requiring enactment of specific legislation or legislation on a specific subject would
violate separation of powers (assuming that the Constitution does not explicitly require legislation on that
topic). "[T]he broader rule is that mandamus will not lie to compel the Legislature to enact any
legislation. A separation of powers does allow for some incidental overlap of function. But a judicially
compelled enactment of legislation is not an incidental overlap; it is the very exercise of legislative power
itself." County of San Diego v. State, 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 594, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 489, 501, review denied
(2008) (decided under California's similar separation-of-powers article). Also Cedar County Committee
v. Munro, 134 Wash.2d 377, 380, 950 P.2d 446, 447 (1998) ("the creation of a new county is an exercise
of legislative power ... ; the Legislature cannot be compelled to form a new county") (decided under
Washington's similar separation-of-powers article). These cases are of academic interest, however,
because the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow an injunction to be issued against the State, and
these separation-of-powers issues need not be addressed.
Further, naming the State as a defendant also has other serious separation-of-powers issues. "It is
the general rule that, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a· governmental unit can only be sued
upon its consent," and that, "such consent is evidenced by the state constitution or a legislative mandate."
Sanchez State, Dept. of Correction, 143 Idaho 239,244, 141 P.3d 1108, J113 (2006). Rule 3(b) avoids
the constitutional issue of whether. this Court can "waive" sovereign immunity.

v.
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unlike Article IX, § 1: The former puts no affirmative duties on the State or any State officer
while the latter puts an affirmative duty on the Legislature. Article I, § 13, provides:
§ 13. Guaranties in criminal actions and due process of
law. - In all criminal prosecutions, the party accused shall [1]
have the right to a speedy and public trial; [2] to have the process
of the court to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf,
and [3] to appear and defend in person and with counsel.

No person shall [4] be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense; nor [5] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself; nor [6] be deprived to life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
Section 13 creates at least six sets of constitutional rights for defendants in criminal cases, as noted by the bracketing above. But § 13 does not place any duty on the "State." If§ 13
impliedly imposes any duties upon the "State," all of the rights involved would be asserted in a
criminal proceeding, and the only branch of State government present in all State criminal proceedings is the Judiciary, so presumably any duties created in one of the branches of State government would be duties for presiding judges, not for the Legislative or Executive Branches. 7
Be that as it may, the determination of whether Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory judgment comes from the Declaratory Judgment Act itself and the cases decided under it, not from
the preceding paragraph's and the footnote's speculations. The Idaho Declaratory Judgment Act
provides that "Courts of record ... shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal
relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." Idaho Code § 10-1201. However,
declaratory judgments can only be issued in justiciable controversies:
Idaho courts have the power to declare the rights, status and
legal relations of persons .... LC.§ 10-1201 ...
An important limitation upon this jurisdiction is that, "a de7

If the "State" has duties under a part of§ 13, then does it also have duties under all of§ 13? For
example, should the "State" be responsible for monitoring all District Judges, Magistrates, Prosecuting
Attorneys, and public defenders to assure that (1) all defendants have speedy and public trials, (2) all
defendants have process to compel witnesses, (3) no defendant is subject to double jeopardy, and (4) no
defendant's right against self-incrimination is violated?
Many officers in addition to public defenders are implicated by § 13 's constitutional rights. There
is no principled distinction under which monitoring public defenders can be separated from monitoring
trial judges and prosecutors. What State officer can do that under our constitutional system? No one.
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claratory judgment can only be rendered in a case where an
actual or justiciable controversy exists." This concept precludes courts from deciding cases which are purely hypothetical or advisory.

State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 597, 809 P.2d 455, 458 (1991)
(internal citation omitted).
·
Wylie v. State, 151 Idaho 26, 31, 253 P.3d 700, 705 (2011 ).
One aspect of justiciability is redressability. In re Jerome County Bd. of Com 'rs, 153
Idaho 298, 308, 281 P.3d 1076, 1086 (2012). Redressability is an essential element of justiciability -

without the possibility of judicial redress, a judgment or order is an advisory opinion.
Therefore, courts will not rule on declaratory judgment actions
which present questions that are moot or abstract. An action for
declaratory judgment is moot where the judgment, if granted,
would have no effect either directly or collaterally on the plaintiff,
the plaintiff would be unable to obtain further relief based on the
judgment and no other relief is sought in the action.

Wylie, 151 Idaho at 31, 253 P.3d at 705 (citations and quotation marks omitted). As Wylie further
observed: "Turning to the question of justiciability, Wylie has been unable to articulate how a
judgment declaring the Ordinance invalid would provide him any relief," so Wylie's request for
declaratory judgment was not justiciable. 151 Idaho at 34, 253 PJd at 708.
The situation here is similar. Rule 3(b) precludes injunctive relief against the State for
Plaintiffs' benefit. A declaratory ruling against the State would therefore not provide judicial relief for Plaintiffs. Accordingly, there is no justiciable controversy between Plaintiffs and the
State, and Plaintiffs are simply asking the Court for an advisory opinion. In fact, the Declaratory
Judgment Act has co·dified the principle that the Court need not issue an advisory opinion.
§ 10-1206. When court may refuse judgment or decree.
- The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment
or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered,
would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to
the proceeding.

If ever there were a situation calling for the application of§ 10-1206 and for the Court's

refusal to enter declaratory judgment against the State, this is it. There is a statutory framework
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in place by which public defender services are provided by the Counties. Plaintiffs' concerns are
addressed by that statutory framework, which provides a robust right ofrepresentation:
§ 19-852. Right to counsel of indigent person - Representation at all stages of criminal and commitment proceedings
- Payment. - (1) An indigent person who is being detained by a
law enforcement officer, ... or who is under formal charge of having committed, or is being detained under a conviction of, a serious
crime, is entitled:

(a) To be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a
person having his own counsel is so entitled; and
(b) To be provided with the necessary services and facilities
of representation including investigation and other preparation. The attorney, services and facilities and the court
costs shall be provided at public expense to the extent that
the person is, at the time the court determines indigency
pursuant to section 19-854, Idaho Code, unable to provide
for their payment.
(2) An indigent person who is entitled to be represented by
an attorney under subsection (1) of this section is entitled:
(a) To be counseled and defended at all stages of the matte.r
beginning with the earliest time when a person providing
his own counsel would be entitled to be represented by an
attorney and including revocation of probation;
(b) To be represented in any appeal;
(c) To be represented in any other post-conviction or postcommitment proceeding that the attorney or the indigent
person considers appropriate, unless the court in which the
proceeding is brought determines that it is not a proceeding
that a reasonable person with adequate means would be
willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous proceeding.
(3) An indigent person's right to a benefit under subsection
(1) or (2) of this section is unaffected by his having provided a
similar benefit at his own expense, or by his having waived it, at an
earlier stage.
Plaintiffs are not objecting to these State laws; they are objecting that the laws are not
being followed. Rather than "slog" through the work of addressing individual problems in individual Counties or groups of Counties, whose populations range from fewer than 1,000 residents
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to greater than 400,000, and whose on-the-ground practical administrative solutions surely cannot be applied Statewide, Plaintiffs want this Court to issue a "cookie cutter" declaration that the
State must fix everything even though no "cookie cutter" response can do so.
In essence, Plaintiffs want this Court to issue a declaration and injunction to the State that
it must make Counties follow the law. There are two central problems with this. The first is
obvious: The Counties are not parties to the lawsuit, and Plaintiffs are suing the State as a proxy
for the Counties. If Plaintiffs have identified problems with the Counties' administration of the
law, suing the State is not the solution. The second is that courts do not issue injunctions "to
obey the law": "But the mere fact that a court has found that a defendant has committed an act in
violation of a statute does not justify an injunction broadly to obey the statute and thus subject
the defendant to contempt proceedings ifhe shall at any time in the future commit some new violation unlike and unrelated to that with which he was originally charged." N.L.R.B. v. Express

Pub. Co., 312 U.S. 426, 435-436, 61 S.Ct. 693, 699 (1941). Yet Prayers B through F are little
more than requests to enjoin the State against ever allowing a violation of the law governing indigent defense. That should not be the basis for declaratory or injunctive relief.
The State closes this part of its argument with some practical prudential and jurisprudential con~iderations. For 125 years of Idaho statehood, Counties or other local units of government have provided whatever indigent defenses were provided at the trial level. The Idaho
Constitution, which Congress approved in the Idaho Admission Act, contemplated that Counties
would provide many governmental services required by law. No decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States has ever held that the Sixth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, or
§ 1983 required a State to take on or to supervise provision of indigent defense services throughout a State. No decision of the Idaho Supreme Court has ever required_ the State to take on or to
supervise the provision of indigent defense services throughout the State under State law.
Plaintiffs' requested relief would affect not only public defenders; it would affect how
every District Judge and every Magistrate conduct criminal trials and hearings. In the abstract,
one District Judge has the legal authority to issue judgments and orders that would affect how
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every County, every other District Judge, and every Magistrate administer indigent defense, even
if there are no controlling decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States or of the Supreme
Court of Idaho requiring the District Judge to do so. But that is not the best way to develop the
law from a prudential or jurisprudential standpoint. A decision to restructure how every County
and trial court provides indigent defense -

if it were ever to be made -

should not come

without review of the Idaho Supreme Court (and perhaps the United States Supreme Court)
because of its extraordinary implications for all of the Counties and trial courts in the State. That
is yet another reason why the State law claims against the State should be dismissed.

C.

The Governor and the Members of the Public Defense Commission Are Not Persons
Against Whom the Requested Relief Under the State Law Claims Can Be Granted,
So the State Law Claims Against Them Should Be Dismissed
This Memorandum explained why the Governor and Members of the Public Defense

Commission could not be enjoined under Federal law at pp. 9-11, supra. The argument and
cases were based upon the Federal law, but the same underlying reasoning also applies to the
State law claims: Neither the Governor nor the Commission members can be enjoined to perform duties they do not have. The State law claims against them should also be dismissed.

CONCLUSION
All of Plaintiffs' Federal and State law claims should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted against these Defendants.
DATED this 8th day of July, 2015.
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

ST ATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

\

B
S. GILMORE
Deputy Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants other than
Governor Otter
CHAEL

By~
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Defendants move this Court under Rule 26(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to
issue a protective order staying discovery pending a decision on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,
filed July 8, 2015. This motion is supported by an accompanying Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Protective Order Staying Discovery Pending Decision on Motion to Dismiss.
DATED this 21st day of August, 2015.
STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

By
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Deputy Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants other than
Governor Otter
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U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile: 208-344-7201
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Defendants file this Memorandum in Support of their motion for a protective order
staying discovery pending the Court's decision on Defendants' motion to dismiss, which they
filed July 8, 2015.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed this case on June 17, 2015, contending that the public defense systems in
Idaho's counties fail to provide indigent criminal defendants with adequate representation, in
violation of their federal and state constitutional rights. Although Idaho statutes require Idaho's
counties to provide defense to indigent defendants, Plaintiffs did not sue the counties or their
commissioners. Instead, they sued the State, the Governor, and the commissioners of the Public
Defense Commission.
Defendants responded to the complaint on July 8 by filing a Rule 12(b) motion to
dismiss. The motion raises purely legal arguments primarily centered on justiciability. It
contends that none of the defendants Plaintiffs chose to name are proper defendants. The motion
is based on the following legal principles:
•

The State ofldaho is not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and thus
cannot be sued for violating Plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights;

•

The other defendants - Governor Otter and the members of the Public Defense
Commission - cannot be sued for the relief requested under section 1983, or for alleged
violations of Plaintiffs' state constitutional rights, because they have no legal authority to
make the sweeping changes to Idaho's public defense system Plaintiffs request; and

•

Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the
State under state law, because the Court lacks authority to enjoin the State and there is no
justiciable controversy between the State and Plaintiffs.

All these matters raised in the motion are legal issues to be resolved by the briefing on the
motion to dismiss.
After Defendants moved to dismiss, Plaintiffs served discovery requests. Plaintiffs
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served all Defendants with interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for documents.
Plaintiffs also noted the depositions of two non-party witnesses. Copies of Plaintiffs' discovery
requests are attached as appendices to this brief.

ARGUMENT
This Court has discretion to stay discovery pending the outcome of the motion to dismiss.
Rule 26(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure empowers the Court to make orders regarding
the timing and sequence of discovery. The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that "[c]ontrol
of discovery is within the discretion of the trial court." Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 749
.890 P.2d 331,335 (1995) (citing Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 6 v. Idaho Dept ofHealth
& Welfare, 106 Idaho 756, 761, 683 P.2d 404, 409 (1984)). In Service Employees, the Court

upheld the trial court's decision to suspend discovery pending the outcome of a "motion to
dismiss [that] raised purely legal issues." See 106 Idaho at 761, 683 P.2d at 409. If an entire
case can be resolved by a dispositive motion pending before the court, it is particularly
appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion to stay discovery. See Taylor v. AJA Servs.
Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 570-71, 261 P.3d 829, 847-48 (2011) (upholding district court's decision

to stay discovery pending resolution of dispositive motion, "especially since th[e] motion for
summary judgment could have been dispositive of the entire case").
There are good reasons for the Court to stay discovery until it resolves Defendants'
pending motion to dismiss. If the Court grants the motion, it will dispose of the entire case. No
discovery is necessary to resolve the motion, because it raises purely legal issues. The Court
should consider no evidence outside the pleadings in deciding the motion. '"The only facts
which a court may properly consider on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim are those
appearing in the complaint, supplemented by such facts as the court may properly judicially
notice."' Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 833, 243 P.3d 642 (2010) (quoting Hellickson v.
Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Idaho App. 1990)).

Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced if discovery is stayed pending the outcome on the motion
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to dismiss. If any of Plaintiffs' claims survive the motion, there will be plenty of time for
Plaintiffs to conduct discovery before trial or summary judgment, neither of which has even been
scheduled.
In contrast, permitting discovery before the Court rules on the motion to dismiss would
impose unnecessary and undue burdens on Defendants. The burden is unnecessary because
Defendants' motion to dismiss should resolve the entire case on purely legal grounds. There is
no need for depositions, document productions, and written discovery at this point. And the
burden would be substantial. For example, Plaintiffs have requested information and documents
dating back to 2010. See, e.g., Document Request No. 1 (requesting all documents relating to the
provision of indigent defense services in Idaho since 2010). Other requests have no time limits.
See, e.g., Document Request No. 12 (requesting all documents relating to the absence of counsel

at indigent defendants' initial appearances in Idaho). At least one request applies to any State
official. See Document Request No. 24 (requesting "all documents relating to any informal or
formal complaints or other information provided or conveyed by state officials relating to
Idaho's indigent defense system and funding for that system, since the passage of the Idaho
Public Defense Act in 2014") (emphasis added).
Moreover, discovery at this point would impose additional burdens on members of the
Public Defense Commission, who also serve in other capacities. For example, both the Hon.
Molly Huskey and Sara B. Thomas have served as the State Appellate Public Defender since
2010.

Plaintiffs' requests would encompass many privileged communications from the

Defendants' public defense work. Their current counsel in this case from the Attorney General's
office would be unable to assist them in document review and production, because the Attorney
General serves as prosecutor in those appellate cases handled by the State Appellate Public
Defender. Those Defendants would bear the entire burden of an enormous amount of document
review that may be entirely unnecessary if the Court grants the motion to dismiss.

All

Defendants except William Wellman serve or have served in legislative, judicial, or other
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governmental positions. 1 They similarly would be required to scour all their records from these
positions to comply with the demands of Plaintiffs' discovery requests. Moving full-speed ahead
with discovery now would unreasonably burden Defendants, who maintain that Plaintiffs have
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
CONCLUSION

There is no good reason to force Defendants to undertake the burdens of discovery while
their motion to dismiss is pending. Defendants respectfully request that the Court exercise its
discretion to enter a protective order staying all discovery until the Court resolves the pending
motion to dismiss.
DATED this 21st day of August, 2015.
STA TE OF IDAHO

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

By

By
W. SCOTT ZANZIG
Deputy Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants other than
Governor Otter

CALLY YOUNGER

Attorney for Governor Otter

1

During the relevant time period, Hon. Molly Huskey has served as a district judge. Sara Thomas has
served on the Criminal Justice Commission. Rep. Darrel Bolz, Sen. Chuck Winder, and Rep. Christy
Perry have served in the legislature. Kimber Ricks has served as a county commissioner. William
Wellman has served as a defending attorney.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21st day of August, 2015, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:
Richard Eppink
American Civil Liberties Union ofldaho Foundation
P.O. Box 1897
Boise, ID 83701

D
D
D

r8]

Jason D. Williamson
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
125 Broad St.
New York, NY 10004

D
D
D

Andrew C. Lillie
Hogan Lovells US LLP
One Tabor Center, Suite 1500
1200 Seventeenth Street
Denver, CO 80202

D
D
D

Kathryn M. Ali
Hogan Lovells US LLP
555 Thirteenth St. NW
Washington, DC 20004
Bret H. Ladine
Hogan Lovells US LLP
3 Embarcadero Center #1500
San Francisco, CA 94111
Jenny Q. Shen
Hogan Lovells US LLP
4085 Campbell Ave., Ste. 100
Menlo Park, CA 94025

r8]

r8]

D
D
D
r8]

D
D
D
r8]

D
D
D
r8]

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile: 208-344-7201
Email: reppink@acluidaho.org
U.S.Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile: 212-549-2654
Email: iwilliamson@aclu.org
U.S.Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile: 303-899-7333
Email: andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com
US.Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile: 202-637-5600
Email: Kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile: 415-374-2499
Email: bret.ladine@hoganlovells.com
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile:
Email: ienny.shen@hoganlovells.com

Deputy Attorney General
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PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO DEFENDANTS
Pursuant to Rules 26 and 3 3 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs Tracy
Tucker, Jason Sharp, Naomi Morley, and Jeremy Payne (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), by and
through their undersigned attorneys, hereby request that Defendants, the State ofldaho,
Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, and Idaho State Public Defense Commissioners Molly Huskey,
Darrell G. Bolz, Sara B. Thomas, William H. Wellman, Kimber Ricks, Chuck Winder, and
Christy Perry ("Defendants") answer, in writing, and under oath the following interrogatories
and serve such answers upon counsel for Plaintiffs.

DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS
In addition to the definitions and instructions set forth in Rules 26 and 33 of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, the following definitions and instructions apply to each of the
discovery requests set forth herein and are deemed to be incorporated in each of the requests.

Definitions

1.

The present tense includes the past and future tenses.

2.

The tenn "document," as used herein, means the original and all non-identical

copies of any handwritten, printed, typed, recorded, or graphic or photographic material of any
kind and nature, including all drafts thereof and all mechanical or electronic sound recordings or
transcripts thereof, however produced or reproduced, and including, but not limited to,
accounting materials, accounts, agreements, analyses, appointment books, books of account,
calendars, catalogs, checks, computer data, computer disks, computer generated or stored
information, computer programming materials, contracts, correspondence, date books, diaries,
diskettes, drawings, electronic-mail ("e-mail") messages, faxes, guidelines, instructions, inter-
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office communications, invoices, ledgers, letters, licenses, logs, manuals, memoranda, metadata,
microfilm, minutes, notes, opinions, payments, plans, receipts, records, regulations, reports,
sound recordings, statements, studies, surveys, telegrams, telexes, timesheets, vouchers, word
processing materials (however stored or maintained) and working papers, and all other means by
which information is stored for retrieval in fixed form.
3.

The term "communication," as used herein, means and includes any transmission

or exchange of information between two or more persons, whether orally or in writing, and
including but not limited to any conversation or discussion by means of letter, note,
memorandum, telephone, telegraph, telex, telecopier, fax transmission, cable, e-mail, or any
other medium.
4.

The terms "relate to," "related to," "relating to," and "regarding," as used herein,

mean mentioning, citing, quoting, involving, representing, constituting, discussing, reflecting,
identifying, describing, referring to, containing, enumerating, evidencing, supporting, or in any
way concerning, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly.
5.

The term "person," as used herein, shall mean any natural person, corporation,

and any other form of business entity, including, but not limited to, partnerships, joint ventures,
and associations, and shall include directors, officers, owners, members, employees, agents,
attorneys, or anyone else acting on the person's behalf.
6.

The terms "and" and "or," as used herein, are to be construed conjunctively or

disjunctively, as necessary, to make the request inclusive rather than exclusive.
7.

The terms "any" and "all," as used herein, shall mean "any and all," and shall be

construed so as to bring within the scope of the request any information that otherwise might be
construed to be outside its scope.
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8.

The term "describe," as used herein, means to state all facts of which you are

aware concerning the subject, including, but not limited to, identifying any dates, any person
involved in or with knowledge of the subject, and any places or locations relevant to the subject.
9.

The term "identify," as used herein, means:
a. In connection with persons, to give, to the extent known, the person's full
name, present or last known address, and, when referring to a natural person,
the present or last known place of employment;
b. In connection with a document, to give, to the extent known, the (i) type of
document; (ii) general subject matter; (iii) date of the document; and
(iv) author(s), addressee(s), and recipient(s);
c. In connection with an oral statement or communication, to the extent known,
to (i) state when and where it was made; (ii) identify each of the makers and
recipients thereof, in addition to all others present; (iii) indicate the medium of
communication; and (iv) state the substance of the statement or
communication.
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10.

The terms "you," "your," and "Defendants," as used herein, shall mean the State

ofldaho, Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, Commissioner Molly Huskey, Commissioner Darrell G.
Bolz, Commissioner Sara B. Thomas, Commissioner William H. Wellman, Commissioner
Kimber Ricks, Commissioner Chuck Winder, Commissioner Christy Perry, and each and every
former, present, and future commissioner and officer of the Idaho State Public Defense
Commission.
11.

The terms "public defender" or "public defenders" shall mean any attorney or

attorneys providing legal services to an "indigent person," as that term is defined at Idaho Code §
19-851(4), who is under formal charge of having committed, or is being detained under a
conviction of a "serious crime," as that term is defined at Idaho Code§ 19-851(5), as well as any
attorney or attorneys providing legal services to a 'juvenile," as that term is defined at Idaho
Code § 20-502(11 ), who is under formal charge of having committed, or who has been
adjudicated for commission of, an act, omission or status that brings her or him under the
purview of the Juvenile Corrections Act (Idaho Code§§ 20-501 et seq.).
12.

The terms "county commissioner" or "county commissioners" shall mean any

member or members of a board of county commissioners as described in Idaho Code Ann. § 31701 - 3 l-718.
Instructions

1.

These interrogatories are continuing in character so as to require you to

supplement your answers and responses promptly if you obtain additional information.
Supplemental answers and responses shall be served on Defendants within a reasonable time, as
set forth in Rule 26(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
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2.

If you encounter or claim the existence of any ambiguities construing a definition,

instruction, or interrogatory herein, set forth the matter deemed ambiguous and the construction
used in responding.
3.

Unless otherwise indicated, no interrogatory herein limits the scope of any other

interrogatory.
4.

All interrogatories (and any requests for the production of documents) are to be

answered on the basis of your knowledge and belief, and/or the knowledge and belief of your
agents and attorneys.
5.

If any information furnished in an answer is not within your personal knowledge,

identify each person who has personal knowledge of the information furnished in such answer
and each person who communicated to you any part of the information furnished.
· 6.

Where a claim of privilege is asserted in responding or objecting to_ an

interrogatory, state the factual basis for the claim of privilege, including (1) the date of the
subject document or communication; (2) the identity of the author, preparer, or the person
responsible for the communication, including without limitation, the author's, preparer's, or
responsible person's name, address, employment, and title; (3) the identities of each person who
was sent or had access to or custody of the document or communication, together with an
identification by employment of each such person; (4) the location of the document (if
applicable); and (5) a summary of the document's or communication's subject matter in
sufficient detail to enable an evaluation of the claim of privilege.
7.

All interrogatories must be answered in full and in writing. If any interrogatory

cannot be answered fully after exercising reasonable diligence, please so state and answer each
such interrogatory to the fullest extent you deem possible; specify the portion of each
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interrogatory that you claim to be unable to answer fully and completely; state the facts upon
which you rely to support your contention that you are unable to answer the interrogatory fully
and completely; and state what knowledge, information, or belief you have concerning the
unanswered portion of each such interrogatory.
8.

If any interrogatory is objected to with respect to only a part of the interrogatory,

fully answer the remaining parts of the interrogatory to which you have not objected.
INTERROGATORIES

1.

Identify the state official(s), other than the Governor and the Idaho Public

Defense Commission, with the authority to ensure that indigent defendants are receiving
representation that meets state and federal constitutional standards.

2.

Describe, in detail, any and all efforts undertaken by Defendants to address state

oversight of public defense delivery in Idaho since the passage of the Idaho Public Defense Act
in 2014.
3.

Describe, in detail, any recommendations proposed by the Idaho Public Defense

Commission to the Idaho state legislature on the provision of indigent defense in Idaho
including, but not limited to, funding and enforcement issues, since the passage of the Idaho
Public Defense Act in 2014.
4.

Describe, in detail, any communications between the Idaho Public Defense

Commission and individual county commissioners related to funding and/or staffing problems
since the passage of the Idaho Public Defense Act in 2014.
5.

Describe, in detail, any proposals by the Governor's Office to contribute funding

to the provision of trial-level indigent defense services prior to or since the passage of the Idaho
Public Defense Act in 2014.
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6.

Describe, to the best of your knowledge, the method by which each ofldaho's 44

counties funds its indigent defense system.
· 7.

Identify which entity or entities are charged with ensuring compliance with the

requirement, pursuant to Idaho Code Ann. § 19-860(1), that "[s]o far as is possible, the
compensation paid to [] public defender[s] shall not be less than the compensation paid to the
county prosecutor for that portion of his practice devoted to criminal law."
8.

Identify which entity or entities are charged with ensuring compliance with the

requirement, pursuant to Idaho Code Ann. § 19-8629(1), that "[t]he board of county
commissioners of each county shall annually appropriate enough money to administer the
program of representation."
9.

Describe, in detail, any efforts undertaken by Defendants to bring public defender

caseloads within Idaho into compliance with the national standards set by the National Legal Aid
& Defender Association and/or American Bar Association.

II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
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Dated: July ~2015

Richard Eppinl<

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
OF IDAHO FOUNDATION
reppink@acluidaho.org
P.O. Box 1897
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 344-9750, ext. 1202
(208)344-720i (fax)
Idaho St~te Bar no. 7503
Jason D. WilJ~amson

AMERICAN CIVIL
UNION
. LIBERTIES
.
FOUNDATION
jwil iiamson@aclu.org
125 Broad Street
1'-fow York_, New York 10004
(212) 284-7340
(212) 549-2654 (fax)
Pro hqc vice application pending
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303:-899-7333 (fax)
Pro hac vice application pending
Kathryn M. Ali

HOGAN LOVELLS US.LLP
katlu:yn.ali@hoganlovells:com
555 Thirte·enth Street NW
·
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 637 ..5600
c202) 637-59 t b· (fax)
Pro hac vice application .pending
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Bret H. Ladine
HOGANLOVELLSUSLLP
bret.ladine@hoganlovells.com
3 Embarcadero Center #1500
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 374-2300
(415) 374-2499 (fax)
Pro hac vice application pending

Jenny Q. Shen
HOGANLOVELLSUSLLP
jenny.shen@hoganlovells.com
4085 Campbell Ave., Suite 100
Menlo Park, CA 94025
650-463-4000
650-463-4199 (fax)
Pro hac vice application pending

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF DOCUMENT REQUESTS TO DEFENDANTS
Pursuant to Rules 26 and 34 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs Tracy
Tucker, Jason Sharp, Naomi Morley, and Jeremy Payne (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), by and
through their undersigned attorneys, hereby request that Defendants, the State of Idaho,
Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, and Idaho State Public Defense Commissioners Molly Huskey,
Darrell G. Bolz, Sara B. Thomas, William H. Wellman, Kimber Ricks, Chuck Winder, and
Christy Perry ("Defendants") produce for inspection and copying the requested documents
described below.
DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS
In addition to the definitions and instructions set forth in Rules 26 and 34 of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, the following definitions and instructions apply to each of the
discovery requests set forth herein and are deemed to be incorporated in each of the requests.

Definitions
1.

The present tense includes the past and future tenses.

2.

The term "document," as used herein, means the original and all non-identical

copies of any handwritten, printed, typed, recorded, or graphic or photographic material of any
kind and nature, including all drafts thereof and all mechanical or electronic sound recordings or
transcripts thereof, however produced or reproduced, and including, but not limited to,
accounting materials, accounts, agreements, analyses, appointment books, books of account,
calendars, catalogs, checks, computer data, computer disks, computer generated or stored
information, computer programming materials, contracts, correspondence, date books, diaries,
diskettes, drawings, electronic-mail ("e-mail") messages, faxes, guidelines, instructions, inter-
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office communications, invoices, ledgers, letters, licenses, logs, manuals, memoranda, metadata,
microfilm, minutes, notes, opinions, payments, plans, receipts, records, regulations, reports,
sound recordings, statements, studies, surveys, telegrams, telexes, timesheets, vouchers, word
processing materials (however stored or maintained) and working papers, and all other means by
which information is stored for retrieval in fixed form.
3.

The term "communication," as used herein, means and includes any transmission

or exchange of information between two or n:iore persons, whether orally or in writing, and
including but not limited to any conversation or discussion by means of letter, note,
memorandum, telephone, telegraph, telex, telecopier, fax transmission, cable, e-mail, or any
other medium.
4.

The terms "relate to," "related to," "relating to," and "regarding," as used herein,

mean mentioning, citing, quoting, involving, representing, constituting, discussing, reflecting,
identifying, describing, referring to, containing, enumerating, evidencing, supporting, or in any
way concerning, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly.
5.

The term "person," as used herein, shall mean any natural person, corporation,

and any other form of business entity, including, but not limited to, partnerships, joint ventures,
and associations, and shall include directors, officers, owners, members, employees, agents,
attorneys, or anyone else acting on the person's behalf.
6.

The terms "and" and "or," as used herein, are to be construed conjunctively or

disjunctively, as necessary, to make the request inclusive rather than exclusive.
7.

The terms "any" and "all," as used herein, shall mean "any and all," and shall be

construed so as to bring within the scope of the request any information that otherwise might be
construed to be outside its scope.
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8.

The term "describe," as used herein, means to state all facts of which you are

aware concerning the subject, including, but not limited to, identifying any dates, any person
involved in or with knowledge of the subject, and any places or locations relevant to the subject.
9.

The term "identify," as used herein, means:
a. In connection with persons, to give, to the extent known, the person's full
name, present or last known address, and, when referring to a natural person,
the present or last known place of employment;
b. In connection with a document, to give, to the extent known, the (i) type of
document; (ii) general subject matter; (iii) date of the document; and
(iv) author(s), addressee(s), and recipient(s);
c. In connection with an oral statement or communication, to the extent known,
to (i) state when and where it was made; (ii) identify each of the makers and
recipients thereof, in addition to all others present; (iii) indicate the medium of
communication; and (iv) state the substance of the statement or
communication.
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10.

The terms "you," "your," and "Defendants," as used herein, shall mean the State

ofldaho, Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, Commissioner Molly Huskey, Commissioner Darrell G.
Bolz, Commissioner Sara B. Thomas, Commissioner William H. Wellman, Commissioner
Kimber Ricks, Commissioner Chuck Winder, Commissioner Christy Perry, and each and every
former, present, and future commissioner and officer of the Idaho State Public Defense
Commission.
11.

The terms "public defender" or "public defenders" shall mean any attorney or

attorneys providing legal services to an "indigent person," as that term is defined at Idaho Code§
19-851(4), who is under formal charge of having committed, or is being detained under a
conviction of a "serious crime," as that tennis defined at Idaho Code§ 19-851(5), as well as any
attorney or attorneys providing legal services to a ''juvenile," as that term is defined at Idaho
Code§ 20-502(11), who is under formal charge of having committed, or who has been
adjudicated for commission of, an act, omission or status that brings her or him under the
purview of the Juvenile Corrections Act (Idaho Code§§ 20-501 et seq.).
12.

The terms "County Commissioner" or "County Commissioners" shall mean any

member or members of a Board of County Commissioners as described in Idaho Code Ann. §
31-701-31-718.
13.

The term "initial appearance" shall mean the first time a person under formal

charge of a "serious crime," as that term is defined at Idaho Code § 19-851 (5), or of an act,
omission, or status that brings her or him under the purview of the Juvenile Corrections Act
(Idaho Code§§ 20-501 et seq.), appears before a judge regarding the charge.
14.

The term "state officials" shall mean any state or county official within the State

ofldaho.
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Instructions
1.

If any part of a document is responsive to any request, the whole document is to

be produced .
. 2.

Any alteration of a responsive documen~, including any marginal notes,

handwritten notes, underlining, date stamps, received stamps, endorsed or filed stamps, drafts,
revisions, modifications, and other versions of a final document is a separate and distinct
document, and it must be produced.
3.

If you file a timely objection to any portion of a request, definition, or instruction,

provide a response to the remaining portion as well.
4.

The terms defined above, along with the individual requests for production and

inspection, should be construed broadly, to the fullest extent of their meaning, in a good faith
effort to comply with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
5.

These discovery requests are continuing and require supplemental responses as

specified in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) if you (or any person acting on your behalf)
obtain .additional information called for by the requests between the time of the original response
and the time of trial. Each supplemental response must be served on Plaintiffs no later than
thirty (30) days after the discovery of the further information, and in no event should any
supplemental response be served later than the day before the first day of trial.
6.

The fact that a document is produced by another person or entity does not relieve

you of the obligation to produce your copy of the same document, even if the two documents are
identical in all respects.
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7.

In producing documents and other materials, you are requested to furnish all

documents or things in your possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such
documents or materials are possessed directly by you or your directors, officers, agents,
employees, representatives, subsidiaries, managing agents, affiliates, investigators, or by your
attorneys or their agents, employees, representatives, or investigators.
8.

Documents are to be produced in full. Redacted documents will not constitute

compliance with any individual request. If any requested document or thing cannot be produced
in full, produce it to the extent possible, indicating which document or portion of that document
is being withheld and the reason that document is being withheld.
9.

In producing documents, you are requested to produce the original of each

document requested, together with all non-identical copies and drafts of that document. If the
original of any document cannot be located, a copy must be provided in lieu thereof, and must be
legible and bound or stapled in the same manner as the original.
10.

Documents must be produced in the file folder, envelope, or other container in

which the documents are kept or maintained by you. If, for any reason, the container cannot be
produced, produce copies of all labels or other identifying marks.
11.

Documents must be produced in such fashion as to identify the department,

branch, or office in whose possession it was located and, where applicable, the natural person in
whose possession it was found and the business address of each document's custodian(s).
12.

Documents attached to each other should not be separated.
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13.

Documents not otherwise responsive to this discovery request must be produced if

such documents mention, discuss, refer to, or explain the documents that are called for by this
discovery request, or if such documents are attached to documents called for by this discovery
request and constitute routing slips, transmittal memoranda, letters, comments, evaluations, or
similar materials.
14.

If any documents requested herein have been lost, discarded, destroyed, or are

otherwise no longer in your possession, custody, or control, or have been transferred voluntarily
or involuntarily to another person or persons, or otherwise disposed of, they must be identified as
completely as possible including, but not limited to, information necessary to identify the
document and the following information: the date of disposal or transfer, the manner of disposal
or transfer, the reason for disposal or transfer, the person authorizing the disposal or transfer, and
the person disposing of or transferring the document.
, 15.

If you claim the attorney-client privilege or any other privilege or work product

protection for any document, state the factual basis for the claim of privilege, including (1) the
date of the subject document or communication; (2) the identity of the author or preparer,
including without limitation, the author's or preparer's name, address, employment, and title; (3)
the identities of each person who was sent or had access to or custody of the document, together
with an identification by employment of each such person; (4) the location of the document (if
applicable); and (5) a summary of the document's or communication's subject matter in
sufficient detail to enable an evaluation of the claim of privilege.
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16.

Notwithstanding the assertion of any objection to production, any document as to

which an objection is raised containing non-objectionable matter that is relevant and material to a
request must be produced. However, that portion of the document for which the objection is
asserted may be withheld or redacted, provided that the above-mentioned identification is
furnished.
17.

If any responsive document is no longer in your possession, custody, or control,

identify its current or last known custodian and describe, in full, the circumstances surrounding
its disposition from your possession or control. Without limitation to the term "control," as used
in this paragraph, a document must be deemed to be in your control if you have the right to
secure the document or a copy thereof from another person or entity, public or private, having
possession, custody, or control thereof.
DOCUMENT REQUESTS

1.

All documents and/or studies conducted, drafted, received, and/or published by

Defendants relating to the provision of indigent defense services in the State of Idaho since 2010.
2.

All documents and/or studies conducted, drafted, received, and/or published by

Defendants relating to the length of pre-trial detention for defendants in the State of Idaho since
2010.
3.

All documents and/or communications with representatives of the National Legal

Aid and Defender Association relating to the provision of indigent defense services in the State
ofldaho since 2010.
4.

All documents and/or communications with representatives of the Sixth

Amendment Center relating to the provision of indigent defense services in the State of Idaho
since 2010.
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5.

All documents and/or communications regarding any alternate legislation or

reforms considered by the State ofldaho relating to the provision of indigent defense services
since 2010, apart from or in addition to the Idaho Public Defense of Act of 2014.
6.

All documents and/or communications relating to any informal or formal

complaints or other information received by Defendants since 2010 relating to the funding of
indigent defense services and the resources allotted to public defenders in the State ofldaho,
including but not limited to, funds to pay investigators or experts.
7.

All documents and/or communications relating to any informal or formal

complaints or other information received by Defendants since 2010 relating to public defender
caseloads in the State ofldaho.
8.

All documents and/or communications relating to any formal or informal

complaints or other information received by Defendants since 2010 relating to attempts by
prosecutors in the State ofldaho to communicate with indigent defendants regarding their
pending criminal case without appointed public defense counsel present.
9.

All documents and/or communications relating to any formal or informal

complaints or other information received by Defendants since 2010 relating to the role of county
commissioners in the provision of indigent defense services in the State ofldaho.
10.

All documents and/or communications relating to any formal or informal

complaints or other information received by Defendants from indigent criminal defendants in
Idaho since 2010 relating to the representation provided to them by a public defender.
11.

All documents and/or communications received by Defendants since 2010

relating to Idaho indigent defendants' access to and ability to contact or communicate
consistently with their assigned counsel, including but not limited to, informal or formal
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complaints or other information related to indigent defendants' inability to review discovery or
other case-specific materials with their public defender.
12.

All documents and/or communications relating to the absence of counsel at

indigent defendants' initial appearances in the State ofldaho.
13.

All documents and/or communications relating to any informal or formal

complaints or other information received by Defendants from indigent defendants in Idaho since
2010 alleging that defendants were forced to pay for the costs of their representation, including,
but not limited to, paying for mandated pre-trial drug testing and the costs of expert witnesses.
14.

All documents and communications relating to any actual or proposed funding of

indigent defense services by the State of Idaho since 2010, including all documents and
communications relating to how indigent defense services are funded by each of the 44 counties
within the State ofldaho since 2010.
15.

All documents relating to the annual funding each county within Idaho has

devoted to the provision of indigent defense services for each year since 2010, reported
separately for each county.
16.

All documents submitted by any county to the central registry and reporting portal

established by Idaho Code§ 67-450E.
17.

All documents and communications relating to any funding the State ofldaho has

provided for trial-level indigent defense services since 2010.
18.

All documents and communications relating to any supervision or oversight the

State ofldaho has provided for trial-level indigent defense services since 2010.
19.

All documents and communications relating to any training the State ofldaho has

provided for trial-level indigent defense providers since 2010.
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20.

All documents identifying or relating to, preferably by county, the number of

attorneys representing indigent defendants in Idaho, whether on a contractual basis, by
appointment of the court, or as a full-time employee of an institutional public defender office,
reported separately for each year since 2010.
21.

All documents identifying or relating to the number of adult criminal defendants

within Idaho who qualify for public defense services, reported separately for each county, for
each year since 2010.
22.

All documents identifying or relating to the number of juvenile defendants within

Idaho who qualify for public defense services, reported separately for each county, for each year
since 2010.
23.

All documents relating to the average per-year and/or per-month caseload for

public defenders in Idaho, reported separately for each county, for each year since 2010.
24.

All documents relating to any informal or formal complaints or other information

provided or conveyed by state officials relating to Idaho's indigent defense system and funding
for that system, since the passage of the Idaho Public Defense Act in 2014.
25.

All communications between the Idaho State Public Defense Commission, or any

member thereof, and individual county commissioners since the passage of the Idaho Public
Defense Act in 2014.
26.
27.

All communications between Governor Otter and individual county

commissioners since the filing of the above-captioned lawsuit on June 17, 2015, relating to
indigent defense services in Idaho.
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28.

All rules proposed by the Idaho Public Defense Commission for the provision of

indigent defense services in Idaho, as well as all drafts of any such rules, and any correspondence
and/or records documenting the rulemaking process.
29.

All uniform performance standards proposed by the Idaho Public Defense

Commission for the provision of indigent defense services in Idaho, as well as all drafts of any
such proposals, and any associated correspondence and/or records relating to these proposed
standards.
30.

All recommendations proposed by the Idaho Public Defense Commission for the

provision of indigent defense services in Idaho, as well as all drafts of any such
recommendations, and any associated correspondence and/or records relating to these proposed
recommendations.
31.

All documents and communication relating to any trainings or supervision for

public defenders proposed by the Idaho Public Defense Commission.
32.

All minutes, recordings, or transcripts of meetings held by the Idaho Public

Defense Commission.
33.

Any and all documents relating to studies, reports, surveys or analysis received,

prepared, requested, or requisitioned by the Idaho Public Defense Commission relating to the
provision of indigent services in the State ofldaho.
34.

All documents identified in your Responses to the Interrogatories or Requests for

Admission.
35.

All documents relied upon in responding to the Interrogatories or Requests for

Admission.
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

TRACY TUCKER, et al.,
Case No. CV OC 1510240
Plaintiffs,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO, et al.,
Defendants.
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PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION TO DEFENDANTS

Pursuant to Rules 26 and 36 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs Tracy
Tucker, Jason Sharp, Naomi Morley, and Jeremy Payne (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), by and
through their undersigned attorneys, hereby request that Defendants, the State of Idaho,
Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, and Idaho State Public Defense Commissioners Molly Huskey,
Darrell G. Bolz, Sara B. Thomas, William H. Wellman, Kimber Ricks, Chuck Winder, and
Christy Perry ("Defendants") answer, in writing, and under oath, the following requests for
admission and serve such answers upon counsel for Plaintiffs.
DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS

In addition to the definitions and instructions set forth in Rules 26 and 36 of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, the following definitions and instructions apply to each of the
discovery requests set forth herein and are deemed to be incorporated in each of the requests.
Definitions

I.

The present tense includes the past and future tenses.

2.

The terms "relate to," "related to," "relating to," and "regarding," as used herein,

mean mentioning, citing, quoting, involving, representing, constituting, discussing, reflecting,
identifying, describing, referring to, containing, enumerating, evidencing, supporting, or in any
way concerning, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly.
3.

The term "person," as used herein, shall mean any natural person, corporation,

and any other form of business entity, including, but not limited to, partnerships, joint ventures,
and associations, and shall include directors, officers, owners, members, employees, agents,
attorneys, or anyone else acting on the person's behalf.

2

000214

4.

The terms "and" and "or," as used herein, are to be construed conjunctively or

disjunctively, as necessary, to make the request inclusive rather than exclusive.
5.

The terms "any" and "all," as used herein, shall mean "any and all," and shall be

construed so as to bring within the scope of the request any information that otherwise might be
construed to be outside its scope.
6.

The terms "you," "your," and "Defendants," as used herein, shall mean the State

ofldaho, Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, Commissioner Molly Huskey, Commissioner Darrell G.
Bolz, Commissioner Sara B. Thomas, Commissioner William H. Wellman, Commissioner
Kimber Ricks, Commissioner Chuck Winder, Commissioner Christy Perry, and each and every
former, present, and future commissioner and officer of the Idaho State Public Defense
Commission.
7.

The terms "public defender" or "public defenders" shall mean any attorney or

attorneys providing legal services to an "indigent person," as that term is defined at Idaho Code§
19-851(4), who is under formal charge of having committed, or is being detained under a
conviction of a "serious crime," as that term is defined at Idaho Code§ 19-851(5), as well as any
attorney or attorneys providing legal services to a "juvenile," as that term is defined at Idaho
Code§ 20-502(11), who is under formal charge of having committed, or who has been
adjudicated for commission of, an act, omission or status that brings her or him under the
purview of the Juvenile Corrections Act (Idaho Code§§ 20-501 et seq.).
8.

The terms "county commissioner" or "county commissioners" shall mean any

member or members of a board of county commissioners as described in Idaho Code Ann. § 31701-31-718.
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9.

The term "initial appearance" shall mean the first time a person under formal

charge of a "serious crime," as that term is defined at Idaho Code § 19-851 (5), or of an act,
omission, or status that brings her or him under the purview of the Juvenile Corrections Act
(Idaho Code§§ 20-501 et seq.), appears before a judge regarding the charge.
10.

The term "state officials" shall mean any state or county official within the State

ofldaho.

Instructions
1.

If you file a timely objection to any portion of a request, definition, or instruction,

provide a response to the remaining portion as well.
2.

The terms defined above, along with the individual requests for admission, should

be construed broadly, to the fullest extent of their meaning, in a good faith effort to comply with
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
3.

These discovery requests are continuing and require supplemental responses as

specified in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) if you (or any person acting on your behalf)
obtain additional information called for by the requests between the time of the original response
and the time of trial. Each supplemental response must be served on Plaintiffs no later than
thirty (30) days after the discovery of the further information, and in no event should any
supplemental response be served later than the day before the first day of trial.

REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
Please admit the following:
1.

The Idaho Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) was created by Executive Order in

2005, and operates under the supervision of the Governor.
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2.

The purpose of the CJC is to provide policy-level direction to State officials and

to promote the efficient and effective use of resources, based on best practices or evidence-based
practices, for matters related to the State's criminal justice system.
3.

The CJC is comprised of at least one representative from the executive,

legislative, and judicial branches ofldaho's state government, and consists of26 total members.
4.

Among other required members, the CJC must include a representative from the

Governor's office; the state Attorney General or his designee; two members from the Idaho
Senate; two members from the Idaho House of Representatives; the Administrative Director of
the Courts; three representatives from the judiciary; and one representative from the Office of the
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender.
5.

In 2009, the CJC formed a Public Defense Subcommittee (Subcommittee) tasked

with developing specific recommendations for improvement ofldaho's public defense system.
6.

In 2011, Defendant Governor Otter issued Executive Order No. 2011-11,

continuing and reaffirming the CJC's mandate .
. 7.

On May 24, 2013, after approximately three years ofinvestigation, the

Subcommittee issued a set of public defense reform recommendations to the CJC.
8.

Defendant Sarah B. Thomas became Chair of the CJC on or about May 30, 2013,

and continues to serve in that capacity at present.
9.

In 2008, the CJC, along with the Idaho Juvenile Justice Commission, authorized

the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) to conduct a comprehensive
evaluation ofldaho's trial-level indigent defense services.
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10.

The CJC identified seven counties to serve as a representative sample of indigent

defense systems to be evaluated by the NLADA. These included Ada, Blaine, Bonneville,
Canyon, Kootenai, Nez Perce, and Power Counties.
11.

In January 2010, the NLADA released the results of its evaluation of trial-level

indigent defense systems in Idaho, entitled "The Guarantee of Counsel: Advocacy & Due
Process in Idaho's Trial Courts."
12.

In its January 2010 report, the NLADA determined that none of the indigent

defense systems in the sample counties were constitutionally adequate.
13.

The NLADA's January 2010 report was made available to and reviewed by

representatives of the executive and legislative branches of Idaho state government, including
Governor Otter.
14.

There are currently no statewide caseload standards for public defenders in Idaho.

15.

There are currently no statewide performance standards for public defenders in

16.

There are currently no specific statewide training requirements for public

Idaho.

defenders in Idaho.
17.

There is currently no statewide oversight of trial-level indigent defense services

being provided to criminal defendants throughout the various counties.
18.

There is currently no requirement that public defenders report their individual

caseloads to state officials or any court.
19.

Aside from the trustee benefit payments allocated to the Idaho Public Defense

Commission (PDC) in 2014 to offer limited training for public defense attorneys around the
state, the State ofldaho currently provides no funding for trial-level indigent defense services.
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20.

Pursuant to I.C. sec. 19-862, each board of county commissioners alone is

responsible for appropriating enough money to deliver adequate public defense services to
indigent defendants being prosecuted in their jurisdiction.
21.

County commissioners are not required to have any formal or informal training in

the law.
22.

A survey conducted by the CJC in 2014 found that indigent defendants are

represented by counsel at their initial appearance in only 5 of the 44 counties.
23.

A significant number of public defenders in Idaho are not receiving adequate

training hours in areas directly relevant to the representation of their indigent clients.
24.

According to a recent report by the Idaho Legislative Services Office regarding

caseloads, public defenders in some counties are handling more than twice the number of cases
they should be.
25.

On any given day, there are hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals being

prosecuted by the State ofldaho, who qualify for in~igent defense services.
26.

The majority of individuals charged with either a misdemeanor or felony in Idaho

are alleged to have violated state law, rather than a county or municipal ordinance.
27.

The State ofldaho does provide funding to county prosecutors' offices throughout

the state.
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reppink@acluidaho.org
P.O. Bo~ 1897
.
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 344-9750, ext. 1202
(208) 344-7201 (fax)
Idaho State Bar no. 7503
Jason D. Williamson

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION
.jwilliamson@aclu.org
12,5 Broad Street
New York.New. York 10004
(212) 284-7340
(212) 549-2'254 (fax)
Pro hoc vice application pending
Ancirew C. Lillie
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
andrew.lillie@hogarilovells.com
One T&bor Center, Suite 1500 .
l200 Seventeenth Street.
Denver, Cb 8Q202
.. " ... · · · .. · · · · · · .. · · · .. · ....... 303-899-7.300 ... · · · .... ·········· 303-899-7333 (fax)
Pro ha.c vice application pending
Kathryn M. Ali

HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
kathryn.ali@hoganloveils~com.
555 Thirteenth Stre~t NW
.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 637-5600
(202) 637-591 Q(fax)

Pro hac vice application pending

000220

Bret H. Ladine
HOGANLOVELLSUSLLP
bret.ladine@hoganlovells.com
3 Embarcadero Center #1500
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 374-2300
(415) 374-2499 (fax)
Pro hac vice application pending

Jenny Q. Shen
HOGANLOVELLSUSLLP
jenny.shen@hoganlovells.com
4085 Campbell Ave., Suite 100
Menlo Park, CA 94025
650-463-4000
650-463-4199 (fax)
Pro hac vice application pending
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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APPENDIX D
PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF
IAN H. THOMSON WITH SUBPOENA
000222

IN THE DISTRICl' COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT .
OF 'I'HE STATE OF'IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IRA.CY TUCKE~ et al.,

Case No. CV OC 1510240
Plaintiffs,

STATE OF IDAHO., ·et al.~

Defendants.

PLAlNTJFFS' NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF IAN H. THOMSON
. Pursuant to Rules 30; 45(a),

and 45(b) of the Idaho Rules o~ Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs

ti;:acy 'f-qcker, J~QP.. Sharp, Naomi Morley, .ancl Jeremy Payne (coliectiveiy, "Plaintiffs"), by and
through their undersigned attorneys, will take the deposition oflan lI. Thomson, Executive
Director, Iciwio State Public· Defen~e Commission~ to commence at 9:QO a.m. Qn August 27,
2015. The deposition will mke place at ~)10 West Main Street (So·nna Building), Boise, Idaho

8~702, and will continue from day to day until completed. The .deposition will be recorded by
· ,st~npgrapbic anq au9io-visua1 means an.d will be condg.cted unqer oath by an office a'uthorized to
take s·1ich testimony. The deposition will be taken for the Puwoses of discovety, for use at trial .
in this ·matter, and fo.r imy other purpose p.ermitted 1;1nde.i; the Idaho Rui~s of CivU Proceclme.
.

.

. The parties are· also hereby notified that a-sub_poena

will be served on fan H. Th6msort for

the production of documents. A copy of the subpoena is attached.

Dated: August 19, 2015

1
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AMERICAN CIV{L LJQERTIES TJmON

.

OJ? lDAIJO FOVNDATIO~

'

reppink@acluidaho.org·
. P..O. Box 1897
·:soise, idaho 83701
(208) ~44-9750, ext, 1202
(208) 344-7201 {fax)
Idaho State Bar' no. 7503

Jason D. Wiil_iam_s9n

.
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBE:Q.'JIES UNION
FOUNDATION
jwillianison@aclu.org
125 Broad Street
New .YQ*, New York .10004
-c212) 284_.:n40_ ..
(212) 549-~654 (fax)
Pto hac vice application pending

C.
..Andrew
.
.

Lillie
.

.

HOGANLOVELLSUSLLP
ahdrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com
O~e Ta~or Center, Suite 1500
'1200 Seventeenth Street
Denver, CO '8Qio2
,303:g99_7300"· ..
303-899~7333 (fax) . · _
Pro h11c vice application pen.ding
.

.

.

Kathryn M. Ali

.
HOGAN LOVELLS US LU,>
katluyn.ali@hogartlovells.com
555 Thirteenth Street NW
Washington, b.C. 20004
(202) 637-5600 ..· :
(202) ·637-5910 (fax)

P.to hac vice application pending

............•··------

Bret H. Ladine
.
HOGANLO'.VELLSUSLLP
bi:-et.ladiite@hogaruovells.com
3 Embarcadero Center #1500
San Frandsco, CA 94111
(415) 374-~300
(415) 3'74-2499 (fax)
Pro hac. vice applica_tfQl'J ·pe-,zcfin!f

000224

Jenny Q..SbeQ.
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
j'enny.shen@hoganlovells.com
4085 Campbell Ave., Suite 100
Menlo Park, CA 94025
650-463-4000
6~0-'463-4199 (fax)
Pro hac vice applict:ltion pending

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Ti;I_E FOUR'Ill .rQ))ICM.L. DlSTJ.UC'r
OF Tl;I_E STAT)l) ~f IJ:>AHO, IN A!W FOR THE COUNI:Y OF AD~
TRACY TUCKER;.et al.,'

C~se No. CV OC 151_0240.
Plaintiffs;
vs.

SUBPOENA

_STATE bF JD,WO, et a}.,
Defendants.

The· State of Idaho ·to: fan H. Thomson, Executive Director, Jdaho State Publip Defense
Commission, ~16 West B~gc~ s·treet, S~it~ 201, Bois~, id~o 83702:

YOU ARE COMMANDED:
[ X ] to ·appear at the place, date and iime spec;ified befow to testify at the taking of a deposition
in the_ abov.e case.

[ X ] t<;> produce or permit inspection and copying of the documents described in Appendix A,
including electrOi;lically stot~Q .iI).foqnatioil, at th~ place, date and time Specified below;
·. 910_ West Main Street (Sonp~ Buildipg), :Qoise, Idaho 83702, August i7, 2015 at 9:00 a.Di.

You are fut.1her nqtified that ii you fail: to appe·ar at the place and time spedfied above, or to .
J?roduce· Qr p~fll)it copying·or inspecti<;>A as specjfi.ecJ above that YOll may b~ _held fn ~QnJempt of
court and that the aggrieved party may recover from _you the sum· of $100 wid all damages which
the party may sustain by yoµr f,!ilure to co.mplywjtp this irµbp~e;na.
Dated this 19th day ofAu~t 201 s·.
By order of the court.
Rich~rd

.

AM.ERIC;\N CIVJL LIBERTQ!:S :UNION:
OF IDAHO FOUNDATION
teppink@acluidaho.or:g
P.O. Box 1897, Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 3.44-975.6, ~?ct. 1202.
ldaho .State Bar no. 7503 ·
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APPENDIXA

.

.

in addition to the definitiops and instru9tions s~t forth in Rµle 45(i)(2) ofthe Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure, the. following· definitions and instructions apply to each of the discovery
req1J.ests set forth herein· and are deemed to be incorporated in each of the requests. lah H.
· Thompson is req11ested to produce to ]?lainti:ffs QOClJll1ents as set forth below by f\ugust 27,
2015,_at 910 West Main Street (Sonha Building), Boise, Idaho_ 83702,

Definitions
, 1.

i.

The present tense includes the pa·st ~d fyture tenses·.

thci tel111 i'document," as use1 h~rein, _mean~ the original and all non-identical

copies of.any handwritten~ printed~ typed~ recorde,d, or g~phlc or photog:i.-apbic mate:dal of any
.

kjnd and nature,' including

.

all drafts th~reof and all inechanical or electronic sound recordings or

transcripts thereof, however prqduced or r~produced, and incfoqing, but not Jimiteci to,
accoun~g materials, accounts, agreements, analyses, appointment books, books of account,
calen,_qa,rs, 9.atal9gs, clw9ks;' computer data,· 99mputer disks, computer gene~ated or-stored
information, c·omputer programming materials, contracts, con:espondence, date boo~s, diaries,
cii_skettes, drawings~ electronic-mail ("e-mail") messages, faxes, guidelines, instructions, inter.

.

office communic~tioris, invoices,. iedgers, l~tters, "licenses, logs, m~uals, ~emoran:da, metadata,
microfilm, niip~tes~ notes, opiriions, payments, pians, receipts, records, regulations, reports,
- · ·. sound recordings~ statep-lent$; studies, surveys? telegrams~ tel~~e~, tini.esheets, voµchers, word
pro~_essing materials (however" stored or maintaine.d) and working papers, and all other m~ans by
which information is stored for tetrievitl jp fixed
3.

form.

The.te~ i•communicatiort,'' as used herein, tne~s cl?d includes any transmission

or exchange of information between..two .or more persons, whether orally or tn writing, anc;i
~

~

C

•

-
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inclµding but not limited to a,riy- conv~rsatio~ of discussfon by means of letter, note·,
'memorandum, telephon~. telegraph, telex, telecopier, fax transmission, cable, e-mail, or any
othei: mecfo.un.

4.

The terms "relate to' " "related to'" "relating· to' '-' and "regarding-,,"' as used herein,
.

.

mean mentioning, citing, quoting, inv~lying, representing, constituting, discussing, refle.cting,
identifying, describing, referring to, containing, enumerating, evidencing, supporting, ot in any,
way concerning, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly.
·: 5.

Th~ term ''per:son/'

. and. ~·any other'
~

~

a~ us~d hei:ei1;1, sball rue~ any natural persog Cbrp<;>ratio~,
1

form of business entity, including, but not iimited to, partiierships, joint ventures,
-

~

,

.

~

.

-

attorneys,
or anyone else acting ori the person's behalf.
.
.
.

6.

The terms "a1_1ci'1 an_d "or," as us~d herei1_1? are to be construed conjU.nctively or
'

'

disjluictively' as necessary' to make the .tequ~st inclusive rather than exclusive~
. 7.

The t~rII1$ "_any" an~ "all/' as ~edh~rein, ·sh~ll mean_ ''any .and all,'' and' ~hall be

consti;ued so as to ptj.ng_ wi!~Jl tb,e scopi of the requesfl:llly infom~atio~ that ojh~rwise might be
..
construed to be outside its scope.
8. ·

The tetm "describe_," as used herein, means to state all facts of which you a.re

aware concerning the subject, including, but~ot limited to, identifyin~. any dates, any person .
involved ":1 or ~ith.knowledge of the. si.ibject, and. any places or locations relevant to the subject.
9.

The term "ide1~tify/' a$ used h;rein, ~eans:
a

1? copnectio_n with persons, to giv~; to the extent khoy,m, th~ per:mn'_s fµll
. ~ame, present or l~st known addr~ss, and, whefi referrin~ to a natu~al person,, ·
-tbe _present o~ last knQWJ;l place of emp1oyrne~t;

6
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b. In con,necti.9p wjt}J a document~. to ~ve, to t}ie ~xteQt known, the (i) type of
doc]lIDent; (ii), general s'Ubject.matter; (iii) date of the document; and
(iv) author(s), addressee(s), and recipient(s);
c. In connecti9p wit11 an qral statement or communication; to the extent known,
to (i) ·state when and where it was mad,e; (ii) identify each of the. makers and
recipients th_ereof: in addition. to all other~ present; (iii) mdicate the medium of
communication; and .Qv) state the substance of the ,statement or
c9qununi_cati9n.
· l 0.

The temis "you" .an_d "your" as used herein shall mean Tan H. Thomson,
.

: 'Executive Direptor; iaahoState Public Defense Co~issi,on.
11.

-

.

The term .''Defendants/' as used
herein~ ~l1all mean the State of Idaho,
Governor
.
•'

.

'

C.L "Butcli' Otter~ Conunjssioner Moll)'. Huskey, Commissioner Darr~ll G. ~olz,
.

.

Commi~sioner
Sa,ra B. Thomas~ Comniissionet
William }J. Wellman,
.~

'

~~

'

~

'

'

Conunissioner Kimber Ricks~ Commissioner Chuck Winder, Commissioner
Christy P~rfy, an~- each and every former~ present, ~d future cdinmissioner a~d
officer of the Idaho State Public Pefense Commission .
. 12.

The terms ~'public defender" or "pul?lic defe1J,ders:' s~all mean any ·atto~ey '~;
.attorneys providing legaf services to an "indigent person," ijS tha,t term is defiQed _
at Idaho Cod~ §. ·t 9-851 (4), who is 'under fo:nual cha!ge of having co~nmifte~, 9r is
},eing ·detajneq unde~ !i conyict.ion o.f ~ ".s~riou~ crimet ~ tha~ t!;lrm ,is -ci~finec:J at
Idaho _Code § 19-8_51(5), as Well as· any attorney or attorneys provi~ing_ legal
a 'juvenile/'
at.Idahp
Co4~ §. 2·0-502(1 l), who
servlces to
. .
. a~ that term is definec{
.
.
~

is under f~~al charge of having committed,

'

6r who ~as b~en adjudicated for

1

·;

: . )·" .

: ;•

""

.·

...
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commission of; an-act. omission or status. that.brings her or him. undet the, purview

of the Juvenile-Corrections Act (Id$o Code§§ 20.:501 et seq_.).
13.

The- ien:ns "County. Commi~sioner" Qr "County· Commissioner~" shall mean ·any membet or members of a Board of County Commissioners, as described in Idaho-

*

Coc!~ A..nn. 31--701-3l-71g_
14.

The tenn "state officials" ·shall me@ll any state or cQunty official within the Stat~
of Idaho .

..

•

8
i

~i

•

--.·
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Instructions

l.

In responding to these rec:(uests_fot p.rodtiction you should furnish all non-

privil~ged document_s (unless such privilege has been waived) that are within your possession,
cust9<;ly, or control,. or are within the possession, ~ustody, or control of youragents, employ~es,
~~-.:~

~-

representatives, or investigators, and identify all documenti;; known to be responsive to. these
reqlloest
or the possession, custody,. or controi of others
y.QU believ~ to QOntroi
.
'
. by stating (a) who
.
.

~

such documents, (b) where you believe such documents cart be found, (c) the nature of the
;clocurp:~nts (i.e., letter, e-mail, report, memorandum, etc.), and (d) when' you believe such

..

.

docUlhents to hav~ been created. .
If, in responding to these requests for·pro4uction, y~m encounter &ny ainbigttities

2. .

_when 'construing a req~est or 4~fmition, th!;: .response sha~l set forth. th~ matter deemed
.

'

ambiguous and ~e c<?n_struction used in your response.

Th~ documents requested must be produqed in thei! entirety, without redaction or

... 3..

.

~"

~

alteration,. except where necessary to protect privileged material. When a document contains
both priyileged and n,<;>n~pri~ilegeci material, the ·uon:-privileged material'must'be di~closed' to the
.tulles\ extent possible without thereby disclosingthe privileged inateri~. If any document or
portion' of any document co_vered
by tliis reque~t i~ withheld froni prod,,iction-yoq must identify
.
.

'

•'

~cJ.cb iuch ~ocum~nt or p~rti_on of the document, and provide, with respect to each $~ch .
document or po~ion thereof, (a) the !easo~(s) for withholding, .Ch) the date of the document; (c)

the \d~ri#ty of each pe~on w~o dr!ifted or assisted in the preparation ~f the do·cument, (d) the

identify of each person ~ho received or h~d access to the document or copi_es thereof, Qr ·to .

whorn;-ariy portion of·t11:e contents .h!¥3 -bee~ qomrnu,nicat~d, (e) the type or'doc~ent and a brief
des~riptio~ ofthe'nafure and subject matter of the docum~nt and (t)a stateme~t-~f-the facts that
.
..
'.
. .' . ~ "
.
'
.
'

·1

,

.

"

9.
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constitute the basis for the claiui ofpriviiege..

' 4, ·

If production of any reqµested document is objec;ted tp Qn the grounds that

p(odu6tiofi is unduly .burdenscfm~, 4escrib'e. the. burden or 1:;xp6nse of the propo~~d di$_covery ..
. 5.

Documents should be produced as·they are kept in the ordinary course of

business. Where possibie, organize· and iabel each document ()( set of docmnepts? indigiting by
f

·numb~r the request to which the docturiefit(s) relates .
. 6..

If any document responding to ail or any part of tbe request for d.ocum~nts 1~_not

currently available, include a statement to that effect and furnish whatev~r documei1ts are
available. Include in your ~t~t~ment when such documents were· mo;t ~e~e~tiy

i~ your.

·. possessio.n: or subject fo yo1,1r c;ontrpl and ~hlit disposition wa,s m~de of them., ·Identify the nam~,
job titl~, and the last kgown address of_each person currently in ·possessi~n .or control of such
doc\1~~13:ts: If any such d~c1Jnients y,rere destroye?? icl~ntify _th~ name, Job .title, and th~ jas( ·
known business address ~f each pets~h who dire?ted that the docur~1eJits be destroyed, and state
the re~ons the documents: were dest;oyed. ·

• !
I

•
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Documents to be Prod1iced
. 1.

. All documen~s related to corpmim,ications amol)g the Idaho Stat~ Puqlic Defense

Co.mmiss.ion or its staff regarding the provision of indigent defense services in. the State of Idaho.
· 2.

All documents.related to-~ommunica~ions between·~y members or staff'ofthe

Idaho State Public.Defen:.se Con:imission and others, including but not limited to the Governor of
Idaho or his office, Idaho legislators, oi Idaho counties or their agents, regardin$ the ·provision of
indigent defense services in the_ St~te ofldaho.
· 3,

All documents related to any rules., standards, onecommendations proposed,
-

~

•

•

•

~ •

•

•

•

'

<

passed, or considered
Idahq State Puolic;:. Qefense Commission relf!.ted to the ptovisicm o;f
.
.
. ~.. l;>y the
- .
~

.

~

.

,

'

.. . indigent defense servic.¢.s in the State of Idaho since 2010.
..

4.

•

n

•

~

•

•

•

All documents related ·to ~y trainings or' supervision for public defenders

·proposed by .the Idaho State. Public D~ftin:se Co~ssion.
~

.. · 5.

.

,

.

All miri1,1tes, recordings, o:r traii~.cripts of meetings. held by the· Idaho Staie Public

Defense Commission.
· · 6.

All documents relating to studies~ reports, surv~ys

·or analy.sis·re~eived, pf~pared, ·

i:equested, ot r~q~isitj.Qne<;l l:>y _th~ Idaho St~te ~~l?U.9 Perep$.e COilJ.IJl.l$Si~l). fel~tiqg to the
provision of indigent services in the State of Idaho.

: :7.

All docull1:ent~ related to any 1egislatiori a,s~esseµ by the Idaho State fµblio

Defense Cciinmissiori rel~ted to the provision of inµigent defense ·services in the State of Idaho
since 2010:

·~. : All documents relatec,l to auy informal or formaJ. <;omplaints received by the Idf,lho
State P_ublic- Defense Commission regarding pu~lic in~igent defense services in the .State of
Idaho. since 2010.

Ii
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..

· 9.

· All documents related to cc;HJlilJ.~nicatjqns invqlving you or others at the Idaho
.

.

· .State Pu,blic Defense Co1n.tr1ission regardi~g this litigation.
10.

All c;locum~n.ts _related. to ~our toµr of visits to l~:laho' s .PlJ.blic; def~nqei;_f of;fic:es

upon taking your position, including any reports, sllinmaties., othot~s.
11.

All documents related to.pommunicafio~ involving the ldah_o State Public

Defense Commission and the provision of indigent qefense services in the State of Oregon.

rI
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APPENDIX E
PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF
LISA FULLMER WITH SUBPOENA
000235

IN TUE ])ISJ'lUCT COURT ()Jt T_UE· )[OURtll JUDI_C_I~;r_, ))ISTR{CT
OJ? THE STAT,E OF IDAHO, IN A.ND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
· TRACY TUCKER, et q[._,

Cf!~e No. CV oc 1510240

Plaintiffsj _

STATE OF lDAI-lO, et.aZ: 1
Defendimts.

PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF LISA FULLMER
-Pursuant to Rl,lles_ 30, 45(a),.ruid 45(b) of1he Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs
Tracy Tucker, JasonShar_p; Naomi Morley, and Jeremy Payne (collectively, "Plaintiffs;'),. by and
through their uri_der:signed attom_eys~ will take the deposition of Lisa Fullmer, former Canyon
County public defender, to comn1ei1ce at 8:00 a.m.. ort Au.gust 28, 2015. 'The deposition will take
piace at 910 West Main Str~et (Sonna Building), Bois~ Idaho 83702,_ and wili continue from

-

1

day to day until completed. The deposition will be recorded by stenographic and aU:dio-visual
means wid will be conducted under oath by art offi~e authorized to take such testimony. T.he
deposhion: will be taken for the purposes of discovery, for use at trial in this matter1_and for any _
!
l

l

other purpose Mi:hJ.itted tui.dei;- the Idaho Rules o:fCivJI :procedure. ·The p~~s are, a!_so ijeEeby-no!~~ed ti.Ia~~ Sl_lbpoe~a-~ll be served on_Lisa Full~er for the.
production of qocuIJ1ent$,

A ~opy o;f1he ~µbpo~na, j~ aJt~cbed.

Dated:· August 20,. 2015
I

•

1
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AMERICAN CIVIL .LIBERTIES UNION:
OF IDAHO FOUNDATJON
reppink@a~lu1d?110.org
P.O._B9}5: 1897
Boise, Idaho 83701
· (208) 344-9750, ext. 1202
. (208) 344-7201 (fax)
· Idah9 ·State Bar no. 7503

Jason D. Williamson

AMERiCAN CIVIL LIBER'riES UNION.
. FOUNDATION
jwiiliamson@aclu.org
1.25' Bro~d Street · ·
New York,New York 10004
(212) 284-7340
(212) 549-2654 (fax)
Pro hac vi~e application pencftng
Andrew C. Liliie
· HOGAN LOVELLS tJS LLP
ancirew.lillie@hoganioyells.·c~m
One. Tabor· Cepter, SiJite l ;,OQ
1200 Seventeenth Street
Denver, CO _80202
303-8'99-7300 .

~?03-899- 7°333 (fax)
Pr<} _h~c vi~e appfic_atio.n p~ndi~g
Kathryn M. Aii .
HOGANLOVELLSUS LLP
·~athryrr.ali@hoganlovells.coill
· 555 Thir.teenth Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 637-5600 · ..
'(207) 637-5910 (fax)
Pr9 hac vice applicati.on pending
Bret ii. L;,._di~e ·
HOGAN.LOVEL.i.s US LLP
bret.iadine@hoganfovells.com
3 Embarcadero Center #1500
Sap :Francisco, CA 94.11 l
(415) ).74-2300
.(41.5) 374-2499 (fax)

Pro hac vice application j)eridin[t

000237

. jenny Q. Shen
}IOG~ LOVELLS US LLP

jenny.shen@hoganlovelis.com

4085 Campbell Ave., Stit~ 100.
Meruo Park, CA 940256~0~4.63-400Q

650-463-4199 (fax) . ·
· Pro hap. vie~ application pe,n{iing

AttorYJeys for Plaintiffs
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. IN THE DJSTRJCT COURT OF l'HE F_OU_R'fU :JQ])ICIAL DISt.RJCT
QF THE STATE OF IOAao, 1~ AND FOE. 'l'H]j: COPNTV OF AJ>A

II

_ TRACY TUCKER, et al.~ .
Ca~e,No.· CV ()C 1510240
Plaintiffs,

'
!'i'

vs.

SUBPOENA

STATE OF IDAHO, et al.;
Defendants.

:rhe St~te of Iciaho_tQ:, Lisa.Fullm~r, c/o Thompson Law FirQl,· 78 SW 5th Ave #2? Me~dian,
ID 83642:
.

YOU ARE COMMANDED:·.

[ XJ t<;> appear at the pi.ace, date a!].d' time specified below to testify at the. taking or a. deposition
in the above c~e.
[ ~] to produce or pernut inspection and copying of the documents_d_escriqed in' f\ppendix A,
including electronically stored information, at the place, date and tiine specified belQw.
>

•

•

~

- 910 West Mai.n Str~et(S6nna Buildjng), Bois~, ld~ho 83702., August 28; l01~ at 8;00 a.~.
I

•

'

•

•

•

•

•

You

~e frirth~t notifie4 th~t jf you fail to· appear at the place ~cJ time specified· ~bove; or to
ptoduc~ or petmit copying ot inspection as specified above that you may b~ heid fo conte.inpt pf
' court·a~q that th~· aggrieved party way recover from.you the sunj 9f $LOO ~1d all dam.ages which
th~ party
SllStain by your failure to comply with this subpoena.
.

may

D~t~d this 2.0tp. day_of August 2015 .

. By.order of.the court
..:·Ricnar

ppmk .. , .

•,
'
·A.M~RlJ~AN ClVlL Lll3ERTIES.UNI0N

OF .IDAHO. fOUNDA.l'lON
,reppink@acluidaho.org.
P.O. Box:'i897; Bois~,I~aho· 83701
{208) 344-9750', ext. 1202
Idiµ,.o Sta~e Bar no. 7503.
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APPENDIX A'
; In addition to the dennjtions and. instn,tctions set forth.in Rule 45(i)(2) o{the {d;mo Rul~
of Civil Procedure, the following. definitions and instructj.ons apply to each of the discovery
requests set 101th her~!n. and are· dee°?eci to be i_ncorpo~ated iri each of ~e requests. Lisa Fullme~
. ~.

'

~

is r~q1,1ested to produGe to Pl~tiffs dQCUJP{lnts as set forth bel9w by Augu~t 2~, 2015., at 910
West Main S1reet(Sonna Building), Boise, Idaho. 83702 ... ·
Definitions·
· 1.

.'_[he pr~sent tense includes the past and f11fute tenses.

-'2.

.The tepn ''document,."
as'.. us¢d
herein, means. th~ ~rigmal and all non-identicai
.
.
.

.

.

.

copies ~f any handwritten, printed, typed, recotded, br graphic br photographic .materiaJ of any
kind ru-id. nature, fu.cl~ding all .drafts thereo:f'and all mechanical or electronic sound recordings or
tr~scripts thereof, however prodµced or "reprodtJced, ancl including, but pot ljmited to,
accounting materials, accounts, agreements, analyses, appointment b?oks, books of account,
cc!lendais_? caJalogs, checks, compu~er ciat~ compµter dlsks, comp:uter _generateq or .sto~
.
'
.
.
..
~

~

information, computer programming _materials, contracts, corresp_ondence, date books, di~es,
dis~ettes,. dni.wjngs.., elecfronic-mafl ("e-m~Ii'') _messages, faxes, guidelines, instm~ti01js, lnteroffice communications, invoices., ledgers, letters~ licenses, logs,. j:nanua]s, memoranda, metadata,
~

'

;

.

.

-·

.

.

microll:lm, minutes, notes, opinions, payJ]len~, plans,. receipts, records, regulations, reports,
sound ie~ordings, statements, stµdie.s, surveys, telegrams, telexes, timesheets, vouch~rs, wo!d _
processing inat{ltials (4owever st9red 01: ,m~ip.tained) anq W9tkipg pap~:rs, and all other means by
-

.

.

.

~

~

.

~hich iilformati~n is stored for retrieval in fixed form.

3,

JheteTilJ."communication,·,;_as used'herei!l, means and inoludes any tiansrnjssion

or exch~ge ofinformatiofi between two or niore persons, whether ·orally or in_ writing, and

5
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includt11g _l:mt not limi1ed to any convei'S~ti<;>J?- or disc~siO:n by_ rrieans of lett~r, note,_
-

•

..

...

•

J

•

memorandum; te;lephone, teiegra]?h, telex, tele~opier, fax transm_issiOJ:l, cable, ~,.mail, or any
.other ni'edium.

' 4.

The terms "_relate toz" "related. to," ''relating tq( and "regardi-Pg/' as used herein,
- - -.:.. --~- - -~~-::.·

,._

-

-

-'•

-'

-- _... . ..

rn_ean 1pentj.oning, citing, quoting, ipvolving, _i:¢present:ing, coIJStituting, discussing, reflecting,
idefntifying, descri]?iirg, "refe~in$ to, containing, e1!urner~ting, evidencing, supporting, or in_ any
.way ~.onceming, in whole OF in pap:, :dir_ectly oripdirectly.
:..

-

. 5.

<

..

•

as used herein, ~hall mean ruiy natural person, corpofatiort,

The te'm'l "person/:

... .......
and any Qther form of business entity,. in~luqing, but pot limhed to, partrierships, jomt ye~tures,
.

·•

,

and as;ocic1.tions, ruid shaJl irtclude directors, officers, owners, members, employees, agents,
' attbmeys; Qr anyone else acting on the person's behalf.

.
'6.

.

·The terms ''q11d" anq "or/ as 11secl herein, are fope construed conjunctively qi;

disjun~tively, ~ _hecess~y, to make' the req~e_st inc~usiv~:ta~er th~Ji exclusiye. . .
:

".Jc

.. The terms "My" and "all," ,as used h~rein, shall mean "any and all,." and shall be
•

-

-

:

,..

--

-

·-

-

•••

-

1.

-

--

-

•

•

•

•

coilstni~~ so as to b_ring wit1:,iJi the- ~cope of the request any infom1ation tliat otherwise might ~e
construed. to be outside its scdpe.
The tenns ''you" and ''your" as used hereiri shall mean :fonner Canyon County

8.

.

.

.

public def~nqei: Lisa Fullmer.
.
.<

· '9. · . ·The
defender"· or ."public· defenders"
shall mean any attorney
or
. . terms "p11blic
'
. .
.,,

.

,

.

,,

~

~ttomeys providJn~ le~0:I ·service$ t? an "h1cljgentper$on," a$ that term is. d~fined atldaho_ Co~e §

19-85 f(4), wp.o is. under iof111al chru:;ge of pa~ing ~ommitted, or is being detained under a
convicti~n of a "serio~$ crime," a~i'°tha,t tennis defined ~t Ic;laho dad~ § 19-851 (5), as well as any

attorney or a~~rrteys .providing leg~ services 'to a ''.i uvenile/ as :fuat tetri.1 is d'e:rined at ldalio

...

.

.

6
'•"".

I

:.•·

•

I.

••
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C9de §10-50.2(11 ),. _wh.o is _umler fqrm~ chaq~e. of havi_ng copup:itted., or who .h.a~ l;>een
adjudi~ated for commission of, a~ ac~, omission or status. that brings her or him under the
purview ofthe Juvenile Coriections Act (Idaho Code §§ 20-50 I et ~eq. ).

, r

.

7

'<

-~ --·· .
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instructions

: 1,

.•

· In responding to these ~eque~t; fot ptpduction you sho~lc;l fu~sh all .poil~ ·

privileged documents (unless such privilege has been waived) that are. within your possession,
custody~ or con,trol; Of ar~ ~~in ~et~·ss~s$ion,. (;UStod~; QI control of your_ ~g,nt_~~ ~l):lpioyees,
repte~e.rtfa:tives, or investigators~ and.identify all doc~ents known to he responsive td these
·request
or th~ pos~ession,- custot;ly,
or
contn>l
of others
by statjp.g (- a) who yo1,1 belfeye tQ" i;;Qntrol
-.
.
. .
.

..

d?cmments, (b)' where· you believe SU~b docwn~ntS ca:n be folirid, (C) the mit~e. Of the

SUCh

. .,

.

.

docwne:O.ts (i.e., letter, e-mcil, report, 'memorandum, etc. ), an4 {d) ~hen you i;;;lieve .such
•

..

·,

•

~

•

J

"

•

docum(;lnts ·to _have been created.
.

.

If~ jn responding :to these requests· for production, you encounter- any ambiguities

:w~en construing a· r~u~~~ or ~efiniti~n, the .respoiise ~~ll~l set for:th the matt~r deemed ·
arnbi~~ous and t}?.e constructi~~ used in your :response.
3,

The
d9cuments
must b~ produced
inJheit entirety,
witho~t :reilaction
01:.
.
. requested
. .
.
"
.
.

.,

~

to

aiterat(on~ except where ~epes;ary protect privjleged. material._ When a docw:ri.ent contains
.
.
.
.,
both p~fvileged non-privileged material, the "nori.;priviieged"material must ciisc~9~e4' th~·
~

and

be

to

full~st ~xtent p~ssible without thereoy di~clq~ihg the p;rivileged ~aterial: If any dpcitinent br
portion of any document covered ~y this req~e~t is withhe~d from production y9u must ,identify
each sitch qoc~ent or pQrtio1rof th~ docurpent, an.cl provide, with respect to e;ch s~ch .
•

•

•

" •

~I

• •

••

•

,

•

.

.

,

,

•

! '

.

•

•

document o~portion thereof, (a) the reasori(s) for withholding, (h) the date 6fthe docWilent, (c)
.

.

.

the J.dei).tity of ~ch perscm wh,o grafted or ~sisted inJhe prepara~ion nf the ·cloc~ment, (d) the· ·

.

-. --

--

..

.

. :..

-

.

-

.

.

_...

: -

.

. .

.

.

idehtify
of each person who received or: had access to the document or copi~s thereof,. or to
.
'
~

who~

any portion of the· contents h~s. be(;]J. conumuucated, ·ce) the type_of document and a brief.

des~iptio~ of the nature and subject matter.of the'._docqm(;lnt, and_ (f) a s~tem~nt of the facts ~hat. .

. . 8
.,,

. . .... -~·.

... .

·--.

:

·.:.- ._

..

...:··
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con~titute tbe b~_is f9r the claim 9£ piiyilege.
~

.

.

~

ffpfoduction of any requested ~ocument is objected fo on. the grounds tha:t

· 4.

production is unduly burdensome; describe the burden or expense of the propos~d discovery.
5.

Docunients should b~ ·produced as they ~e kept in the ordinary course of

business. Where possible, o·;ganize and l~bel each document or set of documents,. indi~ting by
µumbet tp.e request.to whic~ t.J:ie do9ur,r;ient(s) rel.ates.
If any document responding to all o~ any part of the request for documents is not

·6.

.pUI'[eptly
avaiiable,
inplucle
a -~tatemei;1t
j:o·.thaf~ffect
and" fu_rnjsh whatever
documents
are.
.. ·. \
.
.
.
.
. . .
.
.
.

<•

I

•

<

available.
Include_
in your statement
when. ~uch docuri1ehts
were
most recently in your
:.
.
.
.
.
.
'
. .
"

posses~ion orsubject to your control and what disposition w~ inacie of theq:1; · Iqentify the name,
•

•

•

..

,

•

•

f

job title, a,nd the las_t k;nown address of each person currently in_possession or'contro! of s1:1ch
documents.
~- .
.

if any such documents ·were
destroyed,. identifythe n~me.· job title; and the las.t.
.
.

.

~

. .
k_n.9wn l?usines_s addl'ess of .each pei:sort ?v'h6 qitected ~hat the do~ur.nents be de~troyed; and ~tate

'

<

.

.

'

"

~

L

•

..

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

'(

<•

•

•

•

the reasons the :documents- were destroyed.

'

''

..

'

9
:

--···
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Docum·ents to be Produced

. i,

AU cioc~rpents rel~t~d to yoµr job respop~ibiliti~s a~.ii. ¢MyQn Cot,1nty public

defender prior to the op~ning of the Canyon County Public Defendet Office on October 1,, 2014.
2.

All docwnents Tefated to yotir job responsibilities as a Canyon County public
.
.
...
- . ..
.
.... .... - .
-. -....
~-: .
~

~

;.:

"

... .

.~

...

.defender after the opening ofthe Canyqh County Public Defender: Office on October 1,.2014,
3.

All documents related to you~workload as a Canyon County public defender.

.4.

;\II doctJ.n:ie11ts relat~d to any ~aining you r~ceiyeq en: ieques~ed in, yorir role as. a,

Canyo~ County public _defender:. ,

s.

All docum.~nts relat~d io ·communications l;Jetween you ~d Canyon. <;ounty Chier

Public Defend~t Tera Harden, or .other m~agement o:fffo~als wlt~n the Canyon County Publk.
-

.

~

.

.

Defender 9ffice, regar~in.g your abi~ity ~r capacity t~ represint the indigent defendants to whom
. you were assigned ~ a· C~nyo!1 County p~b.lic defonder~ .
6..
'

. · All documents related to co1TlI11unications between you and any Canyon County
-···

~

~

~

-

~

.

~

judges or oth~t court perso.Ill}el, regai:din& your ability or capacity to represent the in4i~ent
,

.

,

defend~ts
to whom
you.
were assigned
as. a Canyon·County
public defender.
.
.
.
. . '"
.
.

7.

,;-

All documentsr~lateµ to cpmnmnic~tions:between yo11 apd an'y Ca,nyon County

prose~utors, regarding your apility_or.capacify to represe.nt the indigent defendants f~ whom you
.

.

.

. were assigned as a Canyon County pub.lie defender,
8. ·

. All'dcicume_nts related tq =any formal

qi; infonrtal

supetv_ision you received ·as a

. <;anyon County public defen~et.
~

'

9.

J.

-

All documents
related.. to :my
form&!- or informal
evalmitions
you reGeived
as ..a
.
.
..
.
.
.

'

'

Canyon C~:rnnty public defender..

10
_,

.,._

·.. I
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. 10..
l,.

..

: 1L

..

All documents·
related
to your
use of investigators
in your
role
as a Canyon
.
.
-··
. .
.·
., . .
. .
.
.

'

All documents related to your use of expert analysis or testimony 111 your role as &

.

Canyon County·pu~~ic defonder.
.

. ..

. .~:

12.
of which you

.

.

..-.. .

.

All docurnenfo related to any informal or formal complaints you have received or.

are aware, regarding your r.~presen!ation of indigent defendin.ts in your role as a

Ca11yo_n Coun~y- pubiic ~eferider.

,.

'

11
It

••••••• ~-..

;~

..

.

·····

.

.

.

...... ·:,.•· .. -~: . :..

-_ :· .

000246

Jason D. Williamson
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION
iwilliamson@aclu.org
125 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004
(212) 284-7340
(212) 549-2654 (fax)
Pro hac vice application pending

Andrew C. Lillie
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com
One Tabor Center, Suite 1500
1200 Seventeenth Street
Denver, CO 80202
303~899-7300
303-899-7333 (fax)
Pro hac vice application pending

Richard Eppink
AMERICAN CML LIBERTIES UNION
OF IDAHO FOUNDATION
reppink@acluidaho.org
P.O. Box 1897
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 344-9750, ext. 1202
(208) 344-7201 (fax)
Idaho State Bar no. 7503

Kathryn M. Ali
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com
555 Thirteenth Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 637-5600
(202) 637-5910 (fax)
Pro hac vice application pending
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
, OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

TRACY TUCKER, et al.,
Case No. CV OC 1510240
Plaintiffs,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO, et al.,
Defendants.
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PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
STAYING DISCOVERY PENDING DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiffs, a proposed class of all indigent persons who are now, or will be in the future,
under formal charge before a state court in Idaho of having committed any offense that could
result in imprisonment, and who are unable to pay for an attorney, hereby oppose Defendants'
Motion for Protective Order Staying Discovery Pending Decision on Motion to Dismiss.
Defendants' motion to dismiss raises questions of fact regarding, among other things, whether
and the extent to which certain state officials, including the Governor and members of the Idaho
State Public Defense Commission, have been involved in the delivery or reform of indigent
defense services in Idaho. Plaintiffs seek discovery on these exact issues. Defendants' motion
for protective order should be denied for two additional reasons. First, the issues raised by this
case are of gre_at public interest. Second, proceeding with limited discovery - especially of third
party witnesses - would impose no undue burden on Defendants. Defendants have therefore
failed to meet the heavy burden required to justify a stay of discovery. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
respectfully request that the Court deny Defendants' motion and allow discovery to continue on
schedule.
BACKGROUND
On June 17, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the State ofldaho, the Governor of
Idaho, and the members of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief from Defendants' ongoing failure to ensure that indigent defendants in Idaho
state courts receive the legal representation guaranteed to them under the U.S. and Idaho
Constitutions. The Complaint alleges that the failures within Idaho's indigent defense delivery
system (which include, but are not limited to, a lack of sufficient funding, oversight, and
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training) are pervasive and consistent across counties throughout the state. Plaintiffs further
allege that Defendants are constitutionally required to ensure that adequate indigent defense
services are provided to Idaho's poorest citizens; that the Governor bears ultimate responsibility
for the provision of indigent defense services to Idaho residents; and that the members of Idaho's
Public Defense Commission are responsible for promulgating rules related to training and datareporting requirements for defense attorneys across the state and for recommending core
requirements to the legislature to ensure that Idaho's indigent defense delivery system meets
constitutional muster, in addition to recommendations related to enforcement mechanisms and
various funding issues. Compl. ,r,r 85-87.
On July 8, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b), in which they "acknowledge the seriousness of the issues that Plaintiffs
describe in their Complaint," but argue that the named Defendants (the State ofldaho, the
Governor of Idaho, and the members of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission) have no
power to grant the requested relief. See Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 6. The motion argues that
neither the State of Idaho, its Governor, nor its Public Defense Commission, as a matter of state
and federal statutory law, have any connection with the delivery of public defense in this state
and have no authority to do anything about it. See id. ·at 9-10.
On August 21, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion For Protective Order Staying Discovery
Pending Decision On Motion To Dismiss. In this motion, Defendants seek to stay all discovery
on the grounds that the motion to dismiss raises purely legal arguments about whether this Court
can grant any relief against these Defendants, and that "permitting discovery before the Court
rules on the motion to dismiss would impose unnecessary and undue burdens on Defendants."
Mem. Supp. Mot. at 4. For the reasons described herein, both arguments fail.

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER STAYING
DISCOVERY PENDING DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS - 3
\\DC - 090334/002608 - 6998293 v2

000249

&

ARGUMENT

Defendants' request to stay discovery should be denied because discovery would help
this Court decide the central legal question raised by Defendants' motion to dismiss, namely:
who exercises what authority (and when, how, and to what extent) over the provision of indigent
defense services in Idaho. Defendants will face no undue prejudice if they are made to respond
to Plaintiffs' discovery requests, and they have failed to supply any compelling reason why
discovery should be stayed. Indeed, Plaintiffs thus far have acted reasonably in seeking
discovery, even voluntarily narrowing their discovery requests to those that are most relevant to
deciding the motion to dismiss, i.e. those requests that seek discovery regarding the extent to
which certain state officials, including the Governor and members of the Idaho State Public
Defense Commission, have been involved in the delivery or reform of public defense services in
Idaho. See 2d Eppink Affidavit. The balance tips further in favor of allowing discovery to
proceed in light of the fact that, as Defendants themselves have acknowledged, this case raises
issues of great public importance.

A. Lega1Standard
The Idaho Supreme Court has emphasized that stays of discovery are disfavored, and that
discovery should not be stayed on account of a pending motion unless the motion would dispose
of the entire action. Taylor v. AJA Servs. Corp., 261 P.3d 829, 847 (Idaho 2011) (citation
omitted). This is consistent with the approach taken by numerous other courts, which, as a
matter of general course, refuse to stay discovery absent good cause to do so. See, e.g., Young v.

United States, 907 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying the federal rule and noting that stays of
discovery should not be granted absent a showing of "good cause"); IPVX Patent Holdings, Inc.

v. 8X8, Inc., No. C 13-01707 SBA, 2013 WL 6000590, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2013)
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(declining to stay discovery pending resolution of motion to dismiss where defendant failed to
carry burden to demonstrate good cause); Spreadbury v. Bitterroot Pub. Library, No. CV 11-64M-DWM-JCL, 2011 WL 2117563, at *3 (D. Mont. May 25, 2011) (denying motion to stay
discovery pending motion for partial summary judgment).
A pending motion to dismiss may justify a stay of discovery only where there are no
factual issues raised by the pending motion, discovery is not required to address the issues raised
by the motion, and the court is convinced that the plaintiff is unable to state a claim for relief.

Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984); White v. Am. Tobacco Co., 125 F.R.D.
508 (D. Nev. 1989) (citing Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1981)). Put another
way, stays of discovery are "disfavored unless there are no factual issues in need of further
immediate exploration, and the issues before the Court are purely questions of law that are
potentially dispositive ... such as where a challenge is directed to the Court's jurisdiction."

FLSmidth Spokane, Inc. v. Emerson, No. 1:13-CV-00490-EJL, 2014 WL 979187, at *1-2 (D.
Idaho Mar. 12, 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Cf TradeBay, LLC v.

Ebay, Inc., 278 F.R.D. 597, 600 (D. Nev. 2011) (typical situations in which staying discovery
pending a ruling on a dispositive motion are appropriate where the dispositive motion raises
issues of jurisdiction, venue, or immunity).
A party seeking a discovery stay bears a "heavy burden" and must make a "strong
showing" in favor of a discovery stay. Raymond v. Sloan, No. CIV. 1:13-423, 2014 WL
4215378, at *7 (D. Idaho Aug. 25, 2014) (citing Skellerup Indus. Ltd. v. City ofLos Angeles, 163
F.R.D. 598, 600 (C.D. Cal. 1995)) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A party
moving for a protective order to stay discovery must show a particular and specific need for the
protective order, as opposed to making stereotyped or conclusory statements. Timothy v. Oneida
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Cnty., No. 4:14-CV-00362-BLW, 2015 WL 4170140, at *2 (D. Idaho July 9, 2015) (citations
omitted). Under this standard, a court "may stay discovery only if it is convinced that the
plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief." US. ex rel. Jacobs v. CDS, P.A., No. 4:14-cv-301, 2015
WL 5257132, at *2 (D. Idaho Sept. 3, 2015) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
Notably, a stay is not permissible to merely save the time and expense that is part of
discovery in all types of litigation. Raymond, 2014 WL 4215378, at *7. Further, discovery stays
are disfa~ored by courts because they undermine judicial efficiency. See, e.g., Raymond, 2014
WL 4215378, at *7.

The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which substantially match the

applicable federal rules, encourage the speedy resolution of litigation and liberal discovery. See,

e.g., Skellerup, 163 F.R.D. at 600-01; Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39, 40 (N.D.
Cal. 1990). These rules do not provide any special procedures for discovery stays when a motion
to dismiss is filed. See Timothy, 2015 WL 4170140, at *2 (discussing the federal rules).

B. Defendants Have Failed To Meet Their Heavy Burden To Demonstrate That A Stay
Of Discovery Is Warranted
As noted above, stays of discovery are disfavored and are appropriate only in rare
instances when a motion to dismiss raises no factual questions to which discovery would be
relevant. That is far from the case here. To the contrary, Defendants' motion to dismiss raises
substantial factual questions that cannot be resolved without at least some limited discovery.
Moreover, Defendants' generalized, conclusory assertions regarding the burdens of responding
to Plaintiffs' discovery requests - which, as noted above, Plaintiffs have made good faith efforts
to narrow - fail to make the necessary "strong showing" to justify a stay of discovery, especially
in light of the strong public interest in efficiently resolving this case. Further, even if Defendants
were to prevail on their motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs would simply file suit against other state or
local defendants, thereby requiring the State to respond to the very same discovery requests in
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any event, whether pursuant to IRCP 45 or 34. Defendants' motion should be denied.

1. Defendants' motion to dismiss raises issues that could be more effectively
; resolved after discovery on threshold factual issues.
'Defendants' motion to dismiss raises not only questions of law, but questions of fact as to
who has exercised authority over the delivery of indigent defense services in Idaho, and to what
-

extent. Discovery therefore will be relevant to show, among other things, what the Defendants
have failed to do in discharging their existing responsibilities over indigent defense, as well as
what they have done and could do to improve the system.
Plaintiffs' discovery requests demonstrate how discovery would be relevant to the issues
raised in the motion to dismiss. For example, Plaintiffs have propounded interrogatories
requesting that Defendants identify the state officials with the authority to ensure that indigent
defendants are receiving the representation guaranteed under the federal and state constitution,·
all efforts undertaken by Defendants to address the oversight of indigent defense in the State, and
any funding proposals by the Governor's office to contribute funding to the provision oftriallevel indigent defense services. Plaintiffs have also requested all documents regarding any
alternate legislation or reforms considered by the State of Idaho relating to the provision of
indigent defense services since 201 O; documents related to any actual or proposed funding of
indigent defense services by the State of Idaho since 2010 (including documents relating to how
indigent defense services are funded by each of the 44 counties); documents relating to oversight
provided to trial-level counsel; and recommendations and rules proposed by the Idaho State
"

Public Defense Commission. All of these questions, among others included in Plaintiffs'
discovery requests and to be included in future discovery, are questions of fact that are relevant
to Defendants' motion to dismiss.
In addition, Defendants argue that neither the Governor nor the Commissioners fall
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within the ambit of Ex Parte Young, in which the U.S. Supreme Court established an exception
to the general rule that, under the Eleventh Amendment, states cannot be sued by non-state
actors, and allowed such actors to sue states for prospective relief, where the suit personally
named a state official. Specifically, the Court found that "[i]n making an officer of the state a
party defendant in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an act alleged to be unconstitutional, it is
plain that such officer must have some connection with the enforcement of the act, or else it is
merely making him a party as a representative of the state, and thereby attempting to make the
state a party." Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908). While the Court's language makes
I
j

clear that not every state official may be sued under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, those that have

.

.

'.

f

"some connection" o the enforcement of the challeng~d act certainly can be. Although

\\... Defendants appe.lio argue that there is no state official who is responsible for ensuring the
'•

/.

dclive:ryofindigent defense services to poor Idahoans, such an excuse is insufficient. See HRPT

Properties Trust v. Lingle, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1127 (D. Haw. 2010) ("lfthere is no state
official charged with enforcing Act 189, then it stands to reason that Governor Lingle herself is
the person with the power to instruct state officials in the executive branch to enforce or to
refrain from enforcing Act 189."). As such, there are questions of fact that bear on whether the
state official named as defendants have a "some connection" to the delivery of public defense in
Idaho.

2. Defendants have failed to offer any compelling reason why discovery should be
stayed.
Defendants' conclusory arguments that their motion to dismiss will succeed are
insufficient to meet the required "strong showing" to warrant a stay of discovery. Plaintiffs have
sued the State, its top executive official, and members of a public defense commission that was
created specifically to protect the constitutional rights of indigent defendants in Idaho.
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As an initial matter, Defendants' motion to dismiss is not likely to succeed.
contrary to their assertions,

First,

Defendants do have authority to effect change on the State's

indigent defense services, which is supported by the language codified in the state's public
defense statutes, and will be, we believe, supported by discovery. Second, the Idaho Supreme
Court has made clear that the counties of the State of Idaho are merely arms of the State. See,
e.g., State ex el. Rich v. Larson, 84 Idaho 529, 374 P.2d 484 (1962); Peterson v. Bannock
County, 61 Idaho 419, 102 P.2d 647 (1940); Ada County v. Wright, 60 Idaho 394, 92 P.2d 134
(1939). The U.S. Supreme Court has been equally clear that the provision of indigent defense
services is a responsibility of the State. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)
(acknowledging "the burden that the States will have to bear in providing counsel" as a result of
.

the Gideon v. Wainwright line of cases; Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that "the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent
criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the
right to a~sistance of appointed counsel in his defense.") (emphasis added); ML.B. v. S.L.J., 519
U.S. 102 (1996) (noting that, under Gideon, a State must provide trial counsel for an indigent
defendant charged with a felony). As such, Defendants cannot avoid this legal obligation by
merely asserting that the State has delegated its authority to the counties.
Likewise, Defendants' arguments regarding the time and expense of discovery apply to
all litigation, and are belied by the fundamental goal of the Rules of Civil Procedure to promote
speedy resolution of litigation. The flawed premise underlying Defendants' argument is that
because they have moved to dismiss, the Court should stay discovery.

That is, however,

insufficient. A defendant's confidence that it will prevail on a dispositive motion does not, by
itself, justify staying discovery. See Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39, 40 (N.D. Cal.
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•
1990). In fact, a federal district court in Idaho recently addressed this issue directly, noting that
the defendants' belief that they would prevail on their motion to dismiss was insufficient.

Timothy, 2015 WL 4170140, at *2 ("This idle speculation does not [warrant staying discovery] .
I

· .. Such general arguments could be said to apply to any reasonably large civil litigation ... Had
the Federal Rules contemplated that a motion to dismiss ... would stay discovery, the Rules
would contain a provision for that effect. In fact, such a notion is directly at odds with the need
for expeditious resolution of litigation.") (alterations and internal citation omitted).* The fact
that a "non-frivolous motion [to dismiss] is pending is simply not enough to warrant a blanket
stay of all discovery." U.S. ex rel. Jacobs, 2015 WL 5257132, at *1 (internal citation omitted).

3. The balance of equities and the public interest weigh in favor of permitting
discovery to proceed.
This Court should decline to stay discovery for at least two more reasons. First, the Court
should consider the strong public interest in an open, efficient resolution of this matter. That
interest weighs in favor of permitting discovery to go forward here, where a large,
geographically diverse class of Idaho residents seeks injunctive relief for civil rights violations
that are a result of decisions made by Idaho public officials and entities. The case has attracted
substantial media attention across Idaho and the United States, and the public has a deep and
'

'

strong interest in the prompt resolution of Plaintiffs' claims. See Morrow v. City o/Tenaha

Deputy City Marshal Barry Washington, No. 2-08-CV-288-TJW, 2010 WL 3057255, at *5 (E.D.
'

Tex. July 30, 2010) ("The Court notes that this case has garnered considerable public attention as
*

.

I

There are no special rules that require a stay of discovery in civil rights lawsuits such as
this one when a motion to dismiss has been filed. Compare to Petrie v. Elec. Game Card, Inc.,
761 F.3d 959, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying the Stay of Discovery provision in a federal
securities act, which provision shows Congress's clear intent to postpone discovery infederal
securities class actions until the sufficiency of a complaint has been sustained).
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a result of the serious allegations made against local public officials. Because of this and the fact
that this case is a class action involving constitutional rights and alleging abuses by public
officials, the prompt res<?lution of this case would best serve the public interest."). Defendants
should not be allowed to delay all discovery on these important issues by merely asserting that
Plaintiffs, in seeking relief from the State, its top public official, and a public commission on
indigent defense, have sued the wrong public officials.
Second, the fact that Defendants would face minimal or no burden if they are made to
comply with Plaintiffs' discovery requests weighs strongly in favor of permitting discovery to
proceed. See, e.g., Kanowitz v. Broadridge Fin. Solutions, Inc., No. CV 13-649 DRH AKT, 2014
WL 1338370, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014). Because Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief from
the State and State officials, there is little danger of an innocent party being forced to settle a
frivolous class action to avoid incidental discovery costs. Cf Gardner v. Major Auto. Cos., 11
Civ. 1664, 2012 WL 1230135, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.12, 2012) (part of the reason behind
discovery stays is to avoid saddling defendants with the burden of discovery in meritless or
frivolous cases and to discourage the filing of such cases). At bottom, Defendants have not
established that allowing discovery will cause them any prejudice or harm. That conclusion is
underscored by the fact that Plaintiffs have acted reasonably in their quest for discovery, and
have even narrowed their discovery requests to those most relevant to the motion to dismiss. See
2d Eppink Affidavit. Although all discovery necessarily involves some inconvenience and
expense, this is not a sufficient reason for a stay or protective order. Moreover, this Court retains
ample power to control discovery so as to minimize incidental costs going forward as it sees fit.

See, e.g., IRCP 26(b)(2).
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CONCLUSION
Idaho case law, which is consistent with the approach taken by federal courts, makes
clear that blanket stays of discovery pending resolution of a motion to dismiss are disfavored
unless the pending motion raises purely legal questions. Defendants' motion to dismiss raises
important factual questions regarding the extent to which Defendants have more than "some
connection" to Idaho's public defense system, see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157.
For these reasons and the others set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the
Court deny Defendant's Motion For Protective Order Staying Discovery Pending Decision On
Motion To Dismiss and allow discovery to continue in this matter without limitation.
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of September, 2015.

Richard Epp1
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Jason D. Williamson
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
· United States District Court,
D. Idaho.
FLSMIDTH SPOKANE, INC., Plaintiff,

v.
Andrew EMERSON, et al, Defendants.
No. 1:13-cv-00490-EJLCWD. I Signed March 12, 2014.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER AMENDING DOCKET NO. 30
CANDY W. DALE, United States Magistrate Judge.

*1 This Order amends and supersedes the Court's Docket
Entry Order entered on March 10, 2014 (Dkt.30).
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion
for Protective Order, (Dkt.23), which requests a stay of
all discovery pending a decision on Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt.6). 1 The current deadline for completion of
all discovery in this case is September 1, 2014, and a bench
trial before District Judge Edward Lodge is set for May 19,
2015. (Dkt.21.) Pursuantto Judge Lodge's referral of all nondispositive matters in this case, (Dkt.10), the Court has held
two telephonic status conferences with the parties in an effort
to address their impasse over the requested protective order.

1

Consistent with District of Idaho Local Civil Rule 37. I,
the parties met and conferred on Defendants' proposed
protective order but were unable to reach agreement.

The first of these conferences occurred on February 25, 2014.
(Dkt.28.) At that time, the Court directed the parties to meet
and confer on Defendants' objections to discovery, including
Defendants' specific objections to the individual requests in
Plaintiffs first set of written discovery. The intent of this
directive was for the parties to identify discovery that could
go forward either before or immediately after a decision
is rendered on the motion to dismiss. On March 7, 2014,
Plaintiff filed a notice, stating that the parties conferred and
"resolved all objections by D..efendants to Plaintiffs First Set
of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents
[p]ropounded to Defendants."(Dkt. 29 at 1-2.) Interpreting
this statement as a resolution of all of Defendants' objections

to d~scovery, on March 10, 2014, the Court entered a docket
entry order finding Defendants' motion for protective order
moot. (Dkt.30.)
Following entry of the March 10 Order, counsel for
Defendant contacted Chambers 2 and stated that, despite
Plaintiffs notice stating otherwise, Defendants were
continuing to ask for a protective order from any and all
discovery being conducted until the motion to dismiss is
decided. Therefore, on March 12, 2014, the Court held a
second telephonic status conference to address Defendants'
concerns about the March 10 docket entry order (Dkt.30).
Based on the comments of counsel during the status
conference, it is now clear that Defendants do not have
specific, unresolved objections to the written discovery
served by Plaintiff. However, Defendants object to going
forward with certain depositions Plaintiff attempted to
schedule after the parties' March 7 meet and confer. And, as
stated in the motion for protective order, Defendants maintain
their overarching objection to any discovery in this case while
the motion to dismiss is pending. Accordingly, the Court finds
Defendants' motion for protective order, (Dkt.23), is not moot
and, for reasons stated below, will grant the motion in part
and deny it in part.
2

Counsel spoke to the undersigned's law clerk, Mark
Cecchini-Beaver.

1. Legal Standard
Rule 26(c) permits the Court, "for good cause, [to] issue
an order to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. "The
United States Supreme Court has recognized this language
confers "broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a
protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection
is required."Seatt/e Times Co. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36,
104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984). Although a court
may, for good cause shown, stay discovery pending resolution
of a motion to dismiss, e.g., Stock v. Comm 'r of the I.R.S.,
No. CV-00-467-E-BLW, 2000 WL 33138102 (D.Idaho
Dec. 20, 2000), that result is not automatic. E.g., Twin City
Fire Ins. Cb. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 124 F.R.D.
652 (D.Nev.1989). Indeed, a complete stay of discovery
is disfavored unless "there are no factual issues in need
of further immediate exploration, and the issues before
the Court are purely questions of law that are potentially
dispositive ... such as where a challenge is directed to the
Court's jurisdiction."Hachette Dist., Inc. v. Hudson County
News Co., 136 F.RD. 356, 358 (E.D.N.Y.1991). The good
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cause inquiry is necessarily dependent on the facts and
posture of each case. Id.

_ 2. Discussion
*2 Defendants argue that there is good cause for a protective
order staying all discovery because such an order will protect
both parties from undue burden and unnecessary expense.
Defendants note that the motion to dismiss attacks the
sufficiency of the Complaint and, if granted or even granted
in part, could obviate or narrow the discovery in this case.
Plaintiff opposes Defendants' motion, arguing it is merely an
effort to prejudice Plaintiff and delay expeditious resolution
of this case.

As a preliminary matter, the Court agrees with Defendants'
characterization of the motion to dismiss. The motion attacks
the sufficiency of the Complaint and does not raise any
jurisdictional issue that could potentially result in dismissal
as a matter oflaw. It is therefore unclear whether a decision
granting the motion to dismiss would necessarily moot
discovery. On the other hand, if the motion is denied, delayed
discovery could affect other case management deadlines,
eviscerating the Court's Scheduling Order (Dkt .21 ).
The Stock case is instructive because it highlights particular
circumstances that warrant a stay of all discovery. There, the
discovery requests were voluminous, covering approximately
200 pages. Stock, 2000 WL 33138102, *2. The requests also
were "burdensome[,] broad," and did not comply with the
limit on interrogatories set by the applicable local rule. Id
Moreover, the court expressed concern that the case might
be "sidetracked" by discovery disputes before two motions to
dismiss could be resolved. Id. Accordingly, the Stock court
stayed discovery.
This case is not Stock.Here, Plaintiff has so far propounded
interrogatories and requests for production numbering
13 pages-inclusive of caption, instructions, definitions,
End of Document

verification, and service details. (Dkt.23-2.) In accordance
with the Court's February 25 directive, the parties conferred,
and "resolved all objections" to these requests. (Dkt.29.) Both
parties now agree there are no specific objections to any
discovery thus far propounded. Thus, there is no apparent
risk that this case will be sidetracked by additional discovery
disputes regarding the pending discovery requests before the
motion to dismiss is resolved.
Defendants nevertheless maintain their general objection to
discovery solely because their motion to dismiss is pending.
Although a stay may avoid undue discovery expenses at
this early stage in the litigation, it may also delay the
speedy resolution of this case. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. I. Given these
circumstances, Defendants have not shown good cause for a
complete stay of discovery. The Court is, however, concerned
that Plaintiff's proposed depositions or additional written
discovery may be premature at this juncture. Therefore, the
Court finds good cause for a more limited stay of discovery.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court being fully advised in
the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants'
Motion for Protective Order (Dkt.23) is GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART.
*3 Defendants shall respond to Plaintiffs first set of written
discovery requests within 30 days of the date of this order.
Plaintiff is restrained from serving any additional discovery
requests or noticing any depositions unless Defendants agree
to such discovery or until the Court resolves the pending
motion to dismiss, whichever is sooner.

All Citations
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2012 WL 1230135
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
E.D. New York.

Dorsey R. GARDNER, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.
The MAJOR AUTOMOTIVE COMPANIES
and Bruce Bentle~, Defendant.
No. 11-CV-1664 (FB).

April 12, 2012.

Attorneys and Law Firms
Marc A. Lebowitz, Lebowtiz Law Office, LLC, New York,
NY, Mark B. Rosen, Portsmouth, NH, for Plaintiffs.
Robert F. Brodegaard, Brodegaard & Associates LLC, New
York, NY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROANNE L. MANN, United States Magistrate Judge.

*1 Plaintiffs Dorsey R. Gardner and John Francis O'Brien,
trustees of the Dorsey R. Gardner 2002 Trust (collectively,
"plaintiffs"), move for an order compelling The Major
Automotive Companies, Inc. ("Major") and a member
of its Board of Directors, Bruce Bendell ("Bendell")
(collectively, "defendants"), to produce documents and
respond to interrogatories served by plaintiffs in their initial
discovery requests. See PL Mot. to Compel Disc. (Nov. 1,
2011) ("11/1/11 Pl. Mot. to Compel"), Electronic Case Filing
("ECF") Docket Entry ("DE")# 19. Defendants cross-move
to stay discovery pending resolution of their motion, served
by them on November 14, 2011, seeking judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or dismissal of the complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the same. See Def. Mot. to Stay Disc. (Nov.
14, 2011), DE # 27; Def. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Stay
(Nov. 14, 2011), DE# 27-1 ("11/14/11 Def. Mot. to Stay");
see also Def. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Judgment on the
Pleadings (Noy. 14, 2011) ("11/14/11 Def. Mem."), DE# 348. 1 Because the discovery motions essentially represent two
sides of the same argument, and require the same threshold
analysis, the Court analyzes them together.

The case was reassigned to this magistrate judge after the
parties filed their discovery cross-motions.

For the reasons to follow, the Court grants defendants' motion
to stay discovery during the pendency of their dispositive
motion, and denies plaintiffs' motion to compel defendants to
respond to plaintiffs' initial discovery requests.

BACKGROUND
The instant case arises out of an allegedly improper
management buyout transaction of Major, a publicly traded
company, effectuated by defendants. See Compl. (Apr. 5,
2011) ,i 1, DE # 1. The Complaint charges Major and
Bendell, who is described as Major's "principal officer and
majority shareholder," with "violations of Section 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 'Exchange Act')
and Securities and Exchange Commission ('SEC') Rule 14a9 promulgated thereunder and [with] breaches of fiduciary
duty."/d. In brief, plaintiffs allege that defendants (1) offered
a misleading justification for the buyout transaction, which
was designed to benefit Bendell at the expense of its minority
public shareholders; (2) failed to create a special committee of
disinterested or independent members to evaluate the fairness
of the transaction for the benefit of minority shareholders;
(3) failed to consider alternatives to the transaction; (4)
withheld and failed to consider financial information from
the eighteen months preceding the transaction (resulting in
an artificially depressed valuation of the company); and
(5) omitted from their proxy material information regarding
Major's performance and true value, so as to mislead minority
shareholders. See id. ,i,i 5-6, 16-35.
According to plaintiffs, defendant Bendell (along with other,
unnamed Board members) thereby breached his fiduciary
duties of care, loyalty, and good faith and fair dealing, and
negligently misrepresented the fair price of Major's stock,
all in violation of Nevada state law. See Compl. ,i,i 3642, 52-58. In addition, plaintiffs complain that the material
omissions in defendants' proxy materials violated federal
securities laws, specifically, Section 14(c) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder. See id. ,i,i 4351; 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a); 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9(a). In their
Answer, defendants deny the allegations and assert a number
of affirmative defenses. See Answer (May 25, 2011), DE# 5.
*2 The parties have already taken a number of steps in
the discovery process in this case. The parties exchanged
initial disclosures on July 14, 2011. See Defendants' Rule
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26(a) Initial Disclosure Statement (July 14, 2011), DE #
8; Plaintiffs' Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosure Statement (July
14, 2011), DE # 9. Plaintiffs then served defendants with
their document requests on August 2, 2011 and first set
of interrogatories on August 3, 2011. See Deel. of Robert
F. Brodegaard (Nov. 14, 2011) ("Brodegaard Deel.") ,i 3,
Exh. A to 11/14/11 Def. Mem., DE # 27-2. Over the next
several days, plaintiffs issued subpoenas to a series of non-

parties, 2 pursuant to Rule 45(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Brodegaard Deel. 'II 4-5. On August
30, 2011, the parties agreed that defendants would respond
to plaintiffs' initial discovery requests by September 16th,
see Email from L. Varn to R. Brodegaard (Aug. 30, 2012),
Exh. C to Deel. of Mark B. Rosen in Supp. of Mot. to
Compel (Nov. 1, 2011), DE # 20-3, and they filed a
stipulation as to electronic discovery on September 19, 2011.
See Stipulation Regarding Electronically Stored Information
(Sept. 19, 2011), DE # 13. Defendants did not respond to
plaintiffs' discovery requests, but instead, in a letter docketed
on September 21, 2011, requested a premotion conference
regarding def~ndants' proposed motion for ·~udgment on the
pleadings, dismissing ~e case in its entirety and, pending the
Court's resolution of the motion, a stay of discovery."Def.
Mot. for Pre-Mot. Conference (Sept. 21, 2011), DE# 14; see
also 11/14/11 Def. Mot. to Stay at 2 (citing Brodegaard Deel.
,i,i 9-1 O); 11/1/11 PL Mot. to Compel at 1.
2

Including Empire Valuation Consultants, LLC, the entity
that drafted defendants' fairness report; Major's in-house
counsel, Gordon Silver; HSBC Banlc U.S.A., N.A.; and
Wells Fargo Banlc, N.A.

On November 14, 2011, following a premotion conference
held on October 25, 2011, defendants serve(\ their motion for
judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) or, in the
alternative, for dismissal for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6).See Notice of Def. Mot. for Judgment on the
Pleadings or to Dismiss Comp1. in its Entirety (Dec. 23, 2011)
("12/23/11 Notice"), DE # 34; 11/14/11 Def. Mem., D.E. #
34-8; Pl. Opp'n to Def. Mot. for Judgment on the Pleadings
(Dec. 9, 2011), DE# 34-9; Def. Reply Mem. in Supp. of
Mot. for Judgment on the Pleadings or to Dismiss Compl.
in its Entirety (Dec. 23, 2011), DE # 34-10. The parties'
fully submitted papers were filed on December 23, 2011. See
12/23/11 Notice. Defendants' dispositive motion is currently
pending before the Honorable Frederic Block, the District
Judge assigned to this case.

DISCUSSION
The parties' discovery-related cross-motions raise two distinct
issues. First, the Court must determine '\\'.hether the automatic
stay provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B), mandates
a stay of discovery pending the resolution of defendants'
dispositive motion. Specifically, the parties dispute whether
the PSLRA applies to post-answer motions for judgment on
the pleadings and, if so, whether the stay should apply to any
or all of plaintiffs' claims. Second, if the Court concludes that
the automatic stay provisions of the PSLRA do not apply, then
it must determine whether a stay is appropriate under Rule
26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
*3 Having concluded that the PSLRA automatic stay applies
to each of plaintiffs' claims, the Court need not and does not
reach the Rule 26(c) issue.

I. Application of Stay to Defendants' Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings
Plaintiffs first argue that a stay is inappropriate because the
automatic stay provision of the PSLRA applies only to preanswer motions to dismiss and not to post-answer motions for
judgment on the pleadings. See 11/1/11 PL Mot. to Compel
at 1, 3. Defendants counter that the automatic stay provision
is applicable here because a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, "[i]n essence, ... is a motion to dismiss."See Def.
Opp'n to 11/1/11 PL Mot. to Compel (Dec. 9, 2011), at 4, DE
# 29. This Court agrees with defendants.

The PSLRA was designed to deter frivolous securities
litigation through stringent pleading requirements and an
automatic stay of discovery pending the resolution of "any
motion to dismiss." 15 U .S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). The PSLRA
provides, in pertinent part, that:
In any private action arising under
this chapter [the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.], ·an discovery
and other proceedings shall be stayed
during the pendency of any motion to
dismiss, unless the court finds upon the
motion of any party that particularized
discovery is necessary to preserve
evidence or to prevent undue prejudice
to that party.
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Id.
Contary to the premise of plaintiffs' argument, the plain
language of the PSLRA does not limit the scope of the
automatic stay requirement to any particular species of
motion to dismiss, and courts have broadly construed the
scope of the stay provision. First, the automatic stay provision
has been held to apply to both initial and successive motions
to dismiss. See Sedona v.Ladenburg Thalmann, No. 03 Civ.
3120 LTSTHK, 2005 WL 2647945, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.14,
2005); In re Salmon Analyst Litig., 373 F.Supp.2d 252, 256
(S.D.N.Y.2005). In fact, as noted by (now) Circuit Judge
Gerard A. Lynch, "it is appropriate to extend the stay"''until a
complaint has been authoritatively sustained by the court .... "
Id.; see Podany v. Robertson Stephens, Inc., 350 F.Supp.2d
375, 378 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (Lynch, J.) (noting that, in PSLRA
cases, there is a "strong presumption that no discovery should
take place until a court has affirmatively decided that a
complaint does state a claim under the securities laws, by
denying a motion to dismiss") (emphasis in original). Staying
discovery pending judicial evaluation of the sufficiency of the
complaint is consistent with "the entire purpose of the stay
provision[, which] is to avoid saddling defendants with the
burden of discovery in meritless cases, and to discourage the
filing of cases that lack adequate support for their allegations
in the mere hope that the traditionally broad discovery
proceedings will produce facts that could be used to state a
valid claim." Podany, 350 F.Supp.2d at 378. Consequently,
those motions that require a court to determine the facial
sufficiency of the pleadings fall within the ambit of the
PSLRA's automatic stay provision, regardless of whether the
complaint has been answered.
*4 Here, defendants have filed a motion for judgment
on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c)or to dismiss the
Complaint in its entirety under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim. See generally 11/14/11 Def. Mem., DE# 348. Rule 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed
-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for
judgment on the pleadings."Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The Second
Circuit has held that courts faced with Rule 12(c) motions for
judgment on the pleadings must "employ [] the same standard
applicable to. dismissals pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)
(6)."Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir.2010)
(citing Johnson v. Rowley, 569 F.3d 40, 43 (2d Cir.2009)
(per curiam)). Indeed, Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure treats Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) identically in
addressing the ramifications of considering "matters outside
the pleadings" and the conversion of motions to dismiss

into motions for summary judgment. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
Significantly, whether filed under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule
12(c), a motion to dismiss asks the court to decide whether
the complaint should be "authoritatively sustained" 3 based
solely on the available pleadings, drawing inferences in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. See generally
Hayden, 594 F.3d at 160. Accordingly, this Court agrees with
defendants that a Rule 12(c) motion is a "motion to dismiss"
within the meaning of the PSLRA ·automatic stay provision,
and that therefore the stay is triggered by defendants' Rule
12(c) motion.
3

In re Salomon, 373 F.Supp.2d at 256.

II. Application of the Automatic Stay to Plaintiffs'
Claims
Having determined that the PSLRA automatic stay applies to
defendants' dispositive motion, the next question is whether
the stay should extend to all of plaintiffs' claims. As outlined
above, plaintiffs advance three claims in their complaint: (I)
a federal securities claim pursuant to Section 14(a) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder; (2)
a Nevada state law claim for breach of fiduciary duties; and
(3) a Nevada state law claim for negligent misrepresentation.
See Compl. ,~ 36-51. Plaintiffs argue that ~e present case is
"not a securities fraud action" as defined by the PSLRA, but
rather is an action involving non-fraud state law claims and
a Rule I 4a-9 claim "based on negligent acts, not allegations
of fraud."See PL Opp'n to Def. 11/14/11 Mot. to Stay (Dec.
9, 2011), at 2, DE # 30. Defendants counter that plaintiffs'
Rule 14a-9 claim and breach of fiduciary duties claim are
couched in terms of fraud or intentional misconduct, thereby
falling within the scope of the automatic stay provision. See
Def. Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Stay Disc. (Dec. 23, 2011), at
3, DE#35.

As detailed below, because the plain language of the PSLRA
does not distinguish between fraud-based and non-fraudbased claims, the discovery stay in this case should cover all
claims.
First, the PSLRA stay provision expressly applies to federal
securities actions (not claims) arising under the Exchange
Act. See15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). Additionally, most
courts in this Circuit have held that the automatic stay
provisions of the PSLRA extend to state securities claims
and non-securities claims brought in actions involving federal
securities claims. See In re Smith Barney Transfer Agent
Litig., No. 05 Civ. 7583(WHP), 2006 WL 1738078, at *3
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(S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2006) (holding that "[t]he PSLRA stay
is not limited to discovery related to securities claims," but
"applies to 'all discovery' in any 'action' under the PSLRA's
purview, regardless of whether non-securities claims are
alleged"); Riggs v. Termeer, No. 03 Civ. 4014 MP, 2003
WL 21345183, at *l (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2003) (holding that
the automatic stay provisions of the PSLRA apply to related
state law claims and to non-class-action securities claims
where "the central claims asserted allege securities fraud and
seek relief under the securities laws"); In re Tromp Hotel
S'holder Deriv. Litig., No 96CIV.7820 (DAB)(HBP), 1997
WL 442135, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 1997) (holding that
the automatic stay provision extends to derivative actions and
to state law claims filed in conjunction with federal securities
claims).
*5 To be sure, one case cited by plaintiffs has construed the
statute to exclude breach of contract and tortious interference
claims asserted pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. See Tobias
Holdings, Inc. v. Bank United Corp., 177 F.Supp.2d 162,
167-68 (S.D.N.Y.2001). 4 Rejecting the reasoning of the
Tromp Hotel case, 1997 WL 442135, at * 1-2, the court
in Tobias found an ambiguity in the PSLRA because it is
"not clear from the face of the statute whether Congress
contemplated the situation where both federal question and
diversity jurisdiction are invoked in a single action."Tobias,
177 F.Supp.2d at 165. Significantly, the Tobias court
expressly noted that the claims for breach of contract and
tortious interference (which the court.referred to as "the nonfraud common law claims") "d[id] not mirror the federal
securities claims .... " Id. at 168;see id. at 169.The court
concluded that the PSLRA stay provision did not apply
to those "distinct state law claims brought under diversity
jurisdiction." Id. at 169.Notably, the plaintiff did not seek and
the court did not order discovery on those claims that mirrored
the federal securities claims-in Tobias, plaintiff's common
law fraud claim. See id. at 164, 167.
4

In another decision issued out of the Southern District
of New York, the court held that the PSLRA's automatic ·
stay was inapplicable to a derivative action that did
not assert a federal securities violation; the court
nevertheless exercised its discretion to stay discovery
pending its decision on a motion to dismiss. In re
Bancorp Deriv. Litig., 407 F.Supp.2d 585, 586-87
(S.D.N.Y.2006). In contrast to Bancorp, the instant case
does involve a federal securities claim.

each of plaintiffs' three claims. First, consistent with the
language of the discovery stay provision, plaintiffs' federal
securities claim clearly "arises under" the Exchange Act of
1934. Contrary to plaintiffs' assumption, the statutory text
does not draw a distinction between federal securities claims
that are based on fraud and federal securities claims that are
based on negligence. As such, the discovery stay applies, at
the very least, to the federal securities claim.
Moreover, the discovery stay also applies to plaintiffs' state
law diversity claims. Where, as here, a private action arises
under the federal securities laws, the PSLRA plainly calls for
a stay of "all discovery and other proceedings," see 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added), with no exception carved
out for situations also involving non-fraud claims grounded in
diversity jurisdiction. 5 Accordingly, this Court respectfully
disagrees with the reasoning set forth in Tobias and, like
the court in Tromp Hotel, finds _that the text of the PSLRA
supports a stay of discovery as to each of plaintiffs' claims.
5

The PSLRA permits the Court to lift the automatic
stay in the event it finds that "particularized discovery
is necessary to preserve evidence or prevent undue
prejudice to [a] party."15 U.S .C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
Plaintiffs do not invoke that portion of the statutory
provision, nor do they purport to make the requisite
showing of need.

In any event, common sense supports a stay of all discovery
in this case, even under the rationale of Tobias. Unlike the
situation in Tobias, plaintiffs' federal and common law claims
each derive from the same factual allegations: namely, that
defendants Bendell and Major affirmatively misrepresented
the value of Major's stock as a means of inducing plaintiffs
to enter into an unfair buyout. To allow discovery on any
one of plaintiffs' claims would open the door to otherwise
currently undiscoverable information related to plaintiffs'
federal securities law claim, and would undermine the
purpose of the PSLRA's automatic stay provision. See Angell
Invs., L.L.C. v. Purizer Corp., No. 01 C 6359, 2001 WL
1345996, at *1-2 (N.D.III. Oct.31, 2001) (staying discovery
on negligent misrepresentation claim, which was "related
closely enough to the federal securities law claims" to involve
the same discovery; distinguishing Tobias as involving state
law claims that are "separate and distinct" from the federal
securities claims). Therefore, all discovery in this case will
be stayed pending a judicial determination of defendants'
pending dispositive motion.

This Court concludes that both the text of the PSLRA and
common sense support staying discovery with respect to
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CONCLUSION

*6 For the reasons stated above, the Court grants defendants'
motion to stay discovery pending the outcome of their
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Having concluded that
a discovery stay is warranted, the Court denies plaintiffs'
motion to compel discovery.
Any objections to the recommendations contained in
this Report and Recommendation must be filed with
the Honorable Frederic Block on or before April 30,

End of Document

2012.SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 72. Failure to file objections in a timely
manner may waive a right to appeal the District Court order.
The Clerk is directed to enter this
Recommendation into the ECF system.

Report

and

SO ORDERED.

All Citations

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2012 WL 1230135, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. P 96,806
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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United States District Court, N.D. California.
Oakland Division
IPVX Patent Holdings, Inc., a
Delaware corporation, Plaintiff,

v.
8X8, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant.
Case No: C 13-01707 SBA
I Filed November 12, 2013

Attorneys and Law Firms
Daniel Adam Rozansky, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP,
Los Angeles, CA, Pierre R. Yanney, Stroock & Stroock &
Lavan LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
Robert J. Crawford, Crawford Maunu PLLC, St. Paul,
MN, Benjamin Kneeland Riley, Bartko, Zankel, Bunzel &
Miller, San Francisco, CA, Norma Natalette Bennett, McFall
Breitbeil and Smith, P.C., Houston, TX,for Defendant.

ORDER
Docket 83
SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG, United States District
Judge

*1 The parties are presently before the Court on Defendant
8x8, Inc.'s ("Defendant") administrative motion to clarify
the Court's directives regarding discovery. Dkt. 83. Having
read and considered the papers filed in connection with this
matter and being fully informed, the Court hereby STAYS all
proceedings in this case until Defendant's motion to disqualify
Plaintiffs counsel is resolved.

I. BACKGROUND
On November 1, 2011, Plaintiff IPVX Patent Holdings,
Inc. ("Plaintiff') commenced the instant patent infringement
action against Defendant in the Eastern District of Texas. See
Compl., Dkt. 1. On August 23, 2012, Defendant filed a motion
to transfi;:r venue to either the District of Delaware or to the
Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Dkt. 25. An amended complaint was filed on September 25,

2012. Dkt. 31. On March 21, 2013, the district court in the
Eastern District of Texas issued an order transferring this case
to the Northern District of California. Dkt. 40. On May 23,
2013, the case was assigned to the undersigned. Dkt. 52.
On August 20, 2013, Defendant filed a motion to disqualify
Plaintiffs counsel and a motion to dismiss. Dkt. 71, 73.
On August 21, 2013, the Court issued an order referring
the motion to disqualify Plaintiffs counsel to the Chief
Magistrate Judge or her designee for determination. Dkt.
75. On that same day, the Court also issued a minute
order stating that Defendant's motion to dismiss will be
held in abeyance pending a ruling on Defendant's motion
to disqualify Plaintiffs counsel. Dkt. 76. The motion to
disqualify Plaintiffs counsel was subsequently assigned to
Magistrate Judge Westmore and is currently set for hearing
on November 21, 2013. See Dkt. 82.
On October 7, 2013, Plaintiff propounded interrogatories
and requests for production of documents on Defendant
which, among other things, seek "highly sensitive" financial
information as well as technical documents such as
schematics, plans, manuals and memorandums relating to
Defendant's technology. Def.'s Mtn. at 3. On October 21,
2013, Defendant filed an administrative motion to clarify the
Court's directives regarding discovery. Dkt. 83. Plaintiff filed
a response on October 25, 2013. Dkt. 84.

II. DISCUSSION
The court has inherent authority to manage the cases before it.
Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-255 (1936) ("[T]he
power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent
in every court to control the disposition of the causes on
its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants."). A "court may, for good cause,
issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,"
including forbidding discovery or specifying terms, including
time and place, for discovery. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(l). "The
burden is upon the party seeking the order to 'show good
cause' by demonstrating harm or prejudice that will result
from the discovery." Rivera v. NJBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057,
1063 (9th Cir.2004). A stays of proceedings in federal court,
including a stay of discovery, is committed to the discretion
of the trial court. Jarvis v. Regan, 833 F.2d 149, 155 (9th
Cir.1987); seeLittle v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th
Cir.1988) (a district court had wide discretion in controlling
discovery).
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*2 In the instant motion, Defendant seeks clarification as to
whether the Court intended to stay all proceedings, including
discovery, pending a determination ofits motion to disqualify
Plaintiff's counsel, which is premised on the improper use
and disclosure of Defendant's confidential information by
Plaintiffs co-counsel. Def.'s Mtn. at 1, 4. According to
Defendant, it "understands" the Court's August 21, 2013
minute order, which states that Defendant's motion to dismiss
will be held in abeyance pending a ruling on Defendant's
motion to disqualify Plaintiff's counsel, as staying this action
''pending determination of the disqualification issues." Id
Plaintiff disagrees, asserting that it does not ''understand" the
Court's minute order as staying discovery in this case. Dkt. 84.
Having reviewed the record, the Court finds that the
August 21, 2013 minute order did not stay discovery
in this case pending resolution of Defendant's motion to
disqualify Plaintiffs counsel. However, the Court finds
that Defendant has shown good cause to stay discovery
until Defendant's motion to disqualify Plaintiff's counsel is
resolved. Staying discovery will avoid the possibility that
the parties will unnecessarily expend time and resources
conducting discovery. If the motion to disqualify Plaintiffs
counsel is granted, the parties will have wasted time and
resources propounding and responding to discovery requests.
Moreover, a limited stay of discovery is appropriate to
prevent Plaintiffs counsel from obtaining technical and
financial information about Defendant before a determination
End of Document

is made as to whether Plaintiff's counsel may continue to
represent Plaintiff in this action. Finally, Plaintiff has not
shown that a limited stay of discovery will impose any unfair
prejudice on it.

In light of the forgoing, the Court hereby STAYS discovery
in the instant action until Defendant's motion to disqualify
Plaintiffs counsel is resolved. To the extent Defendant
requests an order staying discovery pending resolution of its
motion to dismiss, the Court denies this request. Defendant
has failed to demonstrate good cause to stay discovery until
its motion to dismiss is resolved.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
THAT:
1. Discovery is STAYED pending resolution of Defendant's
motion to disqualify Plaintiff's counsel.

2. This Order terminates Docket 83.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2013 WL 6000590
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant.
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Signed March 31, 2014.

Attorneys and Law J:irms
Alexander T. Coleman, Michael J. Borrelli, Borrelli &
Associates, P.L.L.C., Great Neck, NY, for Plaintiffs.
Jeremy M. Brown, Daniel Robert Levy, Epstein Becker &
Green, P.C., Newark, NJ, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
A. KATHLEEN TOMLINSON, United States Magistrate
Judge.

l. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
*1 This is a class action lawsuit alleging claims of (1) unpaid
wages in violation of Article 6 of the New York Labor Law,
§§ 190 et seq., (2) breach of contract, and (3) other claims that
"can be inferred from the facts" against Defendant Broadridge
Financial Solutions, Inc. ("Defendant" or "Broadridge").See
Complaint ("Compl.") [DE 1]. This action is brought by
Plaintiffs Mi~hael Kanowitz, Steven Roy, Helene Cranmer,
Charles Hydo and Daniel Sturchio (collectively, "Plaintiffs")
on behalf of themselves and all similarly-situated employees.
Id The Plaintiffs alleges that Broadridge failed to pay them
non-discretionary wages despite their satisfaction ofobjective
criteria set forth in Defendant's Fiscal Year 2009 Management
by Objectives (MBO) Bonus Plan Document. Id ~ 1.
Before the Court is Defendant's motion for a full stay of
discovery pending the disposition of its anticipated motion to
dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d)(4) (B).See Defendant's Motion to Stay Discovery
("Def.'s Mot.") [DE 14]. Defendant argues that this Court
lacks jurisdiction in light of the "home state" and "local
controversy" exceptions set forth in CAFA, ''which are
triggered when two-thirds of the putative plaintiff class and
the defendant is a citizen of the state in which the action
was filed."ld at 1. As, such, Broadridge submits that there
is "no basis for jurisdictional or any other discovery."ld.
In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant has not
provided sufficient evidence that CAFA applies and that
limited discovery is warranted to determine whether twothirds of the putative plaintiff class and the defendant are
indeed citizens ofNew York State. See Plaintiffs' Opposition
to the Motion to Stay Discovery ("Pls.' Opp.") [DE 15].
For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion to stay
discovery is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Complaint
In Fiscal Year 2009, a period which began on July
1, 2008 and ended on June 30, 2009, Broadridge
implemented and published a bonus payment plan entitled
the "FY '09 Management by Objectives (MBO) Bonus Plan
Document."Compl. ~ 1. According to the Complaint, the
MBO Bonus Plan Document contained both discretionary and
objective bonus provisions. Id. The discretionary portion of
the Bonus Plan "carried a 10% weight." Id. The objective
section, by contrast, constituted 90% of the weight of the
plan. Id At the beginning of Fiscal Year 2009, the named
Plaintiffs and the Class Action Plaintiffs were provided with
the Bonus Plan Document which outlined the criteria under
the plan. Id. Although the named Plaintiffs and the Class
Action Plaintiffs satisfied the objective criteria, Defendant
either "slashed" or refused to pay Plaintiffs the amount that
they had earned. Id. Plaintiffs argue that "[t]hese totals are
due and owing to Plaintiffs and Class Action Plaintiffs as
unpaid wages."Jd. In the alternative, Plaintiffs maintain that
"Defendant's failure to pay this money to Plaintiffs and Class
Plaintiffs is a breach of contract entitling Plaintiffs and Class
Plaintiffs to damages."Jd
*2 Relevant to the motion before the Court is Plaintiffs'
allegation in the Complaint that the basis for subject matter
jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Compl. ~ 2. Plaintiffs
claim that the "amount in controversy exceeds the sum
or value of $5,000,000 and at least one member of the
class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a different state than
DefendantBroadridge."Id The Complaint alleges that all five
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individually-named Plaintiffs are citizens of the State ofNew
York and were employed by Broadridge during Fiscal Year
2009. Id. ,r 4. Broadridge is alleged to be "a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of Delaware" and
"according to the New York State Department of State,"
maintains a "principal executive office" at 2 Journal Square,
Jersey City, New Jersey 07306." Id. ,r 5.
Plaintiffs seek class certification under Rule 23(a) and 23(b)
(3).See Compl. ,r,r 7-8. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek to certify
the following class:
Current and former employees of
Defendant who worked for Defendant
during the Defendant's 2009 fiscal
year, i.e. from July 1, 2008 through
June 30, 2009, and who were
eligible to receive a bonus under
the Defendant's MBO Bonus Plan
applicable to the 2009 fiscal year.

Id. ,r 9. The Plaintiffs contend that the proposed class will
satisfy the requirements of both Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3).Jd. ,r,r
10-20.Plaintiffs further note that "[t]here are over 100 known
employees of the Defendant who fit the class definition
outlined above; many hundreds more may exist."ld. ,r 10.
On or about September 1, 2008, Broadridge published the
Fiscal Year 2009 MBO Bonus Plan Document. Compl. ,r 27.
The cover page of the document specifically stated that the
plan was "retroactive to or 'effective' as of July 1, 2008."ld.
All named Plaintiffs were employed at Broadridge during
the entirety of Fiscal Year 2009 according to the Complaint.
Id. ,r,r 21-26.The purpose of the MBO Bonus Plan was to
"[p]rovide designated associates with individual goals that
are aligned with [Broadridge's] business goals' and to reward
associates when the organization achieves its goals."ld. ,r
28 (internal quotations omitted). The MBO Bonus Plan was
calculated on the basis of four components: (1) financial
results, (2) client satisfaction, (3) projects/initiatives, and
(4) leadership. Id. ,r 30.The MBO Bonus Plan Document
explained how to calculate the different components. Id. ,r
31.The Plaintiffs allege that the leadership component was
the only discretionary section and that it carried a 10%
weight. Id. "Thus, based on this language and simple logic,"
Pfaintiffs conclude, "all other components of the MBO Bonus
Plan, comprising the other 90% of the calculation, were to
be calculated on a non-discretionary basis."ld. Supervisors
employed by Broadridge "explained to Plaintiffs and Class

Action Plaintiffs exactly what they had to do to earn 90% of
their objectively-calculated bonuses for that year."ld. ,r 33.
*3 At the end of Fiscal Year 2009, supervisors submitted the
calculations for approval. Compl. ,r 34. Plaintiffs claim that_
[u]pon such submission, even though the eligible employees
had spent the previous year working towards and striving
to meet such objectively-set criteria, the Defendant's upperlevel supervisors determined that none of the employees'
bonuses could exceed a certain percentage even if those
employees had earned a higher percentage in accordance
with the objectively-based formula as set [forth] ... in the
2009 MBO Bonus Plan Document." Id. ,r 35.Consequently,
Plaintiffs contend, "Broadridge recalculated and slashed the
bonuses of its Plan-eligible employees, including the five
named Plaintiffs and the Class Action Plaintiffs, who had
earned a higher bonus amount under Broadridge's announced
and pre-determined objective formula."Id. ,r 36.Thereafter,
"Broadridge paid to Plaintiffs and Class Action Plaintiffs such
lower amounts and not the amounts that Plaintiffs and Class
Action Plaintiffs had objectively earned over the course of the
2009 fiscal year."Id.

In Count I of the Complaint, Plaintiffs assert a cause of action
for unlawfully withheld wages under New York Labor Law
§§ 190, et seq. Compl. ,r,r 39-42. In Count II, Plaintiffs allege
a cause of action for breach of contract under New York state
common law. Id. ,r,r 45-50.

B. Procedural History

J. Defendant's Pre-Motion Conference Letter
On April 10, 2013, Defendant filed a letter to Judge Hurley
requesting a pre-motion conference for purposes of moving
to dismiss the Complaint, pursuant to FED. R. CN. P.
12(b)(l), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. DE 10.
Defendant argued that the Court is deprived of subjectmatter jurisdiction in light of the "home state" and "local
controversy" exceptions to CAP A since more than two-thirds
of the putative class and Broadridge are citizens of the same
state-New York. Id. at 1-2.In their April 3, 2013 responding
letter to Judge Hurley, Plaintiffs consent to a pre-motion
conference but argue that factual issues exist with respect to
the citizenship of Broadridge and the putative Class Plaintiffs.
· DE 12 at 2. As such, "Plaintiffs ... request discovery into the
factual contentions of citizenship that the Defendant raises in
its letter."ld. at 3. However, Plaintiffs take no position with
respect to merits-based discovery. Id.
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2. The Initial Conference
On April 11, 2013, the parties appeared before this Court
for an Initial Conference. DE 13. The Court acknowledged
that "Defendant is seeking to stay all discovery pending
the submission and determination of its intended motion
to dismiss."ld. Plaintiffs' counsel asserted that they seek
discovery to proceed, "at least with regard to permitting
discovery on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction."ld. In
light of the request to stay discovery and the anticipated
motion before Judge Hurley, the Court stated that:
*4 After hearing from both sides
today, I advised counsel that I believe
it is appropriate for this Court to
take a further look, in a more
formal way, at the arguments and
cases cited by defendant's counsel
this morning, in addition to giving
plaintiffs' counsel an opportunity
to argue why limited discovery
should not proceed, notwithstanding
defendant's legal arguments. Although
the Court realizes that there is some
overlap between the merits of this
action and a request for a complete
stay, I have asked counsel to focus
on the "stay" argument as much
as possible. Defendant's counsel will
file a letter motion, not to exceed
three pages, on ECF by April 22,
2013 seeking a full stay of discovery
pending the anticipated motion to
dismiss. Plaintiffs' counsel will file his
opposition to the letter motion by April
29, 2013. Counsel are free to attach
any pertinent exhibits which help to
focus the issue of the proposed stay of
all discovery.
Id.

3. Judge Hurley's Stay ofDispositive Motion Practice
In the wake of the Initial Conference and the permission
granted to brief the issue of whether discovery should be
stayed, Judge Hurley issued an Electronic Order holding
Defendant's request for a pre-motion conference to file a
motion to dismiss in abeyance. See Apr. 12, 2013 Electronic
Order. Specifically, Judge Hurley held that "Defendant's

request for a pre-motion conference in anticipation of
moving to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l) is hereby
held in abeyance pending Magistrate Judge A. Kathleen
Tomlinson's determination on the forthcoming motion to stay
discovery."ld.

C. The Current Motion to Stay Discovery
In accordance with this Court's directives, Defendant filed a
letter motion to stay discovery, maintaining that exceptions
within CAFA prohibit this action from proceeding in federal
court. See generally Def. 's Mot. Defendant maintains that "a
full stay of discovery is warranted since Plaintiffs' claims
will likely be dismissed, the burdens of discovery would be
extensive and unnecessary, and a stay will not result in any
prejudice to the Plaintiffs."ld. at 1.

The Defendant claims that both Broadridge, as a New York
corporation, and more than two-thirds of the putative class
members are citizens ofNew York State. Def.'s Mot. at 1. As
a result, the Defendant argues, the action lacks subject matter
jurisdiction under CAF A. Id. Further, Defendant contends
that the breadth of discovery and the burden it presents
justifies a full stay pending Judge Hurley's decision on the
anticipated motion to dismiss. Id. at 3. Third, Plaintiffs will
not be prejudiced by a full stay of discovery, particularly
because of their ;,declared intention to re-file in state court" in
the event this action is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Id
In this vein, Defendant asserts that they have demonstrated
the requisite "good cause" to stay discovery. Id.
In response, Plaintiffs point out that there remains a dispute
about whether the citizenship of Broadridge and that of
the putative class is, in fact, consistent with Defendant's
representations. See Pis.' Opp. at 1. Plaintiffs state "[a]s the
Court further knows, based on publicly available information
that the Defendant put on file with the State of New York,
Plaintiffs commenced this action with the belief that the
Defendant's principal place of business was located in New
Jersey."ld at 1-2.As Plaintiffs put it, "[i]n one declaration,
the Defendant asserts that its principal place of business is
truly in New York, but then boldly admits that the information
about its principal executive office location on file with

New York is not a mistake."ld. at 2. 1 Plaintiffs gather that
Defendant "intentionally provided such misinformation, to
a state agency, for the purpose of its own 'administrative
convenience.' "Id. (quoting Declaration of Mark D. DiGidio
annexed to Def.'s Mot. as Exhibit "B" ["DiGidio Deel."] at

5-6).
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Here, Plaintiffs are referring to the listing of Defendant's
''principal executive office" in Jersey City, New Jersey
with the New York Department of State.

*5 Secondly, Plaintiffs takes issue with the "redacted chart"
supplied by the Defendant listing the members of the putative
class. Pl.'s Opp. at 2. The chart, Plaintiffs claim, is defective
because "the only information that the Defendant provides are
the town and state in which it contends each class member
lives or lived at some point."Jd. Plaintiffs take issue with the
fact that Defendant "redacts the names and street addresses
of each putative class member and does not provide a phone
number or any other means for anyone to be able to verify the
accura~y of the chart's details."Jd. (emphasis in original).
Plaintiffs propose that "the Court order the Defendant to
produce the complete chart of the putative class, without
redaction, and with the addition of a column containing
a contact number for each individual."Pls.' Opp. at 2.
Thereafter, at their own expense, Plaintiffs will "randomly
select a handful of putative class members and attempt
to contact them to verify the information about them
that the Defendant has provided."Jd. Plaintiffs maintain
that, if the "defendant's information proves accurate," the
Plaintiffs will concede that Defendant's anticipated motion
to dismiss is unneces-sary. Id. Alternatively, if the data
disclosed by this exercise is inconsistent with Defendant's
representation as to the putative class, "Plaintiff will then
request broader discovery from the Court."Id. This activity,
Plaintiffs maintain, "poses absolutely no prejudice" to the
Defendant o~ the rationale that the foregoing discovery
materials will have to be supplied to Plaintiff in any event
once merits-based discovery commences, either in the instant
forum or in state court. Id.

IV. DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides that "for good
cause shown," a district court may, in its discretion, stay
discovery or issue a protective order limiting discovery to
certain matters. SeeFED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). A party seeking
a protective order has the burden of showing that good
cause exists for issuance of that order. See, e.g. Gambale
v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir.2004);
Garnett-Bishop v. New York Community Bancorp, Inc., No.
12 Civ. 2285, 2013 WL 101590, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan 8,
2013). Further, it is well-settled in this District that litigants
are not entitled to an automatic stay of discovery pending
the determination of a motion to dismiss. See Bachayeva v.

Americare Certified Special Servs., No. 12 Civ. 1446, 2013
WL 4495672, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2013) (issuance
of a stay of discovery pending the outcome of a motion
to dismiss is "by no means automatic") (internal citation
and quotations omitted); Thomas v. New York City Dep't of
Educ., 09 Civ. 5167, 2010 WL 3709923, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept.14, 2010) ("the pendency ofa dispositive motion is not,
without more, grounds for an automatic stay" of discovery)
(internal citations omitted); Rivera v. Incorporated Village
of Farmingdale, 06 Civ. 2613, 2007 WL 3047089, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Oct.17, 2007) (citations omitted) (''the law is clear
in this court that there is no automatic stay of discovery
pending the determination of a motion to dismiss") (internal
citation omitted); Osan Ltd. v. Accenture LLP, No. 05
Civ. 5048, 2006 WL 1662612, at *I (E.D.N.Y. June 13,
2006) (denying motion to stay discovery during pendency of
potentially dispositive motion); Telesca v. Long Island Hous.
P'ship, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 5509, 2006 WL 1120636, at *I
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006) (collecting cases from within this
district noting that the "pendency of a dispositive motion is
not, in itself, an automatic ground for a stay"). As one court
has noted:
*6
Staying discovery pending
judicial evaluation of the sufficiency
of the complaint is consistent with the
entire purpose of the stay provision[,
which] is to avoid saddling defendants
with the burden of discovery in
meritless cases, and to discourage
the filing of cases that lack adequate
support for their allegations in the
mere hope that the traditionally broad
discovery proceedings will produce
facts that could be used to state a valid
claim.

Gardnerv. Major Auto. Companies, 11 Civ. 1664, 2012 WL
1230135, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.12, 2012) (internal citation and
quotations omitted). Factors which courts have considered
when determining whether or not a stay is appropriate
include:
(1) whether the defendant has made
a strong showing that the plaintiffs
claim is unmeritorious; (2) the breadth
of discovery and the burden of
responding to it; and (3) the risk of
unfair prejudice to the party opposing
the stay.
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Chesney Valley Stream Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 24, 236
F.R.D. 113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.28, 2006) (internal citation
omitted); see also Thomas, 2010 WL 3709923, at *3;RxUSA
Wholesale, Inc. v. Alcon Labs, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 3447, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92816, at *5-6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006).
Where a discovery stay is sought pending a dispositive
motion, another consideration which may be evaluated is the
strength of the motion and likelihood of whether the case
could be dismissed based upon the merits of the motion. See,
e.g., Spencer Trask Software & Info. Servs. v. RPost Int'/, 206
F.R.D. 367, 368 (S.D.N.Y.2002). Additionally, courts may

take into account the nature and complexity of the action,
whether some or all defendants have joined in the request for
a stay, and the posture or stage of the litigation. See Chesney,
236 F.R.D. at 115.

A. Whether Broadridge Has Made a Strong Showing
that Plaintiffs' Claims are Unmeritorious
In assessing whether Plaintiffs' claims are unmeritorious,
the Court turns its attention to the "home state" and "local
controversy" exceptions within CAFA which Defendant
argues provide the grounds for the dismissal of this
action. "CAFA allows for the exercise of federal diversity
jurisdiction over class actions involving 100 or more class
members, in which the amount in controversy exceeds
the sum or value of $5,000,000 (exclusive of interest and
costs), and there is minimal diversity, i.e., where, inter
a/ia, at least one member of the putative class and one
defendant are citizens of different states."Richins v. Hofstra
University, 908 F.Supp.2d 358, 360 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (citing
Anirudh v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 598 F.Supp.2d 448, 450
(S.D.N.Y.2009); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A))."CAFA thus
expands federal diversity jurisdiction allowing removal of
cases lacking complete diversity of citizenship among the
parties."ld. (citing BlackRock Financial Management Inc. v.
Segregated Account of Ambac Assur. Corp., 673 F.3d 169,
175 (2d Cir.2012))."By legislating the expansion of diversity
jurisdiction, Congress intended to allow federal courts to keep
'cases of nati~nal importance' in Federal court, and 'to restore
the intent of the framers of the Constitution by providing
for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national
importance under diversity jurisdiction."'ld. (citing Mattera
v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 1878,
2006 WL 3316967 *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2006)).

*7 A brief description of the CAFA "home state" exception
may shed some light on the evidentiary requirements which

Defendant must prove in order to sustain its motion to
dismiss:
CAFA includes several exceptions, including the home
state exception which provides that: "[a] district court
shall decline to exercise jurisdiction .. . over a class
action in which ... two-thirds or more of the members of
all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the
primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the
action was originally filed "
Gold v. New York Life Ins. Co., 730 F.3d 137, 141 (2d
Cir.2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B)) (emphasis

added). Additionally, "when jurisdiction is based on CAFA,
the party seeking to avail itself of an exception to CAF A
jurisdiction over a case originally filed in federal court bears
the burden of proving the exception applies."Anirudh v.
CitiMortgage, Inc., 598 F.Supp.2d 448,451 (S.D.N.Y.2009).
Therefore, in the instant case and for the purposes of this
motion, Defendant has the burden of showing that the "home
state" exception has been met by a preponderance of the
evidence. See Richins, 908 F.Supp.2d at 362. 2
2

The Court notes that "[t]he Second Circuit has not
resolved the level of proof required to establish
an exception to CAF A jurisdiction."Hart v. Rick's
N.Y. Cabaret Intern., Inc., 2014 WL 301357, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Jan.28, 2014)."Some Circuits have applied
a preponderance of the evidence standard."(intemal
citations omitted)."One district court in this Circuit
has applied a reasonable likelihood standard."Id (citing
Mattera, 239 F.R.D. at 80 ("While Defendants have
not provided evidence, in the form of an affidavit or
otherwise, establishing such citizenship, it is reasonably
likely that more than two-thirds of the putative class
members of the proposed class-all of whom work in
New York-are citizens of New York."). In Hart and
Richins, the courts applied a "preponderance of the
evidence" burden of proof. See Hart, 2014 WL 301357,
at *5;see also Richins, 908 F.Supp.2d at 362.

Congress also carved out the "local controversy exception"
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A). "Under the "local
controversy" exception" [a] district court shall decline to
exercise jurisdiction ...

(A) (i) over a class action in which(!) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed
plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in
which the action was originally filed;
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(II) at least 1 defendant is a defendant(aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members
of the plaintiff class;
(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for
the claims ass2erted by the proposed plaintiff class; and
(cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the action was
originally filed; and
(III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct
or any related conduct of each defendant were incurred in
the State in which the action was originally filed; and

(ii) during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that
class action, no other class action has been filed asserting
the same or similar factual allegations against any of the
defendants on behalfofthe same or other persons[.]

Brookv. UnitedHealth Group, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 12954, 2007
WL 2827808, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.27, 2007) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)); Henry v. Warner Music Group·
Corp., No. 13 Civ. 5031, 2014 WL 1224575, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar.24, 2014).
In the instant case, Defendant has "produced from its Human
Resources database the home address information (town,
state and zip code) for the 870 individuals within Plaintiffs'
definition of the putative class; 700 current employees and
170 former employees."Def. 's Mot. at 2 ( citing Declaration of
Douglas Myers, Senior Director, Human Resources ["Myers
Deel."] annexed as Exhibit A to Pl.'s Mot. 113-5). In sum,
Myers identified 865 (751 of 870 employees) members of
Plaintiffs' putative class who are residents ofNew York State.
Id (citing Myers Deel. ,i 7). This number more than satisfies
the two-thirds residency requirement under the CAFA "home
state" and "local controversy" exceptions.Id.
*8 The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs argument that
the information supplied by Defendants does not sufficiently
establish that more than two-thirds of the putative class
members are residents of New York State. As an initial
matter, the Defendant appropriately redacted the names and
street addresses of these individuals given the early stage of
litigation. Second, Plaintiffs' contention-that the listing of
Defendant's "principal executive office" with the Department
of State is indicative of the tendency of Defendant to
misrepresent and misinform the Court-is unsupported. The
Court finds credible Defendant's position that the New
Jersey office was listed for purposes of administrative

convenience and does not govern Broadridge's "principal
place of business." This representation is supported by the
declaration of Defendant's associate general counsel, which
is discussed in further detail below. The Supreme Court has
held that the "principal place of business" ofa corporation is
defined by its "nerve center." Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S.
77, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 1186, 175 L.Ed.2d 1029 (2010)(defining
"principal place ofbusiness" as its "nei:ve center"-"the place
where the corporation's high level officers direct, control, and
coordinate the corporation's activities'').

In Richins, the defendants argued that plaintiffs needed
to show additional proof that more than two-thirds of the
putative class members were residents of New York State
which would thereby qualify the case for mandatory and
discretionary remand to state court under CAFA. Richins, 908
F.Supp.2d at 363. The defendants in Richins provided a chart
illustrating the percentage of Hofstra University graduates
with New York mailing addresses on file. Id. at 362.The
court found that "[t]he data and calculations set forth by
Plaintiffs support strongly the argument that greater than twothirds of the members of the Plaintiff Class are citizens of the
State of New York."Id at *362-63.Although defendants did
not dispute the accuracy of the data there, they did dispute
whether the data reflected the citizenship of the putative class
members since the data was restricted to mailing addresses on
file.Id. The Court ultimately rejected defendants' contentions,
holding that
[t]aken to its logical conclusion,
Hofstra's argument would require this
court to conduct a full trial on
the merits as to the citizenship of
every class member before reaching
a determination of whether or not a
CAF A exception applies. That cannot
be the intent of the statute. Indeed
when determining in the context of a
motion to remand whether a CAFA
exception applies, the court is required
to make a citizenship determination at
the very early stages of the litigation.

Id. Here, the Court finds the data supplied by Broadridge to be
even more substantial than that provided by the plaintiffs in
Richins.Defendants have provided the hometown, state, and
zip codes of the putative class members both currently and
formerly employed with Broadridge. See Myers Deel., Ex.
"A" and "B."
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*9 The court in Richins ordered expedited discovery on
the issue of whether the action should be remanded to state
court pursuant to CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § l332(d)(3).Richins,
908 F.Supp.2d at 360. This is the single case relied upon
by the Plaintiffs to argue that this Court, too, should order
expedited discovery. Pls.' Opp. at 3. In Richins, Defendants
removed the action from state court to federal court pursuant
to CAFA. Richins, 908 F.Supp.2d at 360. In response, the
plaintiffs sought a mandatory remand and the court found that
additional discovery was necessary to confirm whether the
two-thirds threshold had been met under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)
(3).Id. The instant case is distinguishable from Richins.First,
the Court has, in effect, already permitted limited discovery
by allowing the parties to attach supporting evidence to the
motion to stay discovery. See DE 13 ("Counsel are free to
attach any pe~inent exhibits which help to focus the issue
of the proposed stay of all discovery."). Second, as Plaintiffs
point out, the Richins plaintiffs "did not request the names,
street addresses and contact numbers of the putative class
members."Pls.' Opp. at 3. Moreover, the court in Richins
ultimately found the showing made by the defendants there
to be far less substantial than the information presented by
Broadridge here to meet the two-thirds residency threshold
underCAFA.
Moreover, Defendant has satisfactorily demonstrated that
it is a citizen of the State of New York, notwithstanding
that its "principal executive office" is listed with the New
York Department of State as Jersey City, New Jersey.
Defs.' Mot. at 2. Under federal law, "a corporation shall
be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has
been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal
place of business."28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1)."This provision
'establishes a theory of dual citizenship for corporations and
if either the corporation's place of incorporation or principal
place of business destroys diversity, then the courts will not
have diversity jurisdiction. "'Brauner v. British Airways PLC,
No. 12 Civ. 343, 2012 WL 1229507, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12,
2012) (quoting Sty-Lite Co. v. Eminent Sportswear Inc., 115
F.Supp.2d 394, 398 (S.D.N.Y.2000)).
Defining a corporation's "principal place of business" is
based on an evaluation of several factors. "Recent Supreme
Court precedent holds that a corporation's 'principal place of
business' is 'the place where a corporation's offic;rs direct,
control, and coordinate the corporation's activities, often
called the 'nerve center.' "Brauner, 2012 WL 1229507, at
*3 (quoting Hertz Corp., 130 S.Ct. at 1192); FirstStorm
Partners 2 LLC v. Vassel, No. 10 Civ. 2356, 2012 WL

WestlawNexr © 2015 Thomson

1886942, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2012)."[I]n practice it
should normally be the place where the corporation maintains
its headquarters ...."Brauner, 2012 WL 1229507, at *3
(quoting Hertz, 130 S.Ct. at 1193)."A corporation has only
one principal place ofbusiness."ld. (citing Hertz, 130 S.Ct.
at 1193).

*10 Here, Defendant has provided a Declaration from
Associate General Counsel Mark DiGidio to support its
representation that its "principal place of business" is
Lake Success, New York-not Jersey City, New Jersey.
See DiGidio Deel. In his declaration, DiGidio represents
that Defendant's principal place of business is located
at 1981 Marcus Avenue, Lake Success New York. Id.
1 1. Broadridge, DiGidio explains, has "maintained its
headquarters at the Lake Success, New York location since
2007."ld. 1 3. Furthermore, DiGidio states that it is at
the Lake Success, New York location where Broadridge's
"principal corporate officers direct, control and coordin_ate
Broadridge's operations and activities on a daily basis."ld.
1 4. Among these officers are Broadridge's (1) Chief
Executive Officer and Director, (2) President, (3) Corporate
Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, (4)
Corporate Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, (5)
Corporate Vice President, (6) General Counsel and Secretary,
(7) Corporate Vice President, Human Resources, and (8)
Corporate Vice President, SPS International and Global
Outsourcing Solutions. Id. The Court finds this information
compelling with regard to the argument that Broadridge's
principal place ofbusiness is in New York. Moreover, courts
in the Second Circuit regularly find a corporate officer's
sworn statement to be sufficient proof of a corporation's
principal place of business. See Strix, LLC v. GE Capital
Comm., 11 Civ. 4403, 2012 WL 2049825, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
May 7, 2012); FirstStorm Partners 2 LLC, 2012 WL
1886942, at *5.
The Court is not ignoring the fact that Defendant has listed
a "principal executive office" in Jersey City, New Jersey in
its filings with the New York State Department of State. Pls.'
Opp. at 2; Defs.' Opp. at 2-3. The mere listing of a nonNew York "principal executive office" with a state agency is,
however, not determinative of Defendant's "principal place
of business" under federal law. See Hertz, 130 S.Ct. at 1194.
Moreover, as stated in DiGidio's sworn declaration, a Jersey
City, New Jersey location was listed for "administrative
convenience so as to ensure that any formal tax notifications
from New York State would be sent directly to the tax
department and timely addressed."DiGidio Deel. 16. Given
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these facts, the Court finds that Defendant will likely show
that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter pursuant
to the "home state" and "local controversy" exceptions of
CAFA. As a result, Broadridge has shown that the Complaint
is "unmeritorious" in the sense that diversity jurisdiction
cannot be sustained in these circumstances. The first factor
therefore weighs in favor of a stay.

B. The Breadth of Discovery and the Burden of
Responding to It
While the Court notes that Defendant has provided some
evidence that the Complaint may be dismissed, this factor is
not dispositive and the Court must also review other factors
in exercising its discretion to stay discovery under Rule
26(c).See Ceg/ia v. Zuckerberg, No. IO Civ. 569A(F), 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85633, at *3 (W.D.N.Y.2012) ("In finding
good cause, a court is required to balance several relevant
factors including the pendency of dispositive motions,
potential prejudice to an opposing party, the extensiveness
of the requested discovery, and the burden of the requested
discovery on the requested party, i.e., the party seeking the
stay.") (internal citations omitted); Ellington Credit Fund,
Ltd. v. Select Portfolio Services, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 2437, 2009
WL 274483, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.3, 2009). Specifically, the
first prong of the analysis relating to whether the claim is
''unmeritorious" must be balanced against other factors when
assessing whether a stay of discovery should be imposed.
The Court must also assess the breadth and burden of
discovery presented by this action. Chesney, 236 F.R.D. at
115; Barnes v. County of Monroe, No. IO Civ. 6164, 2013
WL 5298574, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Sept.19, 2013); Bachayeva
v. Americare Certified Special Services, Inc. No. 12 Civ.
1466, 2013 WL 4495672, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2013).
Here, Defendant has sought leave from Judge Hurley to
file a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. See DE 10. In light of Plaintiffs' intentions
to re-file this action in state court, dismissal of the instant
action will simply relegate discovery to the state court
proceeding, not preclude it altogether. Although class action
discovery would likely present a burden on the Defendant
while its dispositive motion is pending, Plaintiffs will likely
engage in similar class discovery in state court. See Fantastic
Graphics Inc. v. Hutchinson, No. 09 Civ. 2514, 2010 WL
475309, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2010) (denying defendant's
motion to stay discovery because irrespective of the Court's
ultimate decision on the issue of venue, the action was
going to continue either "here or in New Jersey"). Like the
circumstances in Fantastic Graphics, even if the Defendant's

motion to dismiss is granted here, the case will likely be refiled in state court rather than be abandoned in its entirety.
*11 Moreover, rather than seeking full-blown class
discovery, Plaintiffs are simply seeking to verify the
residency of the putative class members. See Pls.' Opp.
at 2. To this end, the Court finds the Plaintiffs' proposal
reasonable since they are not, at this stage, seeking to engage
in merits discovery. Id. Plaintiffs seek to contact, at their own
expense, a "handful of putative class members ... to verify the
information" provided by Broadridge. Pls.' Opp. at 2. If the
information supplied by Broadridge proves to be accurate, the
Plaintiffs have proposed that they will forego further litigation
in federal court and concede Defendant's representation that
this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Pls.' Opp. at 2. As
such, the Court does not find the limited scope of discovery
requested by Plaintiffs to be burdensome. This factor tips the
scale in Plaintiffs' favor.

C. The Risk of Unfair Prejudice to the Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs argue that they will be prejudiced if the Court
does not permit limited discovery to determine whether
the representations made by the Defendant concerning the
residency of the putative class members is, in fact, true and
verifiable. Pls.' Opp. at 2. Plaintiffs claim that if they are
· "to later l~am in State court discovery that the Defendant's
chart was inaccurate, they will not be able to halt the case
and re-file here."ld. Permitting limited additional discovery
on the narrow issue of whether the putative class-members
are citizens of New York is appropriate here and mitigates
potential prejudice to the Plaintiffs' ability to maintain this
action in federal court. Defendants contend that there is no
prejudice to implementing a full stay of discovery here since
Plaintiffs can re-file the action in state court. Def.'s Mot. at 3.
Granting leave for limited, expedited discovery in the present
matter will not cause Defendant to "suffer the heavy burden of
class action discovery."ld. Moreover, the limited production
will not prejudice the Defendant because this information
is ultimately going to be provided in some court. Finally,
Plaintiffs state that they will "request broader discovery
from the Court" if the representations in the unredacted data
supplied by Broadridge are inconsistent with the results of
their investigation. Pls.' Opp. at 2. The Court will address that
issue if and when it materializes.

D. Additional Considerations
Finally, "[c]ourts also may take into consideration the nature
and complexity of the action, whether some or all of the
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defendants have joined in the request for a stay, and the
posture or stage of the litigation."Chesney, 236 F.R.D. at 115.
The Court appreciates the potentially complex nature of this
action in light of the number of putative plaintiffs. At the same
time, the Court points out that the causes of action are not
particularly complex. Some discovery, therefore, would be
beneficial to resolving the threshold issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction, which may ultimately negate the necessity of
Defendant's· dispositive motion if Plaintiffs agree, as they
represent, to foreclose litigation upon a review of the putative
plaintiffs unredacted records. Moreover, discovery has been
in limbo for over a year. In the interest of moving this case
forward, the Court finds that a balance of the factors supports
the granting of limited, expedited discovery to bring closure
to the jurisdictional issues presented by the Defendant.
*12 In light of the foregoing analysis, the C~urt directs
Broadridge to produce to Plaintiffs an updated and unredacted
chart of the putative class members which includes their
street addresses and phone numbers, no later than May 1,
2014. Plaintiffs will then have thirty (30) days from receipt
of the updated chart to complete their verification of the
End of Document

Plaintiffs' state citizenship. Plaintiffs' communications with
putative class members must be limited to their citizenship.
Following this thirty-day period, the Plaintiffs are directed
to file a letter with the Court confirming whether they have
determined that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
under the "home state" and/or "local controversy" exceptions
of CAFA. If Plaintiffs believe further discovery is warranted,
they must articulate a reasonable basis to the Court to justify
such discovery while the Defendant's motion to dismiss is
pending.

V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's motion to stay
discovery is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, to the
extent set forth in this Order.

SO ORDERED.

All Citations

Slip Copy, 2014 WL 1338370
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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James MORROW, and a Proposed Class of
Other Similarly Situated Persons, Plaintiffs,
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CITY OF TENAHA DEPUTY CITY MARSHAL
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
T. JOHN WARD, District Judge.

*1 Pending before the Court are Defendant Lynda K.
Russell's Second Opposed Motion for Protection Re: Staying
Discovery D_irected Toward Her (Dkt. No. 167) and
Defendant Danny Green's Second Motion for Protection to
Stay Discovery Directed Toward Him (Dkt. No. 169). In
their motions, defendants Russell and Green request that
the Court stay discovery directed towards them in this case,
including but not limited to the talcing of Russell's deposition
currently noticed for August 3, 2010 and the talcing of Green's
deposition currently noticed for August 4, 2010. The Court
held a hearing on these motions on July 30, 2010. Having
considered the parties' briefing, the arguments at the hearing,
and the applicable law, the Court is of the opinion that the
motions should be DENIED.

I. Background

Plaintiffs bring this class action suit against five law
enforcement officers and the mayor of Tenaha. Tenaha is
located in Shelby County, Texas. The plaintiffs allege that the
officers stopped the plaintiffs in traffic because of their race
or ethnicity and unreasonably seized their money or property
in violation of their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs further
allege that there is a widespread pattern and practice of doing
so in the city of Tenaha.
Plaintiffs sued, among others, Shelby County District
Attorney Lynda K. Russell in her individual and official
capacity and Shelby County District Attorney Investigator
Danny Green in his individual capacity. On March 3,
2010, Defendant Russell filed an opposed motion for
protection requesting that the Court stay or abate all
discovery directed towards Russell pending resolution of
certain criminal investigations (Dkt. No. 123). On March
31, 2010, Defendant Green filed a similar opposed motion
for protection requesting that the Court stay or abate all
discovery directed towards him pending the resolution of
certain criminal investigations (Dkt. No. 134). After a hearing
on the motions on April 15, 2010, the Court granted both
motions and ordered a limited stay of discovery only as to
defendants Russell and Green for a period of 90 days (Dkt.
No. 149). That 90 day stay expired on July 14, 2010, and
defendants Russell and Green now seek a further stay of
discovery directed towards them.

II. Analysis
The Supreme Court has established that there exists no
general constitutional, statutory, or common law prohibition
against the prosecution of parallel criminal and civil actions,
even where such actions proceed simultaneously.SEC v.
First Fin. Group of Texas, Inc., 659 F.2d 660, 666-67
(5th Cir.1981) (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1,
11, 90 S.Ct. 763, 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970)). Thus, whether to
stay a civil action pending resolution of a parallel criminal
prosecution is not a matter of constitutional right, but, rather,
one of court discretion, that should be exercised when the
interests of justice so require. Kordel, 397 U.S. at 12 n. 27.A
district court's discretionary authority to stay proceedings
stems from its inherent authority to control the disposition
of the cases on its own docket "with economy of time and
effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants."Landis v. North
American Co., 299 U.S. 248,254, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153
(1936); see also Alcala v. Texas Web County, 625 F .Supp.2d
391, 396 (S.D.Tex.2009). However, "[i]t is the rule, rather
than the exception that civil and criminal cases proceed
together."Alcala, 625 F.Supp.2d at 397 (quoting United
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States ex rel. Gonzalez v. Fresenius Med. Care N. Am., 571
F.Supp.2d 758, 761 (W.D.Tex.2008)). In civil cases, there is
a strong presumption in favor of discovery, and it is the party
who moves for a stay that bears the burden of overcoming
this presumption. Id. at 397-98;see also Fresenius Medical,
571 F. Supp.2d at 761; United States v. Gieger Transfer Serv.,
Inc., 174 F.R.D. 382, 385 (S.D.Miss.1997).
*2 The Fifth Circuit has advised that in ruling on requests for
stays of the civil side of parallel civil/criminal proceedings,
"Judicial discretion and procedural flexibility should be
utilized to harmonize the conflicting rules and to prevent
the rules and policies applicable to one suit from doing
violence to those pertaining to the other. In some situations
it may be appropriate to stay the civil proceeding. In
others it may be preferable for the civil suit to proceedunstayed."Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 487 (5th
Cir.1962) (internal citation omitted). However, the stay of a
civil case should be entered only upon a showing of "special
circumstances." Alcala, 625 F.Supp.2d at 398.District Courts
in Texas have considered several factors in determining
whether "special circumstances" warrant a stay, including:
(1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap
with those presented in the civil case; (2) the status of
the criminal case, including whether the defendants have
been indicted; (3) the private interests of the plaintiffs
in proceeding expeditiously, weighed against the prejudice
to plaintiffs caused by the delay; (4) the private interests
of and burden on the defendants; (5) the interests of the
courts; and (6) the public interest. See, e.g., Alcala, 625
F.Supp.2d at 398-99; Akuna Matata Invs., Ltd. v. Texas
Nom Ltd. P'ship, 2008 WL 2781198, at* 2 (W.D.Tex.2008);
Librado v. MS. Carriers, Inc., 2002 WL 31495988, *
1 (N.D.Tex.2002); see also Trustees of Plumbers and
Pipefltters Nat'! Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc., 886
F.Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (citing Parallel Civil and
Criminal Proceedings, 129 F.R.D. 201, 201-3 (Pollack, J.)
( "Parallel Proceedings")); Volmar Distribs., Inc. v. The New
York Post Co., 152 F.R.D. 36, 39 (S.D.N.Y.1993).
Defendant Russell argues that she has reason to believe there
are ongoing criminal investigations against her based on
the same facts and circumstances asserted in this lawsuit
by the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division,
and the Travis County District Attorney's Office. Likewise,
Defendant Green argues that there is an ongoing criminal
investigation against him based on the same facts and
circumstances asserted in this lawsuit by the U.S. Department
of Justice, Civil Rights Division. Both defendants argue that

they intend to invoke their Fifth Amendment right against
self incrimination in their depositions in this case and that, by
doing so, they face a choice between defending themselves
in this lawsuit and the risk of incriminating themselves in the
potential criminal cases against them. Defendants Russell and
Green assert that they have reason to believe that one or more
persons have either been interviewed by federal investigators
or have been called to testify before the federal grand jury
since the initiation of the discovery stay in April. However,
neither Russell nor Green asserts that they are currently under
indictment nor has either defendant offered evidence that
indictments against them are imminent or even certain.
*3 Plaintiffs base their argument on the fact that no
indictments have been issued against either Russell or
Green and that the 90 day stay was more than sufficient
to serve the defendants' interests. Specifically, plaintiffs
argue that defendants Russell and Green have had more
than enough time to determine their need to invoke the
Fifth Amendment privilege during discovery in this case.
Additionally, plaintiffs argue that there is a substantial risk of
prejudice to them if an additional stay of unspecified duration
is put into place because further delay in the case could lead
to failed memories and lost evidence.
The first question to be resolved is the extent to which the
issues in the potential criminal cases against Russell and
Green overlap with the issues in the present case. The risk of
self-incrimination is more likely ifthere is significant overlap
between the issues in the civil and criminal cases.Librada,
2002 WL 31495988, at * 2;see also Volmar Distribs., 152
F.R.D. at 39 (quoting Parallel Proceedings, 129 F.R.D.
at 203). Both Russell and Green assert that the criminal
investigations directed towards them are based on the same
circumstances giving rise to this action. However, because
there have been no indictments against either Russell or
Green, there is no way to determine whether the issues in the
criminal investigations do, in fact, substantially overlap with
the issues in the present case. Even assuming that there is
complete overlap of the issues, there is little danger in this
case that the civil litigation is an effort by the government
to evade any limits on criminal discovery or pressure the
defendants to waive their Fifth Amendment rights since this
case was brought by private plaintiffs and not a governmental
agency. See Alcala, 625 F.Supp.2d at 402 ("the potential for
prejudice to a criminal defense is diminished where private
parties, and not the government, are the plaintiffs in the civil
action") (citing Citibank, N.A. v. Hakim, 1993 WL 481335,
at* 1 (S.D.N.Y.1993)); see also Brock v. Tolkow, 109 F.R.D.
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116, 119 (E.D.N.Y.1985) ("A stay of civil proceedings is
most likely to be granted where the civil and criminal actions
involve the same subject matter, and is even more appropriate
when both actions are brought by the government.") (internal
citation omitted). Accordingly, this factor is neutral and does
not weigh for or against granting defendants' requested stay.
The second factor to be considered is the· status of the
criminal case. "A stay of a civil case is most appropriate
where a party to the civil case has already been indicted for
the same conduct for two reasons: first, the likelihood that
a defendant may make incriminating statements is greatest
after an indictment has issued, and second, the prejudice to
the plaintiffs in the civil case is reduced since the criminal
case will likely be quickly resolved due to Speedy Trial Act
considerations."Librado, 2002 WL 31495988, at* 2 (quoting
Trustee s, 886 F.Supp. at 1139). Neither Russell nor Green
asserts that they are currently under indictment nor has either
defendant offered evidence that indictments against them
are imminent or even certain. For these reasons, this factor
weighs against granting a stay of discovery as to Russell and •
Green.
*4 Under the third factor, the Court must weigh the private
interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously against
the prejudice that will be caused by the delay that will result
from the stay. Plaintiffs rightfully assert that substantial delay
can lead to the loss of evidence, loss of witnesses, and
faded memories that may frustrate their ability to present an
effective case and meet their burden of proof. This case has
been pending for two years and has already been subject to a
90 day stay of discovery as to defendants Russell and Green.
Any further delay, much less the indefinite delay sought
by defendants, poses a substantial risk of prejudice to the
Plaintiff. This factor, therefore, weighs heavily in favor of
denying the stay.
The Court must also consider the private interests of and
burden on defendants Russell and Green that would result if
the stay is denied. It is well settled that "the Fifth Amendment
does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil
actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative
evidence offered against them."Baxter v. Pa!migiano, 425
U.S. 308, 318, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976).
However, whether or not to permit such an adverse inference
in a civil case is left to the discretion of the district
court.Hinojos.av. Butler, 547 F .3d 285, 291-92 (5th Cir.2008)
(quoting FDIC v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 45 F.3d 969, 977 (5th
Cir.1995)). Accordingly, the Court may lessen the burden

on defendants Russell and Green of proceeding with class
certification discovery in this case while both defendants are
under criminal investigation by limiting the adverse inference
to be drawn from the exercise of their Fifth Amendment
rights. Because discovery in this case is currently limited to
those issues relevant to class certification, the Court will,
at this time, limit any adverse inference arising from either
defendant's decision to invoke his or her Fifth Amendment
right to class certification issues. The decision of whether
to extend any adverse inferences based on the currently
scheduled depositions of defendants Russell and Green or any
later depositions of or discovery from these defendants to the
merits of the case is an open issue that will be determined by
the Court upon the motion of either party.
Next, the Court must consider its own interests in managing
its docket and disposing of cases expeditiously. This Court
has already stayed discovery as to defendants Russell and
Green for 90 days based on their fear of imminent criminal
indictments. However, no indictments have been issued, and
there is no evidence as to whether or when indictments
might issue as to either defendant or when the criminal
investigations against them will be resolved. This case has
been pending for two years and a further stay of discovery
directed towards defendants Russell and Green would result
in an indefinite delay of the class certification and trial
schedule, frustrating resolution if this case for an undefined
period of time. Such a stay of indefinite duration is contrary
to the Court's interest in moving its docket and ensuring
the expeditious resolution of cases before it. Alcala, 625
F.Supp.2d at 407.In addition, stays of indefinite duration
are frowned upon by the Fifth Circuit. See McKnight v.
Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir.1982) (holding that
a stay will be reversed when found to be immoderate or o,f
an indefinite duration). Accordingly, this factor weighs in
favor of denying defendants' motions to extend the stay of
discovery directed towards them until the resolution of the
criminal investigations.
*5 Finally, the Court must consider the public interest in
deciding whether to stay discovery directed to Russell and
Green. As previously discussed, staying discovery towards
these two defendants will result in an indefinite delay in
these proceedings. The Court notes that this case has garnered
considerable public attention as a result of the serious
allegations made against local public officials. Because of
this and the fact that this case is a class action involving
constitutional rights and alleging abuses by public officials,
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the prompt resolution of this case would best serve the public
interest.

III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES
Defendant Lynda K. Russell's Second Opposed Motion for
Protection Re: Staying Discovery Directed Toward Her (Dkt.
No. 167) and Defendant Danny Green's Second Motion for
Protection to Stay Discovery Directed Toward Him (Dkt.
No. 169). The Court FURTHER ORDERS that any adverse
inference arising from either defendant's decision to invoke
his or her Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination
End of Document

will be limited at this time to class certification issues. The
decision of whether to extend any adverse inferences based
on the currently scheduled depositions of defendants Russell
and Green or any later depositions of or discovery from these
defendants to the merits of the case is an open issue that will
be determined by the Court upon the motion of either party.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2010 WL 3057255
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United States District Court,
D. Idaho.

Jackie RAYMOND, individually as an
heir, and as Personal Representative of
the Estate of Barry Johnson, Plaintiff,

v.
Scott SLOAN; Payette County, a political
subdivision of the State ofldaho; Charles Huff,
Sheriff; and John Does 1-20, Defendants,
and the Idaho State Police, Intervenor.

Civ. No. 1:13-423 WBS.

she alleges is both vicariously liable for Sloan's conduct
and independently liable for its failure to train, supervise,
and control its employees. (Id. ,i,i 6, 15, 17-19.)Second, she
alleges that defendants conspired with officers of the ISP to
cover up Sloan's misconduct and asserts that this conspiracy
denied her of her constitutional right of access to the courts
in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. (Id. ,i,i 20-21.)
Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiffs Complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
(Docket No. 27), and to stay discovery pending resolution of
the motion to dismiss, (Docket No. 28); plaintiff seeks leave
to amend her Complaint, (Docket No. 31); and ISP moves to
intervene in the action for the purpose of opposing plaintiffs
motion to file an amended Complaint, (Docket No. 41).

Signed Aug. 25, 2014.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION
TO DISMISS; MOTION TO AMEND; MOTION
TO INTERVENE; MOTION TO STAY

WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.
*1 Plaintiff Jackie Raymond brought this action against
defendants Scott Sloan, Sheriff Charles Huff, and Payette
County arising out of the death of her father in an automobile
collision with Sloan. Defendants now move to dismiss
plaintiffs Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted and to stay discovery pending the
determination of their motion; plaintiff moves to amend her
complaint; and the Idaho State Police ("ISP") moves to
intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b).

I. Factual & Procedural History
On October 18, 2011, Barry Johnson attempted to make a left
tum from Highway 30 into the driveway of his residence near
New Plymouth, Idaho. (Compl. ,i 12 (Docket No. 1).) As he
did so, Sloan, a deputy sheriff of Payette County, allegedly
passed him in the left-hand lane at a speed of 115 miles per
hour.(Id. ,i 13.)Their cars collided. (Id. ,i 16.)Johnson was
ejected :from the driver's seat of his vehicle and died as a result
of his injuries. (Id.)
Plaintiff is Johnson's daughter and heir. (Id ,i 4.) She asserts
two basic theories of relief. First, she brings a state-law
claim for negligence against Sloan and Payette County, which

II. Motion to Dismiss
On a ~otion to dismiss, the court must accept the allegations
in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff.Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468
U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,322 (1972). To
survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff needs to plead "only
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face."Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
This "plausibility standard," however, "asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully," and
where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent

with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility."Ashcro.fi v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57).

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1985
*2 Subsection 1985(3) prohibits two or more persons from
conspiring to deprive any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws. "To bring a cause of action
successfully under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must demonstrate a
deprivation of a right motivated by 'some racial, or otherwise
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators' action.' " RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle,
307 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Sever v. Alaska
Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir.1992)); accord
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). This
requires "either that the courts have designated the class in
question a suspect or quasi-suspect classification requiring
more exacting scrutiny or that Congress has indicated through
legislation that the class required special protection.'' Schultz
v. Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir.1985) (citing
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DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th
Cir.1979)).

Here, plaintiff alleges only that defendants deprived her of
her right of access to the courts in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. (See Compl. ,i,i 20-21.) She has not
alleged that she is a member of any protected class, let alone
that defendants' conduct was motivated by a membership in
such a class. See RK Ventures, 307 F .3d at 1056. Accordingly,
the court must grant defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs
§ 1985 claim.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In relevant part, § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State ... , subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States ... to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983. While § 1983 is not itself a source of
substantive rights, it provides a cause of action against any
person who, under colorofstate law, deprives an individual of
federal constitutional rights or limited federal statutory rights.
Jd.;Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).
"The Supreme Court held long ago that the right of access
to the courts is a fundam~ntal right protected by the
Constitution."De/ew v. Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th
Cir.1998) (citi.ng Chambers v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207
U.S. 142, 148 (1907)). That right is "deni[ed] ... where
a party engages in pre-filing actions which effectively
cover[ ] up evidence and render[ ] any state court remedies
ineffective."/d. (citing Sweke/ v. City of River Rouge, 119
F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir.1997)).
However, because the right of access to the courts is "ancillary
to the underlying claim" that a plaintiff seeks to litigate, a
plaintiff must allege that the defendants' conduct actually
prevented her from litigating that claim. Christopher v.
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). A plaintiff "cannot
merely guess that a state court remedy will be ineffective
because of a defendant's actions."De/ew, 143 F.3d at 1222

(quoting Swekel, 119 F.3d at 1264) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Rather, she must show that she was "shut out of
court" as a result of the defendants' conduct. Christopher, 536
U.S. at 415.
*3 Even if plaintiffs allegations were sufficient to establish
that defendants had conspired to cover up Sloan's misconduct,
(see Compl. ,i 20), she has not alleged that "defendants'
alleged cover-up caused h[er] to lose or inadequately settle
h[er] prior meritorious action."Ejigu v. City of Los Angeles,
286 Fed. App'x 977, 978 (9th Cir.2008). In fact, aside from
her bare allegation that defendants' conduct "significantly
impaired" her ability to seek legal redress for her injuries,
(Compl.iJ 21 ), plaintiff has not alleged any facts establishing
_ that she is currently unable to litigate her state-law negligence
claim.

At this stage in the litigation, it is premature to determine
whether defendants' alleged cover-up will result in the defeat
of her negligence claim. Instead of speculating upon the
fate of that claim, the court will instead dismiss plaintiffs
§ 1983 claim without prejudice. See Delew, 143 F.3d at
1223 (holding that when a plaintiff alleges a cognizable but
unripe access-to-courts claim, the proper course of action is
to dismiss without prejudice). If plaintiffs efforts to litigate
that claim in state court prove unsuccessful, she is free to file
a new access-to-courts claim in either state or federal court. 1
Because an access-to-courts claim does not accrue until
the entry ofjudgment in the underlying claim, the statute
of limitations will not run on that claim until after
plaintiff has had the opportunity to pursue her negligence
claim in Idaho state court. See Morales v. City of Los
Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir.2000) (holding
that the plaintiffs' access-to-courts claim "accrued when
the alleged police misconduct resulted in judgments
being entered against them"). The court's dismissal of
this claim will therefore not prejudice plaintiff from
bringing an access-to-courts claim if and when it ripens.

C. Supplemental Jurisdiction
28 U.S.C. § 1367 authorizes federal courts to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that are
sufficiently related to those claims over which they have
original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); United Mine
Workers ofAm. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). A district
court "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
a claim ... if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over
which it has originaljurisdiction."28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see
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also Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th
Cir.1997) ("[A] federal district court with power to hear state
law claims has discretion to keep, or decline to keep, them
under the conditions set out in§ 1367(c).").

Factors courts consider in deciding whether to dismiss
supplemental state-law claims include judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity. City of Chicago v. Int'!
Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172-73 (1997)."[I]n the
usual case in which federal law claims are eliminated
before trial, the balance of factors ... will point toward
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims."Reynolds v. County ofSan Diego, 84 F .3d 1162, 1171
(9th Cir.1996), overruled on other grounds by Acri, 114 F.3d
at 1000.
Because the court will dismiss plaintiffs §§ 1983 and 1985
claims, only her state-law negligence claim remains. Plaintiff
does not identify any extraordinary or unusual circumstances
suggesting that the court should retain jurisdiction over her
state-law claim in the absence of any federal claim. And
because plaintiffs federal-law claims essentially assert that
she was deprived of her ability to seek relief available under
state law, comity principles suggest that the state courts of
Idaho should be allowed to hear her negligence claim in
the first instance. Cf Delew, 143 F.3d at 1223. The court
therefore declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
plaintiffs state-law negligence claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3).

III. Motion to Intervene
*4 Since ISP has moved to intervene for the limited purpose
of joining in defendants' motion to dismiss and opposing
plaintiffs motion to amend, the court must resolve that
motion prior to determining whether amendment is proper.
Rule 24(b) provides that, on a timely motion, the court may
permit anyone to intervene who "has a claim or defense
that shares with the main action a common question of law
or fact."Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)(l)(B); see Perry v. Proposition
8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir.2009)
(citation omitted).Rule 24(b) requires the court to consider
whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the original parties' rights. Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)
(3)."The court may also consider other factors in the exercise
of its discretion, including 'the nature and extent of the
intervenors' interest and 'whether the intervenors' interests are
adequately represented by other parties.' " Perry, 587 F.3d
at 955 (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd ofEduc., 552
F.3d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir.1977)).

Here, plaintiff alleges that defendants conspired with ISP and
its officers to cover up and manipulate the investigation of
Sloan's wrongdoing; as a result, any defense that ISP might
allege shares common questions of fact with those defendants
assert and thereby satisfies Rule 24(b). Additionally, because
ISP seeks to intervene for the limited purpose of supporting
dismissal and opposing amendment, has already submitted
briefs on these issues, and has already been heard at the
hearing, there is little risk that its involvement in the case
will further delay the proceedings or prejudice . plaintiff.
Accordingly, the court will grant ISP's motion to intervene
for the limited purpose of supporting dismissal and opposing
amendment.

IV. Motion to Amend
Plaintiff seeks leave to amend and has filed a proposed
amended complaint ("PAC"). (Docket No. 31-1.)That
complaint asserts five causes of action: (1) a state-law
negligence claim; (2) a § 1985 claim; (3) a § 1983 claim
alleging that defendants' cover-up denied plaintiff the right
to access the courts; (4) a § 1983 claim alleging t~at
defendants' conduct denied plaintiff substantive due process
by terminating her relationship with her father; and (5) a §
1983 claim alleging that defendants denied plaintiff equal
protection of the laws by interfering with the prosecution of
Sloan.(ld.) In addition, plaintiff seeks to join ISP and four ISP
officers as defendants. (Id.)
A motion to amend is generally subject to Rule 15(a), which
provides that "[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend]
when justice so requires."Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2)."However,
once a scheduling order has been entered pursuant to Rule
16(b), the more restrictive provisions of that subsection
requiring a showing of 'good cause' for failing to amend
prior to the deadline in that order apply."Robinson v. Twin
Falls Highway Dist., 233 F.R.D. 670, 672 (D.ldaho 2006)
(Winmill, J.); accord Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc.,
975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.1992). "Unlike Rule 15(a)'s
liberal amendment policy, which focuses on the bad faith
of the party seeking an amendment and the prejudice to the
opposing party, the 'good cause' standard set forth in Rule
16 primarily focuses on the diligence of the party requesting
the amendment." Sadid v. Vailas, 943 F.Supp.2d 1125, 1138
(D.ldaho.2013) (Winmill, J.) (citing Johnson, 975 F.2d at
607).
*5 Here, plaintiff has not made the required showing of
diligence. On February 18, 2014, plaintiff filed a Notice of
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Tort Claim against ISP and four ISP officers alleging that
those officers were involved in a conspiracy to cover up
Sloan's misconduct. (See Hall Aff. Ex. C (Docket No. 391).) In that notice, plaintiff indicated that she learned of the
identity of those ISP officers on October 31, 2013. (Id) The
court then issued its scheduling order on February 28, 2014,
indicating that the parties would have until April 14, 2014 to
amend their pleadings. (Docket No. 20.)Yet plaintiff did not
seek to leave to amend until July 1, 2014, nearly three months
after that deadline had elapsed. (Docket No. 31 .)Because
plaintiff evidently knew of the basis of any claims she might
assert against ISP no later than February 18, 2014, her failure
to do so before the deadline for amended pleadings shows
that she was not diligent. See Robinson, 233 F.R.D. at 673
("Knowing of the facts forming the basis for the proposed
amendment prior to the deadline for amending precludes a
finding of due diligence.").
Plaintiffs proposed amendments would also result in
prejudice to ISP, which is an additional reason to deny leave
to amend. See id. at 674 ("While a finding of prejudice is not
required under Rule 16(b), it is an added consideration .... ");
Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (noting that the "existence or
degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification
might supply additional reasons to deny a motion" for leave
to amend). In particular, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed ISP
from this· action on February 14, 2014; as a result, ISP
has not conducted any discovery and has not anticipated
having to defend this action. (SeeDocket No. 18.)Ifthe court
permitted plaintiff to join ISP and its officers at this point,
ISP would have approximately two months to produce an
expert report and approximately five months to conduct
discovery. (SeeDocket No. 20.)Requiring ISP to complete
discovery on an expedited timetable at this point in the case
would prejudice its defense of this case-particularly if the
evidence has become stale or unavailable in the six months
since plaintiff previously dismissed it from this action-and
militates against granting leave to amend.
Although plaintiffs counsel conceded at oral argument that
plaintiff could not show good cause to modify the scheduling
order under Rule 16, he nonetheless argued that plaintiff
should be permitted to amend her complaint to cure those
claims that she asserted in her initial complaint. 2 As courts in
the Ninth Circuit have repeatedly emphasized, it is generally
appropriate to permit a plaintiff at least "one opportunity to
amend, unless amendment would be futile."/n re Atlas Mining
Co. Sec. Litig., 670 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1135 (D.Idaho 2009)
(Lodge, J.) (citing Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., USA, 317 F.3d

WestlawNexr © 2015 Thomson

1097, 1108 (9th Cir.2003)); see also Sonoma Cnty. Ass'n
of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma County, 708 F.3d 1109, 1118
(9th Cir.2013) ("As a general rule, dismissal without leave to
amend is improperunless it is clear ... thatthe complaint could
not be saved by any amendment."( citation, internal quotation
marks, and alteration omitted)). However, this rule does not
require the court to permit plaintiffs to assert new claims or
join new parties. See, e.g., Morongo Band ofMission Indians
v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that
denial ofleave to include new claims was appropriate because
the "new claims set forth in the amended complaint would
have greatly altered the nature of the litigation"); Stearns
v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., 763 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1153
(N.D.Cal.2010) (granting leave to amend after dismissal but
requiring plaintiffs to seek leave to add new claims).
2

While Rule 16 does not expressly differentiate between
amendments to pleading upon a party's motion and
amendments to pleading after dismissal, several courts
have permitted limited amendments to cure deficiencies
in dismissed pleadings even when these amendments
otherwise would not have satisfied Rule 16's "good
cause" requirement. See, e.g., Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp.,
281 F.3d 613,626 (6th Cir.2002); MG. ex rel Goodwin
v. County of Contra Costa, Civ. No. 11-4853 WHA,
2013 WL 706801, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 26, 2013)
(granting leave to amend complaint to replace two Doe
defendants with identified sheriffs deputies, even though
the "[p]laintiffs counsel admit[ted] that good cause for
the late amendment is absent").

*6 As plaintiff acknowledged at oral argument, her efforts
to amend her § 1985 claim are futile: that statute requires a
showing of some racial or other class-based animus, see RK
Ventures, 307 F.3d at 1056, and plaintiffhas not alleged-and
appears unable to allege-that any cover-up was motivated
by her membership in a protected class. Plaintiffs· counsel
conceded at oral argument that she had not alleged that any
purported conspiracy was so motivated. The court therefore
dismisses this claim with prejudice and without leave to
amend.
Likewise, plaintiffs efforts to amend her access-tocourts
claim are futile. While her proposed amended complaint adds
considerable detail to her allegations of a cover-up, those
new facts do not resolve the central flaw with her claim:
she has not alleged that defendants' actions have resulted in
the defeat of her state-law negligence claim and cannot do
so until that claim reaches judgment. See Delew, 143 F.3d
at 1223. Granting plaintiff leave to amend that claim would
not cure this defect and is therefore futile. See San Diego
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Cnty. Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 926 F.Supp. 1415, 1425
(S.D.Cal.1995) (denying leave to amend claims challenging
constitutionality of criminal statute when plaintiffs conceded
that they were not currently facing prosecution under that
statute).

Plaintiff also seeks leave to assert a new equal protection
claim in which she alleges that defendants denied her equal
protection of the laws by interfering with Sloan's prosecution.
(SeePAC 125.) But as the Supreme Court has emphasized, a
claim of this nature is unavailing because "a private citizen
lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or
nonprosecution of another."Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614,619 (1973). And even ifitwere not futile, this claim
appears nowhere in plaintiffs initial Complaint, and the court
need not permit her to assert it now. See Rose, 893 F.2d at
1079.
Finally, plaintiff seeks leave to assert a substantive
due process claim alleging that defendants' misconduct
terminated her relationship with her father and thereby denied
her of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. (SeePAC
1 26; Compl. 1 20.) The parties dispute whether plaintiff
should be allowed to amend her complaint to include this
claim, in large part because they disagree about whether
plaintiff attempted to assert a due process claim in her initial
Complaint. Both sides agree that this dispute turns upon how
the court construes paragraph 20 of the Complaint, which
reads:
On information and belief, the
defendants, and each of them
or some of them, during ISP's
investigation of the misconduct of
defendant Sloan as alleged above,
conspired and attempted to, and did,
cover up such misconduct and/or
unduly influence the investigation,
evidence, and witnesses accordingly,
in order to shield defendants
Sloan, Huff, and Payette County
from liability and responsibility
for their aforesaid misconduct,
thereby depriving Plaintiffs of their
constitutional right to due process
and access to the courts, pursuant
to official policies, practices, and
customs ofISP and the Payette County
Sheriffs department, in violation of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments to

the United States Constitution and 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.
*7 (Compl. 120 (emphasis added).)
This paragraph is not a model of clarity, and it leaves open
the question of whether plaintiffs allegations that she was
denied due process are a :freestanding claim or merely part
of her access-to-courts claim. At oral argument, plaintiffs
counsel vigorously argued that plaintiff intended to assert
a separate due process claim alleging that Sloan's reckless
or intentional conduct deprived plaintiff of a constitutionally
protected interest. In light of her allegation that Sloan collided
with her father's car while driving 115 miles an hour, the court
cannot conclude that this claim would be futile. See generally
County ofSacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-55 (1998)
(describing standards applicable to substantive due process
claims).
In short, while plaintiff has not shown good cause to amend

her complaint under Rule 16, the court may nonetheless
permit plaintiff to cure deficiencies in her initial Complaint
notwithstanding her lack of diligence. See Inge, 281 F.3d at
626; MG., 2013 WL 706801, at *2. Accordingly, the court
will permit plaintiff to amend her complaint to re-assert one or
both of two claims: (1) a state-law negligence claim; and (2)
a claim that defendants' conduct deprived her of substantive
due process. The court will not permit plaintiff to plead any
other claim or to join any additional defendant, including ISP
or any of its officers.

V. Motion to Stay

Defendants have moved to stay discovery pending the
resolution of their motion to dismiss. Their motions to dismiss
have now been resolved by this Order. Admittedly there may
be more motions in response to plaintiffs amended complaint,
but the court sees no value in staying discovery any further.
A district court "has broad discovery to stay discovery
in a case while a dispositive motion is pending."Orchid
Biosciences, Inc. v. St. Louis Univ., 198 F.R.D. 670, 672
(S.D.Cal.2001) (citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs.,
Inc., 557 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir.1977)). However, discovery stays
are typically disfavored because they "may interfere with
judicial efficiency and cause unnecessary litigation in the
future."Qwest Commc'ns Corp. v. Herakles, LLC, Civ. No.
2:07-393 MCE KJM, 2007 WL 2288299, at *2 (E.D.Cal.
Aug. 8, 2007). As a result, a party seeking a discovery stay
bears a "heavy burden" and must make a "strong showing" in
favor of a discovery stay. Skellerup Indus. Ltd v. City ofLos

WestlawNexr © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

0002875

c'

Raymond v. Sloan, Not Reported

.Supp.2d (2014)

2014 WL 4215378

Angeles, 163 F.R.D. 598, 600 (C.D.Cal.1995) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants represent that "[t]his [m]otion is made to save
time and expense should the [c]ourt determine that there
are no viable allegations sufficient to create federal court
jurisdiction."(Docket No. 28.)As a general rule, however,
the pendency of a motion to dismiss alone is not enough to
merit a discovery stay. See, e.g., Skellerup, 163 F.R.D. at
600-01; Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39, 40
(N.D.Cal.1990). Nor do defendants explain how a discovery
stay will save time and expense; on the contrary, it appears
that a discovery stay will simply prolong these proceedings
by forcing the parties to wait until the resolution of an
additional motion to dismiss to begin discovery. Defendants
have therefore not made a "strong showing" that a discovery
stay is warranted, Skellen,p, 163 F.3d at 600, and the court
will deny its motion for a disc~very stay.

*8 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants' motion
to dismiss be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. Plaintiffs
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S .C. § 1983
End of Document

and her state-law claim for negligence are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
(1) the Idaho State Police's motion to intervene be, and the
same hereby is, GRANTED;
(2) plaintiffs motion for leave to amend be, and the same
hereby is, is GRANTED IN PART on the terms set forth in
this Order; and
(3) defendants' motion for a discovery stay be, and the same
hereby is, DENIED.
Plaintiff has twenty days from the date this Order is signed to
file an amended Complaint, if she can do so consistent with
this Order.

All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2014 WL 4215378
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United States District Court, D. Montana,
Missoula Division.
Michael E. SPREADBURY, Plaintiff,

v.
BITIERROOT PUBLIC LIBRARY, City
of Hamilton, Lee E.nterprises, Inc.,
and Boone Karlberg, P.C., Defendants.
No. CV 11-64-M-DWM-JCL.

May 25, 2011.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Michael E. Spreadbury, Hamilton, MT, pro se.
Natasha Prinzing Jones, Thomas J. Leonard, William
L. Crowley, Boone Karlberg, Jeffrey Brandon Smith,
Garlington Lohn & Robinson, Missoula, MT, for Defendants.

ORDER
JEREMIAH C. LYNCH, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 PlaintiffMichael E. Spreadbury has filed various motions
in this action. The Court will address several of those motions
in this Order.

L Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
Spreadbury filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.
Spreadbury submitted a statement of his financial condition
as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Because it appears
Spreadbury lacks sufficient funds to prosecute this action IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that his Motion to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis is GRANTED.

IL Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Spreadbury moves for appointment of counsel to represent
him in this action. In support of his motion Spreadbury states
he is disabled, that he has been unable to secure gainful
employment, and he has not been able to find legal counsel to
represent him i~ this action. He contends his legal claims have
merit, and that he is entitled to legal assistance as a matter of

right. I

Spreadbury cites to Fed.R.Civ.P. 44(a) in support of his
motion for appointment of counsel. Rule 44( a), however,
establishes what constitutes evidence of a domestic or
foreign official record, and it does not provide any right
to the appointment of counsel.

A plaintiff does not have a right to the appointment of
counsel in a civil action. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965,
970 (9th Cir.2009). Although the Court has discretionary
authority to appoint counsel to represent an indigent litigant
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(l) (see Palmer, 560 F.3d at
970), such appointment can occur only under "exceptional
circumstances." Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th
Cir.1991).Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970.
A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an
evaluation of both 'the likelihood of success on the merits
and the ability of the [litigant] to articulate his claims
pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues
involved.'Neither of these factors is dispositive and both
must be viewed together before reaching a decision.
Id (citing Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th
Cir.1986) (citations omitted)).See also Palmer, 560 F.3d at
970.
At this early stage of this lawsuit there is no basis in the
record on which the Court could conclude that Spreadbury has
presented exceptional circumstances warranting appointment
of counsel. Although Spreadbury asserts he is disabled, he
has not established that he will be unable to sufficiently
articulate his claims. He also has not demonstrated the
requisite likelihood of success on the merits of his claims.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Spreadbury's
Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED.

IIL Motion to Appoint Lead Defense Counsel
Jeff Smith, an attorney with the firm of Garlington, Lohn &
Robinson, is counsel for Defendant Lee Enterprises, Inc. in
this matter. All other Defendants named in this action are
represented by Natasha Prinzing Jones, Thomas Leonard, and
William Crowley, all of whom are attorneys at the firm of
Boone Karlberg, P.C.

Spreadbury moves for an order consolidating Defendants'
legal representation, and appointing Jeff Smith to serve
as lead counsel for all Defendants named in this action.
Spreadbury asserts the appointment is warranted due to the
nature of his claims advanced in this action, and based on his
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perception that it would be inequitable for Defendants to be
represented by multiple attorneys. Spreadbury also relies on
rules applicable to the appointment of counsel for parties in
class action lawsuits. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 23(g).
*2 Spreadbury's motion wholly lacks merit. This matter is
not a class action lawsuit, and is not governed by Rule 23.
There exists no legal authority, and no basis in the record for
the Court to designate and appoint a single attorney to serve as
counsel for all Defendants in this action. Parties to an action
are at liberty to retain counsel of their choice. THEREFORE,
IT IS ORDERED that Spreadbury's Motion to Appoint Lead
Defense Counsel is DENIED.

IV. Motion to Remand Pendent State Claims
On April 19, 2011, Defendants Bitterroot Public Library and
City of Hamilton removed this action to this Court from
the Montana Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli
County. Defendants' Notice of Removal was filed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), and they assert this Court has federal
question jurisdiction over this action as provided by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 based on the federal claims Spreadbury advances in
this case.
In addition to his claims pled under federal law, Spreadbury
advances numerous claims against Defendants that are
cognizable under Montana law. With respect to those claims,
federal law grants this Court "supplemental jurisdiction over
all other claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution."28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Under the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that all
of Spreadbury's state law claims advanced in this case are
sufficiently related to his federal claims so as to "form part
of the same case or controversy" within the contemplation of
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Therefore, the Court has supplemental
jurisdiction over all of Spreadbury's stat~ law claims.
Spreadbury moves, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), for
an order remanding his claims for intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress that are pied under Montana
law. Spreadbury presumably intends to leave all of his other
remaining state law claims for resolution by this Court. For
the reasons discussed, Spreadbury's motion for remand is
denied.

The Court has discretionary authority to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under the
conditions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), or to remand
those claims as provided under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). A district
court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for
the following reasons:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim
or claims over which the district court has original
jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it
has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(l)-(4). Further, consistent with Section
1367(c)(2), the court also "may remand all matters in which
State law predominates."28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
*3 A court's retention of supplemental jurisdiction is
discretionary, and the court may decline to exercise
jurisdiction over state law claims "[d]epending on a host of
factors including the circumstances of the particular case, the
nature of the state law claims, the character of the governing
state law, and the relationship between the state and federal
claims."City ofChicago v. International College ofSurgeons,
522 U.S. 156,173 (1997).
Spreadbury has not identified any valid reason justifying
a remand of his emotional distress claims. Instead, he
incorrectly asserts the Court does not have jurisdiction over
his emotional distress claims contrary to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)
as discussed above. He has otherwise failed to identify
any circumstances under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) which would
prompt the Court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over
his emotional distress claims, and he has failed to establish
grounds for remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). Therefore,
under the circumstances of this case, the Court does not deem
it appropriate to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Spreadbury's emotional distress claims, or to remand
those claims. THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that Spreadbury's Motion to Remand Pendant State Claims is
DENIED.

V. Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Court Action
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On May 13, 2011, Spreadbury filed a motion requesting
partial summary judgment against Defendants with respect
to some of the claims set forth in his S~cond Amended
Complaint. Spreadbury's motion also challenges the qualified
immunity which some of the Defendants assert, or may assert
in defense of Spreadbury's claims.
On May 19, 2011, Spreadbury moved to stay discovery in
this matter pending the Court's resolution of his motion for
partial summary judgment and the related issues of qualified
immunity. He contends he is entitled to a stay of discovery
under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
A defendant's eligibility for qualified immunity, if granted,
affords the defendant "immunity from suit rather than a mere
defense to liability [.]"Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526
(1985). Consequently, if a defendant is eligible for qualified
immunity, then the defendant should not be subjected to the
End of Document

costs of trial, or burdens of discovery. "Until this threshold
immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be
allowed[,]" so as to avoid the excessive disruption which
unnecessary litigation could cause to a government official's
duties. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.Thus, under Harlow a stay
of discovery is for the benefit of a defendant who may be
entitled to qualified immunity, not for the benefit of a plaintiff
attempting to defeat qualified immunity.
Based on the foregoing, Spreadbury has failed to establish
any good cause for a stay of discovery pending resolution
of his moti9n for partial summary judgment. THEREFORE,
IT IS ORDERED Spreadbury's motion to stay discovery is
DENIED.

All Citations

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2011 WL 2117563
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to originai" U.S. Government Works.
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United States District Court,
D. Idaho.
Heather S. TIMOTHY, an individual, Plaintiff,

v.
ONEIDA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
state ofldaho; Dustin W. Smith, individually and
in his capacity as Prosecuting Attorney for Oneida
County, Idaho; Shellee Daniels, Dale F. Tubbs and
Max C. Firth, individually and in their capacities
as Oneida County Commissioners, Defendants.
No. 4:14-cv-00362BLW.

I

Signed July 9, 2015.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Stephen J. Muhonen, Carol Tippi Jarman, Richard A Hearn,
Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey, Pocatello, ID, for
Plaintiff
Bruce J. Castleton, Tyler D. Williams, Naylor and Hales,
Boise, ID, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

B. LYNN WINMILL, Chief Judge.
*1 Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Quash
Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order (Dkt.27). Pursuant
to the Court's discovery dispute procedure outlined in the
Case Management Order, the parties contacted Court staff in
attempt to mediate a pending discovery dispute. Unable to
resolve the issues, Defendants move to stay discovery and
quash several subpoenas. For the reasons set forth below, the

Court will grant Defendant's motion in part and deny it in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Heather Timothy was fired from her position as
legal secretary to Oneida Co1JD.ty Prosecutor Dustin Smith
after she reported Smith for allegedly misappropriating public
funds. In August 2014, Timothy filed this lawsuit. The
original amended complaint named Oneida County, Smith,
and County Commissioners Shellee Daniels, Dale Tubbs,

and Max Firth as defendants and asserted claims for (I)
injunctive and declaratory relief for First and Fourteenth
Amendment violations, (2) retaliatory discharge in violation
of the First Amendment, (3) denial of due process in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (4) wrongful termination in violation
of state law, (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress,
(6) termination of private employment in violation of public
policy, (7) intention infliction of emotional distress, and (8)
conspiracy claims against the Commissioner defendants tied
to the First Amendment claim and the Fourteenth Amendment
due process claim.
Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint, which
the Court partially granted. Specifically, the Court dismissed,
with leave to amend, (I) the First Amendment claim as to
the Commissioner defendants (Count II), (2) the propertyinterest claim alleged within the due process claim (Count III)
as to the Commissioner defendants, (3) the claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress as to the Commission
defendants (Count V), (4) the claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, alleged against Smith only (Count
VII), and (5) the conspiracy claims associated with First
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment propertyinterest claims. The Court dismissed, without leave to amend,
the liberty-interest claim encompassed within the due process
claim (Count III), and the accompanying conspiracy claim.
Timothy has filed a Second Amended Complaint (Dkt.25),
re-alleging all those claims dismissed with leave to amend.
In addition, Timothy has filed a motion to reconsider the
Court's decision denying Timothy the opportunity to amend
her liberty-interest and accompanying conspiracy claim.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint and have opposed the motion to reconsider.
This discovery dispute arose when Timothy notified defense
counsel, Bruce Castleton, that she intended to serve third
party subpoenas directed to: (I) Lt. Kyle Fullmer, Idaho State
Police; (2) private attorney Mark L. Heideman, who served
as a special prosecutor in connection with an investigation
into Defendant Smith; (3) Sheriff Jeffery Semrad, Oneida
County Sheriffs Office; and (4) Bruce J. Castleton. Each
subpoena directs the recipient to appear for a deposition
and requests production of documentation related to various
communications and the appointment of a special prosecutor
in connection with the investigation of Dustin Smith.
Castleton Deel. ,i 2, Bxs. A-D.
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*2 Mr. Castleton contacted Mr. Heam and objected to
the subpoenas on the grounds that "most if not all of
what they seek is moot in light of the Court's recent order
partially dismissing the claims against Defendants, including
relevant here the liberty-interest and conspiracy claims
against Defendants .... "Defe' Opening Br., p. 2, Dkt. 27-1. Mr.
Castleton also objected to the subpoena served against him
on the grounds that his deposition would raise attorney-client
privilege issues. Mr. Heam, in response, indicated that his
client, Timothy, would be proceeding with the subpoenas and
would not agree to a stay of discovery.
Unable to informally resolve these issues, Defendants now
file a motion to quash the subpoenas and a motion for
- protective order staying all discovery pending resolution of
Timothy's motion to reconsider and Defendants' recentlyfiled motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.

ANALYSIS
1. Motion for Protective Order to Stay Discovery
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) governs the granting of
a protective order. A party seeking such an order must show
"good cause." Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39,
40 (N.D.Ca.1990). A party seeking to stay discovery carries
an even heavier burden and must make a "strong showing"
for why discovery should be denied.Id. (citing Blankenship
v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir.1975))."The
moving party must show a particular and specific need for
the protective order, as opposed to making stereotyped or
conclusory statements."Jd. (citing Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure, § 2035).

In this case, Defendants have not made a "strong showing"
justifying a stay of all discovery; rather, Defendant merely
urge that discovery should be stayed pending Court's ruling
on its motion to dismiss. Defendants have done no more
than to argue in conclusory fashion that its motion to dismiss
will succeed. This "[i]dle speculation does not satisfy Rule
26(c)'s good cause requirement. Such general arguments
could be said to apply to any reasonably large civil litigation.
If this court were to adopt Defendants' reasoning, it would
undercut the Federal Rules' liberal discovery provisions. Had
the Federal Rules contemplated that a motion to dismiss under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) would stay discovery, the Rules would
contain a provision for that effect. In fact, such a notion is
directly at odds with the need for expeditious resolution of
litigation. Gray, 133 F.R.D. at 40.

Defendants, however, argue that the information '.(imothy
seeks through the third-party subpoenas only relates to
Timothy's dismissed liberty-interest claim. Timothy has
subpoenaed Sheriff Semrad, to whom she reported Smith's
alleged misappropriation of public funds. Timothy alleges
that she was terminated, at least in part, "because she was
perceived to have been communicating negative information
about Prosecutor Smith to the Sheriff. Sec. Am. Comp/. ,r 38,
Dkt. 25. Given his involvement in the events that allegedly led
to Timothy's termination, he would appear to be a key witness,
and not just have information relating to the dismissed libertyinterest claim.
*3 Likewise, Mark Heideman, as the special prosecutor
assigned to investigate Smith, and Lt. Kyle Fuller of the
Idaho State Police, who also investigated Smith's alleged
misappropriation of funds, could have information that might
bear on the various other claims Timothy has alleged apart
from the liberty-interest claim. For example, they might
have information that might bear on Timothy's allegations
that the Commissioner defendants conspired with Smith in
denying Timothy her constitutional rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments (two claims that currently remain
in the case). In addition, after Lt. Fulmer's investigation
of Smith had concluded, on January 30, 2014, Lt. Fulmer
interviewed Timothy about criminal investigation into Smith.
Sec. Am. Comp/. ,r 74, Dkt. 25. Four days later, on February
4, Timothy received a Notice of Pending Personnel Action,
which indicated she may have been involved in acts or
omissions that could subject her to discipline. Id. ,r 75. Given
the proximity between these two events, it is possible that
Lt. Fulmer may have information relating to the Smith's
decision to issue the Notice. These are just a couple examples
of relevant information that the subpoenaed witnesses may
possess.
Finally, the Court also believes that Mr. Castleton could
have information relevant to claims apart from the libertyinterest claim, but the proposed deposition of Mr. Castleton,
as counsel for the defense, raises distinct issues, which the
Court will address below.

2. Castleton Subpoena
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that discovery of facts
possessed by an attorney is proper where the facts are
relevant, non-privileged, and essential to preparation of one's
case. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511, 67 S.Ct. 385,
91 L.Ed. 451 (1947). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held
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that blanket assertions of privilege are extremely disfavored.
U.S. v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 1000 (9th Cir.2002). And when
a party challenges discovery of information from counsel
based on privilege, the challenging party has the burden
of establishing the relationship and privileged nature of
the communication. U.S. v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504, 507 (9th
Cir.1997).
But "[t]he strong presumption against a blanket assertion
of privilege while normally appropriate and necessary,
must be abandoned where a party seeks to depose trial
counsel."Melaleuca, Inc. v. Bartholomew, No. 4:12-cv00216-BLW, 2012 WL 3544738, *2 (D.Idaho August 16,
2012) (citing Shelton v. Am. Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323,
1327-28 (8th Cir.1986)). Instead, because Timothy seeks to
depose trial counsel, she must establish that "the information
sought (1) cannot be obtained through other means; (2) is
relevant and not covered by privilege or the work-product
doctrine; and (3) is necessary in preparing their case."Jd.
(citing Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327-28).
"It is rare for this standard to be satisfied," Stewart Title Guar.
Co. v. Credit Suisse, No. 1:11-cv-227-BLW, 2013 WL
4763949, *1 (Sept. 4, 2013), and, at least at this juncture, this
case is no different. Indeed, this issue can be dispensed with
under the first factor. Timothy has made no effort to show
End of Document

that the information she seeks from Mr. Castleton cannot be
obtained through other means. Discovery has not even begun
in this case. It is not only possible, but likely, that the other
individuals Timothy intends to depose hold the information
Timothy seeks from Mr. Castleton. The Court therefore finds
that Timothy has failed to establish that any information she
seeks from Mr. Castleton cannot be obtained through some
other discovery.
*4 Accordingly, at this point, the Court will quash any
subpoena issued for Mr. Castl this case. P erhaps, at some
later time, Timothy will be able to meet standard. That time,
however, is not now.

ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to
Quash Motion for Protective Order (Dkt.27) is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part. discovery is denied, but Defendants'
request to quash Mr. Castleton's subpoena is granted.

All Citations

Slip Copy, 2015 WL 4170140

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

WestlawNext' © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

0002943

-. ,c"

~..lnited States v. CDS, P.A., Slip C , _ (2015)

2015 WL 5257132
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
D. Idaho.
United States of America, United States of
Americ~ ex. rel., Dr. Jeffrey Jacobs, Plaintiff,

v.
CDS, P.A. d/b/a Pocatello Women Health
Clinic; Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a/ Portneuf
Medical Center, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability Company; LHP Pocatello, LLC, a

Medicare and Medicaid patients who were referred to the
Medical Center by the Health Clinic in violation of the
AntiKickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) ("A.KS"),
and the Stark Law, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn.
All Defendants have moved to dismiss Jacob's Complaint
without leave to amend on the grounds that Jacobs (1) fails to
stat~ a viable claim ofreliefunder Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and (2) fails to plead fraud under
False Claims Act with the particularity required by Rule 9(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The parties' disagree
about whether initial disclosures under Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure must be exchanged and discovery
commenced pending a decision on the motions to dismiss.

Delaware limited liability company, Defendants.
Case No. 4:14-cv-00301BLW

I

Signed 09/03/2015

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

B. LYNN WINMILL, Chief Judge

INTRODUCTION
*1 Before the Court is Defendants' CDS, P.A. d/b/a
Pocatello Women's Health Clinic's (the "Health Clinic") and
Pocatello Hospital LLC, d/b/a PortneufMedical Center, LLC
(the "Medical Center") and LHP Pocatello, LLC's ("LHP")
Joint Motion to Stay Discovery (Dkt.28). Pursuant to the
Court's discovery dispute procedure outlined in the Case
Management Order, the parties contacted Court staff in
attempt to mediate a pending discovery dispute. Unable to
resolve the issues, Defendants move to stay discovery. For
the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny Defendants'
joint motion.

BACKGROUND

Relator Dr. Jeffrey Jacobs initiated this action on behalf
of the United States government pursuant to the qui tam
provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3724, et seq.
Jacobs alleges that Defendants submitted false certifications
to the federal government in connection with payments to
Medicare and Medicaid. More specifically, Jacobs alleges
that Defendants falsely and fraudulently submitted, or caused
the submission of, claims for medical services provided to

ANALYSIS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) governs the granting of
a protective order. A party seeking such an order must show
"good cause." Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39,
40 (N.D.Ca.1990). A party seeking to stay discovery carries
an even heavier burden and must make a "strong showing"
for why discovery should be denied. Id. (citing Blankenship
v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir.1975)). "The
moving party must show a particular and specific need for
the protective order, as opposed to making stereotyped or
conclusory statements." Id (citing Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure, § 2035).
Here, Defendants argue that a stay of discovery pending a
decision on their motions to dismiss is warranted because
the issues raised by Defendants' motions to dismiss speak
to the threshold question of the sufficiency of Jacobs'
Complaint and do not require factual discovery to resolve.
In essence, Defendants have done no more than to argue in
conclusory fashion that its motion to dismiss will succeed.
This idle speculation does not satisfy Rule 26(c)'s good cause
requirement. "The explosion of Rule 12(b)(6) motions in the
wake of Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.C.1937 (2009), has made speedy
determinations of cases increasingly more difficult. ... The fact
that a non-frivolous motion is pending is simply not enough to
warrant a blanket stay of all discovery." U.S. ex rel. Howard
v. ShoshonePaiute Tribes, No. 2:10-CV-01890-GMN, 2012
WL 2327676, at *4 (D. Nev. June 19, 2012). In fact, such
a notion is directly at odds with the need for expeditious
resolution oflitigation. Gray, 133 F.R.D. at 40.
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*2 Defendants argue, however, that Relator must meet the
heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b). This is true. But it is still not enough to justify
a stay of discovery pending a motion to dismiss. Rather,
courts have held that "a district court may stay discovery
only if it is convinced that the plaintiff cannot state a claim
for relief." Howard, 2012 WL 2327676, at * 1 (emphasis
in original) ( citing Twin City Fire Insurance v. Employers
of Wasau, 124 F.R.D 652, 653 (D.Nev.1989) and Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Tracinda Corp., 175 F.R.D. 554,
55 6 (D .Nev.1997)). Other courts within the Ninth Circuit will
allow a stay of discovery if, after taking a "preliminary peek
at the merits" of a pending motion to dismiss, "there appears
to be an immediate and clear possibility that [the pending
motion to dismiss] will be granted." GTE Wireless, Inc. v.
Qualcomm, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 284, 286 (S.D. Cal. 2000).
The Court has taken a preliminary look at the pending motions
to dismiss, and this is not case where the complaint is
"glaringly deficient" and "completely wanting." Cf Jepson,
Inc. v. Makita Corp., 34 F.3d 1321, 1327 (7th Cir.1994).
End of Document

Nor is it a case in which the defendant is not a person
for purposes of the FCA as in Howard. Instead, this is a
run-of-the-mill case involving a standard motion to dismiss
under Twombly and Iqbal and Rule 9(b). Even if the Court
grants the motions to dismiss in part, the likelihood is that
the Court will also grant leave to amend, as granting leave
is a commonplace response to technical shortcomings in a
complaint. United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d
984, 995 (9th Cir.2011). Accordingly, the Court will deny
Defendants' motion.

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Joint Motion to Stay
Discovery (Dkt.28) is DENIED.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2015 WL 5257132
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

TRACY TUCKER, et al., on behalf of themselves and )
all others similarly situated,
) Case No. CV OC 1510240

)

Plaintiffs,

) REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
) SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'

\tS.

)
STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" 0 ~ in his
)
official capacity as Govemor ofldaho; HON. MOLLY
)
HUSKEY, et al., in their official capacities as
)
members of the Idaho State Public Defense
)
Commission,

Defendants.

----------------

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER STAYING DISCOVERY
PENDING DECISION ON
MOTION TO DISMISS

))

ARGUMENT
Defendants' pending Motion to Dismiss raises purely legal matters and, if granted. will
dispose of this action entirely. The Idaho Su.preme Court has said that it is within a coure s
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discretion to stay discovery pending ruling on a Motion to Dismiss that may dispose of all
claims. "Because the control of discovery is within the discretion of the trial court, there was no
error in the trial court's suspension of discovery since the motion to dismiss raised purely legal
issues which were capable of resolution without a complicated foray into the facts." Serv.
Employees Int 'l Union, Local 6 v. Idaho Dep 't ofHealth & Welfare, 106 Idaho 756, 761, 683

P.2d 404,409 (1984). Given that the Motion to Dismiss is purely legal in nature~ factual
discovery is unnecessary, and it would be an undue burden on Defendants who may not even be
parties to this action once the Motion to Dismiss has been decided to have to answer discovery
now.
1- Discovery is unnecessary at this juncture because Defendants' Motion ta
Dismiss may dispose of the case entirely.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss asserts that Plaintiffs' Complaint does not state a claim.
upon which relief may be granted as to any of the Defendants. This includes both st.ate and
federal law claims. The Motion to Dismiss relies on purely legal arguments as to the
justiciability of Plaintiffs' claims against the named defendants. First., the State ofldaho is not a
.

proper defendant in this action because it is not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and so it cannot be sued for violating Plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights. See Will v.

Michigan Department o/Stare Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (1989) ("[N]either a
State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under § I 983 "). Nor is the
State a proper defendant under state law because the Court cannot enjoin the State as an entity

under I.R..C.P. 3(b). See Weyyakin Ranch Properly Owners' Association, Inc. v. City of
Ketchum, 127 Idaho 1, 896 P.2d 327 (1995) (the designation of a governmental entity and not the

.

elected officials individually did not comply withI.R.C.P. 3(b) when injunctive relief was

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
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sought). These arguments are grounded in law, and no factual discovery would provide
additional insight into nlle or statute.

The other defendants named in the Complaint cannot be sued for the relief requested
because an examination of the applicable statutes shows that they have no legal authority to
affect the changes to the public defense system that Plaintiffs seek. Governor Otter and members
of the Public Defense Commission have no direct con1.Tol, administration, or responsibility for
providing public defender services. That authority and responsibility was delegated to the
counties by the Idaho Legislature in Idaho Code § 19-859, which states that "(t]he board of
county commissioners of each county shall provide for the representation of indigent persons and
other individuals who are entitled to be represented by an attorney at public expense." There is

no factual discovery which could shed any light on the meaning of this statute, which is clear and
unambiguous on its face. The responsibility and authority to provide constitutionally adequate
public defense services in Idaho rests with the counties, not with the State, the Governor, or the
Public Defense Commission. The named defendants are not proper defendants in this action, and
they cannot provide the ·requested relief. as a matter oflaw.

Plaintiffs address this problem in their Response with the statement that «even if
Defendants were to prevail on their motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs would simply file suit against
other state or local defendants, thereby requiring the State to respond to the very same discovery
requests in any event. .. .'' Response at 6-7. So, Plaintiffs posit, even if the wrong defendants
have been sued here, they must nonetheless provide discovery, because Plaintiffs may at some
point sue the correct defendants. This argument is unavailing here, in this proceeding, because,

if Defendants prevail on their Motion to Dismiss. Defendants will be out of this case. If
Plaintiffs file suit against other~ later-to-be~identified defendants, then it will be up to those
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defendants to address potential discovery requests made in that proceeding. The notion that
•
Plaintiffs can name the wrong defendants in this proceeding and require them to respond to
burdensome discovery requests because Plaintiffs might one day name the right defendants in
another proceeding runs afoul of basic principles of civil procedure. To the extent that Plaintiffs
plan in a future proceeding to propound discovery on Defendants as persons who are not parties
to the lawsuit, that too would occur as part of that future proceeding, and would come under·

.

different Rules of Civil Procedure than. those that allow Requests for Admission, for Production

of Documents and for Interrogatories to be propounded to parties.
What's :more, the discovery propounded to these presumptive "other state and local

defendants" would almost necessarily be of a different sort and scope. For instance, suit brought
against a single county in Idaho would likely not result in discovery regarding all 44 counties in
the State or all State officers. The proposition that Plaintiffs' current discovery is inevitable as
propounded to these Defendants regardless of who is named in a future complaint is not just
implausible, it is immat.erial; if Defend.ants' Motion to Dismiss is granted, Plaintiffs can decide
whether to initiate other proceedings against other defendants and propound whatever discovery
requests they like. Possible discovery in a potential future proceeding is not a basis for denying a
protective order in this proceeding.
2. The discovery requested remains extensive and would constitute an undue
bnrden on Defendants.
Plaintiffs' assertion that Defendants would face ''minimal or no burden" if they comply
· with Plaintiffs' supposedly narrowed discovery requests is simply untrue. Plaintiffs have still
requested documents and infonna.tion dating back to 2010. See, e.g., Document Request No. I
(requesting all documents relating to the provision of indigent defense services in Idaho since
2010). At least o:ne request applies to any State official. See Document Request No. 24
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER STAYING DISCOVERY PENDING DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS -4
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(requesting "all documents relating to any infoxmal or formal complamts or other information
provided or conveyed by state officials relating to Idaho• s indigent defense system and funding
for that system, since the passage of the Idaho Public Defense Act in 2014") (emphasis added).
Also, as nearly all of Defendants on the Public Defense Commission have served in other
governmental positions as well, some of which necessarily involved privileged communications,
responding to these requests would require substantial document review.
Plaintiffs point to having "nazrowed'' their discovery requests, but the discovery
requested remains extensive and burdensome. Of nine interrogatories, Plaintiffs have suspended,
for the time being, two. Of thirty four document requests 1, Plaintiffs have suspended eleven.
Complying with the 23 document requests that remain would impose a substantial burden on
Defendants who may be out of the case once the Court rules on the Motion to Dismiss. None of
the twenty-seven Requests for Admission have been suspended.
There is no prejudice to Plaintiffs if discovery is stayed. If Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss is granted, Plaintiffs will have lost nothing. If they choose t.o file a suit against other
defendants, they will be able to conduct their discovery at that time, against the right defendants.
If Defendants' Mo~on is not granted, or is granted only as to some Defendants, Plaintiffs will

still have ample time to conduct discovery in this proceeding, again, against the correct
defendants.
Most importantly, the remaining discovery requests shed no light on the issues raised in
the Motion to Dismiss: namely, whether the State can be named as a party under § 1983, and
what legal authorities and responsibilities Defendants have regarding the provision of public

defense services, as provided by the constitution and statute.

1 Although the

document requests number 35, document request 26 is empty.
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CONCLUSION

Toe pending Motion to Dismiss is purely legal in nature and may dispose of this case in
its entirety. Proceeding with extensive discovery before disposing of the Motion to Dismiss

would impose a subst.antial, and potentially unnecessary, burden on Defendants. For these
reasons, Defend.ants respectfully request that the Court stay all discovery until after it has
disposed of the pending Motion to Dismiss.
DATED this 18th day of September, 2015.
STATEOFIDAHO
OFFlC Q
ATTORNEY GENBB.AL

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

By
S. GILMO);'{E
Deputy Attorney General
Attomey for Defendants other than
Governor Otter
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of September, 2015, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:
Richard Eppmk
American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho
Foundation

~ S . Mail
Hand Delivery
D_.PtLCsimile: 208-344-7201

P.O. Box 1897
Boise, ID 83701
Jason D. Williamson
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
125 Broad Street
New York, NY 10004
Andrew C. Lillie
Ho~ Lovells US LLP
One Tabor Center, Suite 1500

Ga'"Email: reppink@acluidaho.org

1200 Sevepteenth Street
Denver, CO 80202

D

D
D

U.S.Mail

Hand Delivery
jacsimile: 212-549-2654
L,¥'Exnail: jvvilliamson@aclu.org

bl
D
0

U.S.Mail

Hand Delivery
D __.Pacsimile: 303-&99-7333
0"" Email: andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com

D
0

Kathryn M. Ali
Hogan Lovells US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street NW
Wasbingto14 DC 20004

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivery
I:] 9csimile: 202-637-5600
l!:t'Email: Kathcyn.ali@hoganlovells.com

Bret H. Ladine
Hogan Lovells US LLP
3 Embarcadero Center 1500
San Francisco, CA 94111
Je:r,.ny Q. Shen
Hogan Lovells US LLP
4085 CampbellAvenue, Suite 100
Menlo Park, CA 94025
.

D U.S.Mail
0 Hand Delivery
D ~imile: 415-314-2499
121" Email: bret.ladine@hoganlovells.com
0 U.S.Mail
D Hand Delivery
D F simile:

~ ·:·enn .shen

\

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER STAYING DISCOVERY PENDrNG DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS - 7
000303

I : (o

N0·------;:,;;-;:;:::-",7-::-r--A.M. _ _ _ _Fl-t:L~~
0

OCT 2 0 2015
'

Jason D. Williamson
AMERICAN CML LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION
jwilliamson@aclu.org
125 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004
(212) 284-7340
(212) 549-2654 (fax)
Admitted pro hac vice

Andrew C. Lillie
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk
By STEPMAN!E HARDY
HOGANLOVELLSUSLLP
f:i"=t''liY
andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com
One Tabor Center, Suite 1500
1200 Seventeenth Street
Denver, CO 80202
303-899-7300
303-899-7333 (fax)
Admitted pro hac vice

Richard Eppink
AMERICAN CML LIBERTIES UNION
OF IDAHO FOUNDATION
reppink@acluidaho.org
P.O. Box 1897
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 344-9750, ext. 1202
(208) 344-7201 (fax)
Idaho State Bar no. 7503
Attorneys for Plaintifft

Kathryn M. Ali, kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com
Brooks M. Hanner, brooks.hanner@hoganlovells.com
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 637-5600
(202) 637-5910 (fax)
Admitted pro hac vice
Bret H. Ladine
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
bret.ladine@hoganlovells.com
3 Embarcadero Center #1500
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 374-2300
(415) 374-2499 (fax)
Admitted pro hac vice
Jenny Q. Shen
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
jenny.shen@hoganlovells.com
4085 Campbell Ave., Suite 100
Menlo Park, CA 94025
650-463-4000
650-463-4199 (fax)
Admitted pro hac vice

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Case No. CV OC 1510240
TRACY TUCKER, et al.,
ORDER GOVERNING DISCOVERY
Plaintiffs,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER GOVERNING DISCOVERY - 1
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.

~

ORDER GOVERNING DISCOVERY
The Court, having considered the Defendants' Motion for Protective Order Staying
Discovery Pending Decision on Motion to Dismiss, filed August 21, 2015, and having heard oral
argument from the parties on October 16, 2015, hereby GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN
PART that motion.

The defendants are HEREBY ORDERED to answer plaintiffs'

interrogatories numbers 1, 6, 7, and 8; to produce and permit the plaintiffs to inspect and copy
the documents and materials requested in plaintiffs' requests for production number 32, 33, 34,
and 35; and to answer all of the plaintiffs' requests for admission.

The plaintiffs' other

interrogat~ries and requests for production are HEREBY STAYED, and no depositions shall be
commenced, until this Court's decision on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed July 8, 2015,
or further order of this Court. If the motion to dismiss is denied, all discovery may proceed at
that time.
DATED this

/11¥

day of

Uv/:- t~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this -uf'day of

c>J.obtu' , 2015, I caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed to
each of the following:
Steven L. Olsen
steven.olsen@ag.idaho.gov
Colleen D. Zahn
colleen.zahn@ag.idaho.gov
Scott Zanzig
scott.zanzig@ag.idaho.gov
Michael Gilmore
mike.gilmore@ag.idaho.gov
Civil Litigation Division
Office of the Attorney General
954 West Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83702
By U.S. mail

Richard Eppink
reppink@acluidaho.org
ACLU ofldaho Foundation
P.O. Box 1897
Boise, Idaho 83701
By U.S. mail

David F. Hensley
9avid.hensley@gov.idaho.gov
Cally A. Younger
cally.younger@gov.idaho.gov
Counsel to the Governor
Office of the Governor
Idaho State Capitol Building
700 West Jefferson Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
By U.S. mail
·

Bret H. Ladine
Hogan Lovells US LLP
3 Embarcadero Center #1500
San Francisco, California 94111
By U.S. mail

David W. Cantrill
Cantrill Skinner Lewis Casey &
Sorensen, LLP
P.O. Box359
Boise, Idaho 83701
By U.S. mail

Andrew C. Lillie
Hogan Lovells US LLP
One Tabor Center, Ste. 1500
1200 17th Street
Denver, Colorado 80202
By U.S. mail

Kathryn M. Ali
Brooks M. Hanner
Hogan Lovells US LLP
555 13th Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20004
By U.S. mail
Jenny Q. Shen
Hogan Lovells US LLP
4085 Campbell A venue, Ste. 100
Menlo Park, California 94025
By U.S. mail
Jason D. Williamson
ACLU Foundation
125 Broad Street
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Admitted pro hac vice

Admitted pro hac vice

Richard Eppink
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
OF IDAHO FOUNDATION
reppink@acluidaho.org
P.O. Box 1897
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 344-9750, ext. 1202
(208) 344-7201 (fax)
Idaho State Bar no. 7503

Kathryn M. Ali, kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com
Brooks M. Hanner, brooks.hanner@hoganlovells.com
HOGANLOVELLSUSLLP
555 Thirteenth Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 637-5600
(202) 637-5910 (fax)
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Admitted pro hac vice
Bret H. Ladine
HOGANLOVELLSUSLLP
bret.ladine@hoganlovells.com
3 Embarcadero Center #1500
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 374-2300
(415) 374-2499 (fax)
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Andrew C. Lillie
HOGANLOVELLSUSLLP
andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com
One Tabor Center, Suite 1500 CHRISTOPHIA D. RICH, Clerk
1200 Seventeenth Street
~ JAMIE M4ATIN
Denver, CO 80202
omnv
303-899-7300
303-899-7333 (fax)
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Jason D. Williamson .
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION
.
jwilliamson@aclu.org
125 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004
(212) 284-7340
(212) 549-2654 (fax)
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Admitted pro hac vice
Jenny Q. Shen
HOGANLOVELLSUSLLP
jenny.shen@hoganlovells.com
4085 Campbell Ave., Suite 100
Menlo Park, CA 94025
650-463-4000
650-463-4199 (fax)

Admitted pro hac vice

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TRACY TUCKER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV OC 1510240 ·

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD
EPPINK

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, etal.,
Defendants.
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SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD EPPINK
STATEOFIDAHO )
: ss.
County of Ada
)
I, Richard Eppink, having been duly sworn upon oath, depose and say:
1. I am one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in this case.
2. Exhibit 1 to this affidavit is a true copy of a document titled "Remarks by Chief Justice
Roger Burdick to Public Defender Interim Committee, August 15, 2013," which I
downloaded from the Idaho Legislature's official website, using this link,
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2013/interim/defense0815 burdick.pdf, on
November 23, 2015.
3. Exhibit 2 is a true copy of a document titled "State of the State and Budget Address,
Monday January 12, 2015," which I downloaded from the Governor of Idaho's official
website, using this link,
http://gov.idaho.gov/mediacenter/speeches/sp 20l5/SOS%20FY%202016.pdf, on about
November 10, 2015.
4. Exhibit 3 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers DOOl 153 through DOOl 155)
produced to me by Defendants' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20,
2015, Order Governing Discovery, in response to formal discovery requests propounded
by Plaintiffs.
5. Exhibit 4 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers D000724 through D000725)
produced to me by Defendants' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20,
2015, Order Governing Discovery, in response to formal discovery requests propounded
by Plaintiffs.
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6. Exhibit 5 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers.D003065 through D003074)
produced to me by Defendan~s' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20,
2015, Orqer Governing Discovery, in response to formal discovery requests propounded
by Plaintiffs.
7. Exhibit 6 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers D000375 through D000378)
produced to me by Defendants' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20,
2015, Order Governing Discovery, in response to formal discovery requests propounded
by Plaintiffs.

.

8. Exhibit 7 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers D000364 through D000368)
produced to me by Defendants' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20,
2015, Order Governing Discovery, in response to formal discovery requests propounded
by Plaintiffs.
9. Exhibit 8 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers D000240 through D000244)
produced to me by Defendants' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20,
2015, Order Governing Discovery, in response to formal discovery requests propounded
by Plaintiffs.
10. Exhibit 9 is a true copy of Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests for
Admission to Defendants.
11. Exhibit 10 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers D000410 through D000413)
produced to me by Defendants' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20,
2015, Order Governing Discovery, in response to formal discovery requests propounded
by Plaintiffs.

,
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12: Exhibit 11 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers D000049 through D000055)
produced to me by Defendants' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20,
2015, Order Governing Discovery, in response to formal discovery requests propounded
by Plaintiffs.
13. Exhibit 12 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers DOOl 149 through DOOl 152)
produced to me by Defendants' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20,
2015, Order Governing Discovery; in response to formal discovery requests propounded
by Plaintiffs.
14. Exhibit 13 is a true copy of document (Bates numbers DOOl 172 through DOOl 180)
produced to me by Defendants' counsel in this case, pursuant to this Court's October 20,
2015, Order Governing Discovery, in response to formal discovery reques.ts propounded
by Plaintiffs.
15. Exhibit 14 is a true copy ofldaho Executive Order No. 2015-04, which I downloaded
from the Governor of Idaho's official website, using this link,
http:!/gov .idaho.gov/mediacenter/execorders/eo 15/E0%202015-04%20SageGrouse%20pdf.pdf, on November 23, 2015.
16. Exhibit 15 is a true copy ofldaho Executive Order No. 2015-03, which I downloaded
from the Governor of Idaho's official website, using this link, ··
http://gov.idaho.gov/mediacenter/execorders/eo15/E0%20201503%20Epilepsy%20pdf.pdf, on November 23, 2015. ·
17. Exhibit 16 is a true copy ofldaho Executive Order No. 2010-11, which I downloaded
froni the Governor of Idaho's official website, using this link,
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http://gov.idaho.gov/mediacenter/execorders/eo10/eo 2010 I I.html, on about November
19, 2015.
DATED this 23rd day of November, 2015.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME this 23rd day ofNovember, 2015.

l

:\11'1:l"tl'tft

:

ANDauiisJ ·

INGRID
Notary Public
.. State of Idaho

-

)

'

. ....,,

Not Publi~or Idaho
Res ing at: /3)()/;r..__
My commission expires: '/· Z,J.. ·,2..1)/f
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of November, 2015, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed to each of
the following:
Steven L. Olsen
steven.olsen@ag.idaho.gov
Michael S. Gilmore
mike.gilmore@ag.idaho.gov
Shasta Kilminster-Hadley
shasta.k-hadley@ag.idaho.gov ·
Scott Zanzig
scott.zanzig@ag.idaho.gov
Civil Litigation Division
Office of the Attorney General
954 West Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83702

By email
Cally A. Younger
cally.younger@gov .idaho. gov
Counsel to the Governor
Office of the Governor
Idaho State Capitol Building
700 West Jefferson Street
Boise, Idaho· 83702

By email
David W. Cantrill
cantrill@cssklaw.com
Cantrill, Skinner, Lewis, Casey & Sorensen, LLP
P.O. Box 359
Boise, Idaho 83701

By email
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THE STATE OF IDAHO
SUPRE:ME COURT

P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, IDAHO 83720.0101
{208) 334-3464
rburclick@ldcourts.net

ROGERS. BURDICK
CHIEF JUSTICE

REMARKS BY CHIEF JUSTICE ROGER BURDICK TO
PUBLIC DEFENDER INTERIM COMMITTEE
AUGUST 15, 2013

I would like to thank the interim committee for inviting me to talk about the
public defender system in the State of Idaho. My comments are based upon
personal observations from having served as a public defender for four years in
Gooding, Jerome, Lincoln and Camas Counties as well as a prosecutor in Ada and
Jerome counties and now almost thirty-two years in the judiciary, twenty-two as a
magistrate and ·district court judge and now ten years on the Supreme Court.
·At the outset I want you to know that I fully support the Criminal justice
Commission's vision of key areas of study:
• The structure and organization of how Idaho will deliver its system of public
defense
• How the system will be held accountable
• The standards and funding for training, and
• How best to provide on-going and stable funding to support Idaho's system
of indigent defense .
. Next, _I would like to describe what a public defender's job entails. Our judicial
system is a three-legged stool which depends on advocates for two sides - a
prosecutor and a crimi~al defense attorney going to an impartial third party - the
judge - who applies law to a set of contested facts. Ali three-legged stools are only
as stable and useful for their intended purpose as the three legs.. In Idaho's system
of justice today, defense for the indigent is the weakest leg in the system. I am not
in any way impugning the comp~tence of the individual defenders but rather the
system. Frankly, our system for the defense of indigents, as required by Idaho's
constitution and laws, is broken.

l

0003131
EXHIB.IT

A.s we lo_ok a,t our system of justice it fo only right that the two
advocates on either side of a factual dispute are roughly equal in terms of talent,
resources, and time. The job of a public defender is not as envisioned by some to ·
"get the guilty off through a technicality~" The job of a public defender is an
advocate to ·make sure that the goverrunent's case is grounded in fact and law.
Throughout my years as a public defender, over 95% of my c~ses were concluded
with entries of a plea of guilty. I estimate that figure i~ true today in all criminal
cases. There seems to be little or no difference between the conduct of private and
public criminal defense attom~ys in tenns of the fin.~l resolution of their cases. So
prior to this plea of gmlty, what Will a public defender be doing?
First, a public defender contrary to any other lawyer practicing·Iaw has no
control over who their client will be. These attorneys are doing 4 tremendous
service to the communicy in their public defense ~ork.

A public defender is notified of an appointment after an arrest has ·been
made. The first step is usually at a hearing called an initial appearance Where the
defender finds out the allegation an,d first meets their client. Usu~ly the public
defender has minutes to obtain background information about the clie:qt's ability to
secure a bond or other info~_ation.
Next, the pubiic defender contacts the ·prosecutor for purposes of discovery
ancl/or discussions concern.mg the case itself. This phase of the case can taj(e
minutes to months. Felo:Q.y cases ate serious allegations involv4ig drug-related or
property c.rimes and will ·take· some time. A murder case;:, of course, .or other
crimes of violence may take a significant period of time to investigate, review and
strategize for trial.
·
The 4~fense attor,ney will interview their client, contaGt witnesses? and
obtain all the information that law enforcement has gathered. Additional
conferences are set with witnesses,. ·client and family as well as the prosecuting
attorney. There is also a determination based on the information, what violat10ns,
i.f any, can be proven beyoncl a reasonable doubt. This process of checkipg law
and facts is what some refer to as plea negotj.ations. The end result i$ a plea of
guilty or a 1;rial if the inattei is not di_smisseci. Once this phase i$ concluded the
defense attorney's ne~t responsibility is sentencing.
The sentencing phase is a significant p~ of a public defe11der's work. Most
of the individuals w~o are on the public defender; s caseload are individuals who
,have suffered lives signjficat;ttly different than ours. Ofl:entjtpes, there is grinding
poverty; sexual, physicaJ or emotional abuse; alcohol and/pr some sort of
substance abuse or addiction; mental illness, lack of education, and as a result they
'have lived very chaotic lives. As a public defender I often times stood in wonder
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at how some of niy clients were still alive or that they functioned at all in modern
society.
Most publjc defenders have an intimate knowledge of the res·ources in a
co:mmunjty that are availably to try to rehabilitate :or place individuals prior to
ultimate sanQtions of jail or prison time. Most crin:J.inal defense attorneys will
indicate to you that tll.ese facilities and alternatiyes ate non-existent ~ many
counties or lacking even in our largest cities and counties_. I think your work on the
pub1ic defender system will have a significant impact on the justice reinvestnient
initiative ~d save taxpayers money. An appropriately trained public defender can
better see what pl~ceµients are best based upon.evidence based risk factors thereby
saving_ taxpayers unneeded w~ste for services or incarceration.
The most significant factor in any sentence is the defendant's prior criminal
record. Without that ~ccurate prior criminal record it is very hard for an effective
sentence to be determin:ed.
Does the case end at sentencing? The short answer is ~'no" for felonies and
''yes;' :for misdemeanors. In either case there is an issue of appeal and if it is in fact
a misdemeanor the public defender of the county involved will be in charge of that
appeal after consultation with their client. As concerns a felony there are not_ only
signific~t issues of appeal, but also ·pleas of leniency pursuant to Criminal Rule
35, as ·well as uniform post- conviction relief issues.
For those of you not familiar, post-c~nvicfion relief is a s_tatutory vehiqle
enact~d whereby a defendant can file a civil ~uit alJeging fout ~asic grounds to
have theit ponviction reviewed by the criminal. court that imposed the· sentence.
The most common ground for the gr~ting of a post-convictiQn reltef petition is the
incompetency of defen$e counsel. So a publiQ. defender not only must work with
their client in making certain decisions throughout the case, but they must also be
cognizant that they ·can be sued for incompetency of counsel at the ·end of their
representation. As an aside, as a public defender, I often felt that I was battling not
only the P:rose9liting attomey and law enforcement, but also QlY client in tenils of
,their analysis of tp.e .case an(l what they thought sho"Qld be the outcome, and also
the attom~y who was going to sue me at the ~~d of the case in a post-conviction
reli~f proceeding.
This gives _you an idea of the responsibilities of a public defender in a
criminal case. Public defenders. also represent individuals in child protective act
proceedings, juvenile corrective act proce_edings, m,eittal competency and
commitment proceedings, extradition, ~d civil and criminal contempt
proceedings. All of the basic responsibilities I mentioned for a criminal case apply
to the~e prQpeedings.
3
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I need to comment that child. protection, and juvenile justice cases -present
especi~lly important examples of the need to inSUte attorneys who handle these
.cases ~e well trained; not only in
law, but that they know how to adequately
· represent these vulnerable children. Our judges tell us that in some counties, the
newest attorneys are often assigned these cases, yet the complexity of the law and
the vulnerability of the children represented require seasoned, well trained and
capable attor_peys. These laws can on1y be imple¢ented as intended if qualified,
.
trained lawyers are available.

the

, WHAT is IDAHO'S. HISTORY OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Even before Idaho had been admitted to the union, our territorial legislators
enacted statµtes r~lating to the right of ~(mnsel. The 1874 Criminal Practice Act, §
3, states "w~en the defendant is brought before the magistrate upon ail arr~st, either
with or wi¢.out warrant, on a charge of having committed a public offense, the
magistrate shall immediately infonn him of tJie charge against him and of his right
to the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings and before ~y further
proceedings are had."
·

If the defendant wished to

have an attorney, the magistrate h1;1d to adjourn
the examination and send a pe.ace officer to take a message to the attorney within
the township or city as the defendant may name.
·
·
Section 267 of the same act then describes what happens ~hen the defendant
is brought before the djstrict court. "If the defendant appears for arraignment
without ·counsel, he shall be informed by the court that it is his right to have
coUllsel before being arraigned, and shall be asked if he desires the aid counsel/'

of

This conc~pt of counsel at court; proceedings was carried into the
constitutional convention and mEtde a part of the Idaho Constitution. Article I, §13,
states in part:
·
"Section 13. Guarantees in crimlnal actions and ·q.ue process of lawsin all crimin~l prosecutions, the party accused shidl have the right to a
speedy and public trial; to have the process of the court to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf and to appear and defend in
person and with counsel. ... "
The right to counsel in a criminal case has cpntinued uninterrupted in one statute or
another until today.
The policy embodied in these statute.s pr~dated by half of century the United
States Supreme Court's pronouncement of the same Federal rule in Johnson v.
Zerbst.
1n Johnson, the U.S. Supreme Court said a defendant in a federal
prosecution has the right to counsel in a criminal case even if they c<?uldn'~ ~ffo.rd
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the same. In Betts v. Bradley, the United States Supreme Court refused, however,
to extend the federal rule to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, and Idaho
was cited as one of eighteen states affording counsel to an indigent aGcused of a
crime. The fact states had enacted their own provisions showed that federal
protection was no~ needed.
Idaho's statute was enacted seventy-six years before the United States
Supreme Court overruled Betts v.. Bradley, and declared in Gideon v. Wainwright
in 1963:
''The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trial in some countries, but it is in

ours."
"Fr.om the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and
1aws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive
safeguar9s designed to. assure fair tri_als before impartial tribunals in
which every d~fendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal
cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his
accusers without a lawyer to assist him."
Throughout the nation there are symposiums, speeches and articles celebrating the
50TH anniversary ofthe Gideon decision.
However, forty years earli~r than Gideon v. Wainright, in 1923 the Idaho
Supreme Court stated in State v. Pontroy:
It is the public policy of this state, disclosed by constitutional
guarantees as well as by numerous provisions of the statutes, to accord
to every pe:,;son accused of a crime, not only a fair and impartial trial,
but every reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense and to
·vindicate ·his innoce:q.ce upon a trial. In a ·case of indigent persons
accused of crime, the cotµt must assign counsel to the defense at
public expense."
As can be seen by this very plain statement, the ·right to be represented by an
attorney at state expense is one of Idaho's basic tenents of crimlnal law. Not only
is it a basic tenent that defendants hav~ the right to be representeq by an attorney,
they must also be given the right to a fair and impartial trial and be given every
reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense to vindicate their innocence upon
trial. These words of "fair and impartial trial" and "reasonable opportunity to
prepare for his· defense" have been the laws of this state since before statehood and
certainly since 1923.

5
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Historically those protections have been explored by federal and state law
and have been expanded to juvenile proceedings and post arrest interrogation, line
ups, other identification proceedings, preliminary hearings, arraignments, plea
negotiations, sentencing .proceedings, .rights of appeal, and probation violation
proceedings. Additionally, since the 1960's courts throughout the nation hav~
further defined what a fair and impartial trial is and what is needed in modem
advocacy to prepare and .present a fair and impartial trial. Additionally, every
crimin~ defendant in Idaho by statute and constitutional history must be given a
reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense,
As we go forward ask yourselves .are we in fact protecting and enhancing
these stati,ltory and constitutional responsibilities? We should be in fact trying to
uphold these ideals that wete handed tq us about 140 years ago.
THE IDAHO COURTS' RESPONSIBILITY

Pursuant to Title 3 of the Idaho Code specifically Idaho Code § 3-101, the
Idaho Supreme Court has exclusive power in the admission and ·policing of
attorneys in the State of Idaho. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court must
approve all rules defining the power of the Idaho State Bar pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 3-408 touching on .r.ules or prof~ssion~ conduct for attorneys. A~ st1ch, the
Idaho Supreme Court has a significant jpterest in how the public defimders of the
State of Idaho are carrying out th~ir dutjes tQ def~nd Idaho citizen,.s.
However, the ·court also understands the power of the legislatur¢ to set
p\lbliq policy of how best the State of Idaho can meet its constitutional and
statutory duties to provide for th~ .crin!inal defense of indigents. A.s such, the
Idaho courts stand ready to help this committee in any way possible.
For instance our existing and ce~y our new technology systems will
trac~ and manage cases assigned to public defenders and will allow you Md the
counties to hold the system accoun~ble as well as track expen~es and other costs.
Speakµig of ·costs, I would urge the ! committee to co~ider other
recommendations to provide a fair ~ethod of public defender reimbursement.
Considerable work h~ been completed in the :area of a defep.daht's financ.ial
obligations and their impact on the system, society and recidivism. We can
acquaint the interim committee with this data and offer recommendations.
We would be. pleased to present 't;hes~ recorinnendatiop.s and others to you at
subsequent committee meetings_. For instance a'. panel of administrative district
judges will .meet on October· 17 to .answer questions from the front lines and
provide their experienced perspective on these iss~es.

6
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Your third branch of government will be active in making sure the interim
committee is given factual information as well as any help necessary so you can
c;raft a public policy that carries out idaho's long tradition of constitutional and
statutory representation of indigent perso11s.
I believe strongly that Idaho must aggressively 4Dprove the ~stem that
exists today. Any change which takes place should have as benchmarks the
following broad principles.
first, I think the legislature and Governor's enacting of House Bills 148 and
149 to· clarify who is entitled to an attorney at public expense is an important first
step.
Secondly, since 1923 Idahoans have had the right for every "re~sonable
opportunity" to prepare a defense. This starts with t4ne - time to interview,
investigate and prepare legal arguments. All of Idaho public defense attorneys do
not have that time. Appropriate Cc!Seload ,i-µmbers exist from state and national
organizations. These should be closely examined by the interim committee and
made enforceable.
Every reasonable opportunity for ~ fair l:llld impartial trial should include
competent attorneys who are trained and have an experience level commensurate
with the case or crime. This necessitates a well-funded, systematic state-approved
training program. Remember the large sums of state and county dollars used for
training for other members of the criminal justice system.
'Part of the' funding issu_e needs to include an analysis of lowest bidder or
fixed fee contracts. The conflict of economic interest is inherent in this approach
and must be eradicated.

Idaho has already d~fih~d the parameters of our task to "make sure that
every person accused of crime, not only is given a fair and impartial trial but every
reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense and vindicate his innocence upon
trial." It has been the duty of this state before statehood and continues today. It is
our d~ty to protect these fundamental ideals for the future.
Thank you for your time here today.

7
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C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
GOVERNOR

STATE OF THE STATE AND BUDGET ADDRESS
MONDAY, JANUARY 12, 2015

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Honorable Justices and Judges, my fellow constitutional officers,
distinguished legislators and members of my Cabinet, honored guests, friends, my family and our First Lady ...
my fellow Idahoans.
Allow me first to comment briefly on two men who were with us here throughout the first eight years of
my tenure in this office - Superintendent of Public Instruction Tom Luna and Secretary of State Ben Y sursa.
puring my time in government I have seldom been privileged to work so closely with two individuals
more devoted to the public interest or more motivated by the better angels of public service than Tom and Ben.
Please join me now in an appreciation of their work, their legacy, and their friendship.
To our newly elected legislators and constitutional officers, congratulations and welcome. I applaud
your willingness to serve. I respect and appreciate your civic virtue. And I encourage your attention, patience
and commitment to the processes and purposes of our State government.
Like you, I am beginning a new term in office. It is an honor and a privilege to have once again garnered
the support and confidence of the citizens ofldaho.
Like you, I take that responsibility very seriously. And I know that public confidence must be earned
anew every day. So let us begin our work together unfettered by cynicism or mistrust, and with a sure
understanding of our limitations as well as our potential.
With you, I look forward to advancing the interests of the people we serve.
With you, I am committed to continuing our efforts to make Idaho what America was meant to be.
Ladies and gentlemen, we are blessed to live in interesting times. There is unrest and uncertainty all
around us. But that's nothing new to the human experience.
There has never been a shortage of issues upon which weU-intentioned people could earnestly and
actively disagree in any free and dynamic society.
We also are blessed to live in a nation and a state where there is an orderly, responsible, citizen-driven
process for sorting out and addressing those issues. Our process is not designed to satisfy everyone. Nothing
ever can. But it is designed to do more than stimulate public discussion and debate.
Ultimately, it must inspire resolution and progress - however imperfect or incomplete.
That is the lodestar on which we must find our way forward in the days ahead.
Unfortunately, that has not been a hallmark of our national government in recent years.
From immigration to energy and from environmental protection to budgeting, there is neither rhyme nor
reason to how the federal government does - or does not - do its job.
Partisan rancor and political infighting are unacceptable excuses for inaction and dysfunction. Here in
Idaho we have not only the opportunity but the responsibility to set a higher standard, and then live up to it.
I ran for Governor in 2006 because my six years in Congress taught me that the states are where our
Republic must meet today's challenges and prepare for those that lay ahead.
1
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That is just as true today, and even more apparent. So I am more determined than ever for Idaho to
·
embrace that opportunity.
It will mean setting an example of both fiscal responsibility and policy vision, especially on those issues
that are fundamental to our future prosperity, consistent with the proper role of government and aligned with
our Idaho values. That will require all of us working together rather than at cross-purposes.
We must not allow ourselves to emulate the federal government's politics of division, procrastination
and misdirection for which we all are paying the price.
In some cases and op, some issues, we already have put off making some tough decisions for too long.
· That cannot and must not continue. Today, I will outline some issues on which I believe we must act - not in
careless haste but with all appropriate dispatch.
Perhaps the most important message I want to leave with you today is simply this: Idaho Learns.
We learned the value of being more frugal and accountable with taxpayer resources during the Great
Recession. We learned the value of preparation and consensus building during our discussions concerning
transportation funding. We learned the value of process and inclusion during our efforts to improve education.
And we have learned that even the best intentions and plans must be carried out with equal attention to detail
and public perceptions from our contract experience with the Idaho Education Network.
Idaho Learns.
And those lessons run deep.
As a result of our experiences we move forward more confident in our abilities, more certain in our
goals, and better prepared for the challenges before us. Future generations will benefit from our efforts to apply
these lessons today.
I am not here to offer panaceas or to insist that your deliberations proceed in a particular direction - we
are after all separate but equal branches of State government.
Instead,'! am here to offer my view of what our state priorities should be and where our resources can be
most effectively used in the public interest.
That list begins with education. .
Last year in this chamber I laid out a five-year plan for sustainably and responsibly investing in our
public schools. :
I greatly appreciate your support for achieving those goals and I encourage your continuing help in
seeing this process through as we welcome new Superintendent of Public Instruction Sherri Ybarra.
In Idaho, public schools are the most fundamentally proper role of government. They are essential to the
health of our families, our communities and our economy.
In addition to the choices that parents are afforded with home schooling, charter schools and private
schools, world-class public schools can set the bar for higher individual achievement. They are the key to our
prosperity and Idaho's competitiveness in the global marketplace.
As you know, our school improvement plan is based on the recommendations of my broad-based,
bipartisan Education Task Force, which was led and facilitated by the State Board of Education. The goal of its
recommendations is to build a public school system that is focused on student outcomes, responsive to local
needs, respectful of the role of classroom teachers, and more accountable to parents, patrons and taxpayers.
The Fiscal Year 2016 Executive Budget recommendation I am submitting to you today provides more
funding for teacher training and professional development, and a significant infusion of money for teacher
compensation under the new tiered licensure and career ladder proposed by the State Board of Education.
To support continuous improvement, my recommendation provides additional funding to help local
school districts conduct planning on how best to improve the education of our children every year.
In addition, I'm calling for another $20 million in discretionary operating funds for local schools in
fiscal 201 (i.
My recommendation also includes funding to provide more career and college counseling for students.
As we implement our K-through-Career goals I want students and parents to have the best information available
in making important decisions about courses, programs and post-secondary opportunities that will give them a
leg up toward success in the workforce.
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My total General Fund budget request for the coming year represents a 5.2-percent increase.
But my proposal for public schools calls for 7.4 percent more funding. That's almost $60 million more
than we allocated for schools before the Great Recession began in fiscal year 2009.
Beyond the numbers·, I'm also calling on the State Board of Education and our education partners to
work together to develop a comprehensive plan for improving literacy and reading proficiency. Reading at
grade level by the end of third grade is a major foundation for a student's education. It enables their success in
every other subject area. We absolutely must prepare our students by doing more to achieve this critical
benchmark. Anything less is simply unacceptable.
·
My hope while you consider this request is that we work together to continue assessing the impact of the
current year's investments and seek to advance those policies and processes that work best for Idaho students.
We know that one of our initiatives to improve the quality and equity of the public school experience for
our students is the Idaho Education Network.
It enables students in Salmon and Montpelier to get the same kind of advanced instruction as those in
Sandpoint and Meridian. It enables Idaho to overcome our geographic and socioeconomic barriers. It allows us
to realize the kind of opportunities for enlightenment and progress that not long ago were available only in our
largest and most connected communities.
The kind and quality of courses and the level of instruction provided by the IEN truly is staggering. I
believe its value is beyond question. The IEN. is an asset that must be maintained. The challenges in continuing
this world-class educational tool can and should be overcome.
I am committed to fulfilling the vision and promise of the IEN, which will start with rebidding the
contracts involved, but also includes a strong recommendation for full funding ofIEN operations in fiscal 2016
to ensure the service is continued for Idaho students.
·
One of the benefits of the Idaho Education Network continues to be the ability to bring college-level
courses into high school classrooms throughout Idaho. That in tum helps ensure that more of our students are
adequately prepared for the academic rigors of college life.
Our colleges and universities have been spending too much time, money and energy on remedial
programs to bring Idaho high school graduates up to a post-secondary level of competence on such critical
subjects as science, math and reading comprehension.
Many of our employers also are having trouble finding workers with the skills they need in an
increasingly complex economy to enable those businesses to remain competitive.
And I'm not just talking about computer science, engineering and healthcare fields; we have businesses
struggling to find enough well-trained and qualified welders, technicians and other trades positions. In fact, at
current levels of economic growth we are going to be tens of thousands of employees short of industry demand
for the skills and level of post-secondary training and education they need in the coming years.
That's why oui efforts to better prepare students to be contributing members of society now extend
beyond the old K-12 focus to a K-through-Career emphasis.
Education must not be allowed to end with high school.
We have a responsibility to use our tax dollars more strategically and effectively- and to build and
strengthen partnerships with employers - if we are to meet our goal of at least 60 percent of Idaho citizens
between the ages of 25 and 34 having a post-secondary degree or professional certification by 2020.
Folks, that's just five years down the road. We have a lot of work to do to achieve this worthy goal.
Already the Board of Education and our higher edu~ation institutions are working more closely than
ever with the Department of Labor, the Department of Commerce, Professional-Technical Education, Health
and Welfare and local organizations to develop commonsense plans for meeting our workforce development
needs.
That includes more pronounced, targeted and sustainable investments in such programs as the computer
science initiative at Boise State University, an employee readiness initiative at the University of Idaho, career
path internships at Idaho State University, and the Complete College Idaho program throughout our higher
education system.
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Those are amongst the top priorities at each of our schools, and I'm asking for your continuing support
to help them succeed - to help US succeed in building a comprehensive system of education and workforce
training opportunities so that Idaho Learns applies to all the citizens of our state.
I'm also pleased to report some good news from the efforts of our Leadership in Nuclear Energy
Commission or LINE Commission and the Center for Advanced Energy Studies-CABS. As you will recall,
that group did an outstanding job highlighting the strengths and capabilities of our National Lab - and one of
their key recommendations focused on "regionalizing CABS" by including other state partners.
This past fall my good friend Governor Mead and the University of Wyoming agreed to join as equal partners in
the CABS consortium of our state universities.
This is but the first step in a continuing effort to fulfill the promise of the INL and CABS.
Let me talk for just a moment now about something that you won't find in my budget recommendation.
But I believe it has the potential to improve the lives and enhance the opportunities of many Idaho citizens. I
believe that because we've already seen it happen right here in this valley.
In 2007, my first year as Governor, the Treasure Valley was one of the last metropolitan areas in
America without a community college. That year the Legislature enacted my request to provide a State
incentive of startup funding for any local jurisdictions where voters opt to establish a community college
district. Ada and Canyon counties soon stepped up to the challenge and voted to establish the College of
Western Idaho.
And what a tremendous success it's been. It's forever changed the way education is delivered here in
Idaho's most populated area. It's hard to even imagine this val_ley now without CWI playing a significant role in
our future.
.
Thanks to the incredible efforts of President Bert Glandon, the visionary leadership of the College of
Western Idaho Board and collaboration with Boise State University and others, CWijoins as a full partner with
the College of Southern Idaho and North Idaho College in fulfilling the promise of true "community" colleges.
They are providing affordable, accessible and responsive resources for both students and employers to
meet their education and career-training goals.
·
Through them, Idaho Learns is taking on a broader definition.
Providing that opportunity for our citizens during the economic downturn was critically important to our
recovery.
.
Now that we are rebounding, we find ourselves faced with growing demand and intensifying need for
the services that community colleges are uniquely able to provide.
So today I challenge again the underserved communities ofldaho where no broad-based community
college programs now exist to canvass their citizens and businesses on the value that can be added to their
economic development and public enrichment efforts by establishing a community college district of the size
and focus that will meet their local needs.
·
Those needs and my challenge for local leaders to address them will be part of the discussion in each
town I visit to conduct Capital for a Day. We did it with CWI and we can do it again.
Preparing Idahoans for the workplace is the primary focus of the Idaho Department of Labor. It's not
just about sending out unemployment checks.
And the experts at Labor and our other State agencies now have a clearer picture than ever of where our
people will be working in the years ahead - if they are educated and trained to do the kinds of careers being
created.
We now expect to outpace the national employment growth rate with 15,000 job opportunities a year
being created for Idaho workers through 2022- many of them in the healthcare and construction fields.
That's why Director Ken Edmunds and his team at Labor have developed a plan for retaining, recruiting
and returning employees to Idaho to help meet the demand for skilled workers.
The idea behind the "Choose Idaho" initiative is to bridge the coming labor shortage by keeping Idaho's
best and brightest right here at home, encouraging former Idahoans to come home, and welcoming people with
new skills to our communities.
4

000323

To help build on that effort, my budget recommendation for fiscal 2016 includes a transfer of $5 million
for Industry Sector Grants.
.
That will help build partnerships between industry and our education system to more effectively address
a growing shortage of skilled and trained employees - a key element of our K-through-Career goals.
At the same time, I'm pleased that the Department of Labor was able to announce last month that
Idaho's economic recovery and job growth will allow the unemployment insurance tax rate paid by Idaho
businesses to fall for the third consecutive year- this time by another 16.8 percent. That means tens of millions
of dollars in savings that can help capitalize additional Idaho growth.
I appreciate your support over the years for reducing the tax burden on Idaho citizens. From increasing
the grocery tax credit to lowering income tax rates and providing personal property tax relief, we are keeping
almost $157 million in the hands ofldaho taxpayers during 2015. And that will grow to more than $169 million
during the year that begins July 1 as our economy keeps expanding.
Director Jeff Sayer and his team at the Department of Commerce are working hand-in-glove with
Education, Labor, Transportation, Agriculture, Health and Welfare and other State agencies to leverage marketdriven economic growth into improving how employers see Idaho. Their goal is nothing less than to make Idaho
a global leader in growth and prosperity.
And we have some great resources to help Accelerate Idaho, including the Tax Reimbursement
Incentive or TRI that you approved last year. This performance-based tool is attracting great interest from
businesses ready to create thousands of jobs and invest billions of dollars in Idaho's future.
Thank you for recognizing that Idaho Learns extends to the lessons from other states where
government is mortgaging its future to up the ante on attracting new businesses.
By contrast, the TRI requires employers to prove up their commitment to Idaho with jobs and capital
investments before a dime of their tax payments are reimbursed. And most importantly, the TRI is getting just
as much attention from our homegrown Idaho businesses looking to expand as it is from employers outside
Idaho looking for a better place to achieve their goals.
One of the most crucial parts of making Idaho a better place to do business and create jobs is improving
our infrastructure. My budget recommendation includes an additional $3 million infusion for the Idaho
Opportunity Fund at the Department of Commerce. That money is used for strategic grants to help Idaho
communities provide the water, power, wastewater treatment, roads and other infrastructure necessary for new
or expanding businesses.
A great example of the return on investment from our Opportunity Fund is Cives Steel. When one of the
nation's largest steel fabricators was looking to expand west of the Mississippi River it found a home in Ucon,
just north ofldaho Falls.
It landed there for a number of reasons, but one factor in particular helped seal the deal: Ucon was able
to secure a $400,000 Idaho Opportunity Fund grant to support infrastructure needed for the Cives operation. So
far the employee-owned company has invested about $10 million in facilities and equipment in Idaho. That
figures to grow to about $32 million as Cives creates more than 150 career opportunities in Bonneville County.
You know as well as I do that every Idaho community that's been passed over by a new or growing
employer understands the value of those grants. But they only help address a small fraction of our statewide
infrastructure needs.
The biggest of the big-ticket items in our infrastructure inventory is our long-term, multibillion-dollar
investment in Idaho's roads and bridges.
And ifldaho Learns means anything at all, it's time for us to address that elephant in the room.
Our own circumstances and the realities of our national government require us to seize the opportunity
to become more self-reliant, to be the architects of our own destiny rather than the afterthoughts of a federal
funding system that could be skewed to our disadvantage. There's a real possibility that Congress will try to
pass a transportation funding bill in the coming year - maybe as early as the spring.
, A cold, hard assessment of the politics involved indicates that we run the risk of getting left in the lurch
if that federal legislation changes the Highway Trust Fund formula so that we wind up paying in more than
we're allotted for our needs in Idaho.
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A survey last winter showed that most Idahoans believe our aging highways and bridges will need
attention within ten years.
That's one benchmark to consider.
But the maintenance backlog we already have makes it even more important to figure out now how to
pay for the hun~eds of millions of dollars in improvements needed to protect Idaho lives and corridors of
commerce.
Ladies and gentlemen, we know that after education, investing in infrastructure is among the smartest,
most cost-effective and frankly essential uses of taxpayer dollars to promote the public's general welfare and
· sustain economic growth.
And that truth is being embraced by voters. It's interesting to note that roughly half of the survey respondents said transportation funding should be among the Legislature's top three priorities - even though
most are satisfied with the condition of our roads and bridges right now.
They get it. Building and maintaining infrastructure is not an overnight proposition -whether it's
highways, broadband connectivity, electric transmission lines or water treatment facilities. It takes planning and
a commitment to sustainable long-term investment.
We already have 785 state and local bridges in Idaho that are over 50 years old and considered
structurally "deficient."
That number will grow to almost 900 bridges by 2019 even after completing work on the 68 for which
we already have funding.
This isn't a matter ofHennie Penny telling us that the sky is falling. It's a real problem, but we know
how to fix it if we have the resources. Major Idaho highway improvement projects since 2009 - mostly funded
by GARVEE bonds and federal stimulus money-have reduced the accident rate on those routes by 35 percent
and the death rate by 25 percent.
Under Director Brian Ness and Board Chairman Jerry Whitehead, the Idaho Transportation Department
is making significant strides in efficiency and more effectively using limited highway resources. ITD has
eliminated more than 100 full-time positions since 2013 alone by reducing layers of management. It now is
recognized among the best-run transportation agencies in America.
I fully understand the misgivings of some about higher transportation costs.
But there is something to be said for the old adage about being "penny wise and pound foolish." In fact,
every dollar we invest now in our roads and bridges will save motorists and taxpayers $6 to $14 later.
Chairmen Brackett and Palmer, legislative leaders, I am not going to stand here and tell you how to
swallow this elephant. That would be contrary to all we have learned about each other and the people we serve
in recent years. But we all know it must be done. I welcome financially responsible legislation that addresses
steady, ongoing and sustainable transportation infrastructure in Idaho; however, I will NOT entertain proposals
aimed at competing for General Fund tax dollars with education and our other required public programs or
services.
That raises the question of taxation.
So allow me to reflect for just a moment on our Idaho tax system and its conformance with the basic
tenets of equity, certainty and simplicity. By that I mean taxation must be fair in its policy and administration
across taxpayer classifications; it must be predictable so that taxpayers can plan and prepare as they conduct
their business and personal affairs; and it must be understandable so that taxpayers have a fighting chance of
making sense of the tax code and its impact on them.
As it stands today, Idaho unfortunately has become a confusing hodgepodge of taxing authorities. That
undermines public confidence that those who collect the tax are accountable to citizens for how the revenue is
used. With that and the benchmarks of equity, certainty and simplicity in mind, I'm asking for your help today
in ensuring that over the coming four years we can make Idaho's tax system one of the best in the nation.
I believe that work should start now by enacting the recommendations from the task force I assembled
last year to consider improvements to how the Idaho State Tax Commission operates. Those recommendations
are aimed at improving the efficiency, accountability and transparency of our revenue operations. That includes
refining the role of the Commission itself with the addition of a director over day-to-day agency business.
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By now most of you know that I would like to see us further reduce the marginal rates for Idaho's
individual and corporate income tax below 7 percent from their current 7.4 percent, as well as the complete
elimination of the personal property tax. To that end, my budget recommendation sets aside the first year of a
five year approach to reduce our income tax brackets from 7.4 percent to 6.9 percent.
This effort will provide relief to 44 percent of taxpayers this year and up to 51 percent of taxpayers by
2018.
I also believe the time has come for Idaho to prepare for a potential change in federal law to address the
issue of tax equity. It's called the Marketplace Fairness Act.
As many of you know, that legislation now before Congress would clarify the legal authority of states
like Idaho to impose and enforce a sales tax on interstate purchases of goods online.
Not only is this a fundamental matter of fairness for those brick-and-mortar businesses in our
communities. It also is a matter of securing our own long-term prosperity.
Simply put, every dollar of sales tax from online purchases that goes uncollected is the better part of a
dollar that is NOT going to support the necessary and proper roles of our State government - especially meeting
the education and infrastructure needs of our growing economy.
Congress has yet to act. But the legislation has support from within our own Idaho delegation.
On the topic of Congress, I believe the chances now have improved - if only marginally - to repeal or
more likely make incremental changes to Obamacare that would have a real impact here in Idaho.
I have studied the recommendations of my Medicaid Redesign Workgroup and agree with its findings up to a point. I especially appreciate the Workgroup's strong focus on personal accountability, requiring copayments, and managed care.
But more broadly, Idaho Learns should also apply to these findings and their experience. The
W orkgroup did its homework and deserves an opportunity to share what they have learned. I am asking you to
hold hearings this session, listen to their findings, ask questions and educate yourselves on all the work they
have done.
We worked together collaboratively and with great success on creating Your Health Idaho. After some
initial trials, Idaho now is successfully running its own insurance exchange cheaper, more efficiently, with less
staff and with better service than the national system that overpromised and profoundly under-delivered. That's
because Your Health Idaho is locally run and utilizes insurance agents and brokers working in the free market.
In fact, the marketplace is the key to how Idaho is advancing our goal of making health care more
affordable and accessible for all Idahoans.
Many people in this state have quietly gone about the business of putting Idaho at the forefront of the
changing healthcare landscape.
By building public-private partnerships, Health and Welfare Director Dick Armstrong and the men and
women who are working on the State Healthcare Innovation Plan are changing the way we pay for and deliver
healthcare services - including Medicaid.
Those who are working diligently in both the public and private sectors to improve healthcare outcomes
in Idaho deserve our sincere thanks.
My thanks also go to the Legislature and those advocates who are enabling us to more aggressively
address the local challenges of behavioral health. Less than a month ago I was in Idaho Falls to cut the ribbon
on Idaho's first Behavioral Health Crisis Center, where people with mental health or substance abuse problems
can get short-term help without going to a hospital emergency room or a jail cell.
It's an important part of the broader improvements needed in our community-based services. We know
that best practices across the country show that such local facilities reduce law enforcement and hospital-related
costs while providing more sustainable support and better access for vulnerable citizens. That's why I once
again am requesting funds for an additional Behavioral Health Crisis Center in the coming year.
Another decision for which I'm proud of the Legislature, our courts and our Executive agencies is their
unprecedented collaboration in enacting and now implementing the Justice Reinvestment Initiative or JRI.
This is an effort started two years ago by the good chairmen of our House and Senate Judiciary
committees.
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Last year's overwhelming legislative support for Senate Bill 1357 and hard work during the past year by
our courts, Department of Correction and Commission of Pardons and Parole has resulted in an outstanding set
of administrative rules for you to consider during this session.
They spell out in detail how we can improve public safety, reduce recidivism and lower the costs
associated with locking up offenders by prioritizing and refining our post-release supervision efforts with swift,
· certain and graduated sanctions.
I appreciate your continuing support as our Justice Reinvestment efforts move from careful planning to
effective on-the-ground implementation.
I hope you will consider it equally important to continue our work toward addressing the very real
challenge we face in our public defense system.
The courts have made it clear that our current method of providing legal counsel for indigent criminal
defendants does not pass constitutional muster.
This is a priority for our counties so it also must be a priority for us. If we value the ideals embodied in
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth amendments to the U.S. Constitution, then it is undeniably our responsibility
to take the phrase "due process of law" as seriously as the Framers intended.
Which brings me to another constitutional issue - the defense of traditional marriage.
Last year we found ourselves in the position of defending an amendment to the Idaho Constitution
approved by voters in 2006 and .,. . I believe - truly representing both the intentions and the values of our
citizens. It defines marriage between a man and a woman as the only "domestic legal union" valid in Idaho.
It is incumbent upon those ofus sworn to uphold and defend our Constitution and to do so based on its
content now- n,ot on changing societal views since it was enacted or how any ofus would write it today.
Therefore, I will continue to do all I can to uphold my oath and defend our Idaho Constitution.
I am hopeful that our recent request for the U.S. Supreme Court to review the issue will be accepted and
that we can look forward to an outcome that affirms our Constitution.
It's unfortunate that so many of our differences with the national government wind up in court. But in
the absence of any federal consensus on a multitude of issues, too often the courts become the last refuge both
for public policy disputes and safeguarding our freedoms.
.
That may well be where such questions as protection of sage-grouse and siting of electricity
transmission corridors end up. I hope not, and we are working hard with Idaho landowners, sportsmen, federal
land managers and other stakeholders to fmd common ground through our administrative processes on those
issues and others.
During the past year we completed the historic Snake River Basin Adjudication process. The largest
single-stream adjudication in U.S. history took 27 years and covered water rights on about 87 percent ofldaho's
land area. We advanced our efforts to similarly adjudicate all northern Idaho water claims. And we made great
progress on our efforts to preserve, recharge and more sustainably manage our water throughout the state.
In addition and with gratitude for your help and support, I'm proud to announce that there now are five
Rangeland Fire Protection Associations throughout Idaho. They are organized and prepared to launch initial
attacks when wildfire threatens any of more than 3 .5 million acres of state, private and BLM rangeland in our
state.
Ladies an:d gentlemen, look high above you. Within this magnificent chamber so beautifully renovated
just a few years ago, you see an Idaho sky through a vaulted dome of glass. This chamber, this building, this
body has all the room that anyone could need to accommodate the biggest, loftiest and most meaningful ideas
and actions.
In fact I would measure that the entire church used in the summer of 1787 to create this great Republic
would but fill this chamber.
So as you begin your deliberations today, don't limit yourselves.
Think big. Be bold. Act decisively. Reflect the Idaho values you were sent here to represent.
And as you consider the magnitude of the work ahead and how it will benefit the citizens we serve, keep
looking up toward higher aspirations.

8

000327

Keep looking up and apply what Idaho Learns so that our fondest hopes and best intentions will lead to
·
a better tomorrow for future generations.
Join me in putting Idaho and our people first and foremost in your minds.
Good luck, Godspeed, and may God continue to bless America and the Great State of Idaho.
Thank you.
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The SixtlJ. ~endmer;it of the U.S. Constitution provides that the accused sqall enjoy the
right to tl).e assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions. As with ,6ther rights that are
fundamental and essential to a fair trial, the vindication of the Sixth Amendment right fo counsel
is a state r~spofrsib1Jity. Although a state may delegate its duty to apprise citizens of this right to
counties, it' is ultimately the state's responsibility to ensure that the co~stitutiC?nal .obligation is
met.
In 2009, the Idaho Criminal Justice Gomm'.ission ("the Commission" or "ICJC") form,ed a
Public Defen.se Subcommittee ("the Subcom.mi~ee") tasked with developing recommendations
for improvement of Idaho's public defense system. In January of 2010, the-National ·Legal Aid &
Defender Association ("NLADA") released a report which suggested that Idaho is not
ade9uate~y satisfyi~g its Sixth Amendment obligations. For more than thre_!:l y~ars, the
Subcommittee ·cot'nmitted _itself to identifying improvements to be made, and its effo~s yield!:)d
·
·
•
four pieces ;of proposed legislation.
'fhe , first piece of Jegislatior;i provides µniform · eligibi\ity ,requiretpents for the
appointgi.ent of ~ounsel at public ~xpense'. More specifically, the arpep~h1'ents----;first~ redefine
the t~rm • . " ~erious crime," to include any offense the penalty for 'Wruch ' includes the mete
possi~i_lity '·of .~onfinement. The ~1,1bcommittee observeci th~f some Ip_aho coµrts~xpecting that
a jail sentence will ultimate! y not be· imposed-do not ~_ppoint counsel, whet~s oth~r courts will
appoint counsel if the applicable cri!Jllnal -s tatute,tirovides for the · inere possibility of a jail
sentence. COJ:?-Stitu~onally, a person is ·e~ti~e9 to ,cowisel if he or she faces actuii,1 iOJ-prisonment,
even for violation o'f .probati<;>n. In other words, person may ~ot be sentenced to inc~ceration or
have his or her suspended sentence imposed without having qeen previously availed of the right
to counsel.. The proposed changes to § I ~-851 will avoid -ambiguity and will en~ure that all
Idahoans are appointed counsel under the same circumstances .and in conformance with
constitutional demand"s.
.
Similarly, · the Subcommittee learned that there is variance in terms of who financially
qualifies for appointment of-counsel. While the current statute enumerates several factors that
courts may consider, there is no uniform standard o'f financial eligibility. The proposed
amendments will require the courts to presume a person is financially eligible for appointment of
counsel if certain objective factors are present. However, the courts will still have discretion to
either deny appointment of counsel in spite of the financial presumptions or to appoint counsel in
lieu of them.
The Subcommittee also acknowledged that requiring a person to complete a financial
affidavit in order to qualify for appointment of counsel puts the person in a constitutional
predicament. Under penalty of perjury, a person could potentially be compelled to disclose
information that would be incriminating, such as the existence of, say, illegal income or assets.
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In such a situation, the person is forced to choose between the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. To remedy this dilemma,
the proposed amendments to § 19-854 will restrict the admissibility of information provided in
financial affidavits. This will encourage full and accurate disclosure and behoove efforts to limit
appointment of counsel to the truly indigent.
Next, the Subcommittee discovered that there is inconsistency in terms of whether people
are required to contribute to or repay the cost of their court-appointed attorney. What is more, the
Subcommittee is concerned that current contribution and r~coupment practices may discourage
people from requesting or accepting the appointment of counsel. Some counties require an
application fee up-front and/or warn people that they may have to repay the cost of counsel with
lit:tle-to-no notice of how much it will cost them. Because of this potential 1for discouragement,
the Subcommittee recommends that § 19-854 be amended to prohibit · pre-dispositional
if
contribution and to limit post-dispositional recoupment to the costs associated with conviction,
,
any.
Last, the amendments to Title 19 add "defending attorney" as a defined term to include
the myriad public defense practitioners in Idaho who are private attorneys appointed by the court
on a c~se-by-case basis or contracted by the county on a systematic basis. The Subconprittee
realized that many public defense attorneys do not currently file annual reports pursuant to§ 19864 because the statute only expressly applies to county offices of the public defender. By
expanding the reporting requirements to all attorneys providing public defense services, the
amendments will facilitate the collection of comprehensive data-a foundational prerequisite to
m<taningful assessment ofldaho's public defense system.
The second and third pieces of legislation propose amendments to the Juvenile
Corrections Act and the Child Protective Act, respectively. With regard to the Juvenile
Corrections ActJ the
proposed legislation amends § 20-514 to expound the circumstances in
r
which juveniles are appointed counsel and to conform their right to counsel to that of adults. The
Subcommittee f6und that counsel is particularly important for juveniles, given that child~en
generally may not understand or appreciate the legal process. For the same reason, the
Subcommittee cbncluded that, although it is impractical to prohibit juveniles from waiving their
right to counsel in all situations, certain proceedings should preclude waiver. As such, the
amendments set forth particular requirements that must be met before a juvenile may waive the
right to counsel and also enumerate the situations in which waiver is prohibited altogether.
Similarly, out of a concern for practical implications once again, instead of providing for
the right to counsel in the diversion context, the Subcommittee decided to limit the admissibility
of statements made by juveniles in pre-adjudication proceedings. While there is constitutional
ambiguity ~d significant variance nationwide as to whether a juvenile is entitled to the
assistance of counsel in the pre-adjudication context, the amendments will balance the rights of
juveniles with tb.'e government's interest in facilitating informal disposition of juvenile
proceedings.
With regard to the Child Protective Act, the Subcommittee recognized that children over
12 should have their interests represented by an attorney that is acting as a zealous advocate.
Currently, children are only unqualifiedly entitled io a guardian ad litem ("GAL") in child
protection proceedings. However, the GAL's role is to protect the "best interests" of the childnot necessarily to advocate on behalf of the child's own wishes. The amendments to§ 16-1614
will allow children to have a voice in the critical decisions being made about their lives in child
protection actions.
The final piece of legislation is reflective of a Subcommittee finding that the most
significant trend in nationwide approaches to public defense reform has been the movement
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toward state oversight of the public defense function. As such, the Subcommittee concluded that
authority should be statutorily delegated to an independent commission to promulgate and
enforce certain standards for public defense attorneys, including statewide training and
continuing legal education requirements, data reporting requirements, core provisions for
contracts between counties and private providers of public defense services, qualification
standards, and caseload and workload controls.
The Subcommittee agreed on the substance and form of the proposed legislation creating
the commission and providing for its duties. After discussion, the ICJC determined that the
appropriate action was not to pursue passage of this proposed legislation, but rather to support
the creation of an interi~ legislative committee to examine potential means of reforming Idaho's
public defense system. During the 2013 legislative session, the Idaho legislature passed House
Concurrent Resolution 026, establishing that interim legislative committee. Thereafter, the
Subcommittee identified four critical areas that it recommends the ICJC ask the interim
committee to consider: (1) the structure and organization of indigent defense delivery; (2) the
oversight and accountability of indigent defense delivery; (3) the mechanisms, standards, and
funding for training and education for "defending attorneys" as defined in Idaho Code § 19851 (1 ); and (4) long-range planning for stable and ongoing funding of indigent defense delivery.
Lastly, the Subcommittee has recognized that one cost of maintaining the status quo is
the potential for litigation. The state ofldaho has made, and the Subcommittee believes, it should
continue to make improvements in the delivery of indigent defense services in Idaho. The
Subcommittee believes that the best way to make reforms in Idaho is through the legislative
p,rocess. The landscape of indigent defense reform across the country has, however, been shaped
to some extent by lawsuits. The Subcommittee believes that the legislative interim committee
should be aware of the potential for litigation from special interest groups, including those from
outside the state, aimed at forcing change in Idaho.
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816 W. Bannock St., Suite 201
Boise, ID 83702
Tel (208) 332-1735 • Fax (208) 364-6147
mail@pdc.idaho.gov

Ian H. Thomson, Esq.

December 1, 2014

Executive Director
Judge Molly Huskey, Chair

Dishict Court Judge
Darrell G. Bolz, Vice-Chair

Jm•enile Justice Com111issio11
Rep. Jason A. Monks

House of Representatives

Christopher Rich
Ada County Clerk
200 W. Front St., #1198
Boise, ID 83702

Comrnr. Kimber Ricks

Ida/to Assoc. of Counties
Sara B. Thomas, Esq.
State Appellate Public Defender
WilliarnH. Wellman, Esq.

Defending Attorney
Sen. Chuck Winder

Senate

Dear Mr. Rich,
The State Public Defense Commission was established in the last legislative
session as a self-governing agency in the executive branch of state government.
Among other things, the Public Defense Commission has been charged with
promulgating rules regarding uniform data reporting requirements for the annual
reports submitted by the public defenders in each county. That data will include the
caseload, workload, and expenditures of those attorneys handling indigent
appointments. Those cases will include adult criminal cases, juvenile delinquent
matters, child protection cases, guardianship representation, mental health
commitments and some civil contempt cases.
Although we hope that eventually the statewide implementation of Odyssey
will alleviate the burden on the counties of collecting and reporting this data, the
Public Defense Commission has been charged with collecting and evaluating much
of this data for the state legislature. I understand that county clerks are already
constantly receiving information requests and surveys from various state agencies
and state courts. It is not our desire to increase the burden on your office.
Nevertheless, it is likely that you will be receiving requests from our office during
the upcoming year.
Although this letter is not a request for infonnation, I did want to let you
know that you are likely to receive such requests in the upcoming year. I would
hope that when we do send a request for information that you feel free to contact us
with any questions you might have about the information we are seeking. Also,
upon receiving a request, please let us know if you have already collected similar
data and passed it on to another agency. I will be happy to track that information
down and try to reduce your office's efforts.
Let us know if there is anything we can do to make it easier for you to assist
us in the task at hand. Likewise, if you have any ideas regarding data collection I
would love to hear them.
Sincerely,

EXHIBIT,000332
D000724

Ian H. Thomson
Executive Director
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TEN
PRINCIPLES
OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM

February

2002

Approved by American Bar Association House of Delegates, February 2002. The American Bar
Association recommends that jurisdictions use these Principles to assess promptly the needs of
public defense delivery systems and clearly communicate those needs to policy makers.
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INTRODUCTION
The ABA Ten Principles ofa Public Defense Delivery System were sponsored by the
ABA Standing Committee on Legal and Indigent Defendants and approved by the ABA
House of Delegates in February 2002. The Principles were created as a practical guide for
governmental officials, policymakers, and other parties who are charged with creating and
funding new, or improving existing, public defense delivery systems. The Principles constitute the fundamental criteria necessary to design a system that provides effective, efficient,
high quality, ethical, conflict-free legal representation for criminal defendants who are unable
to afford an attorney. The more extensive ABA policy statement dealing with indigent
defense services is contained within the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Providing

Defense Services (3d ed. 1992), which can be viewed on-line (black letter only) and purchased
(black letter with commentary) by accessing the ABA Criminal Justice Section homepage at
http://www.abanet.org/ crimjust/home.html.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants is grateful to
everyone assisting in the development of the ABA Ten Principles ofa Public Defense Delivery

System. Foremost, the Standing Committee acknowledges former member James R.
Neuhard, Director of the Michigan State Appellate Defender Office, who was the first to
recognize the need for clear and concise guidance on how to design an effective system for
providing public defense services. In 2000, Mr. Neuhard and Scott Wallace, Director of
Defender Legal Services for the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, jointly
produced a paper entitled "The Ten Commandments of Public Defense Delivery Systems,"
which was later included in the Introduction to Volume I of the U.S. Department ofJustice's
Compendium of Standards for Indigent Defense Systems. The ABA Ten Principles ofa Public

Defense Delivery System are based on this work of Mr. Neuhard and Mr. Wallace.
Special thanks go to the members of the Standing Committee and its Indigent
Defense Advisory Group who reviewed drafts and provided comment. Further, the Standing
Committee is grateful to the ABA entities that provided invaluable support for these
Principles by co-sponsoring them in the House of Delegates, including: Criminal Justice
Section, Government and Public Sector Lawyers Division, Steering Committee on the
Unmet Legal Needs of Children, Commission on Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the
Profession, Standing Committee on Pro Bono and Public Services. We would also like to
thank the ABA Commission on Homelessness and Poverty and the ABA Juvenile Justice
Center for their support.

L. Jonathan Ross
Chair, Standing Committee on
Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants
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Black Letter
'"§ The public defense function,

§

including the selection, funding,
• §;,~ and payment of defense counsel,
is independent.

.#,:-·=Defense counsel's ability, training,

gf ·-~and experience match the complexity
~...#1 of the case .

:~The same attorney continuously
.·~ Where the caseload is sufficiently
high, the public defense delivery
,...::.......:: system consists of both a defender
office and the active participation of
the private bar.

,.l

.. \e

Clients are screened for eligibility,
.,...:'"'~ and defense counsel is assigned and
f;::..)P notified of appointment, as soon as
feasible after clients' arrest, detention,
or request for counsel.

_/ Defense counsel is provided sufficient
/ § time and a confidential space within
.. 'JR. which to meet with the client.

/
/

represents the client until completion
of the case.

,,€-~ There is parity between defense

::.; counsel and the prosecution with
~. . ,.,.-¥ respect to resources and defense
counsel is included as an equal
partner in the justice system.

Defense counsel is provided with and
required to attend continuing legal
education.

·"':iffi i~'&.. Defense counsel is supervised

~ j I and systematically reviewed for
. ~. ~.!' quality and efficiency according
Defense counsel's workload is
controlled to permit the rendering
of quality representation.

to nationally and locally adopted
standards.
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With Commentary

1

The public defense function, including

the selection, funding. and payment of
defense counsel, 1 is independent. The public
defense function should be in~ependent from
political influence and subject to judicial
supervision only in the same manner and to
the same extent as retained counsel.2 To safeguard independence and to promote efficiency
and quality of services, a nonpartisan board
should oversee defender, assigned counsel, or
contract systems.3 Removing oversight from
the judiciary ensures judicial independence
from undue political pressures and is an ·
important means of furthering the independ~nce of public defense.4 The selection of the
chief defender and staff should be made on
the basis of merit, and recruitment of attorneys should involve special efforts aimed at
achieving diversity in attorney staff.5

2

Where the caseload is sufficiently high, 6
the public defense delivery system consists of both a defender office7 and the active
participation of the private bar. The private
bar participation may include part-time
defenders, a controlled assigned counsel plan,
or contracts for services. 8 The appointment
process should never be ad hoc,9 but should
be according to a coordinated plan directed
by a full-time administrator who is also an
attorney familiar with the varied requirements
of practice in the jurisdiction. IO Since the
responsibility to provide defense services rests
with the state, there should be state funding
and a statewide structure responsible for
ensuring uniform quality statewide.11

3

Clients are screened for eligibility,12 and

defense counsel is assigned and notified
of appointment, as soon as feasible after
clients' arrest, detention, or request for

counsel. Counsel should be furnished upon
arrest, detention, or request, l3 and usually
within 24 hours thereafter.14

4

Defense counsel is provided sufficient
time and a confidential space within
which to meet with the client. Counsel
should interview the client as soon as practicable before the preliminary examination or the
trial date.15 Counsel should have confidential
access to the client for the full exchange of
legal, procedural, and factual information
between counsel and client.16 To ensure
confidential communications, private meeting
space should be available in jails, prisons,
courthouses, and other places where
defendants must confer with counsel.17

5

Defense counsel's workload is controlled
to permit the rendering of quality representation. Counsel's workload, including
appoint~d and other work, should never be
so large as to interfere with the rendering of
quality representation or lead to the breach of
ethical obligations, and counsel is obligated to
decline appointments above such levels.18
National caseload standards should in no
event be exceeded,19 but the concept of workload (i.e., caseload adjusted by factors such as
case complexity, support services, and an
attorney's nonrepresentational duties) is a
more accurate measurement.20

2
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6

Defense counsel's ability, training, and
experience match the complexity of the
case. Counsd should never be assigned a case
that counsel lacks the experience or training to
handle competently, and counsd is obligated
to refuse appointment if unable to provide
ethical, high quality representation.21

?

The same attorney continuously
represents the client until completion

of the case. Often referred to as "vertical
representation," the same attorney should
continuously represent the client from initial
assignment through the trial and sentenc- _
ing. 22 The attorney assigned for the direct
appeal should represent the client throughout
the direct appeal.

8

There is parity between defense counsel
and the prosecution with respect to
resources and defense counsel is included as

an equal partner in the justice system. There
should be parity of workload, salaries and
other resources (such as benefits, technology,
facilities, legal research, support staff, paralegals, investigators, and access to forensic services and experts) between prosecution and
public defense. 23 Assigned counsd should
be paid a reasonable fee in addition to actual
overhead and expenses. 24 Contracts with
private attorneys for public defense services
should never be let primarily on the basis of
cost; they should specify performance requirements and the anticipated workload, provide
an overflow or fun<;ling mechanism for excess,

unusual, or complex cases, 25 and separately
fund expert, investigative, and other litigation
support services. 26 No part of the justice
system should be expanded or the workload
increased without consideration of the impact
that expansion will have on the balance and
on the other components of the justice
system. Public defense should participate as
an equal partner in improving the justice
system. 27 This principle assumes that the
prosecutor is adequately funded and supported in all respects, so that securing parity will
mean that defense counsd is able to provide
quality legal representation.

9

Defense counsel is provided with and
required to attend continuing legal
education. Counsel and staff providing
defense services should have systematic and
comprehensive training appropriate to their
areas of practice and at least equal to that
received by prosecutors. 28

lo

Defense counsel is supervised and
systematically reviewed for quality
and efficiency according to nationally and
locally adopted standaros. The defender
office (both professional and support staff),
assigned counsel,or contract defenders should
be supervised and periodically evaluated for
competence and efficiency.29
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1 "Counsel" as used herein includes a defender office,
a criminal defense attorney in a defender office, a contract attorney, or an attorney in private practice
accepting appointments. "Defense" as used herein
relates to borh the juvenile and adult public defense
systems.
2 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals, Task Force on Courts, Chapter
13, The Defense (1973) [hereinafter "NAC''],
Standards 13.8, 13.9; National Study Commission on
Defense Services, G11idelines far Legal Defense Systems
in the United States (1976) [hereinafter "NSC"],
Guidelines 2.8, 2.18, 5.13; American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice, Providing Defense
Services (3rd ed. 1992) [hereinafter ''.ABA"], Standards
5-1.3, 5-1.6, 5-4.1; Standardr far the Administration of
Assigned Cottnsel Systems (NI.ADA 1989) [hereinafter
·~ssigned Counsel"], Standard 2.2; NLADA
Gttidelines far Negotiating and Awarding Contracts
far Criminal Defense Services, (1984) [hereinafter
"Contracting"], Guidelines II-1, 2; National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Model P11blic Defender Act (1970) [hereinafter
"Model Ace"], § lO(d); Institute for Judicial
Administration/American Bar Association, f11venile
j11Stice Standardr Relating to Co11nsel far Private Parties
(1979) [hereinafter '~BA Counsel for Private Parties"],
Standard 2.l(D).

3 NSC, s1pra note 2, Guidelines 2.10-2.13; ABA,
Sttpra note 2, Standard 5-1.3(b); Assigned Counsel,
Sttpra note 2, Standards 3.2.1, 2; Contracting, mpra
note 2, Guidelines II-1, II-3, N-2; Institute for
Judicial Administration/ American Bar Association,
f11venilef11.stice Standardr Relating to Monitoring (1979)
[hereinafter "ABA Monitoring"], Standard 3.2.
2 Judicial independence is "the most essential character of a free society" (American Bar Association
'Standing Committee on Judicial Independence,
1997),
5 ABA, stpra note 2, Standard 5-4.1
6 "Sufficiently high" is described in detail in NAC
Standard 13.5 andABA Standard 5-1.2. The phrase
generally can be understood to mean chat there are
enough assigned cases to support a full-rime public
defender (taking into account distances, caseload
diversity, etc.), and the remaining number of cases
'are enough to support meaningful involvement of
the private bar.

7 NAC, Sttpra note 2, Standard 13.5; ABA, Sttpra note
2, Standard 5-1.2; ABA Counsel for Private Parties,
s11pra note 2, Standard 2.2. "Defender office" means a
full-time public defender office and includes a private
nonprofit organization operating in the same manner
as a full-time public defender office under a contract
with a jurisdiction.
8 ABA, mpra note 2, Standard 5-1.2(a) and (b); NSC,
s11pra note 2, Guideline 2.3; ABA, Sttpra nore 2,
Standard 5-2.1.
9 NSC, stpra note 2, Guideline 2.3; ABA, s1pra note
2, Standard 5-2.1.
10 ABA, Sttpra note 2, Standard 5-2.1 and commentary; Assigned Counsel, stpra note 2, Standard 3.3.1
and commentary n.5 (duties of Assigned Counsel
Administrator such as supervision of attorney work
cannot ethically be performed by a non-attorney, citing ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
and Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
11 NSC, stpra note 2, Guideline 2.4; Model Act,
s11pra note 2, § 1O; ABA, sttpra note 2, Standard 5l.2(c); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(provision of indigent defense services is obligation of
state).
12 For screening approaches, see NSC, stpra note 2,
Guideline 1.6 and ABA, stpra note 2, Standard 5-7.3.
13 NAC, stpra note 2, Standard 13.3; ABA, supra
note 2, Standard 5-6.1; Model Act, s1pra note 2, § 3;
NSC, sttpra note 2, Guidelines 1.2-1.4; ABA Counsel
for Private Patties, sttpra note 2, Standard 2.4(A).
14 NSC, s1pra note 2, Guideline 1.3.
15 American Bar Association Standards for Criminal
Justice, Defense Ftenction (3rd ed. 1993) [hereinafter
"ABA Defense Function"], Standard 4-3.2;
Performance Gttidelines far Criminal Defense
Representation (NI.ADA 1995) [hereinafter
"Performance Guidelines"], Guidelines 2.1-4.1; ABA
Counsel for Private Parties, stpra note 2, Standard 4.2.
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l 6 NSC, mpra note 2, Guideline 5.10; ABA Defense
Function, mpra note 15, Standards 4-3.1, 4-3.2;
Performance Guidelines, supra note 15, Guideline
2.2.
17 ABA Defense Function, supra note 15, Standard
4-3. l.
~8 NSC, mpra note 2, Guideline 5.1, 5.3; ABA,
supra note 2, Standards 5-5.3; ABA Defense
Function, supra note 15, Standard 4-1.3(e); NAC,
supra note 2, Standard 13.12; Contracting, supra
note 2, Guidelines III-6, III-12; Assigned Counsel,
stpra note 2, Standards 4.1, 4.1.2; ABA Counsel for
Private Parties, supra note 2, Standard 2.2(B)(iv).

l9 Numerical caseload limits are specified in NAC
Standard 13.12 (maximum cases per year: 150
felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile, 200 mental health, or 25 appeals), and other national standards state chat caseloads should "reflect" (NSC
Guideline 5.1) or "under no circumstances exceed"
(Contracting Guideline III-6) these numerical limits.
The workload demands of capital cases are unique:
the duty to investigate, prepare, and rry both the
guile/innocence and mitigation phases today requires
an average of almost 1,900 hours, and over 1,200
hours even where a case is resolved by guilty plea.
Federal Death Penalty Cases: Recommendations
Conceming the Cost and Quality ofDefense
Representation (Judicial Conference of the U niced
Scates, 1998). See also ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases (1989) [hereinafter "Death Penalty"].
20 ABA, stpra note 2, Standard 5-5.3; NSC, S1tpra
note 2, Guideline 5.1; Standards and Evaluation
Design far Appellate Defender Offices (NLADA 1980)
[hereinafter ''.Appellate"], Standard 1-F.
21 Performance Guidelines, S1tpra note 15,
Guidelines 1.2, l.3(a); Death Penalty, S1tpra note 19,
Guideline 5.1.
22 NSC, mpra note 2, Guidelines 5.11, 5.12; ABA,
stpra note 2, Standard 5-6.2; NAC, S1tpra note 2,
Standard 13.1; Assigned Counsel, stpra note 2,
Standard 2.6; Contracting, mpra note 2, Guidelines

III-12, III-23; ABA Counsel for Private Parties, mpra
note 2, Standard 2.4(B)(i).
23 NSC, supra 'note 2, Guideline 3.4; ABA, supra
note 2, Standards 5-4.1, 5-4.3; Contracting, supra
note 2, Guideline III-10; Assigned Counsel, S1tpra
note 2, Standard 4.7. l; Appellate, S1tpra note 20
(Performance); ABA Counsel for Private Parties, S1tpra
note 2, Standard 2. l(B)(iv). See NSC, supra note 2,
Guideline 4.1 (includes numerical staffing ratios,
e.g.: there must be one supervisor for every 10 attorneys, or one pare-time supervisor for every 5 attorneys; there muse be one investigator for every three
attorneys, and at lease one investigator in every
defender office). Cf NAC, stpra note 2, Standards
13.7, 13.11 (chief defender salary should be at parity
with chief judge; staff attorneys at parity with private
bar).
24 ABA, stpra note 2, Standard 5-2.4; Assigned
Counsel, stpra note 2, Standard 4.7.3.
25 NSC, s,pra note 2, Guideline 2.6; ABA, mpra
note 2, Standards 5-3.1, 5-3.2, 5-3.3; Contracting,
supra note 2, Guidelines III-6, III-12, and passim.
26 ABA, s1pra note 2, Standard 5-3.3(b)(x);
Contracting, supra note 2, Guidelines III-8, III-9.
27 ABA,Defense Function, S1tpra note 15, Standard
4-l.2(d).
28 NAC, s1pra note 2, Standards 13.15, 13.16;
NSC, supra note 2, Guidelines 2.4(4), 5.6-5.8; ABA,
supra note 2, Standards 5-1.5; Model Ace, S1tpra note
2, § lO(e); Contracting, supra note 2, Guideline III17; Assigned Counsel, mpra note 2, Standards 4.2,
4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.4.1; NLADA Defender Training and
Devewpment Standards (1997); ABA Counsel for
Private Parties, supra note 2, Standard 2.1 (A).
29 NSC, stpra note 2, Guidelines 5.4, 5.5;
Contracting, stpra note 2, Guidelines III-16;
Assigned Counsel, mpra note 2, Standard 4.4; ABA
Counsel for Private Parties, supra note 2, Standards
2.1 (A), 2.2; ABA Monitoring, supra note 3,
Standards 3.2, 3.3. Examples of performance standards applicable in conducting these reviews include
NLADA Performance Guidelines, ABA Defense
Function, and NLADA/ABA Death Penalty.
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Public Defense Commission
FY 2015 ANNUAL BUDGET REPORT
[A]

[B]

[D]

[C]

[E]

[F]

· FY 2015 Actual

SALARY & BENEFITS

Legislative

Actual Exp.

%at

Monthly

Extrapolated
{Full 12-mo.)

Appropriations

July-June

Allocation

Estimate

Expenses

$119,800

$76,645

64%

$8,516

$116,770

Executive Director-Total

$67,001

Executive Director-Salary

$48,545

Admin. Asst.-Total

$9,735

Admin. Asst.-Salary

$8,858

OPERATING COSTS
Rent/Utilities

$70,200

$32,843
$10,439
$8,654

Parking

$1,260

$140

$1,574

$115

$15

$180

IT Services {CIO)

$31

$2,323

Communications

$3
6%

$31

$3,304

$271

$936

$104

$1,248

$1,387

$167

$2,056

Legal Services (AG)

$0

$0

2%

$690

$0

$1,155

$93

Postal & Mail

$244

$35

$418

Phone/Fax

$407

$58

$699
$39

$39

Email
Employee Development

Memberships

0-

$1,971
$924
$766

Accounting {DFM)

m

$15,128

$6,302

Assesment/Taxes

--....

$1,235

Rent

Agency Services

><
:c

$71,996
$16,558

57%
19%

$39,822
$7,708

Other (Conf. Rm. Space)

ffl

$100,211
$6,000

Publications/Subscriptions
Training (CLE/Conferences)
Administrative Costs

$4,061

10%

$332

$4,593

$615

$615

$2,096

$332

$3,978

$1,350

$2,462

6%

$352

$3,129

Copies/Copier

$1,475

$211

$2,529

Office Supplies

$987

$141

$600

Travel

Commissioners

$9,407
$4,752

24%

$852
$335

$10,223
$4,017
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FY 2015 Actual
Actual Exp.
%of
July-June
Allocation

Legislative
Appropriations

$1,070
$3,682

Airfare
Other·
Executive Director
Airfare
Other

ioffi;~-Equip~-;;~i..-

~-~~·~H

I, __ ,.-_..,. _ _ _ - ~ ~ - - - - - ~ - - - - - - "-L,,.,. ....... !

•

,__......_,,,.._.

__,_,

,_,.~,-

•

-•

........ _ _ _ _

-

-

..._

Furniture
Computer/Electronics
Misc. (signs, decor)
Software
r -- . ~ ------

~""" _...,...,...,_.. .... _,.... -~- -,.. ~ ·- -.........--~ ........ --- .. -no,..
-,

--

...

-

-

-

~-~·-·

~-,•----~--

--

-·

-

,._..,

- · - •• -- .. - - ··~~- .._..- ~-

..... ~ , • -

$110,000
-

•••

~,

~.

•• -

-·-~- -

$89,401

•• , . .,.,

-~ • .._,,

'

NAPD Membership
Juvenile Training
Facilities
Airfare/Milage
Meals
Lodging

$3,680
$7,806
$731
$2,698
$1,262
$1,245

Other
Capital Conference
Facilities
Airfare/Milage
Meals
Lodging

$1,869
$24,802
$281
$12,436
$2,612
$7,404

Other
Defender Summit
Facilities
Airfare/Milage
Meals
Lodging

$2,069
$53,113
$2,418
$18,894
$8,812
$18,000

Other

c: :

:

:

-

$517
$190
$328

.

$4,017

$6,206
$2,276
$3,931

,, ....--···· -· " - ... · - .. --

:-~,. •

,4 _..,"-"k_ - ~ • • "

I-,

_.._

~"~ ... ,:.

,

-••""'-"•-

..~

• .: -

$6,994
$3,271
$1,454
$1,452

1TRUSTEE & BENEFIT PAYMENTS

\ •• ~

-->lwt-•< ~ _..._

-

-

$335

$4,655
$1,707
$2,948
$13,111
• ...ii% ..

. . ~,. ·· . . . . ~--·~--..........

Extrapolated
(Full 12-mo.)
Expenses

Monthly
Estimate

: : TOTAL

$300,000

$4,989
$205,868

........... ...1,.

~

.. -.~·-· ..,.,.

81%
--~

- ~ .....l

,,

-j

~ ..

....

•· .

, ............-

;,•&..-.....

.,.. - . "'"
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FY2015 Trustee & Benefits Allocations

$

NAPD Memebership

3,680.00

Juvenile Public Defense Conference

Number of Registered Attendees

23

Actual Attendees

22

Presenters

6

(4) Reimb

Expense Breakdown

Total Cost

$
$
$
$

Honorariums
Facility Costs
Materials
Catering

Cost per

Cost Per

Attendee

Presenter

1,300.00
731.40
322.03
747.80

Lunch

$262 .50

$8.75

Refreshments/Snacks

$485 .30

$16 .18

Attendees

Presenters

Lodging

$788.50

$456 .50

Per Diem

Travel

$186.00

$328.60

Car Rental/Parking

$32 .00

$214 .94

Airfare/Mi le age

$928 .72

$1,769.60

Total Cost of Juvenile Conference

$
$
$
$

1,245.00
514.60
246.94
2,698.32

$35 .84

$

7,806.09

$76.08

$8.45

$54.77

$1.45

$35 .82

$42 .21

$294.93

$112.89

$461.61

133

Presenters

Public Defense Summit

Number of Registered Attendees

142

Actual Attendees

(6) Reimb

{58) Reimb

Expense Breakdown

Total Cost

$
$
$
$

Honorariums
Facility Costs
Materials
Catering

June 4th Breakfast

Cost per

Cost Per

Attendee

Presenter

400.00
2,417.50
1,859.98
7,286.50

$630.00

$6.30

June 4th Lunch

$1,147.50

$7 .65

June 4th Banquet

$2,224.00

$19 .86

$535 .00

$3 .57

Refreshments/Snacks
June 5th Breakfast

$630.00

$6.30

June 5th Lunch

$1,147.50

$7.65

June 5th Dinner

$497.50

$9 .95

Refreshments/Snacks

$475.00

$3 .17

Attendees

Presenters

Lodging

$17,406.09

$594.00

Per Diem

$1,320.50

$205 .10

Car Rental/Parking

$2,187 .81

$541.55

$15,985 .01

$2,908.86

Travel

$
$
$
$

18,000.09
1,525.60
2,729.36
18,893.87

$130.87

Total Cost of Public Defender Summit $

53,112.90

Airfare/Mileage

16

$37.13

$9.93

$12.82

$16.45

$33 .85

$120 .19

$181.80

$341.88

$265.59
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Capital Defense Seminar
Number of Registered Attendees

---~-· ... - --- -

~------- -------· -

...... , ....

31

_._

Actual Attendees

------ - _... _______

Expense Breakdown_---·-- ... ·- ________ Honorariums
Facility Costs
Materials

-..

Travel
Lodging
Per Diem

!$

~I $
i

Car Rental/Parking

$1,507.50
$934.54

Airfare/Mileage

$7,951.63

$814.34
$866.54

i

t$

$
!
$4,484.49 l $
t

"----·-·

7,403.76 )
2,321.84:
1,801.08 '
'
12,436.12 ,

-····

·-·---

24,801.81

$
$
$

110,000.00
89,400.80
20,599.20

Amount Remaining

Cost Per
Presenter

1

._,

------ ---- _......,!

$9.66.

,

$

Total Cost of Capital Seminar $

Trustee & Benefits Allocation
Total Trustee & Benefits Spent

8

j

}

$1,134.00 '.

Presenters

281.25 i
267.91 !
289.85;

$289.85
Attendees
Presenters ;
$6,269.76

Cost per
Attendee
l

!

Refreshments/Snacks

.,..

Total Cost

t$
$

Catering

32
(23} Reimb

$195.93

$141.75

$47.11

$101.79

$29.20
$248.49

$108.32

$530.39

$912.42

$560.56
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MISSION
The mission of the State Public Defense Commission is to seek and preserve freedom for all by
vigorously safeguarding Constitutional rights. In the words of Thomas Jefferson, "The price of freedom is
eternal vigilance."

VISION
The State Public Defense Commission hopes to serve Idaho by

(1) Serving as a clearing house of information regarding indigent defense for all relevant
stakeholders;
(2) Maintaining standards to ensure that attorneys have adequate training and resources to fulfill
their Sixth Amendment obligations;
(3) Promulgating rules for attorney training and data collecting; and
(4) Informing the legislature of any Sixth Amendment issues in the State.

GOALS

FIRST GOAL

Objective 1:

The Public Defense Commission will strive to Maintain or Improve the
Performance of Individual Defending Attorneys.
The Commission will seek to promulgate rules regarding training and Continuing
Legal Education (CLE) requirements for defending attorneys where representation
is provided by statute or required by the state or federal constitution in Fiscal Year
2017.

S11lJ\TEGY 1:

The Commission will include training and CLE requirements in its suggested core
contract terms for distribution in the Fall of 2015.

S1MTEGY 2:

The Commission will propose administrative rules setting out the practice and
experience required in order to qualify for a contract or to serve as a public defender.

1
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PERFORMANCE MEASURE:

Objective 2:

The Commission will undertake the negotiated rule-making process
in June and July of 2016, allowing a proposed rule to be submitted to
the Department of Administration by the end of August of 2016.
With initial publication and comment period slated for October of
2016, a pending rule can be voted on by the Commission at the
beginning of November of 2016, in time for publication and
presentation to the legislature.

The Commission will strive to ensure that defending attorneys are qualified to
represent indigent clients where representation is provided by statute or under the
state or federal constitution.

STRATEGY 1:

The Commission will include minimum qualification and experience standards in
certain cases in suggested core contract terms offered to the counties and defending
attorneys.

STRATEGY 2:

The Commission will make recommendations to the legislature, by statute or rule, to
establish minimum qualifications and experience standards in certain cases.

PERFORMANCE MEASURE:

Objective 3:

Proposed legislation should be written and ready for presentation to
the Legislature by January of 2016. If presented as for adoption by
rule, the Temporary Rules process will need to be followed and all
drafted rules must be submitted to the Department of Administration
by the end of August 2015 in order to be published in the October
2015 Bulletin.

The Public Defense Commission will provide access to meaning~!, useful, and
relevant trainings to defending attorneys.·

S;rRATEGY 1:

In the immediate future, the Public Defense Commission will host and conduct CLE
trainings paid out of Trustee-Benefit payment funds.

PERFORMANCE MEASURE:

In each Fiscal Year, the Commission should present substantive
trainings for d~fending attorneys. Those trainings should include
emphasis on training attorneys to handle juvenile cases, child
protection actions, criminal cases, and capital training.

BENCHMARK: The Commission will allocate as much of the Trustee-Benefit payments as possible
in each fiscal year; and the Commission will strive to reach more than 190 defending
attorneys in Fiscal Year 2016.
STRATEGY 2:

The Public Defense Commission will explore the possibility of partnering with other
Idaho and national organizations to provide the most effective trainings.

BENCHMARK: In Fiscal Year 2016 the Commission will determine dates ofIPA conferences
through the next eighteen months, and conduct coordinating meeting with members
of the IACDL subcommittee and with Federal Defenders ofldaho
STRATEGY 3:

The Public Defense Commission will seek to offer scholarships, financial subsidies,
or incentives for defending attorneys to avail themselves of training programs and
opportunities not offered by the Commission.
2
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PERFORMANCE MEASURE:

The Commission will propose qualifications for scholarships and
trustee-benefit payments by temporary rule by late August of 2015, in
time for publication in the October 2015 Bulletin and presentation to
the legislature for approval in January of 2016.

BENCHMARK: Final adopted rules will be in place for Fiscal Year 2017.
I

STRATEGY 4:

The Commission will provide online and remote training resources through webinars
and the NAPD-MyGideon library.

PERFORMANCE MEASURE 1:

The Commission will conduct a Winter and Summer drive for
defending attorneys to join NAPD in each Fiscal Year.

BENCHMARK: The Commission will seek to increase NAPD membership above 186 attorneys in
Fiscal Year 2016.
PERFORMANCE MEASURE 2:

STRATEGY 5:

SECOND GOAL
Objective 1:

The Commission will create a web-page featuring Idaho CLE credit
courses offered through NAPD archived webinars during FY 2016.

The Commission will seek additional funding sources through grants and
partnerships. .

The Public Defense Commission will seek or explore systemic
recommendations for the provision of indigent defense.
The Commission will thoroughly explore or review other systems, models or
alternatives by the end of Fiscal Year 2016.

STRAIBGY 1:

The Commission will gather information regarding all models for the provision of
public defense.

STRAIBGY 2:

The Commission will seek input from defending attorneys and boards of county
commissioners in order to determine their ideas and suggestions regarding the
provision of indigent defense.

PERFORMANCE MEASURE:

Objective 2:

The Commission will continue to meet with defending attorneys and
county commissions in every county, either one-on-one or through
public defender events and Idaho Association of Counties
conferences.

The Commission will obtain sufficient information and perspective about Idaho's
current circumstances to develop recommendations.

STRAIBGY 1:

The Commission will coordinate with the Idaho Supreme Court to determine what
information will be collected through the Odyssey Program.

BENCHMARK: Odyssey will be fully implemented in every county by the Summer of 2017, and the
Commission will be ready to begin collecting its data through organized custom
reports. A year of data collection will then be collected through Fiscal Year 2018.
3
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STRATEGY 2:

The Commission will identify any additional data that needs to be collected by the
defending attorneys for the purpose of annual reporting.

PERFORMANCE MEASUIIB 1:

Provide the counties and defending attorneys a suggested template
report for use across the State by the end of the county's fiscal year in
September of 2015.

PERFORMANCE MEASURE 2:

Engage in the negotiated rule-making process in June of 2016 in
order to construct rules regarding the statutory reporting
requirements of defending attorneys. That will allow for submission
in August of 2016, for publication in October and adoption in
November of the same year.

STRATEGY 3:

The Commission will develop a mechanism to gather input from defending attorneys
regarding their unique circumstances.

STRATEGY 4:

The Commission will collaborate with the Idaho Association of Counties to gather
information for actual and projected expenditures for public defense.

Objective 3:

The Commission will make recommendations for workload standards.

STRATEGY 1:

The Commission will review and select a time-management software program that
would be recommend~d for defending attorneys in order to collect the data
necessary to develop workload recommendations.

STRATEGY 2:

Identify the cost of a pilot program and explore funding solutions for that program.

STRATEGY 3:

Identify the counties that would serve as a pilot participant to track attorney time.

STRATEGY 4:

Identify how the data is going to be collected

PERFORMANCE MEASURE:

Objective 4:

The Commission will have collected meaningful workload data
before the end of Fiscal Year 2019.

The Commission will identify the model that most appropriate meets the needs of
Idaho, and indigent defendants according to the applicable constitutional standards.

STRATEGY 1:

The Commission will ensure that Objectives 1, 2, and 3 have been satisfactorily
completed.

STRATEGY 2:

The Commission will identify workload standards, taking into account all external
factors, including but not limited to: the geography of the county, the proximity of
attorneys to clients and the courts, and travel distances required.

4
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EXTERNAL FACTORS
This strategic plan represents an initial attempt to identify those specific areas where the legislature has
granted authority to the Commission. Nearly the entirety of the strategic plan is contingent on the further direction
and approval of the Idaho Legislature. The existence of the Joint Interim Committee for Public Defense Reform
means that the authority and scope of the Commission's charge is subject to change depending on the needs and
decisions of the policymakers. The Commission is ready and willing to adapt with the shifting landscape and will
revisit the strategic plan as often as is necessary in order to ensure responsiveness to the needs of Idaho.

5
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MEETING MINUTES
STATE PUBLIC DEFENSE COMMISSION
Date I time 4/7/2015 8:30 AM I Location Canyon County Administration Building, 1st Floor Public Conference Room,
111 North 11th Avenue, Caldwell, ID

Meeting Commission Meeting-Model Contract Terms

Commission members present
Molly Huskey, Chair, District Judge I Darrell Bolz, Vice Chair, Juvenile Justice Comm. I Kimber Ricks, Madison Co.
Comm. I William Wellman, Defense Attorney
Ian Thomson, Exec. Dir. I Nichole Devaney, Admin. Asst.

Commission members absent
Chuck Winder, Senator I Christy Perry, Representative I Sara Thomas, SAPD (arrived late at 12:00pm)

Others present
None

1.

Item

Responsible

Welcome and Call to Order:

Huskey

Called to order at 8:35am
2.

Approval of Meeting Minutes (3/3/15):
Mr. Wellman moved to adopt the minutes as presented, Mr. Bolz seconded, and the
motion unanimously passed with one small typographical correction.

3.

Determination of who will attend the PDC Presentation to I.AC. on June 11th:
Judge Huskey stated that it was not necessary for all members to attend. Ms. Thomas,
Comm. Ricks and ED Thomson will already be in Coeur d'Alene, and suggested that
either she or Mr. Wellman complete the group. Comm. Ricks suggested that anything the
Commission wanted to talk about to better explain its purpose would be helpful for the
audience. Judge Huskey recommended taking 30 minutes or so to go over the contract
terms and then allow 30 minutes or so for questions. Comm. Ricks agreed, stating that the
commissioners rely heavily on county staff and supporters to draft new contracts. Judge
Huskey recommended the contracts terms discussion be the topic for the full hour and a
half allotment. ED Thomson offered to forward an email in advance to all the
Commissioners asking for suggested questions/concerns. Judge Huskey recommended
tailoring the email to specify questions about contracts. Comm. Ricks mentioned that it
would be helpful if the PDC touched on the issue of how the determination of who
qualifies for a public defender is made. Mr. Bolz noted that it might be helpful for model
contract terms to include a definition of a "flat fee contract" or that this issue be addressed
with the IAC. Comm. Ricks reminded the PDC that there is clear division between some
counties. The PDC needs to remember the differences between those counties with full-
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Item

Responsible

time commissioners, and in-house public defender offices. He expressed a desire that the
PDC make an attempt and trying to mend some of those fences.
4.

Suggestions for use of excess Operating Budget FY 2015:
At this time the anticipated operating funds available total approximately $25,000. Mr.
Wellman referenced the Executive Leadership training discussed in the previous meeting,
and inquired whether that was something the Commission wanted to use the money
toward. ED Thomson referenced an email he forwarded to all the institutional office heads
stating that he had only received interest from one person. Judge Huskey suggested
offering leadership training to some of the up and coming PD's who show interest in
leadership. Comm. Ricks commented that selection of individuals should be approached
with caution so as not to give any appearance of favoritism. Judge Huskey proposed that
she and ED Thomson get together over the next month and select a handful of potential
individuals and establish a potential cost.
ED Thomson suggested that some of the funds could be used toward educating the
Commission, such as bringing out David Carroll from the Sixth Amendment Center to
make a presentation to the group. He recommended asking him to come for the June
meeting. Judge Huskey and Mr. Wellman agreed that would be a good idea. ED
Thomson will contact him to see what his availability is in June. Comm. Ricks asked if this
type of training should be open to the attendance of some of the interim committee
members. Judge Huskey liked that idea and recommended getting Mr. Carroll's
availability and then the Commission could determine which other individuals would
benefit from a presentation that day.
Mr. Bolz stated that if some money is reverted back to the general fund this year, it
would not likely affect the Commissions budget next year. The legislature understands
the Commission is new and will need a year to establish itself and its expenses.

5.

Model Contract Terms:
The Commission then undertook a close examination of the contract terms.

Huskey/Wellman/
Ricks

Case Types: Mr. Wellman suggested that the PDC use an inclusive approach that
would strive to identify any case where a person's liberty is restricted. Mr. Wellman
suggested that this list be incorporated with some verbiage within these terms to help
Commissioners. ED Thomson suggested including direct appeals for all cases, whether
that be by ·contract or through the SAPD' s services. There was also additional discussion of
including appeals of juvenile delinquency matters. ·
Reports and Inspections: The Commission will recommend that annual reporting occur
at the end of the county's fiscal year, and that it be submitted by the last day of October.
The specifics of what that annual report should include were discussed and refined. That
information must include all of those attorneys that provide services under the contract,
regardless of whether they are the named attorney under the contract.
Caseload Reports: There were suggestions that the proposed wording be modified to
reflect the annual reporting requirement and to include the case types already included.
Expenditure Reports: Suggestions were made to reflect the annual reporting and to
include the case types. ED Thomson suggested adding language to distinguish between
extraordinary expenses being spent out of original budget appropriations vs.
Page2
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Item

Responsible

supplemental funding coming from the court. Commissioners generally agreed that the
PDC should develop a standard form or report to be used by reporting attorneys, and that
there would be a significant benefit in having all counties use the same form.
Other: 'Inere was some discussion around the bar complaint process. It was determined
that the requirements would be triggered by bar discipline instead of a complaints.
Performance Expectations to be Considered: Mr. Wellman opened it up to the
· Commission for direction as to whether the ABA's Ten Principles of a Public Defense·
Delivery System, their guidelines for the defense function, or the NLADA Performance
Guidelines should be incorporated or used in the terms of the contract. He asked, how the
Commission might refer to them in a model contract. What burden would they place upon
the countie~? There was general agreement amongst the Commissioners that the ABA Ten·
Principles, along with part of the preamble, should be a mandatory provision of the
contract. The Ten Principles could be attached as an addendum. There was a discussion
about state and county exposure to liability once standards and aims are adopted. Ms.
Thomas reminded the members that any proffered terms will be presented to the
Legislature for adoption; if the counties then choose not to adopt them then the state and
or county may open themselves up to liability (the state for not making them mandatory,
and the county for acting contrary to state recommendation).
There was also a discussion of the NLADA Guidelines compared to the ABA Guidelines
for the Defense Function Standards. The Commissioners generally agreed that the NLADA
Guidelines were (1) more recent, (2) incorporated most of the ABA guidelines, and (3)
were more relevant to indigent defense practice. At the suggestion of Ms. Thomas and
Chair Huskey, Thomson will order a bound volume of the NLADA guidelines for each
county and member of the interim committee. There was general agreement to remove all
caseload/workload issues from the initial model terms. Instead, attorneys should be
guided by the ABA Ethics Opinion 06-441, which would be attached as an addendum.
In discussing caseload, the issue of capital cases came up. Chair Huskey wondered
whether it would be instructive for the members of the Commission if she were to arrange
a meeting with J. Burdick, and obtain the court's interpretation of 18-4004A, and whether a
First Degree murder case is considered a death penalty case in the absence of a filing of the
Notice of Intent to Seek Death, before the statutory 60-day period after arraigni;nent has
been satisfied, or where that period has been extended by an agreement of all parties.
Should the capital standards apply in the interim? Otherwise, the defense team is at a
significant disadvantage and very behind if that decision is made months later.
Other Proposed Meetings: Ms. Thomas pointed out that the PDC will be going through
the Executive Legislative System. Any proposed model contract terms need to go through
the Governor's office, and reviewed by David Hensley or Mark W arbus. Chair Huskey
would like to sit down with Governor's Office in advance of submitting any rules. Ms.
Thomas offered to arrange that meeting. Comm. Ricks also offered to help arrange the
meeting with Mr. Warbus. The PDC's goal would be to use the June IAC meeting as the
start of a comment period, with feed~ack incorporated into the terms by September. (The
IAC fall meeting is to be held from September 28-30 at the Grove Hotel.)
It was also suggested that Chair Huskey and Dan Chadwick have a meeting with
Comm. Yzaguirre (Ada County), to find out what are their concerns. A meeting could be
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set-up for early May. There was an inquiry whether the IAC, and Dan Blocksom, could be
used to assist counties in constructing model contract terms until the PDC is able to do so.
Ms. Thomas made a motion for the PDC to ask for another FTE-attomey position next
year, who could work with the counties to create RFP bids, and to manage, write and
construct contracts. Mr·. Bolz seconded the motion. Comm. Ricks inquired as to whether it
was premature, and whether anything similar already existed. Ms. Thomas explained that
such an attorney would be an expert on the issue, and would constitute an actual service
where the state (through the PDC) could off-set a cost to the counties. Comm. Ricks asked
whether the PDC was appointing itself to act in that capacity. Ms. Thomas indicated that
participation would not be mandatory. Chair Huskey added that the attorney could also
help arrange and develop PD trainings, and data reporting. Such a position would require
additional legislation. The vote in favor of the motion was unanimous (five present).
,

Grounds to renegotiate contract: Ms. Thomas believes there needs to be a clearer
standard, other than "significant changes", when a defending attorney is justified in
renegotiating a contract. The Commission should look for a definition of what constitutes a
"significant change," and should probably include a definition of materiality. Ms. Thomas
also believes there needs to be an "out" provision, like in Blaine County, in the event any
case exceeds 60 hours of attorney-time. In that event, the attorney would have to notify the
county, and then estimate the time required. In that event, the attorney would then be paid
by the hour. The administrative district judge would then make a determination of the
appropriate number of hours and the reimbursement rate, under seal.
Qualifications and Case Requirements: Many of the remaining terms had already been
taken up in the previous contract terms meeting on January 28th. There were some
adjustments suggested when addressing capital cases. There was also lengthy discussion
surrounding the experience qualifications required for juvenile representation, and
whether the same case severity distinctions should be made when distinguishing between
certain felonies and delinquency cases. The Commission generally agreed that serious
adult felonies would be divided if the possible exposure was 15 years or greater, or where
certain mandatorY. minimums applied. Juvenile cases need to be distinguished between
whether the cases.are waivable and non-waivable crimes (whether the cases are
transferra~le into adult court). There was considerable discuss~on as to what qualifications
should be necessary in those types of cases. There was general agreement that any
resulting model contract term should parallel the statute that discusses transferring
jurisdiction from juvenile to adult court.
6.

Next Meeting: May 5, 2015, 1 - 5pm
Agenda Items for Next ~eeting:
Review and finalize model contract terms; should discuss IAC presentation in June;
follow-up on David Carroll meeting in June; postpone discussion on strategic plan and
caseload/workload studies.
Proposed to meet again at Canyon County Administration Building.

7.

Adjournment

Huskey
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Attachments:
Proposed Model .Contract Terms (Rough Draft)
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Ricks, Sen. Chuck Winder, and Rep.
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Attorney for Defendants William H. Wellman
and Sara B. Thomas

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURIB .JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

TRACY TUCKER, et al., on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH"
OTTER, in his official capacity as Governor
ofldaho; HON. MOLLY HUSKEY, et al., in
their official capacities as members of the
Idaho State Public Defense Commission,
Defendants.

---------------

)
) Case No. CV OC 1510240
)
) DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES TO
) PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF
) REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION TO
) DEFENDANTS

)
)
)
)
)

. Pursuant to the court's Order Regarding Discovery, dated October 19, 2015, Defendants
answer Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests for Admission as follows. Defendants deny each request
except as specifically admitted below.

Ill

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION TO DEFENDANTS - 1
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REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
Please admit the following:
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 1: The Idaho Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) was creat-

ed by Executive Order in 2005, and operates under the supervision of the Governor.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 1:

Defendants admit that on June 16, 2005, Gov-

ernor Kempthorne issued Executive Order No 2005-06, which "establish[ed] the Idaho Criminal
Justice Commission." See Idaho Administrative Bulletin Volume (I.A.B. Vol.) 05-8, pages 1516 (August 3, 2005); 2006 Idaho Session Laws (I.S.L.), pp. 1430-1432. Executive Order 200506 was repealed and replaced by Executive Order 2005-17, which was in turn repealed and
replaced by Executive Order 2006-29. By its terms, that Executive Order ceased to be effective
no later than four years later and is no longer in effect.

Governor Otter continued the Idaho

Criminal Justice Commission through Executive Order 2011-11, dated July 19, 2011, and
Executive Order 2015-10, dated September 23, 2015.

Defendants deny that the Idaho

Criminal Justice Commission "operates under the supervision of the Governor." The currently
effective executive order, Executive Order 2015-10, does not provide for the Governor to
supervise the Idaho Criminal Justice Commission, and it authorizes the Governor to appoint only
a minority of the Commission's members.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 2: The pmpose of the CJC is to provide policy-level direction

to State officials and to promote the efficient and effective use of resources, based on best
practices or evidence-based practices, for matters related to the State's criminal justice system.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 2: Defendants deny this Request for Admission

because it is inconsistent with Executive Order 2015-10, which recites the following purpose for
the CJC:
2.

The purpose of the Commission shall be to provide policy-level direction
and to promote efficient and effective use of resources, based on a datadriven approach and evidenced-based practices, for matters related to the
State's criminal justice system.
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 3: The CJC is comprised of at least one representative from

the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of Idaho's state government, and consists of 26
total members.
· ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 3: Defendants admit this Request except for the

fact that Executive Order 2015-10 provides that the CJC "shall consist of 25 members," and
recognizing that from time to time there can be vacancies in the membership of the CJC that,
until filled, will leave the CJC with fewer than 25 total members.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 4: Among other required members, the CJC must include a

representative from the Governor's office; the state Attorney General or his designee; two
members from the Idaho Senate; two members from the Idaho House of Representatives; the
Administrative Director of the Courts; three representatives from the judiciary; and one
representative from the Office of the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 4: Defendants admit this request. See Executive

Order 2015-10.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 5:

In 2009, the CJC formed a Public Defense Subcommittee

(Subcommittee) tasked with developing specific recommendations for improvement of Idaho's
public defense system .
. ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 5:

Defendants admit that the CJC formed a

subcommittee in 2009 tasked with evaluating the public defender system and bringing
recommendations to the CJC.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 6: In 2011, Defendant Governor Otter issued Executive Order

No. 2011-11, continuing and reaffirming the CJC' s mandate.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 6: Defendants admit that Governor Otter issued

Executive Order No. 2011-11, "CONTINUING THE IDAHO CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMIS-

SION." However, the continued CJC was differently constituted than the CJC established in
2005 (which had 22 members, not 26).

Defendants deny that Executive Order 2011-11

"continu[ed] and reaffirm[ed] the CJC's mandate" because the Executive Order No. 2005-06's
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Paragraph 2, clauses a thro4gh g, overlapped in part with Executive Order No. 2011-11 's
Paragraph 2, clauses a through e, but also differed in part in their directives to the CJC. Compare
I.A.B. Vol. 05-8, pages 15-16 (August 3, 2005), 2006 Idaho Session Laws (I.S.L.), pp. 14311

1432, with I.A.B. Vol. 11-9, p. 31 (September 7, 2011); 2012 I.S.L., p. 1008.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 7: On May 24, 2013, after approximately three years of in-

vestigation, the Subcommittee issued a set of public defense reform recommendations to the
CJC.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 7: Defendants admit that on May 24, 2013, the

CJC ·Public Defense . Subcommittee adopted Recommendations of the Public Defense
Subcommittee in a process summarized below:
In 2009, the Idaho Criminal Justice Commission ("the
Commission" or "ICJC") formed a Public Defense Subcommittee
("the Subcommittee") tasked with developing recommendations
for improvement of Idaho's public defense system. In January of
2010, the National Legal Aid & Defender Association ("NLADA")
released a report which suggested that Idaho is not adequately satisfying its Sixth Amendment obligations. For more than three
years, the Subcommittee committed itself to identifying improvements to be made, and its efforts yielded four pieces of proposed
legislation.

See http://icjc.idaho.gov/pubs/ICJC%20Recommendations%20of1>/o20the%20Public%20
Defense%20Subcommittee.pdf.
, REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 8: Defendant Sarah B. Thomas became Chair of the CJC on

or abo'ut May 30, 2013, and continues to serve in that capacity at present.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 8: Defendants admit this request.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 9:

In 2008, the CJC, along with the Idaho Juvenile Justice

Commission, authorized the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) to conduct
a comprehensive evaluation ofldaho's trial-level indigent defense services.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 9: Defendants admit that the CJC was aware that

the NLADA intended to evaluate Idaho's trial-level indigent defense services. Defendants admit
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that the CJC agreed to cooperate with the evaluation, but deny that the CJC authorized the
evaluation by funding or permitting it. The NLADA funded the evaluation through a grant and
did not need the CJC's permission to do it. Defendants deny that the NLADA evaluation was
"comprehensive" because the NLADA sent evaluators to only seven ofthe 44 counties.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 10: The CJC identified seven counties to serve as a repre-

sentative sample of indigent defense systems to be evaluated by the NLADA. These included
.
Ada, Blaine, Bonneville, Canyon, Kootenai, Nez Perce, and Power Counties.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 10: Defendants admit that a subcommittee of the

CJC identified seven counties to serve as a representative sample for the NLADA evaluation, but
deny that the full CJC selected or approved the sample counties.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 11: In January 2010, the NLADA released the results of its

evaluation of_trial-Ievel indigent defense systems in Idaho, entitled "The Guarantee of Counsel:
Advocacy & Due Process in Idaho's Trial Courts."
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 11: Defendants admit that in January 2010 the

NLADA released a document the cover of which was titled and subtitled "The Guarantee of
Counsel: Advocacy & Due Process in Idaho's Trial Courts" and "Evaluation of Trial-Level
Indig~nt Defense Systems in Idaho."
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 12:

In its January 2010 report, the NLADA determined that

none of the indigent defense systems in· the sample counties were constitutionally adequate.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION

12: Defendants admit that the 2010 NLADA

report stated: ''NLADA finds that none of the public defender systems in the sample counties are
constitutionally adequate." Page iii. Defendants deny the rest of this Request for Admission to
the extent it implies that the counties involved were a statistically valid random sample of coun-,
ties in Idaho or that the NLADA report is a "determination" that must be judicially accepted.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 13: The NLADA's January 2010 report was made available

to and reviewed by representatives of the executive and legislative branches of Idaho state government, including Governor Otter.
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ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 13:

Defendants admit that NLADA's January

2010 report was made available to members of the executive and legislative branches of Idaho
State Government, including the named Defendants, who had the opportunity to review it.
Defendants admit that the named defendants who are persons reviewed the report. Defendants
neither admit nor deny which Legislative or other Executive officers "reviewed" the 2010 report
because Defendants are not responsible for and do not monitor which other State officers did so.
· REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 14: There are currently no statewide caseload standards for

public defenders in Idaho.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 14: Defendants admit this Request for Admis-

sion.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 15: There are currently no statewide performance standards

for public defenders in Idaho.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 15: Defendants deny this Request. United States

Supreme Court decisions, Idaho Supreme Comt decisions, Idaho Court of Appeals decisions,
Idaho Supreme Comt rules and State Bar Rules contain some performance standards which apply
to all

public defenders in Idaho.

Defendants admit that there are no statewide statutory

,performance standards for public defenders in Idaho and no Idaho State Public Defense
Commission rules with statewide performance standards for public defenders in Idaho.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION

16: There are currently no specific statewide training require-

ments for public defenders in Idaho.

·

ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 16: Defendants admit this Request for Admission

except as qualified in this paragraph. Defendants note that Idaho State Bar Rules 400 through 408
require every attorney practicing in Idaho, including public defenders, to paiticipate in continuing
legal education (CLE), although that requirement does not require public defenders to take CLE
specific of criminal defense. Defendants further note that Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3 contains
Stand.ards for Qualification of Appointed Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.

Ill
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 17: There is currently no statewide oversight of trial-level
indigent defense services being provided to criminal defendants throughout the various counties.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 17: Defendants admit this Request for Admission
with ~he exception of Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3 's standards for Qualification of Appointed Couni

sel in Death Penalty Cases.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 18: There is currently no requirement that public defenders
report their individual caseloads to state officials or any court.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 18: Defendants admit this Request for Admission
with respect to repmting to State Executive or State Legislative Officers, but deny that there is no
requirement to report to other officials or courts. Idaho Code § 19-864 requires all defending
attorneys to "submit an annual report to the board of county commissioners and the appropriate
administrative district judge showing the number of persons represented under [the Idaho Public
Defense Act], the crimes involved and the expenditures . . . made in carrying out the
responsibilities imposed by [the act]." Defendants object to this Request for Admission as unduly
burdensome to the extent that it seeks information on whether any other Idaho judge has ever
required a public defender to report his or her individual case load to the judge because that would
require a survey of every one of the 45 current District Judges, all of the 88 Magistrate Judges,
and over 60 Senior Judges, any of whom could be designated to hear criminal cases. Little
purpose would be served by diverting these judicial officers from their normal duties to answer
such a survey to determine whether one or more of them has ever asked a public defender to
repo,t his or her case load to the Court.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 19: Aside from the trustee benefit payments allocated to the
Idaho Public Defense Commission (PDC) in 2014 to offer limited training for public defense
attorneys around the state, the State of Idaho currently provides no funding for trial-level
indigent defense services .
. ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 19: Defendants admit that the trustee benefit
payments allocated to the Idaho Public J?efense Commission (PDC) in 2014 to offer training for
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public defense attorneys around the state is :funding the State of Idaho currently provides for
trial-level indigent defense services.

Defendants deny that the funds are provided to offer

"limited" training. There are no limits imposed on the PDC regarding the training it can provide
with the funds. Defendants object to this Request for Admission as unduly burdensome to the
extent that it seeks information on whether any defending attorney has applied for and received
any State grant funding, which would be additional funding for trial-level indig~nt services.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 20: Pursuant to J.C. sec. 19-862, each board of county com-

missioners alone is responsible for appropriating enough money to deliver adequate public
defense services to indigent defendants being prosecuted in their jurisdiction.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 20: Defendants deny this Request for Admission.

Idaho Code § 19-862(2) explicitly allows counties that establish and maintain an office of public
defender to "accept private contributions for support of the office" of public defender in addition
to the appropriations for suppmt of the office for which they alone are responsible.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 21: County commissioners are not required to have any for-

mal or informal training in the law.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 21: Defendants admit Request for Admission 21.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 22: A survey conducted by the CJC in 2014 found that indi-

gent defendants are represented by counsel at their initial appearance in only 5 of the 44 counties.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION

22: Defendants deny this request because it

suggests that the CJC conducted a complete and accurate survey. Defendants believe the request
may be referring to an informal e-mail poll a member of a CJC subcommittee conducted. Not
every defending attorney was polled, and public defenders from only some counties responded,
making any results of the informal poll incomplete and unreliable. Defendants are aware of no
written report describing the informal poll and its results, which have not been presented to or
reviewed by the CJC.

II/
II/
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· REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 23: A significant number of public defenders in Idaho are not

receiving adequate training hours in areas directly relevant to the representation of their indigent
clients.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 23:

Defendants object to this request on the

ground that the tenn "adequate training" is ambiguous and Defendants do not know what the
Plaintiffs consider "adequate." Defendants admit that the PDC's initial assessment of the amount
and source of the mandatory continuing legal education (CLE) credit hours obtained by public
defenders in their current reporting period indicated that a significant number of public defenders
in Idaho were not receiving adequate CLE training hours in areas directly relevant to the
representation of their indigent clients. Defendants note that the PD C's initial assessment did not
include other training the public defenders may have received.

Since the PDC's initial

assessment, the PDC has helped increase available training by joining public defenders to the
National Association for Public Defense, which provides significant online resources. The PDC
also has used its trustee benefit payment allocation to host and sponsor indigent defense attorney
training conferences at little or no cost to the attending attorneys. Defendants believe the PDC's
effmts have improved and will continue to improve the training Idaho's public defenders are
receiving.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 24:

According to a recent report by the Idaho Legislative

Services Office regarding caseloads, public defenders in some counties are handling more than
twice the number of cases they should be.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 24: Defendants object to this Request for Admis-

sion because it is vague and does not identify the repmt In addition, the notion of the number of
cases a public defender "should be" handling is a subjective judgment not based on any adopted
caseload standards in Idaho. Defendants also deny this Request for Admission to the extent that it
may be referring to written materials presented to the 2014 Legislative Public Defense Reform
Interim Committee. The website for the that 2014 Interim Committee contains links to a number
of materials submitted to the Interim Committee and lists three Committee Staffers,
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http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2014/interim/defense.htm, but none of the Staff materials
that are linked to that website stated that public defenders in some counties are handling more
than twice the number of cases that the public defenders should. If Plaintiffs are referring to
materials other than those produced by the Legislative Services Office for the 2014 Legislative
Public Defense Reform Interim Committee or are themselves inferring such a conclusion, they
need to provide more information about what materials they are referring to in order to allow
Defendants to admit or deny this Request.
1

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 25: On any given day, there are hundreds, if not thousands, of

individuals being prosecuted by the State ofldaho, who qualify for indigent defense services.
·

ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 25: Defendants object to this Request for Admis-

sion because it is vague and because it would be unduly burdensome to answer. It is vague because the words "individuals being prosecuted" could refer to persons who are in court on "any
given day" or to persons who have prosecutions pending on "any given day." The numbers
would vary significantly depending upon which meaning these words have. It is further vague
because "hundreds" might refer to any number from 200 on up. There is no way to know what
the threshold for "hundreds" is. It is unduly burdensome because in order to answer this question
for "any given day" one would have to know the actual number of defendants who qualify for
indigent defendant services on every day of the year, presumably for several years, which would
require reviewing the Court dockets for every county in the State and further determining which
criminal defendants are eligible for indigent defendant services to determine whether there are
"hundreds" of them on each of those days.
· REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 26: The majority of individuals charged with either a misde-

meanor or felony in Idaho are alleged to have violated state law, rather than a county or municipal ordinance.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 26: Defendants admit this Request for Admission

.

for felonies because neither citi~s nor counties have authority to enact ordinances creating felonies. See Idaho Code § 31-2604 (noting that cities and counties may create misdemeanors by
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ordinance). Defendants object to the part of this Request for Admission that concerns misdemeanors as unduly burdensome because it would require Defendants to compile a Statewide list of all
misdemeanor prosecutions and separately determine which were brought under Idaho statute and
which were brought under city or county ordinance in order to determine where a majority lie .

.

-

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 26:

The State of Idaho does provide funding to county prose-

cutors' offices throughout the state.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 26:

Defendants deny this Request for Admission.

There is no direct legislative appropriation to County Prosecutors' Offices throughout th~ State
as such. However, some State revenues a1·e dlrectly distributed to counties, which in t11rn may use
those revenues for county offices, including the County Prosecutor's Office or the County Public
Defender's Office (if there is one). Se~, e.g., Idaho Code § 63-3636(8), -(lO)(b)-(c), -(11), & ~
( 13) (distribution of State sales tax to Couf!,ties).
DATED this 12th day of November, 2015.
STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

By

By

4-H-~

SCOITANZIO

-

Deputy Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants State ofldaho,
Hon. Molly Huskey, Darrel G. Bolz,
Kimber Ricks, Sen, Chuck Winder, and
Rep. Christy Perry

/k{)fr: ~ t,.er4---

CALLYYOUNG

e,,w.;I ~-.

Attorney for Govem01 Otte1·

CANTRILL SKINNER LEWIS CASEY &
SORENSEN;LLP

By

pJwfd;;r/

DAVID W. CANTRILL

Attorney for Defendants William H.
Wellman and Sara B. Thomas
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12th day of November, 2015, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy o~the foregoing by the following method to:
Richard Eppink
American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho
Foundation
P.O. Box 1897
Boise, ID 83701
. Jason D. Williamson
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
125 Broad Street
New ,York, NY 10004
Andrew C. Lillie
Hogan Lovells US LLP
One Tabor Center, Suite 1500
1200 Seventeenth Street
Denver, CO 80202

D U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Facsimile: 208-344-7201

!Z] Email: reppink@acluidaho.org
0U.S.Mail

D Hand Delivery
D Facsimile: 212-549-2654

!Z] Email: jwilliamson@aclu.org
0U.S.Mai·I

D Hand Delivery
D Facsimile: 303-899-7333
!Z] Email: andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com

Kathryn M. Ali
Hogan Lovells US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20004

0U.S.Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Facsimile: 202-637-5600
!Z] Email: kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com

Bret H. Ladine
Hogan Lovells US LLP
3 Embarcadero Center 1500
San Francisco, CA 94111

0U.S. Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Facsimile: 415-374-2499
!Z] Email: bret.ladine@hoganlovells.com

Jenny Q. Shen
Hogan Lovells US LLP
4085 Campbell Avenue, Suite 100
Menlo Park, CA 94025

0U.S.Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Facsimile:
!Z] Email: jenny.shen@hoganlovells.com
evelyn.perry@hoglanlovells.com

SCOTTZANZ

Deputy~ n : a : :
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MEETING MINUTES
STATE PUBLIC DEFENSE COMMISSION
Date I time 9/15/2015 1:00 PM I Location Len B. Jordan Building, Conference Room B-09,
650 W. State Street, Boise, ID 83702
Meeting September Commission Meeting

Commission members present
Molly Huskey, Chair, District Judge I Kimber Ricks, Madison Co. Comm. I Chuck Winder, Senator arrived at
1:25pm I William Wellman, Defense Attorney I Christy Perry, Representative
Nichole Devaney, Admin. Asst.

Commission members absent
Darrell Bolz, Vice Chair, Juvenile Justice Comm. I Sara Thomas, SAPD

Others present
Kathy Griesmyer, ACLU I Eric Fredericksen, SAPD
Item

Responsible

1.

Welcome and Call to Order: Judge Huskey ~alled the meeting to order at 1:00pm.

Huskey

2.

Approval of Prior Meeting Minutes (8/19/15): Approval of the minutes was
postpone.cl until the next meeting to allow those members who were present an
opportunity to review the minutes.

3.

Executive Session: Judge Huskey made a motion to move into an Executive Session Huskey
as authorized by subsection 74-206F for the purpose of discussing personnel matters
and an update on the pending litigation. The executive session would be attended by
the commissioners only, with the exception that the administrative assistant could
remain for the personnel discussion. A roll call vote was taken with all present
members (4) unanimously agreeing. The public session was adjourned at
approximately 1:05pm.

a. Personnel Matters-Review of Executive Director Applicants: Mr. Folgerson
application package would need removed from consideration as it was
incomplete at the time of submission. In Mr. W~lhnan's opinion the only
vi~ble applicants were Mr. James and Mr. Patterson. He is familiar with both
candidates and offered his opinion on both. Comm. Ricks asked the members
what they could learn from the previous director that would prevent similar
issues. Judge Huskey offered that she would like to ~valve Dan Chadwick in
the interview and selection process. The Commission will need someone who
works well with the counties and Mr. Chadwick would be the best person to
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Item

Responsible

provide that insight. Additionally she stated that the new director would need
to be able to take direction well initially. The commission members have many
years of experience with the legislature, the new director should be open to
direction in that regard. Mr. Wellman shared that this person would also need
the ability to delicately approach issues given the pending law suit and hurdles
that face the commission at this time. Judge Huskey shared that she would like
to see the commission reopen the position posting. Rep. Perry commented that
she felt the position requires a great deal of administration she was not sure
that an attorney after having practiced many years would be happy in an
administrative role such as this. Judge Huskey and Mr. Wellman explained
that some attorneys are more interested in the administrative side, these are the
individuals that are comfortable working on policy, research and the like .. The
commission would need to find an individual such as this. Judge Huskey
offered that in her opinion the current applicants have not shown interest in
this type of work therefore they may not be the best fit. At this point the
administrative assistant was excused and only the members remained for the
litigation update.
b. Update on Litigation from Judge Huskey:
The public session promptly reconvened at 1:30pm at which time Rep. Perry motioned
that the Executive Director position posting be reopened, Mr. Wellman seconded, and
the motion passed unanimously. Reposting should be effective immediately, closing
on October 5, 2015. The members would expect an update at the next meeting with
the understanding that the posting had just closed. Judge Husky requested that Ms.
Devaney contact the current applicants and make them aware that the position would
be reposted however they need not apply again. Their application packages would be
considered along with any new packages received through reposting.
4.

Discuss section VII.J.lb of the Suggested Contract Terms, finalize for submission to Thomas
IAC:
Ms. Thomas was not present therefore the discussion was postponed until the next
meeting. ·

5.

Discuss temporary rules for Public Defender Training and Scholarship
Qualification:

Thomas

The discussion was postponed until the next meeting due to Ms. Thomas absence.

6.

Joint IACDL Sun Valley Conference Update: Ms. Devaney summarized_ that IACDL Devaney
has agreed to partner with the Commission on the Sun Valley Conference to be held
March 4 and 5, 2016. The commission will be responsible for paying IACDL $15,525
regardless of the number of attendees up to 104. Any additional attendees over 104
will be at a cost of $150.00 per registrant. The PDC would cover the cost of registration
and two night's hotel for all attendees who register through the PDC. Participants
traveling a distance of 200 - 300 miles would also receive a travel allocation of $150.00
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those traveling a distance greater than 300 miles would receive $300. IACDL holds a
dinner on Friday evening, this is typically included in the price of registration
however, for PDC registrants it would be at an additional discounted cost. Rep. Perry
asked if the conference is in line with training topics the commission has previously
provided. Mr. Wellman assured her it was a very well done conference and would be
valuable to all PD' s.
7.

Addition to Agenda: Judge Huskey asked if the Commission could discuss the
Interim Committee Meeting scheduled for Friday, September 18th. She shared that she
had been ~sked to provide an update on the Commission that should include requests
for additional services/assistance the Committee could provide to help the
Commission to be successful in its charge. After much discussion the following topics
were suggested:

Statutory modification to address training funding and the ability of the
Commission to conduct training programs.
Provide the Commission enforcement capabilities - contract terms, standards
and qualification requirements will not be effective if counties are able to opt
out. The addition of enforcement to the Commission's charge will require
additional staff and resources.
Provide information on a state funding mechanisms. The following three
models would be suggested: a) state administered funding from one
location/agency, b) a regional funding program administered at the district
level or c) leaving funding at a county level subjecting it to a cap.
Sen. Winder moved that Judge Huskey present on the three points suggested, Mr.
Wellman seconded, the motion passed unanimously.
Judge Huskey voiced her concerns about the length of time it may take to find an
Executive Director. She felt the Committee will need to be aware of the constraints the
Commission maybe under due to the lack of staff as they relate to the Commissions
goals for the year.
8.

Set Future Meeting Schedule: The meeting schedule has been set through December.
Jan. 5, 2016 was the only additional date added to the schedule.

9.

Agenda I~ems for Next Meeting

a. Executive Session: Personnel Issues - Applicant update
b. High Quality Representation in Child Welfare Case (Debra Alsaker-Burke):
Judge Huskey requested that Ms. Devaney contact Debra Alsaker-Burke to
invite her to present at the 10/5 meeting.
10.

Devaney

Next Meeting Location: Nampa Public Library

The members then decided that the next meetings should be held as follows: The
November meeting in Boise at the LBJ Building & December's in Nampa at the Public
Library.
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11.

Item

Responsible

Adjournment: Mr. Wellman motioned to adjourn, Judge Huskey seconded the
motion passed unanimously. The meeting adjourned at 3:10pm.

Huskey

Attachments:
Suggested Contract Terms
Public Defender Training and Scholarship Qualification
Memo of Understanding with IACDL
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STATE PUBLIC DEFENSE COMMISSION
MEETING MINUTES
October 21, 2014
Location: State Appellate Public Defender, 3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100, Boise, ID 83703

Time: 10:00 am - 2:00 pm

Members Present:
Molly Huskey, Chair, District Court Judge
Darrell Bolz, Vice Chair, Juvenile Justice Commission
Jason Monks, Representative
Kimber Ricks, Madison Co. Cmmsr.
Sara Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender
William Wellman, Defense Attorney
Chuck Winder, Senator

Ian Thomson, Executive Director

ffl

><

Members Absent:
Huskey arrived at 11 :OOam
Winder arrived at 12:15am
Monks left at 11 :30am

:C Others Present:
-

Marilyn Paul, Twin Falls PD

mKathy Griesmyer, ACLU-Boise
Jason Williamson, ACLU-NYC
.... Tanya Greene, ACLU-NYC
~ Rep. Luker .
~

I.
2.

Welcome and call to order
Call for additional items
a NORC DOJ Survey

b

Meeting Minutes

Bolz
All members
Sara Thomas mentioned the letter she had received from NORC, addressing the Thomson
national survey they are conducting for DOJ. She suggests that we send out
a letter or email to the various counties (PDs or clerks) to encourage wide
participation. (Marilyn Paul noted that she has received the same materials).
Thomson will prepare and send the letter.
Vice-Chair Bolz mentioned that no meeting minutes had been aooroved (past Bolz
1
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Minutes

Meeting Outcomes/Decisions Reached

Who's
Responsible

Due Date

four meetings.) He suggested that all members review the minutes m
advance of the next meeting for the Commission's approval.
3.
a

b

c

Report on PDC developments
Lease,office,hiring

ED Meetings: IACDL, IAC,
ACLU, PDs in Bonner, Boundary,
Kootenai, Owyhee, Gem

Public Defense Roster: numbers
and geography

Thomson
ED Thomson has moved forward on a lease at the Garro Building (Bannock St.
downtown). The Dept. of Lands has delayed and prolonged the process
considerably with their own lease. A final lease and possession is hopefully
forthcoming. The problem of parking was mentioned. Thomson indicated
that parking would be included in the lease and that Capital Mall parking
was not available to PDC employees. Vice-Chair Bolz said he would look
into parking for members of the Commission in the new garage.
ED Thomson indicated that interview for the administrative assistant position are
scheduled for tomorrow. Interviews will be conducted with someone from
HR or Rachel Murray from the SAPD in attendance.
Thomson brought up the fact that he has met with board members of IACDL,
representative of IAC and ACLU, and several county public defender office
heads.
Ricks explained that 36 of the counties are headed by part-time commissioners,
and they are in need of considerable education. Step one is educating the
commissioners on the inherent conflict of relying on the prosecutors for
advice regarding PD contracts. There are a few counties that are hiring
outside counsel to advise on this issue. Ricks suggests a meeting with
commissioners and prosecutors (or the civil deputy). All commissions meet
at least once per month. Bolz suggests that the PDC consider getting on the
statewide Commissioner-meeting, which is in the I 51 . or 2nd week of
February. Ricks also suggests a regional tour. There are six commission
districts, and each has a quarterly meeting. (ED will check with IAC for a Thomson
schedule and consider attending those meetings.) Ricks indicated that they
are frequently looking for things to put on the agenda.
ED Thomson presented a summary of current public defender roster numbers.
(Summary document was distributed to members.) Thomas inquired whether
there rules that will require judges to follow certain standards .when making
appointments? If not, the Commission is likely to end up requiring certain
standards from institutional defenders and not requiring the same from the
contract attorneys in other counties.
Thomson passed around four geographical maps outlining the distances from
out-of-town contract public defenders. It was suggested by Rep. Bolz that
similar slides be prepared for the Interim Committee next week.
There was a discussion about how time should be considered and whether it
should be included in proposed contract terms. Wellman and Thomas

Nov. 4th
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Minutes

d

Travel: E.D. meetings with county
defenders and commissioners

4.

Commission related
mail/correspondence

5.

Commission Media Inquiries

lY,(e~ting Outcomes/Decisions Reach~d
suggested that contracts might include a "door-to-door" travel time
allowance.
Chair Huskey mentioned the Judge's need to consider the reimbursement for
attorneys' court time, and the impact it has on courthouse accommodation of
the calendars for privately retained counsel and the public defender. She
inquired whether public defenders get "high-centered" by spending so much
time waiting for private counsel and always being heard last?
Thomas proposed a quarterly report to the Commission on the expense budget.
Those in attendance were in general agreement. Thomson proposed
travelling as much as possible in November and December in order to meet
with county defenders and commissioners. Thomas suggested an
informational presentation: it needs to be emphasized that PD reporting is
necessary in order to advocate for additional resources. She advocated a
presentation that convinces the county_ commissions and public defenders
that the PDC is a resource. She reiterated that J. Burdick has already
admitted that the system is broken. Thomas also proposed that someone
from the PDC speak to the IACDL in Sun Valley. Wellman brought up the
IACDL listserve response to Jared Hoskins' survey, which indicated that the
response was very poor . He expressed a desire to receive information and
input directly from defending attorneys. ED Thomson agreed to get
Wellman a copy of the PD roster for contact information.
Monks brought up complaints and letters being sent directly to PDC members. It
was proposed that all correspondence with complaints be sent to the ED. ED
Thomson is to draft and create a form letter. It will be sent around to the
Commission for revisions.
Chair Huskey believes that a strategy with a cohesive message from the
commission needs to be composed in response to inquiries or pieces like the
Moscow-Pullman Daily News, and Idaho Public Television.
Huskey and Thomas indicated that Spitfire Communications, out of DC, has had
money in the past to help states develop media strategies regarding public
defense funding and inadequacy of representation. They are a media
relations firm familiar with the subject. Thomas also suggested talking to the
NAPD. Huskey expressed the need for help not only in crafting that
message, but in delivering it. They may help prepare a media kit. The PDC
should also consider using social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc). The ED
needs training on how to conduct an interview and help developing a
message. Thomas suggested that Jeff Ray or Wray (at DOC), may be a
resource, he was previously with Channel 2. Huskey believes that kind of
training is a high priority. Wellman expressed that the Mission and Vision

· Who.'s
Responsible

Thomson

Due Date

Endofweek

Monks, Winder,
other members
Thomson
Molly Huskey,
other members

Nov. 4th
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Minµtes

6.

Model Contracts

Meeting O_utcomes/Decisions Reached
Statement of the Commission gives significant guidance on the matter. Chair
Huskey recommended looking at Gallatin, locally, for guidance. A motion
was proposed that the PDC make an inquiry with Gallatin as to how much a
press kit would cost, the motion was seconded and passed unanimously.
Chair Huskey asks if commission members get a media inquiry, where should
they go and do they want to each individually respond? Thomas
recommended that all inquiries go through the ED. Ricks says that he would
like the option to respond to local media, if it is in his own community.
Wellman moved for a resolution that all media inquiries be forwarded to the ED,
with the Commissioners' discretion to make a statement if it concerns a local
political concern. The motion was seconded and passed unanimously.
Thomas made a motion for the ED to reach out to Spitfire and to obtain a bid
from Gallatin as to how much advice on a press kit would cost. The motion
was seconded and passed unanimously.
Chair Huskey called Dan Chadwick to inquire whether the counties wanted a
template contract, or whether they wanted options to pick and choose from?
Chadwick indicated that they would want various options. She suggested
that the Commission first identify what is mandatory and then decide what
the extra options (add-ons) would be
Thomas suggested that any model contract should include workload issues.
Other members believed that workload issues should be on the optional
menu.
Wellman suggested that the PDC require that commissioners not use their
county attorney to advise on workloads. In his opinion, the issue of inherent
conflict is a core concept. Wellman referred primarily to the Washington
contract, which addressed standards, not specific caseloads.
In the preliminary draft, caseload and workload issues should be a mandatory
element-regardless of whether this takes the form of hard caps or mere
standards.
Members of the commission asked to see a copy of the Blaine County contract.
Ricks suggested a training requirement for attorneys. Chair Huskey suggested
the NLADA standard for experience required to handle criminal cases. Chair
Huskey suggested that maybe the PDC should keep qualification standards
separate from contract requirements. Ricks responded that Commissioners
probably want guidance on that issue. If the Commission establishes
requirements, it will likely cost more money from the State (is this an
unfunded mandate?). Such a requirement is going to impact counties
fiscally.
Training requirements should also be kept separate and distinct from the

Who's
Responsible

Due ])ate

Thomson
Huskey, Wellman,
Ricks, Thomson

Nov.41h

Thomson

Nov. 4th
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Minutes

Defender Training

7.

8.

a

IACDL seminars

b

Determining eligibility for training
Content of Report for Interim
Committee on 10/28/14 (likely 45-

Meeting Outcomes/Decisions Reached

Who's
Responsible

Due ])ate

required level of experience of the attorneys.
Chair Huskey inquired as to whether worker's comp and malpractice would need
· · to be a core requirement of the contract. Worker's comp is already required.
Malpractice is handled differently by each attorney/county, but the insurance
is quite cheap.
Chair Huskey expressed that any contract should include in the definitional
section, the va_rious types of cases to be covered by the services of the
attorney. Thomas would like to see the model contract clearly define the
types of cases that local public defenders would handle.
Ricks asked what is specifically missing in the Madison County contract that he
sent around? He believes it works and knows that it is used as a model in
other surrounding counties. Wellman explained the process of attorney
selection in rural counties-that it is generally not an open bid contract.
Chair Huskey expressed a belief that any contract should place limits, or clearly
defme limits, on outside work, the expectations of the attorney, and
participating in the reporting requirements. (The PDC is ultimately
interested in workload information.)
Chair Huskey asked whether the model contract will be defining what the
attorneys will be doing. Those expectations are defined by the ABA
Guidelines for the criminal defense function.
Bolz inquired about a requirement for vertical representation and whether the
contract would weigh in on the type of representation required. Chair
Huskey explained her position that verticality is very difficult for some
larger courthouses.
Thomas sent around a document with several questions.
Thomas, Monks,
Thomson suggested that the PDC could spend some of its money in partnering Winder, Thomson
with the IACDL Sun Valley conference this year, which is emphasizing
criminal forensics. Winder expressed an interest in the PDC sponsoring its
own trainings. Members of the Commission generally agreed. Thomas raised
the question about whether there were any limitations in co-sponsoring
trainings with for-profit entities.
Thomas proposed a motion for the PDC to put on a training this year, which was
seconded and adopted unanimously.
Thomson

Chair Huskey suggested that the ED make the presentation to the Interim Huskey, Thomson
Committee next week. Sen. Winder indicated that it might be helpful for the
5

0000053
000380

Minutes
minutes)

9.

10.

Next meeting-Assignments and
Agenda (Final interim Committee
11/25/14)
Adjournment

Meeting Outcomes/D.ecisions Reached

Who's
Responsible

Chair to be available for questions, but thinks Ed should present the report.
Thomson
(Chair Huskey indicated she could make it, but not before 11 :30.)
Ed will present the Interim Cmte. with its numbers concerning the PD Roster
and the illustrations of geographic distance.
Ed to plan on 20-25 minute presentation, to be followed-up with their questions.
Ed to provide them with additional information: Model Contract will be
ready in January, and any IDAPA rules necessary by January.
Rep. Luker indicated that the Interim Cmte. would like a list of the legislative
fixes that they could make by the November date.
Thomas mentioned that Judges need power to appoint; Chair Huskey mentioned
that she would like to see the return of the four-year service term for public
defenders.
Next meeting scheduled for November 4 1", 2014, from l-5pm. The meeting will
be held at the Canyon County Courthouse. Chair Huskey to make Huskey, Thomson
arrangements and ED to notify members.
Any agenda items should go to the ED.
Thomas motioned to adjourn. Seconded, and adjourned.
Huskey

Due Date

Oct. 28th

Endofweek

6
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Idaho Criminal Justice Commission Three-Year Strategic Plan
Approved June 29, 2012; May 24, 2013, December 13, 2013

''Think Big, Start Small"
Governor's Executive Order "Idaho's current criminal justice efforts and initiatives require clear strategic planning and continued coordination."
The Idaho Criminal Justice Commission will continue to collaboratively develop a strategic plan to improve criminal justice policy, program and
operational decision making.
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Strategies

m

Persons Responsible

1) Report on causes of new parole violations
2) Prevention Action - Reinstate Educational Climate
Survey and collect gang involvement information in
the survey

Brent Reinke & Olivia Craven
Elisha Figueroa and Prevention
And Treatment Research
(PATR)

3) Continue work with Children of Incarcerated Parents
including video visitation program and pilot program
.
, for incarcerated pregnant women
4) Sex Offender Management including developing
statewide policy for juvenile and adult sex offender
assessment, treatment, supervision and recidivism
reduction, draft registration notification protocol

Ross Mason, Chair, Children of
Incarcerated Parents

5) Form a Reentry Council

Shane Evans, Chair, Sex
Offender Management Board

Brent Reinke & Sharon
Harrigfeld

Indicators of Success

Annual report
Report
Youth Prevention
Survey
Services to 7D"A, of the
children, ages 0-18, of
incarcerated parents
Adopt Administrative
Rules
Adoption of
registration notification
promulgation
Lower rates of
recidivism

Status

In process
Working with
prevention
coalitions
Reports of
progress
Legislation 2014
Legislation 2015

Completion Date

September 2014
June 2014
July 2014

July 1, 2017

July 2014
July 2015

Report to ICJC

December 2014
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IM.MJJii.liJ HJJ.ttM5f,if.rMJ,foiYii
" ... providing policy makers and criminal justice decision
makers with accurate information results in better
decisions, improves public safety and results in the
efficient use of public resources; ... "

l, ~~

Advance delivery of justice
through effective interventions
by proposing balanced
solutions, which are cost
effective and based on best
practices

..

·«·"

.•• Strategies

.

...... , ..... - ·-·. ~"'··

: 1) Provide input to interim legislative committee for
public defense reform

1

.
11 t'c¥ffiil\

.•"-J·

.

..

Persons Responsible_• ... } .. lndicatorsofSuccess ;:

· Da·n Chadwick, Chair, Public
Defense Subcommittee

..
!

1) Determine reasonable expectation of community needs
and services based on resources
2) Promote standards and equity throughout Idaho where
applicable
i) Indigent defense
ii) Effective policing practices
iii) Accreditation standards
iv) Adjudication
v) Prosecution
3) Reduce criminogenic risk factors in both adult and juvenile
populations through the expanded use of effective
evidenced-based risk assessments, policies and
programming to inform decision making
4) Ongoing assessment of problem solving courts and other
community-based sentencing alternatives
5) Examine emerging issues

.t Passage of legislation

'

2) Report on usage and provide education of best
practices in photo line-up to decrease likelihood of
false identification

: 3) Evaluate the pros· and cons of privatization
throughout criminal justice system

Dan Hall

1•

ICJC

ICJC presentation on
·' usage
Incorporation of
training at POST
Council
Presentations of
privatization

... _Status_ ..•. ;; __ CompletlonDat_!!J

', Under
· July 2015
consideration by
interim
committee
May2014

, May 2015

February 2015

effe_ctjve!les_s . ··--
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1Governor's'Executive'Order)2011!11-" ... it is in the best interest of the citizens of the
State of Idaho that government promotes
efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice
system and, where possible, encourage dialogue
among respective branches of government to
achieve this effectiveness and efficiency; ... "

t ~ _:
1 1)

. ' :...~. :..

Strategies·:_~--~--·-----~--~--::·~ .. ~-Persons Responsible~Identify small number of longer-term ·
, ·: Sara Thomas, Chair, ICJC
focus/depth areas
·; Gary Raney, Vice-Chair, ICJC
i) Juvenile justice continuum
Sheriffs Association
ii) Adult justice continuum

,

1) Identify strategies to promote efficiencies and
effectiveness in the criminal justice system in conjunction
with the Grant Review Council
Award funds appropriated through federal grant
programs within the purview of Planning, Grants and
Research of the Idaho State Police
2) Continue presentations and training on trends, best
practices & priority issues in adult & juvenile corrections
3) Create and implement data sharing mechanisms and
agreements among stakeholder agencies for the purposes
of cross systems analysis and reporting
4) Maintain awareness of substance abuse trends and
priority issues

Promote well-informed
policy decisions

.,.JL Indicators of Success~::;~....._., Status ' Theme meeting days
· toward focus areas or
·. information groups
1
'. held semiannually

,

Continue to promote the efforts of the "Results Sharon Harrigfeld
First" Project
'•
·; Gary Raney and Grant Review
Develop funding strategies consistent with
statewide strategic planning efforts of the
·, Council
Commission including the following priorities:
' Commission hold the Council
i) Collaborative
responsible
ii) Evidence-based or best practice where
possible enhances measurable outcomes:
a) The solution of crimes
b) Assistance to victims
c)
Direct services to the community
iii) Sustainable
• iy)__Exit_ strategi~s , --- ...

ICJC report of results
actionable in Idaho
1) Grants awarded
that address the
priorities of ICJC
Strategic Plan

~- .:reo~pletion D~t~j
: Provide
' Ongoing
opportunity for
evaluation
, following
·. presentations to
determine next
, step_s
· May2014

October 2014
. 1) Grants
awarded
based on ICJC ,
strategies

Semiannual or
yearly Grant
Review Council
updates to ICJC

",,#

I

.........

2)

Report of
awarded
grants

Semiannual

1 . . . . , •• ,,

(continued on next page)
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Strategies
4) Develop strategies among agencies and
branches of government to share data

Persons Responsible
· Sharon Harrigfeld, lead, and
, ICIC

Indicators of Success
· 1)

Completion of
business process
map

Develop ongoing access to behavioral health"

,' IDOC, IDJC, IDHW, Courts

treatment from criminal justice clients.

'

.
· 6) Identify criminal justice system budget needs
.. and_priorities .•
.. .• . _ .

I

ICJC

2) Presentation of
models for crisis
centers &
determine ICJC
written support
Submit list of priorities

• ,

.

.,

t ColTlpletlon Date_ .
· June 2014

2)

i 5)

Using the Global
Reference Architecture & the
National Information Exchange
Model, two or
more agencies will
collaborate on &
implement an
interface providing for the sharing
of information
: 1) Report on
substance use
disorder services
funding, ongoing
access to
behavioral health
treatment and
trends, including
Medicaid and
Affordable Health
Care Act

•r

September 2014

1

Report every
. other month

Jan. 24, 2014

,I

·, July-Sept. 2014
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STATE PUBLIC DEFENSE
COMMISSION
Presentation to Joint Finance-Appropriations
Committee for FY 2016
Ian H. Thomson, Executive Director

m
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Self-governing agency of the Executive

Ian Thomson
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The Problem

-

• 44 different public defender systems in Idaho
• No uniformity, no training or qualification standards
• General consensus that'current system is inadequate

The Approach
• Set reporting requirements, gather information
• Ensure public defenders have access to relevant training
• Report to legislature and make recommendations for public
defense reform
}

.

~._: I

.

' ~
/ '•

,

, '

,

.
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PURPOSE OF P.D.C.
• PROMULGATE RLILES for public defender training and data collection
regarding indigent defense services
• Maintain standards to ensure that defending attorneys have adequate
TRAINING AND RESOLIRCES to fulfill their Sixth Amendment obligations
• Serve as a CLEAR.INGHOllSE
stakeholders

OF INFOR.MATION for relevant

• INFORM THE LEGISLATLIRE of Sixth Amendment issues and make
legislative recommendations.

0001175
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START-UP COSTS
• No Capital Outlay Budget in FY 2015
• Estimated Total One-Time Outlays:
$9,300
• One-Time Expense Savings
- Acquired some furniture at no cost to state
- Significantly reduced IT and communications through
C.1.0 by leasing space in the same building as other state
tenants
(Endowment Fund Investment Board and State
Independent Living Council)

D001176
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Because the Public Defense Commission
is only Four Months into its First Year of
Operations, anticipated program expenses
are still uncertain.
In FY 2015 & FY 2016 Commission Will
(1) Seek Other Revenues, ie. Grants
(2) Identify Additiqnal Program Expenses

0001177
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- - - - - - - - - ~ _ } FY 2015 Approp.

JI

FY 2015 Expected :;

·. $119,800

Personnel
Exec Dir. (<9 mos)

$76,300

$37,500

$67,000

$30,700

$9,300 · ·

. · Admin. Asst. (<8 mos)

FY 2015 Remainder

.

. $6,800

Expected Personnel Reversion: $43,500*
'

~---------

Operating Expense·s
· (<9 mos.)

I

lf

i: FY 2015 Approp.

FY 2015 Expected

· $70,200

$40,800

[L

FY 2015 Remainder
·. $29,400

Possible Operating Budget reversion
in first year due to "partial" year.
*Full-year personnel expenses are $6,000 less than amount appropriated.
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FY 2015 Appropriation $110,000
-

-

-

-

T

-

~

-

--

l'

i:

Program

- --

- -

Spent

lf

.

-~-

~

~--

Planned

-r --

-

-

--

- -,r - ---

-

: Beneficiaries :. % of 262 PDs

~--------~----~

1

~----

· $1,000

186

·71%

$67,500

154

59%

. Capital Defender Training

$19,700

25

9%

Juvenile Defender Training

$9,600

21

8%

Online Training & Resources

$3,680

2-Day Defender Conference

Total

$3,680

$97,800

..'

Total Allocated Expenses for FY 2015:

$101,480

D001179
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No Change from FY 2015 other than 3% CEC

-

-

-

Operating Budget Category

•-

:•

-

FY 2015 Appropriation

1r

-

FY 2016 Reque~

Personnel Costs

$119,800

Operating Expenditures

$70,200

Trustee/Benefit

$110,000

$110~000

Total

$300,000

$304,300

Full-Time Positions {FTP)

1.5 .

$124,100*
$70,200 ·

1.5

See FY 2016 Legislative Budget Book 5-107

*represents 3% CEC and increased cost of benefits
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The Office of the Governor
Executive Department
State ofIdaho

EXECU11VE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF IDAHO
BOISE

State Capitol
Boise

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2015-04
ADOPTING IDAHO'S SAGE-GROUSE MANAGEMENT PLAN
WHEREAS, in December 2011, the U.S. Department of the Interior invited the eleven (11) western
states impacted by a potential Endangered Species Act (ESA) listing of the greater sage-grouse to develop statespecific conservation plans that would conserve the species and its habitat while maintaining predictable levels
of land use; and
WHEREAS, Governor Otter accepted the federal government's invitation, and by and through Executive
Order 20I 2-02 established the Governor's Sage-grouse Task Force (Task Force) to collaboratively develop
science-based recommendations for inclusion in Idaho's sage-grouse conservation plans; and
WHEREAS, in September 20I 2, and based on recommendations from the Task Force, I submitted the
Federal Alternative of Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter for Greater Sage-grouse Management in Idaho
(Governor's Alternative) as an alternative for inclusion in the National Greater Sage-grouse Land Use
Planning Strategy. This national planning strategy amends some 68 U.S. Bureau ofLand Management (ELM)
planning units and 20 U.S. Forest Service (USFS) National Forest Plans by including objectives, habitat
conditions and management actions for sage-grouse; and
WHEREAS, in Febntary 2013, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) published the Greater SageGrouse Conservation Objectives Team Final Report (COT Report). The purpose ofthe COT Report, which was
developed in conjunction with state wildlife agencies, was to establish the ESA goals by identifying Primary
Areas of Conservation (PAC) and the threats to the species throughout its range, as well as to develop
conservation measures, based on the best available science, to address those threats. The COT Report provides
the flexibility to create solutions that meet the needs ofgreater sage-grouse and the local ecological and
socioeconomic conditions; and
WHEREAS, Governor Otter requested the FWS to evaluate the Governor's Alternative for consistency
under the COT Report, and in April 2013, the FWS concluded that the foundational elements, and some
individual components, within the Governor's Alternative were consistent with the COT Report. (App. 2); and
WHEREAS, based on the strength ofFWS's recommendation, the BLM and USFS selected the
Governor's Alternative as a co-preferred alternative within Idaho's portion of the national planning strategy
(see Alternative E in the Idaho and Southwestern Montana Greater Sage-Grouse Draft Land Use Plan
Amendments and Draft Environmental Impact Statement, 78 Fed. Reg. 65,703 (Nov. 1, 2013)); and
WHEREAS, the State has continued refining individual components ofthe Governor's Alternative,
including but not limited to: (1) Idaho Code§ 38-104B developing rangelandfire protection associations; (2)
the State Board ofLand Commissioners on April 21, 2015, adopting the Land Board's Greater Sage-grouse
Conservation Plan (Land Board Plan) for State endowment lands complementary to the Governor's Alternative
(App. 3); (3) the State Oil and Gas Conservation Commission on April 23, 2015, adopting portions ofthe Land
Board Plan applicable to oil and gas programs (App. 3, p. 38); (4) working collaboratively with the local
federal agencies' representatives and Task Force members to better clarify the Governor's Alternative; and (5)
increasing statefimdingfor enhanced lek monitoring, habitat restoration projects, and wildfire suppression;
and,
WHEREAS, it is vital to the interests of the State to continue these efforts as the listing ofthe species
and/or overly restrictive federal land-use plan amendments would adversely impact Idaho's sovereign interest
in managing its wildlife pursuant to Idaho Code§ 36-103 and§ 67-818, its customs, culture and way of life,
and the State's ability to generate revenues from private property and endowment lands;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, Governor ofthe State ofIdaho, by the authority vested
in me under the Constitution and laws ofthe State ofIdaho do hereby order the following:
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EXHIBIT 1,

That all executive agencies, to the extent consistent with existing state law.for relevant permits and
policies, adopt the Governor's Alternative and all supporting documentation, incorporated in its entirety into
this Executive Order by this reference, hereinafter known as "Idaho's Sage-grouse Management Plan, " which
includes:
L
Application of thefmmdational elements of Idaho's Sage-grouse Management Plan (Idaho's
Plan) to a/l landownerships. These foundational elements are consistent with the COT Report and apply across

all land ownerships.
a.
Habitat Zones - Idaho's Plan includes three distinct management zones: Core Habitat
Zone (CHZ), Important Habitat Zone (!HZ), and General Habitat Zone (GHZ). The COT
Report identified the most important habitat areas for maintaining sage-grouse
representation, redundancy, and resiliency across the landscape. These are'!s (or PA Cs)
closely align with CHZ and !HZ. The three management zones within the Sage-grouse
Management Area (SGMA) represent a management continuum that includes, at one end,
a relatively restrictive approach aimed at providing a high level ofprotection to the
species within the CHZ, and on the other end, a relatively flexible approach for the GHZ
allowing/or more multiple-use activities. The zones are reflected in the attached map.
(App. 1, p. 24).
i.
Core Habitat Zone (CHZ) - The CHZ includes approximately sixty-five percent
(65%) of the known active leks and is occupied by approximately seventy-three
percent (73%) ofsage-grouse males. CHZ supports the highest breeding densities
ofsage-grouse in Idaho, and maintenance ofthese populations ensures that Idaho
has a viable and robust population ofsage-grouse. Management in CHZ is the
most restrictive to protect what local data shows as the "best ofthe best" habitat.
ii.
Important Habitat Zone (!HZ) - The !HZ includes approximately twenty-five
percent (25%) ofthe known active leks and is occupied by approximately twentytwo percent (22%) ofsage-grouse males.
iii.
General Habitat Zone (GHZ) -This management zone includes five percent (5%)
ofsage-grouse males, and generally includes few active leks andfragmented or
marginal habitat.
b.
Population Objectives - In conjunction with the habitat zones, these population goals:
(1) measure the efficacy ofthe State plan; and (2) ensure that there is an appropriately
tailored response to significant fluctuations in habitat and populations.
i.
Objective 1 - Implement regulatory mechanisms that maintain and enhance sagegrouse habitats, populations, and connectivity within CHZ. Recognizing the
impact of wildfire, the !HZ provides important management flexibility and a
strategic conservation buffer.
ii.
Objective 2 - Stabilize sage-grouse habitats and populations by monitoring the
effectiveness of the regulatory measures over time. A primary objective is to
minimize habitat lost within CHZ, and to a lesser extent, !HZ.
c.
Conservation Areas - Idaho's Plan divided the SGMA into four Conservation Areas
(CA) across the state: the Mountain Valleys, Desert, West Owyhee, and Southern. Each
CA is divided into Core, Important, and General management zones. (App. 1, p. 8).
d
Adaptive Regulatory Triggers - Given the unpredictability ofwildfire, these triggers
provide a regulatory backstop to manage loss within a CA. An adaptive trigger is
employed when dramatic shifts in the population or habitat occurs based on an average
over a three year period compared to the 2011 baseline.
i.
The adaptive triggers are based on the severity ofhabitat or population loss (i.e.
a "soft trigger" or a "hard trigger''). (App. 1, pp. 11, 69-71).
ii.
When monitoring information indicates that a soft trigger may be tripped, the
Implementation Commission 1 -aided by technical expertise from Idaho
Department ofFish and Game and other relevant State agencies -will assess the
1 Should the BLM and USFS adopt the Governor's Alternative, or an alternative consistent with the Governor's Alternative, for
Incorporation Into relevant Land and Resource Management Plans, the Governor shall execute a companion Executive Order
establish Ing an Implementation Task Force as outlined In Appendix 1, pages 21, 67-71.
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factor(s) leading to the decline and recommend potential management actions.
(App. 1, p. 69).
iii.
If the hard trigger becomes operative, management changes no longer are
discretionary and will be implemented by the Implementation Task Force.
e.
Rangeland Fire Protection Associations (RFPA) - RFPAs act as a regulatory
mechanism across all landownerships ensuring quicker initial attack on wildfires in the
CHZ and !HZ through the deployment ofadditional trained firefighters and resources
located in ntral parts of the SGMA.
i.
Idaho Code§ 38-104B provides for the creation andfimding ofRFPAs in Idaho.
ii.
RFPA members work collaboratively with federal land management agencies and
Idaho Department ofLands (IDL) to protect more than 2.9 million acres of
federal and state rangeland and 675,000 acres ofprivate land. These numbers are
expected to grow as additional RFPAs become operational in the near fi1ture.
iii.
The success and effectiveness ofRFPAs in Idaho is considered a model by other
western states.
IL
Applicability of Idaho's Plan to Lands Managed by the Federal Govemment (as more fully
described in Alternative E ofthe Draft Environmental Impact Statement/
a.

Fire -Idaho's Plan for wildfire on federal lands focuses efforts on prevention,
suppression, and resto~ation. The objective within Idaho's Plan is to implement actions
necessary to manage fire within the normal range offire activity and maintain and
restore healthy, native sage-steppe plant communities within CHZ and !HZ.
Invasive species - In addition to the wildfire restoration efforts, Idaho's Plan calls for
the aggressive management ofexotic undesirable plant species within the CHZ and !HZ.
I11Jrastructure - Jnfrastn,cture means discrete, large-scale anthropogenic features,
including but not limited to, highways, high voltage transmission lines, commercial wind
projects, energy development (e.g. oil and gas development, geothermal wells), airports,
mines, cell phone towers, landfills, residential and commercial subdivisions. (App. 1, p.

b.
c.

32).
i.

1.

2.

ii.

1.

2.

3.

Permitted activities in specific habitat designations
Jnfrastmcture in CHZ - Jnfrastntcture development in areas designated as CHZ
is prohibited, except if conducted pursuant to a valid existing right, incremental
upgrade and/or capacity increase ofexisting development, or if a project-level
exemption is obtainable by meeting the criteria outlined in Appendix 1, including
compensatory mitigation. (App. 1, pp. 35-36).
Jnfrastmcture in !HZ - Jnfrastnicture development in areas designated as !HZ is
permissible subject to meeting the criteria specified within Idaho's Plan and
approved by the ELM State Director. (App. 1, p. 42)
Best Management Practices (BMPs) for proposed infrastnicture development
within CHZ and !HZ.
Jnfrastnicture development should reflect unique localized conditions including
soils, vegetation, development type, predation, climate, and other local realities
and should utilize best management practices as described in Idaho's Plan. (App.
], pp. 43-45).
A lek buffer of 1 km (0.6 miles) from occupied leks will be applied to essential
public services, including but not limited to distribution lines, domestic water
lines, and gas lines. This will enable development in a manner that maintains
populations, habitats, and essential migration routes where possible. (App. 1, pp.
43-45).
No Surface Occupancy (NSO) within 1 km ofan occupied lek will be applied to
oil and gas development. (App. l, pp. 46-47)

2

Governor Otter encourages the adoption of Alternative E in the final EIS as it is consistent with the laws, programs, and policies of
the State of Idaho. However, the Governor recognizes that the BLM and USFS may adopt a different alternative (or revised
alternative) in the record of decision (ROD) and such action may necessitate a revision to this Executive Order.
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iii.

d

IIL

Nothing in Idaho's Plan shall revoke, suspend, or modify any project or activity
decision made prior to the effective date ofthe ROD.
Improper livestock grazing (secondary threat) -This section ofIdaho's Plan requires
that the Idaho Rangeland Health Standards (IRHS) be met and is consistent with the COT
report. While no studies exist directly relating livestock grazing systems or stocking rates
to sage-grouse abundance or productivity, Idaho's Plan addresses improper livestock
grazing within CHZ and !HZ through adaptive management according to the following
process:
i.
Sage-grouse habitat characteristics will be incorporated into relevant Resource
Management Plans as desired conditions, recognizing that these desired
conditions may not be achievable due to the existing ecological condition of an
allotment, the ecological potential of the area, or causal events unrelated to
livestock grazing. (App. 1, pp. 14-20).
ii.
Based on these habitat characteristics, habitat assessments will be conducted to
help inform grazing management in conjunction with scheduled term grazing
permit renewals or if an adaptive regulatory trigger has been tripped (App. 1, p.
73-75).
iii.
In conju~ction with scheduled term grazing permit renewals, livestock grazing
will be assessed through the IRHS (primarily Standards 2, 4, and 8), as informed
by the COT Report with respect to sage-grouse. (see Idaho Standards for
Rangeland Health and Guidelines for Livestock Grazing Management (1997)).
1.
Assuming no adaptive regulatory trigger has been tripped, there is a rebuttable
presumption that current grazing systems within a particular CA are adequate to
maintain viable sage-grouse populations.
2.
This does not preclude adaptive changes to grazing permits based on the other
standards contained in the IRHS.
iv.
If an adaptive regulatory trigger has been tripped within a CA, and after a more
thorough analysis ofthose allotments within a relevant CA determines that
improper livestock grazing is a potential limiting factor, modifications to permits
will be determined based on ecological site potential and will be selected from the
suite of management options outlined in Idaho's Plan. (App. 1, pp. 48-50).

Applicability ofIdaho's Plan on State and private lands
a.

b.

c.

In April 2015, the Staie Board ofLand Commissioners and the Idaho Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission contingently approved the Land Board Plan. (App. 3). The
Land Board Plan,' consistent with the constitutional mandate (IDAHO CONST. ART. IX,§ 8),
includes enforceable regulatory stipulations for inclusion into certain leases, permits,
and easements on State endowment lands. Adoption and implementation ofthe Land
Board Plan is contingent upon the incorporation ofIdaho's Plan into the federal landuse plan amendments for sage-grouse.
Certain permit holders on private lands can voluntarily agree to add BMPs into their
permit, which would then become binding. However, private land comprises less than
twenty percent (20%) of sage-grouse habitat in Idaho (and less than 6% ofthe CHZ).
Existing land uses and landowner activities are vital to the State ofIdaho. Idaho's Plan
recognizes changes in sage-grouse populations and habitats on private lands could
influence land management on public lands as adaptive triggers can become operative
within a CA regardless oflandownership. To offset any impacts, SGMAs have been
designed to provide flexibility in order to allow for the continuation ofland uses and
valid existing rights. In addition, Idaho continues to encourage voluntary conservation
efforts on private land for the conservation ofsage-grouse.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused
to be affixed the Great Seal of the State of Idaho at the Capitol in
Boise on this 2l1h day of May, in the year ofour Lord two thousand
and fifteen, and of the independence of the United States of
America the two hundred thirty-ninth and of the Statehood of
Idaho the one hundred twenty-fifth.

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
GOVERNOR
LAWERENCE DENNEY
SECRETARY OF STATE
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The Office ofthe Governor
Executive Department
Stale ofIdaho

State Capitol
Boise

EXECU17VE DEPARTMENT
STATEOFIDAHO
BOISE

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2015-03
AUTHORIZING THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE TO IMPLEMENT A FDAAPPROVED EXPANDED ACCESS PROGRAM FOR TREATMENT-RESISTANT EPILEPSY IN
. CHILDREN

WHEREAS, Idaho's citizens with severe or life-threatening diseases or conditions may not be able to
access critical medications that are still in clinical trials; and
WHEREAS, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has established Expanded Access Programs to
allow limited, supervised access to such medications; and
·
WHEREAS, the FDA has approved an Expanded Access Program for Epidiolex®, a dn1g being evaluated
for treatment-resistant epilepsy; and
WHEREAS, it is estimated that eight people per 1,000 have active epilepsy; and
WHEREAS, there are children in Idaho with treatment-resistant epilepsy who may benefit from
Epidiolex®; and
WHEREAS, the Department ofHealth and Welfare operates to improve the health status ofIdahoans,
increase the safety and self-szifficiency of individuals andfamilies, and enhance the delivery of health and
human services;
NOW. THEREFORE, I, C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, Governor ofthe State ofIdaho, by virtue of the authority
vested in me by the Constitution and laws ofthe State ofIdaho, do hereby order as follows:
1. The Department ofHealth and Welfare shall investigate the needfor, and implement if appropriate, as
determined by the Department, a FDA-approved Expanded Access Program for Epidiolex®;
2. Further, as part of the investigation, the Department shall estimate the scope of the need in Idaho for
this program, and shall determine whether appropriate medical supervision is available that allows safe
and effective implementation ofsuch a program;
3. If implemented, the Department shall investigate and monitor long-term solutions, such as licensure of
the medication, that may reduce or eliminate the need/or the program in the future; and
4. The Department shall trackfimding utilizedfor the program and may accept private contributions,
federal funds.funds from other public agencies or any other source for the purpose of implementing this
study.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused
to be aff1Xed the Great Seal of the State of Idaho at the Capitol in
Boise on this J 61h day of April, in the year of our Lord two
thousand and fifteen, and of the independence of the United States
of America the two hundred thirty-ninth and of the Statehood of
Idaho the one hundred twenty-fifth.

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
GOVERNOR
LAWERENCE DENNEY
SECRETARY OF STATE

EXHIBIT 15000401

C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
GOVERNOR
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF IDAHO
BOISE

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2010-11
REVIEWING THE PREPARATION
AND ADMINISTRATION OF IDAHO'S PLAN UNDER THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT

WHEREAS, the State ofIdaho, in accordance with the provisions ofthe Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act o/2002, 42 U.S.C. § 5601 ("JJDPA';, is required to designate a
state agency to supervise and administer Idaho's plan under the JJDPA and to establish a state
juvenile justice advisory group; and
WHEREAS, the first regular session ofthe 53rd Idaho Legislature established the Idaho
Department ofJuvenile Corrections ("Department'; and amended existing law to create a
juvenile corrections system based on principles of accountability, community protection, and
competency development; and
WHEREAS, the pwposes and intent ofIdaho's Juvenile Corrections Act of 1995 and the
JJDPA was heller served by transferring the Idaho Juvenile Justice Commission ("Commission';
to the Department; and
WHEREAS, the Department was designated as the sole agency for supervising the
preparation and administration ofIdaho's plan under the JJDPA, and the Office for Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention was abolished effective July 1, 1995; and
WHEREAS, the Commission was transferredfrom the Office ofthe Governor to the
Department effective July 1, 1995, and has functioned as the advisory group referenced in Title
42, Section 5633(a)(3), United States Code; and
NOW. THEREFORE, I, C.L. "Butch" Oller, Governor ofthe State ofIdaho, by the
authority vested in me by Article If~ Section 5, ofthe Idaho Constitution, and Section 67-802,
Idaho Code, do hereby order that:
1. The composition ofmembership ofthe Commission shall be in conformity with the
JJDPA. The chairman, vice-chairman, and members ofthe Commission shall be
appointed by, and serve at the pleasure ofthe Governor. Members shall serve a term of
three years, except for the youth members who shall serve a term of one year. The
chairman and vice-chairman shall serve in such capacities for three years.
2. The Commission shall perform the following functions:
issues;

a.

Advise the Department onjuvenilejustice and delinquency prevention

b.

Participate in the development and review ofIdaho's plan under the JJDPA;

c.

Be afforded an opportunity to review and comment on all grant applications under
the JJDPA submitted by the Department;

d

Ensure compliance with the core protections ofthe JJDPA by jurisdictions with
public authority in Idaho through education, technical assistance, monitoring and
remedial actions for violations;

e.

Perform such other duties that the JJDPA requires to be performed by the advis01J 1
group referenced in Title 42, Section 5633(a)(3), United States Code;

f

Pe,form such other duties that the JJDPA requires to be pe,jormed by the
supervisory board referenced in Title 42, Section 5671 (c)(/), United States Code,
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EXHIBIT 16

and Title 28, Section 31.102(b), Code ofFederal Regulations, until such time as the
director of the Department may establish a11other committee, commission, or board
within the Department to perform those duties; and

g.

Perform such other duties as requested by the director ofthe Department, which
may include submitting reports to the director ofthe Department and making
decisions on grant applications under the JJDPA submitted to the Department.

This Executive Order shall cease to be effective four years after its e11hy i11to force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused to be affixed the Great Seal ofthe State ofIdaho at th e
Capitol in Boise on this 4th day of October in the year ofou r
Lord two th ousand and ten and of the Indepe ndence oft he
United States ofAmerica the two hundred thirty-fifth and ofthe
Statehood ofIdaho the one hundred twenty-first.

~~pr~~
C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
GOVERNOR

BEN'SlJRSA
SECRETARY OF STATE
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By AUSTIN LOWE

Jason D. Williamson
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION
jwilliamson@aclu.org
125 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004
(212) 284-7340
(212) 549-2654 (fax)

Andrew C. Lillie
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com
One Tabor Center, Suite 1500
1200 Seventeenth Street
Denver, CO 80202
(303) 899-7300
(303) 899-7333 (fax)

Admitted pro hac vice

Admitted pro hac vice

Richard Eppink
AMERICAN CML LIBERTIES UNION
OF IDAHO FOUNDATION
reppink@acluidaho.org
P.O. Box 1897
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 344-9750, ext. 1202
(208) 344-7201 (fax)
Idaho State Bar no. 7503

Kathryn M. Ali, kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com
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Admitted pro hac vice

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Case No. CV OC 1510240
TRACY TUCKER, et al.,
Plaintiffs, ,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO, et al.,

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO
.
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
FILED JULY 8, 2015
(CORRECTED)

Defendants.

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - I
000404

.
This lawsuit is not, as Defendants suggest, about miscreant counties refusing to obey
Idaho's public defense statutes. Rather, Plaintiffs complain that public defense services across
the state have failed under the weight of contemporary caseloads, an absence of coherent practice
standards, and a far-reaching, longstanding lack of resources. The Chief Justice of Idaho's
Supreme Court has already stated that the statewide system is "broken." 2d Aff. Eppink ex. 1.
Defendant Governor Otter, too, has declared that the system "does not pass constitutional
muster." Id. ex. 2 at 8. Plaintiffs, and poor Idahoans accused of crimes across the state, call
upon this Court, in fulfillment of its fundamental role to interpret and vindicate core
constitutional rights, to render judgment on the statewide system.
In considering this motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b), the Court must draw all

inferences from the record and pleadings in the Plaintiffs' favor. ISEEO v. Evans, 123 Idaho
573, 57,8 (1993). The Court must liberally construe the complaint and presume that all facts
alleged there are true. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. White, 86 Idaho 374, 376 (1963).

I.

The Defendants Bear Ultimate Responsibility For Ensuring That Constitutional
Rights of Idahoans Are Protected.

In support of the motion to dismiss, Defendants suggest that Plaintiffs have not only sued
the wrong parties, but that, under Idaho law, it is Idaho's 44 separate counties-not state
officials-that collectively bear responsibility for a deficient statewide system. These arguments
fail for three reasons. 1 First, decades of U.S. Supreme Court case law make it clear that states
have the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that adequate indigent defense services are
available. Second, although Defendants may delegate some of their constitutional duties to

1

Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs prayed for relief only from the State of Idaho itself.
But, in paragraph 3 of the Complaint, Plaintiffs defined "State" to refer to all of Defendants
throughout the Complaint. (Similarly, this Response uses "the State" to refer to Defendants.)
Accordingly, the prayer seeks relief from all Defendants.
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS -2
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.
counties, they cannot simply wash their hands of the state's duties and avoid responsibility if
those duties go unfulfilled. This is especially true where, as in this case, the majority of the
counties are unable to fulfill their duties because they do not have the resources, training, or
supervision to do so. See Compl.

,r,r 9-20, 36.

Third, unlike some rights protected by the state

and federal constitutions, the right to counsel for indigent defendants places on the State an
affirmative duty to guarantee that this right is respected.2
A. The U.S. Supreme Court Has Indicated Repeatedly That Indigent Defense Is the
State's Responsibility.

The U.S. Supreme Court determined long ago that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates most sections of the Bill of Rights (including the Sixth
Amendment), thereby making them applicable to the states. Specifically, the Supreme Court has
made clear that the right to counsel applies to the states.

See, e.g., Powell v. State of

Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67-68 (1932) (Fourteenth Amendment due process clause incorporates
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel

in capital cases);

Gideon v.

Wainwright,

372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating the right to counsel in felony cases); Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25 (1972) (incorporating the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases).

The Idaho

Supreme Court has, in tum, acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to
the State ofldaho. See Abercrombie v. State, 91 Idaho 586, 592 (1967).
As such, it is no surprise that the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly referenced the
State's responsibility to ensure that its citizens' Sixth Amendment rights are protected.

First, in

2

Though Defendants are correct that the State of Idaho itself is not a "person" for the purposes
of prospective injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the State itself remains a proper
defendant to the Plaintiffs' state law claims and requests for declaratory judgment. See ISEEO v.
State of Idaho, 142 Idaho 450, 453 (2005) [hereinafter ISEEO V] (affirming judgment against
State of Idaho in systemic reform litigation). The individual defendants, sued in their official
capacities, are proper defendants as to all of the Plaintiffs' claims.
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 3
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explicitly overruling its previous decision in Betts v. Brady 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court in
Gideon noted that "the Betts Court, when faced with the contention that 'one charged with crime,

who is unable to obtain counsel, must be furnished counsel by the state,' conceded that
'(e)xpressions in the opinions of this court lend color to the argument."' Gideon, 372 U.S. at
343. Since then, the long line of cases following Gideon has consistently reiterated the point.
For instance, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Court clarified that under Gideon, it is the State's
responsibility to guarantee that defendants receive_ constitutional representation in criminal
actions brought by the State: "When a State obtains a criminal conviction through such a trial, it
is the State that unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of his liberty.... Thus, the Sixth
Amendment does more than require the States to appoint counsel for indigent defendants." 446
U.S. 335, 343-44 (1980) (internal citations omitted). Numerous other cases have also recognized
the State's ultimate responsibility for ensuring a fair trial for indigent defendants prosecuted by
the State.

See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977) ("State expenditures are

necessary to pay lawyers for indigent defendants at trial," citing Gideon and Argersinger);
ML.B. v. S.L.J, 519 U.S. 102, 113 (1996) ("A State must provide trial counsel for an indigent

defendant charged with a felony" (citation omitted)); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532-33
(2004) (recognizing a number of affirmative obligations that flow from the well-established
principl~ that a State must provide all individuals with a meaningful opportunity to be heard in
its cou~s, including "the duty to' provide counsel to certain criminal defendants"); Walters v.
Nat'! Ass'n ofRadiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 332 (1985) ("[W]e have held that this provision

requires a State prosecuting an indigent to afford him legal representation for his defense");
Ludwig.v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 627 (1976) ("[I]f an accused is

indigent, the State is required to furnish him counsel without cost before he may be deprived of

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 4
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his liberty." (citation omitted)). There is no question that it is each state's responsibility to
ensure that indigent defendants' Sixth Amendment rights are realized.
B. The State Has an Affirmative Duty to Ensure Sixth Amendment Compliance.

States do not just bear ultimate responsibility for indigent defense-they have an
affirmative duty to guarantee that indigent defense is constitutionally adequate. The Supreme

Court has emphasized this again and again. In Bounds, it held that "an indigent defendant's right
under the Sixth Amendment places upon the State the affirmative duty to provide him with
counsel for trials which may result in deprivation of his liberty." 430 U.S. at 834. Eight years
later, in Maine v. Moulton, the Court made this even clearer, holding that the Sixth Amendment
"imposes on the State an affirmative obligation" and further specifying that "this guarantee
includes the State's affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents the protections
accorded the accused by invoking this right." 474 U.S. 159, 171, 176 (1985).

The Sixth

Amendment right to counsel, therefore, is unlike many of the rights preserved in the Bill of
Rights, such as the First Amendment freedom of speech or the Fourth Amendment right to
privacy, which simply prohibit certain state actions. Rather, the Sixth Amendment is one of a
few special constitutional guarantees that require states to take affirmative steps to supply
necessary resources and supervision to see that the Constitution is carried out. Cf Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-104 (1976) (holding that states must provide adequate medical care to

prisoners in their custody, under the Eighth Amendment); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
315-316 (1982) (holding that the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause requires the State to provide involuntarily committed mental patients with such
services as are necessary to ensure their reasonable safety from themselves and others.); City of
Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (holding that the Due Process

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 5
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Clause requires states to provide medical care to suspects in police custody who have been
injured while being apprehended).
Together, the Supreme Court later explained, these "affirmative duty" guarantees require
that "when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety
and general well-being." DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989) (citation
omitted). The Court went on to explain the reason for this:
The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the State by the
affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders
him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic
human needs--e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safetyit transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment
and the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 200 (citations omitted). The same principle applies in the context of indigent defense,

where the State has a similar duty to ensure that defendants prosecuted by the State receive a fair
trial in accordance with the Sixth Amendment. As the Court explained in Moulton, when the
.

'

State hales a person into court and threatens her liberty, it is the State that has the corresponding
"affirmative obligation" to provide competent counsel if she cannot afford an attorney. Moulton,
474 U.S. at 171.
The parallel state constitutional guarantee, in Article 1, Section 13, of the Idaho
Constitution, is at least coextensive with the Sixth Amendment right. See State v. Tucker, 97
Idaho 4, 7 (1975); cf State v. Cada, 129 Idaho 224, 230 (1996); State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483,
488 n.4 (1984); Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 115 (1983); see also Bement v. State, 91 Idaho
388, 395 (1966) (noting the extreme importance of the right to counsel in Idaho, calling it "the
most pervasive right of an accused" (citation omitted)). Because that guarantee is part of the
state constitution, it is, obviously, the State that is responsible for fulfilling it. And if no State of

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 6
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Idaho official is tasked with fulfilling a constitutional responsibility, as the State seems to
suggest,' it is the judiciary' s job to declare a constitutional violation. See LC. § 10-1201.
C. Delegation Is Not Abdication.

Noting that "Counties or other local units of government have provided whatever
indigent defense services were provided at. the trial level," Defendants argue that the Idaho
Constitution "contemplated that Counties would provide many governmental services required
by law." Although such delegation is permitted, the counties are merely subdivisions of the state
that are tasked with carrying out state responsibilities. As such, the counties' failure is the
State's failure.

See Striclfaden v. Green Creek Highway Dist., 42 Idaho 738, 738 (1926)

("Counties are generally ... involuntary subdivisions or arms of the state through which the state
operates for convenience."); see also Ada Cnty. v. Wright, 60 Idaho 394, 404 (1939) ("Moreover
the building and maintenance of the roads and highways by the state is one of the sovereign
duties of government; and the act here involved, recognizing this duty on the part of the state,
~_onstitutes counties and highway districts as agencies and arms of the state for carrying out its

governmental purpose." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). Hence, the counties' failure to
fulfill State responsibilities-not out of intransigence or negligence, but due to lack of resources
and supervision-ultimately lies at the feet of the State. Indeed, the Governor's own Criminal
Justice Commission ("CJC") acknowledged this in its report on Idaho's public defense system:
"As with other rights that are fundamental and essential to a fair trial, the vindication of the Sixth
Am~ndment right to counsel is a state responsibility. Although a state may delegate its duty to
apprise citizens of this right to counties, it is ultimately the state's responsibility to ensure that
the constitutional obligation is met." 2d. Aff. Eppink ex. 3 at D' 1153.

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 7
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Idaho courts have interpreted the relevant sections of the Idaho Constitution as conveying
no authority to the counties independent from the state. See, e.g., Shillingford v. Benewah Cnty.,
'

48 Idaho 447, 453 (1929) ("County commissioners must act as a board, and have only such
power as is expressly or impliedly conferred on them by statute." (internal citations omitted)).
Article XVIII, Section 5, of the Idaho Constitution states that "[t]he legislature shall establish,
subject to the provisions of this article, a system of county governments which shall be uniform
throughout the state; and by general laws shall provide for township or precinct organizations."
Id. § 5. Section 11 provides that "[c]ounty, township, and precinct officers shall perform such

duties as shall be prescribed by law." Id. § 11. Courts have clarified that under these provisions,
counties have no authority or responsibility independent from the state. See, e.g., Shillingford,
48 Idaho at 453; Prothero v. Ed. ofComm'rs of Twin Falls Cnty., 22 Idaho 598 (1912).
A number of federal appeals courts, in the context of both constitutional and statutory
obligations, also have found that states may not escape liability by merely delegating their
obligations to the counties. For instance, in Stanley v. Darlington County School District, a case
involving a State's obligation to desegregate its public schools, the Fourth Circuit clearly stated
that a State's right to delegate power to a political subdivision does not absolve the State of its
ultimate responsibility:
Because the Fourteenth Amendment imposes direct responsibility on a state to
ensure equal protection of the laws "to any person within its jurisdiction," a
state's delegation to a political subdivision of the power necessary to remedy the
constitutional violation does not absolve the state of its responsibility to ensure
that the violation is remedied. Even if a state gives its local school districts the
power and means to remedy segregation, it can still be sued by the students in
those districts for its failure to take steps to dismantle a dual educational system
that it created.
84 F.3d 707, 713 (4th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Others have recognized the same principle.
See, e.g., Robertson v. Jackson, 972 F.2d 529, 533 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Although the state is
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permitted to delegate administrative responsibility for the issuance of food stamps, 'ultimate
responsibility' for compliance with federal requirements nevertheless remains at the state level."
(citation omitted)); Woods v. United States, 724 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1984) ("While the
state may choose to delegate some administrative responsibilities ... the ultimate responsibility
for operation of the plan remain[s] with the state." (citations omitted)); Kruelle v. New Castle

Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 697 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that state department of education is
, liable for failure of local school district to comply with federal law.)
Under the cases cited above, the responsibility under the Sixth Amendment lies with the
State, which cannot abdicate its constitutional duty by simply delegating administrative
responsibility for public defense to the counties.
II.

As the Only State Officials Who Give Effect to Idaho's Statewide Indigent
Defense System, the Governor and PDC Members Are Proper Defendants In
Litigation Challenging the Adequacy of That System.
In its seminal 1908 decision in Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court held that state

officials sued in their official capacities for prospective or declaratory relief are proper
defendants so long as the officials have "some connection" to the laws involved. 209 U.S. 123,
157 (1908). The Governor and the members of the Public Defense Commission ("PDC") rest
their argument that no relief can be granted here on cases, like Association des Eleveurs de

Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 2013), involving state laws
authorizing enforcement proceedings or other state action directly against individuals. However,
Defendants' "affirmative obligation" to maintain an adequate statewide public defense system,

Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171, is "simply not the type of statute that gives rise to enforcement
proceed~ngs."

Los Angeles Cnty. Bar Ass'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992).

Accordingly, when a state law "is not of the type to give rise to enforcement proceedings, a state
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official nonetheless may be named as a defendant under Ex parte Young if he has [a]
responsibility to 'give effect' to the law." Idaho Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Wasden, 32
F. Supp. 3d 1143, 1148 (D. Idaho 2014) (citation omitted).
The decision in Los Angeles County Bar Association v. Eu shows how the Ex parte

Young analysis works when plaintiffs challenge systemic issues, as they do here, rather than the
failure to enforce a criminal or regulatory statute. In Eu, the plaintiffs challenged the California
legislature's limit on the number of judges for Los Angeles County. 979 F.2d at 700. The
County itself, despite having the option under state law to allow appointment of additional

.

.

judges above the limit, was not a defendant in the appeal. Id. at 700 n.1. The defendant
governor and secretary of state, like their counterpart defendants in this case, argued that it was
the legislature-not executive branch officials-that had the power to determine the appropriate
number of judges to be assigned to each county and claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit based on their lack of connection to the establishment of the limit on judges. Id. at 701,
704. The Ninth Circuit rejected those arguments. Id. at 704. Noting that the case was not of the
kind involving "enforcement proceedings," it held that the Governor's power to appoint judges
and the .secretary of state's duty to certify judicial elections was a sufficient connection to the
challenged system-despite that neither official had the power to directly increase the number of
judges. Id. Moreover, the court added that "[w]ere this court to issue the requested declaration,
we must assume that it is substantially likely that the California legislature, although its members
are not all parties to this action, would abide by our authoritative determination." Id. at 701
(citation omitted).
Here, Governor Otter and the PDC members have a far more direct connection to Idaho's
statewide indigent defense system than did the California governor and secretary of state in Eu.
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See also Back v. Carter, 933 F. Supp. 738, 752 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (holding, in suit challenging
membership requirements of judicial nominating committee, that because governor "play[ed] a
role" in the committee's operations by selecting from judicial nominees the committee identifies,
governor's connection was sufficient to overcome the Eleventh Amendment). The Governor not
only appoints the majority of the PDC, LC. § 19-849(1)(c), he has been and remains deeply and
directly involved in its work, has been in regular communication with the PDC on systemic
public defense issues, and has legal appointment authority over the State Appellate Public
Defender and boards of county ·commissioners as well. For its part, the PDC has direct, statutory
duties to establish rules governing public defenders throughout the State, LC. § 19-850(1)(a), and
is mandated to make recommendations for system-wide reform, LC. § 19-850(1)(b).
Yet, despite these specific duties, Defendants have failed to fulfill them. As a result,
Idaho's' public defense delivery system continues to suffer from the same deficiencies it faced
before passage of the 2014 amendments to the State's public defense statutes.

These

Defendants are the very state officials who "give effect" to Idaho's statewide public defense
delivery system, and, as such, they are not immune from suit over that system. See Wasden, 32
F. Supp. 3d at 1148.

A. The PDC Members Have a Direct Connection to Idaho's Public Defense
Delivery System Under Ex parte Young.
A statewide commissioner of an agency is a properly named defendant in a lawsuit
regarding that agency's duties. See Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1151 (10th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the Oklahoma Commissioner of Health was a properly named defendant in a
lawsuit challenging an amendment to a state statute preventing recognition of adoptions by
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same-sex couples). 3 For instance, in Lakeside Roofing Co. v. Nixon, No. 4:10CV01761, 2011
WL 1465593 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 18, 2011), the court denied a motion to dismiss in a case naming
the· Governor of Missouri and three Commissioners of the Missouri Labor and Industrial
Relations Commission. The court found that the law "provides a sufficient connection between
the Commissioners and the enforcement of the Law to make the Commissioners potentially
proper parties for injunctive relief." Id. at *4 (citation omitted). There, the Commissioners were
required to provide a list of nonrestrictive states to the Department of Labor, which would in turn
determine which laborers are prohibited from working state jobs during a period of excessive
unemployment. Id. The court reasoned that "[a]lthough the Commissioners are not the final
decisio~akers, the Commissioners assist in giving effect to the allegedly unconstitutional law
because they make the requisite determination for what constitutes a restrictive state. Thus, the

.

Commissioners are an indispensable part of the process of enforcing the Law and their presence
in this lawsuit may be required for complete relief." Id.
The Idaho Public Defense Commission, as its very name suggests, is Idaho's only state
agency tasked with overseeing and promulgating rules for trial-level indigent defense services in
Idaho. Its members are properly named defendants under the Ex parte Young exception. It was
establis~ed as a self-governing agen~y in the executive branch of state government. See 2d Aff.
Eppink ex. 4 at D'724.
The PDC is specifically, statutorily mandated to improve Idaho's statewide public
~efense system. Among other things, the PDC is required to promulgate rules establishing
training requirements for public defenders. LC. § 19-850(1)(a)(i). Training requirements are
essential to guaranteeing that a state's public defense delivery system is constitutionally

In that case, the Governor, who was a defendant in the lower court proceedings in which the
statute was held unconstitutional, did not appeal the judgment. Finstuen, 496 F .3d at 1142.

3

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 12

000415

adequate. The American Bar Asso_ciation's Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System
emphasizes the critical role of training in preparing defense attorneys to be effective advocates
for their clients. See 2d Aff. Eppink ex. 5 at D3069 ("Defense counsel's ability, training, and
experience match the complexity of the case"; "Defense counsel is provided with and required to
attend continuing legal education"; "Defense counsel is supervised and systematically reviewed
for quality and efficiency according to nationally and locally adopted standards."). Furthermore,
the PDC developed and sponsored three statewide training programs for public defenders in
2015. See Aff. Thomson

,r 9.

Indeed, accompanying the pass~ge of the 2014 amendments to

Idaho's public defense statutes, the Legislature appropriated a $110,000 budget for the PDC to
develop and conduct trainings for public defenders around the state. 2d Aff. Eppink ex. 9 at 7-8
·(answer no. 19); id. ex. 6 at D'376-378. The PDC is, accordingly, intimately involved in
overseeing indigent defense reform in Idaho, not just at a policy level, but on a local level as
well, delivering training to individual public defenders on the ground. While these training
sessions are not alone sufficient to repair the system, the PDC efforts and authority related to the
training program demonstrate its close connection at all levels of Idaho's public defense system.
Likewise, the PDC has affirmative duties to ensure adequate data reporting by public
defenders throughout Idaho.

LC. § 19-850(a)(ii).

The PDC defendants have themselves

acknowledged that making systemic, statewide improvements and monitoring the constitutional
adequacy ofldaho's statewide system requires data collection and reporting. See 2d Aff. Eppink
ex. 7 at D'366-367. In fact, the remedial injunction in a recent indigent defense class action in
the State of Washington specifically ordered increased data reporting and collection. Wilbur v.
City ofMount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
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Another section of the Public Defense Act requires the PDC to "make recommendations
to the Idaho legislature for legislation on public defense system issues including, but not limited
to" core requirements for county-level contracts with private attorneys, "enforcement
mechanisms," and "[f]unding issues including, but not limited to" training, data collection, and
conflict cases. LC. § 19-850(1)(b). Under the statute, the PDC was required to make a set of
initial recommendations by January 20, 2015, in addition to "each year thereafter as deemed
necessary by the commission .... " Id.
The PDC, furthermore, is part of an "Executive Legislative System," involving
Governor's office review and approval of the PDC's proposed rules and recommendations. 2d
Aff. Eppink ex. 8 at D'242. Unfortunately, the PDC has failed to meet its initial statutorilyprescribed deadline for making those recommendations, further stalling legislative action to fix
the statewide system. See 1st Aff. Eppink ex. A at 12. The Commissioners are developing
model contract language and a statewide data reporting system. See 2d Aff. Eppink ex. 7.
Additionally, the PDC has been in regular communication with the Governor's office, county
officials (including Dan Chadwick, Executive Director at Idaho Association of Counties), and
the interim legislative committee on public defense. See, e.g., 2d Aff. Eppink ex. 8 at D'242, ex.
10 at D' 410, and ex. 11 at D' 54 ("Rep. Luker indicated that the Interim Cmte. would like a list of
the legislative fixes that they could make by the November date.").
Despite its clear statutory mandate, the PDC has failed to promulgate rules and provide
recommendations that would have set specific standards for the state's public defense system,
and thus has contributed to the ongoing failure of the system.

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 14

000417

B. Governor Otter Also Has a Direct Connection to Idaho's Public Defense
Delivery System under Ex Parle Young.
A governor is a properly-named defendant in systemic reform lawsuits regarding the
State's provision of indigent defense services, based on both general and specific connections.
For example, in Kitchen v. Herbert, the Tenth Circuit held that Utah's governor was subject to
suit under Ex parte Young because he was "statutorily charged with 'supervis[ing] the official
conduct of all executive and ministerial officers' and 'see[ing] that all offices are filled and the
duties thereof performed."' 755 F.3d 1193, 1202 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting the Utah Code)
(footnote omitted). Idaho's governor bears identical responsibilities under I.C. § 67-802(1) and
(2). Cf Estep v. Commissioners of Boundary Cnty., 122 Idaho 345, 346 (1992) (regarding the
executive branch functions of Idaho county commissioners and other officials).

Therefore,

because Governor Otter is "responsible for the general supervision of the administration by the
local ... officials," he is not immune from suit. 755 F.3d at 1204 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Because of similar responsibilities, Georgia's governor was a proper defendant in a suit
challenging deficiencies in the state's provision of indigent defense services there. Luckey v.
Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir. 1988); see also Utah Republican Party v. Herbert, No.
2:14-CV-00876-DN-DBP, 2015 WL 6395587, at *4 (D. Utah Oct. 22, 2015) (holding that
allegations that the Governor was the supervisor of all official conduct of all executive and
ministerial officers, which included the chief election official in charge of enforcement of the
challenged provision of SB54, were enough to show that the Governor had "' some connection'
to the enforcement of the challenged provision of SB54, and a 'particular duty' to enforce the
law"); Hall v. State of Louisiana, 983 F. Supp. 2d 820, 832 (M.D. La. 2013) (holding that the
governor and attorney general were properly named defendants because the complaint alleged
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that they had "some connection with the enforcement of the 1993 Judicial Election Plan, or that
they are specifically charged with the duty to enforce the Plan and are currently exercising and/or
threatening to exercise that duty.).
· Like the governor in Los Angeles County Bar Association v. Eu, Idaho's governor's
connection as an appointing and supervising power over Idaho's public defense system means he
is a proper defendant here. Recall that in Eu, California's governor was a proper defendant in a
suit over limits on the number of county judges-not because the governor had power to increase
or decrease the number of assignments, but merely because he had appointment powers to fill
judicial vacancies. 979 F.2d at 704. Here, Governor Otter has the same appointment powersnot only to fill vacancies on the statewide Public Defense Commission, I.C. § 19-849(1)(c), but
also to appoint the State Appellate Public Defender, I.C. § 19-869(2), and to fill vacancies on
Boards of County Commissioners, who administer public defenders for the State in each county,
I.C. § 59-906A. See also I.C.-§ 31-5203(4).
Governor Otter has far more than general responsibilities over Idaho's indigent defense
t

system than did the governor in Eu. Indeed, he has other substantial and direct connections to
Idaho's statewide system. First, the Governor has a long history of involvement in Idaho's
public defense system, and reform of that system in particular, beginning with the Governor's
creation of CJC in 2005 by way of executive order, in addition to the creation of the Public
Defense subcommittee in 2009. The Governor's executive order was intended to provide policy
makers and criminal justice decision makers with more accurate information that would improve
public safety and general equity across the state, including in the area of indigent defense. See,

e.g., 2d Aff. Eppink ex. 12 atD'1150. In January of 2010, the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association released a report that suggested Idaho was not adequately satisfying its Sixth
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Amendment obligations. Over the next three years, the CJC committed itself to identifying
improvements to be made to Idaho's public defense system. And in 2013, the CJC submitted
written recommendations to the Legislature regarding specific reforms to the state's public
defense system. In turn, these efforts yielded four pieces of proposed legislation focused on
public defense reform. See id. ex. 3.
Second, the PDC was established in 2014 as a "Self-governing agency of the Executive,"
and the Governor sits atop the PDC's organizational hierarchy, as the top-level official
responsible for Idaho's statewide public defense system. Id. ex. 13 at D' 1173. The Governor is
also the hub of the "Executive Legislative System" that the PDC follows, which requires the
Governor's office to review, vet, and approve any rules, recommendations, or guidelines before
they are established within the statewide system. Id. at ex. 8 at D'242. Naturally, therefore, the
Governor's office has been in ongoing communication with the PDC since its creation in 201_4.
Aff. Thomson ,r,r 14-15. Hence, the PDC, according to its own records, reports to the Governor,
who bears the ultimate responsibility for the PDC's actions.
Third, Idaho's Governor has broad executive order authority, which he can use towards
reforming Idaho's statewide public defense system. Just this year, Governor Otter issued an
expansive executive order establishing a comprehensive "Sage-Grouse Management Plan,"
requiring detailed supervision and achievement of objectives throughout the state.

2d Aff.

Eppink ex. 14. Also this year, the Governor authorized a brand new statewide health care
program, permitting-by executive order alone-an executive branch agency to fund and
implement the program as necessary. Id. ex. 15. The Governor may also use executive orders to
ensure that local jurisdictions are complying with federal law. In 2010, for example, Governor
Otter commanded Idaho's Juvenile Justice Commission to "ensure compliance," by all
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')urisdictions with public authority in Idaho," with the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act, including through "monitoring and remedial actions for violations." Id. ex. 16.
Especially in light of Defendants' acknowledgement, in their opening brief, of "the seriousness
of the issues the Plaintiffs describe," the Governor could likewise use his executive order
authority to ensure compliance with the Sixth Amendment and Idaho Constitution· in both
criminal and juvenile proceedings in Idaho.
The Governor's connection to the State's public defense delivery system, for all of these
reasons, is far more substantial than a mere generalized duty to enforce all state laws, as
Defendants suggest. The Governor's real argument, instead, seems to be that he should be
immune from this lawsuit because there is no state official who was comprehensively
responsible for Idaho's system. The federal court in HRPT Properties Trust v. Lingle explained
why such an argument must be rejected. 715 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1127 (D. Haw. 2010). There,
the court allowed a prospective suit to go forward against a state governor, notwithstanding the
defendant's claim that neither he nor any of his employees were responsible for enforcing the
law in, question.

'

The court held that if there is no state official specifically charged with

enforcing the challenged act, "then it stands to reason that [the governor] is the person with the
power to instruct state officials in the executive branch to enforce or to refrain from enforcing"
the act.' Id. This Court should similarly reject Defendants' attempts to argue that no Idaho state
official could be sued to fix its public defense delivery system.

III.

Resolving Systemic Reform Litigation Is a Central Responsibility of the
Judiciary.
,· It has been a fundamental purpose of the courts of the United States since their creation

to afford citizens a method to challenge State action and seek its reform. Resolving litigation
that challenges systemic constitutional deficiencies on the state level, in particular, has been a
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core responsibility of the American judiciary at least since Brown v. Board of Education, 349
U.S. 2~4, 300-301 (1955). Through remedial schemes combining structural injunctions and
declaratory judgments, courts have a special duty to oversee the elimination of systemic
constitutional violations by states both "root and branch." See Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S.
430, 43.8 (1968). Although state and local authorities bear primary responsibility for managing
their affairs, courts must act when those authorities fail to m~et their affirmative obligations. See
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-281 (1977). As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed,
plaintiffs challenging statewide constitutional failures need not base their case on individual local
violations, but instead may rely on the existence of system-wide deficiencies. Brown v. Plata,
131 S. Ct. 1910, 1925 n.3 (2011).
'
Idaho courts are no strangers to this kind of systemic reform litigation. In the face of the
State's repeated failure to correct constitutional deficie_ncies in Idaho's educational system, the
Idaho Supreme Court stepped in-five times-and expressly reaffirmed the courts' "duty to
determine whether the current funding system passes constitutional muster" in upholding this
District Court's judgment declaring the system unconstitutional. ISEEO V, 142 Idaho at 453,
459--460. The Idaho Supreme Court, in Hellar v. Cenarrusa, likewise upheld a district court's
declaration invalidating the 1982 reapportionment of the Legislature as violating the Idaho
Constitution. 106 Idaho 571, 575 (1984). In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court went on to enter its
own declaration striking down a later reapportionment, and entered an order prescribing a
specific reapportionment plan. Id. at 585. Several years after Hellar, the Court made clear that
"[p]assing on the constitutionality of statutory enactments, even enactments with political
overtones, is a fundamental responsibility of the judiciary, and has been so since Marbury v.
Madison . . . . Constitutional rights, as well as this Court's duty to faithfully interpret our
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constitution and the federal constitution, do not wane before united efforts of the legislature and
the governor." Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 640 (1989). Here, Plaintiffs ask this
Court to do just that: pass upon the constitutionality of Idaho's public defense services, as
reflected in the statutory enactment of the Public Defense Act and the actions (and omissions) of
Defendants for ensuring that the constitutional guarantees of adequate indigent defense are
carried out in this state.
Systemic reform litigation specifically concerning public defense systems is also familiar
territory for state courts. In Hurrell-Harring v. State of New York, New York's highest court
affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint raising issues nearly identical to those
alleged in the complaint in this case. 15 N.Y.3d 8, 27 (2010). The court rejected the State's
argument that "a claim for systemic relief of the sort plaintiffs seek will involve the courts in the
performance of properly legislative functions," and denied the State's motion to dismiss despite
that the New York Legislature had "left the performance of the State's obligations under Gideon
to the counties, where it is discharged, for the most part, with county resources and according to
local rules and practices." Id. at 15-16. Likewise, in Michigan, the Court of Appeals stated that
"it is the state that ultimately has the affirmative constitutional obligation to implement a system
that safeguards the right to counsel .... " Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89, 136 n.24 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2009), aff'd in result, 832 N.W.2d 761, 765 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013). Accordingly, the

Duncan court held that "[i]f a county system is constitutionally inadequate," and the court hears
the evidence and finds "widespread and systemic instances of deprivation of counsel and
deficient performance resulting from a flawed county system of providing indigent
representation, but the county is in full compliance with existing state law and mandates, the
cause of the constitutional deficiencies will necessarily flow from failures by the state." Id.
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The very same logic applies here. In this instance, just as in other systemic reform
litigation in Idaho state courts, the ultimate question at issue is not whether implementation in
individual local jurisdictions is adequate, but whether the State has provided an adequate means
for local jurisdictions to provide constitutionally sufficient services. See ISEEO V, 142 Idaho at
455. It has not. The law is clear that where a state seeks to "commit[] the details of its operation
to local officers," it must first provide "suitable machinery" that will enable such officials to
fulfill the legal obligation in question. Fenton v. Bd. of Commissioners of Ada Cnty., 20 Idaho
392, 403 (1911). Plaintiffs in this case allege that the State has not provided the counties with
suitable machinery to provide constitutionally adequate public defense. Accordingly, "the issue
is systemic in nature," and the Distric~ Court may make generalized findings. JSEEO V, 142
Idaho at 455. Here, just as the Idaho Supreme Court has had to point out before in this kind of
litigation, "the State fails to grasp the relevance of the adage 'the whole is greater than the sum
of its parts."' Id.
Finally, litigating these important issues on a county- or city-level basis would be
inefficient, duplicative, expensive, and time-consuming. As such, Plaintiffs have specifically
tailored the relief they are requesting to avoid imposing an unreasonable burden on either the
State or the Court. To the extent that enforcement will require, at the outset, efforts to craft a
workable plan, the State has in place both the people and programs that would allow it to assign
and complete that work quickly. Indeed, just as Defendants were able to provide the resources to
litigate this matter on behalf of the entire State, it can utilize those resources to propose an
interim plan here, and by doing so, reduce the overall burden on the State. While Plaintiffs
believe this approach is preferable-and indeed advantageous for Defendants-the Court, if
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necessary, has the authority to invoke its equitable powers to require the State to craft a litigation
and dis~overy plan.
At bottom, the State of Idaho should not be permitted to prevail on technical points about
the scope and duties of certain State-level employees, in an effort to obscure its fundamental
obligations to indigent Idaho defendants.
IV.

When a Statewide System of Constitutional Compliance Has Failed, It Is the
Judiciary's Unique Responsibility to Declare It.

Idaho's declaratory judgment statutes are "broad and comprehensive," Idaho Mut. Benefit

Ass'n v. Robison, 65 Idaho 793, 797-798 (1944), and must be "liberally construed and
administered," I.C. § 10-1212. Their express purpose is to "afford relief from uncertainty and
insecurity with respect to rights ...." Id.
The declaratory judgment statutes begin, in fact, with a decisional rule that disposes of
the State's argument: "No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for." LC.§ 10-1201. As the State acknowledges in its
brief, a Court may refuse to enter a declaratory judgment only when a declaration "would not
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding." I.C. § 10-1206. The
uncertainty that gives rise to this proceeding is whether the State's system for ensuring the right
to counsel throughout Idaho's 44 counties is constitutional as is, or whether the State must adjust
that system. 4 There would, however, be a genuine

1.c: § 10-1206 issue if this class action were

4

The commissioners of the Public Defense Commission can adjust that system by promulgating
rules governing training requirements for public defenders and issuing recommendations through
the "Executive Legislative System." 2d Aff. Eppink ex. 8 at D'242. (Indeed, even were the
plaintiffs to petition the Commission for rulemaking, the Governor's review and approval would
still be needed under that "Executive Legislation System.") The Governor can also make even
more sweeping adjustments by Executive Order. See, e.g., 2d Aff. Eppink exs. 14-16. And the
State of Idaho, which is the plaintiff in every criminal case in state court, can do so by taking
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forced into a· county-by-county approach. For, even if a court were to declare, as part of this
action or a separate one, that individual counties were not complying with constitutional or
statutory requirements, it would not terminate the root uncertainty that the plaintiffs raise in the
existing complaint: whether the statewide system itself is constitutionally adequate.
A statewide declaratory judgment would terminate that root uncertainty. As the Idaho
Supreme Court explained in Wylie v. State, declaratory judgment actions are properly dismissed
only where "the judgment, if granted, would have no effect either directly or collaterally on the
plaintiff, the plaintiff would be unable to obtain further relief based on the judgment and no other
relief is sought in the action." 151 Idaho 26, 31 (2011) (emphasis added) (quoting ISEEO v.

Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 282 (1996) [hereinafter ISEEO JI]). This Court's
declaration that Idaho's system is currently operating below constitutional thresholds would have
a direct effect on the plaintiff class because it would require the State to meet those thresholds
before it could continue to prosecute indigent criminal defendants. Class members could obtain
immediate further relief based on the judgment, through stays and other appropriate temporary
relief in their criminal proceedings until the State dispatched the resources and rules needed for
constitutional compliance.

Alternatively, if this Court determines, after hearing all of the

evidence, that Idaho's statewide system is operating at or above constitutional thresholds, the
judgment would resolve the question whether Idaho has systemic problems, rather than merely
local deficiencies. Cf I.C. § 10-1201 ("The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in
form and effect .... "). Either way, the class complaint would be redressed, at least in part, by a
declaratory judgment.
In short, either the statewide public defense system in Idaho is constitutional or it is not.

actions to ensure that criminal caseloads and workloads do not exceed constitutional limits, given
the number and experience of public defenders available throughout the state.
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Th~ time for making that decision will come once the evidence is developed and presented. The
question now, though, is whether a declaratory judgment actio~ may p~oceed at all. To decide
that question, this Court only considers whether the uncertainty about the statewide system's
constitutionality presents "a real and substantial controversy" or merely a hypothetical one.

Miles

v: Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,642 (1989); see also Harris v. Cassia Cnty., 106 Idaho

513, 516-517 (1984). With Defendant Governor Otter himself having stated on the record to the
Idaho public that "our current method of providing legal counsel for indigent criminal defendants
does not pass constitutional muster," the question is very real and quite substantial. 5 2d AFf.
Epp ink ex. 2 at 8.

In systemic reform class litigation, which raises "matter[s] of great

fundamental importance," it is imperative that the courts resolve constitutional uncertainties, and
the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized a public interest justiciability exception to ensure these
kinds of cases are heard. ISEEO 11, 128 Idaho at 284. In any event, deferring this real and
substantial question to county-level litigation would achieve nothing because, even if the Court
concluded that public defense in a particular county is inadequate, it will still not be certain
whether it is the county's fault or just a localized symptom of a statewide, systemic deficiency.

See Du~can, 774 N.W.2d at 136 n.24. Thus, because a declaration about the adequacy of the
statewide system in Idaho will "remove an uncertainty" about the constitutiona~ity of indigent
defense in Idaho, Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action must proceed to further discovery and

5

The. State's entwined argument that declaratory relief is not available if injunctive relief is not
also available is flatly rejected by statute: "Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions
shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief
is or could claimed." LC. § 10-1201 (emphasis added); see also Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 471 (1974) ("engrafting [on] the Declaratory Judgment Act a requirement that all of
the traditional equitable prerequisites to the issuance of an injunction be satisfied before the
issuance of a declaratory judgment is considered would defy Congress' intent to make
declaratory relief available in cases where an injunction would be inappropriate"); LC. § 10-1215
(requiring Idaho's declaratory judgment statutes be interpreted "to harmonize, as far as possible,
with federal laws and regulations on the subject of declaratory judgments and decrees").

be
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adjudication. See LC.§ 10-1205.

V.

Plaintiffs' Suit Complies With Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 3(b) and 65(d).

Plaintiffs' lawsuit complies fully with the mandates of I.R.C.P. 3(b) because the suit
names Governor Otter and the individual members of the PDC as defendants.

Rule 3(b)

specifies that government officials "shall not be designated as parties in any capacity unless the
action is brought against them individually or for relief under Rules 65 or 74." Plaintiffs named
Governor Otter and the individual PDC members as defendants in this case.
Defendants' reliance on Weyyakin Ranch Prop. Owners' Association Inc. v. City of

Ketchum, 127 Idaho 1, 896 P.2d 327 (1995) is misguided. While the language in Weyyakin
correctly explains the interplay between I.R.C.P. 3(b) and 65(d), the plaintiffs in that case sued
only the City of Ketchum, rather than the elected officials individually, thereby violating the
Rule. · That is not the case here, where Plaintiffs have sued the relevant state officials
individually. Defendants obviously disagree as to which individual state officials could be
properly sued for the State's failure to provide a constitutionally adequate indigent defense
system, and seem to suggest that members of the Idaho Legislature would have to be named in
the lawsuit in order for Plaintiffs to get the relief requested in their Complaint. But that is the
very issue being decided by this Court. The fact that Defendants believe it to be "obvious" that
the Governor and Commissioners have been named improperly does not make it so.

*

*

*

*

*

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs re~pectfully request that the Court deny
Defendant's motion to dismiss and allow all discovery to proceed in this matter.
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Respectfully submitted this 24th day of November, 2015.

,·
· Richard Eppink ·
ACLU OF IDAHO FOUNDATION
Jason D. Williamson
ACLU FOUNDATION
Andrew C. Lillie
Kathryn M. Ali
Bret H. Ladine
Jenny Q. Shen
Brooks M. Hanner
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Scott Zanzig
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By email
Cally A. Younger
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Office of the Governor
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By email
David W. Cantrill
cantrill@cssklaw.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TRACY TUCKER, et al., on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO, et al.,
Defendants.

------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 1510240
REPLYMEMORANDUMIN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants (1) the State of Idaho, (2) Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, and (3) the seven
members of the Public Defense Commission (PDC) file this Reply Memorandum in support of
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. This Reply is accompanied'by an Objection and
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Affidavits and Exhibits. However, Defendants cannot know before
their argument whether their Objection and Motion to Strike will be granted. Thus, this Reply
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addresses the Affidavits and Exhibits as a fallback argument in case the Objection and Motion to
Strike is denied in full or in part, but Defendants' primary argument is that the Affidavits and
Exhibits should not be considered at all.

I.

OVERVIEW OF REPLY ARGUMENT

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs may bring Federal claims against "persons", i.e., socalled State actors, "who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State ... , subject[], or cause[] to be subjected, any ... person ... to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States] .... "
Plaintiffs agree that Idaho itself cannot be sued under § 1983. Response to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss (Response), p. 3, n.1 ("the State ofldaho itself is not a 'person' for purposes
of prospective injunctive relief under ... § 1983"). Because Idaho cannot be sued under§ 1983,
Plaintiffs' Federal claims are reduced to whether the Complaint alleged facts showing that the
Governor or PDC members personally subjected or caused any Plaintiff to be subjected to deprivation of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Governor and PDC members have taken
no action or inaction regarding public defense services that would allow the Court to provide relief against them under§ 1983, so the Federal law claims against the Governor and PDC members must be dismissed because Plaintiffs have no case or controversy with these Defendants.
The issue of whether Idaho may be sued for deprivation of the right to counsel found in
Idaho Const., Article I, § 13, has never been addressed in a published opinion of the Idaho Supreme Court. However, for the sovereign immunity, prudential, and separation-of-powers reasons given in the Argument below, the Court should dismiss the State law claims against Idaho.
Further, because neither the Governor nor the PDC can provide the State law relief prayed for in
the Complaint, the Court should likewise dismiss the State law claims against them.
The issue before the Court is not whether the Complaint has alleged some Federal or
State constitutional violation regarding provision of public defender services. For purposes of
the Motion to Dismiss, the Court may assume that some Plaintiff alleged facts that if true would
allow the Court to determine that he or she was denied his or her constitutional right to counsel.
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"The facts of this case are not at issue because [defendant] accepts the facts [plaintifl] alleged in
its complaint as true for the purposes of its 12(b)(6) motion .... " ABC Agrs, LLC v. Critical Ac-

cess Group, Inc., 156 Idaho 781,782,331 P.3d 523,524 (2014). The issue thus becomes: Are
Plaintiffs seeking a remedy against the named Defendants that is consistent with Federal and/or
State law. The Argument below shows that they are not.

II. FEDERAL CLAIMS AGAINST THE GOVERNOR AND PDC MEMBERS
SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF A CASE OR CONTROVERSY BECAUSE
THEY CANNOT PROVIDE THE REDRESS SOUGHT IN THE COMPLAINT'S
PRAYERS FOR RELIEF

Before addressing why neither the Governor nor PDC members can provide the redress
prayed for in the Complaint and why the Federal law claims against them should be dismissed,
Defendants first address the common practice ofmetonymy 1 in which the words "the State" are
often used interchangeably with or as shorthand for the words "State actors." 2 To take an example from the Response, "[I]n paragraph 3 of the Complaint, Plaintiffs defined 'State' to refer
to all Defendants throughout the Complaint," Response, p. 2, n.1, i.e., the Complaint used the
term "the State" to include two sets of State actors -

the Governor and the PDC members.

, Appellate courts often use the words "the State" to refer to State actors generally, not
necessarily to a State of the Union itself. E.g., prison officials sued over whether they provided
adequate law libraries or acceptable alternatives were called "the State" in Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.S. 817, 97 S. Ct. 1491 (1977), 3 cited Response, p. 4; there were numerous references to constitutional limitations upon or constitutional requirements imposed upon "the State" in a suit
against Federal officers, including the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, Walters v. National

Metonymy is "a figure of speech consisting of the use of the name of one thing for that of another
of which it is an attribute or with which it is associated (as 'crown' in 'lands belonging to the crown')."
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, p. 782 (11th ed. 2003). "For instance, 'Wall Street' is often
used metonymously to describe the U.S. financial and corporate sector, while 'Hollywood' is used as a
metonym for the U.S. film industry .... " https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metonymy.
2
"State actors" need not be officers or employees of the State itself; city and county officers and
employees acting under color of State law are "State actors." Padgett v. Wright, 516 F. App'x 609, 611
(9th Cir. 2013) (mayor acting in his official capacity was a state actor); Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Cty. of
Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 413-14, 258 P.3d 340, 348-49 (2011) (county sheriff was a state actor).
3
The State officers who were sued are listed in Smith v. Bounds, 538 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1975).
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Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 105 S. Ct. 3180, 3195 (1985), cited Response, p. 4;
there were references to "the State" in a suit against a city, City ofRevere v. Massachusetts

General Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 103 S. Ct. 2979 (1983), cited Response, p. 5. Thus, courts often
metonymically refer to "the State" without literally meaning a State of the Union.
Defendants concede based upon the cases cited at Response, pp. 3-6, that some "State
actor(s)" (as broadly defined) is or are responsible for providing indigent defense in Idaho trial
courts. They do not concede that the Governor, the PDC members, or any other State Executive
Officer is such a State actor. Importantly, despite the sweeping use of the words "the State" in
Plaintiffs' cases, not one case cited at Response, pp. 3-6, holds that the Sixth Amendment requires a State of the Union or one of its officers to be responsible for ensuring that there are
constitutionally adequate public defender services throughout the State. 4
Cases cited later do not supply what is missing from pages 3-6. Response, p. 7, cites two
Idaho cases and concludes that the "counties' failure to fulfill State responsibilities ... ultimately
4

Plaintiffs quote the Recommendations of the Public Defense Subcommittee of the Criminal Justice
Commission, adopted May 13, 2013, as follows:
As with other rights that are fundamental and essential to a fair trial, the vindication of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a state responsibility. Although a state may delegate its
duty to apprise citizens of this right to counties, it is ultimately the state's responsibility to
ensure that the constitutional obligation is met.
Response, p. 7, quoting from Second Epp ink Aff., Ex. 3. This quotation was part of a larger report that
included recommendations for legislation for the 2014 Session. As with any report recommending legislation, its focus and conclusions were legislative or political, not judicial; it may well be that its members
believe that the State has a political responsibility for the public defense system. That is a far cry from
whether Federal or State law places legal responsibility on the State or on specific State actors. In the
end, neither the Commission nor its Subcommittee has authority to determine who has legal responsibility
for public defense; that is a matter for the Courts. "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
Further, the Subcommittee's comments that accompanied its proposed legislation preceded the
2014 amendments to the Public Defender statutes. See 2014 Idaho Session Law, chapter 247, adding the
Public Defense Act to the Idaho Code. The Subcommittee was not describing the system now in place; it
was describing the system that preceded enactment of legislation along the lines that it proposed.
Lastly, Plaintiffs describe the Criminal Justice Commission as the Governor's "own" Commission.
It is accurate that the Governor created the Commission by Executive Order. Executive Order 2015-10,
dated September 23, 2015, Idaho Administrative Bulletin, No. 15-12, pp. 23-26. However, only four of
the Commission's ten ex officio members are direct gubernatorial appointees; only three of the nine direct
gubernatorial appointees are unrestricted because the rest must represent specified entities; the Legislature
and the Judiciary appoint the remaining seven members. The Commission represents all three branches
of government and other interests as well. It is not the Governor's "own".

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

-4

000434

"

lies at the feet of the State." But no Idaho case cited on page 7 (or any other case that Defendants know) holds that the State is legally responsible for a county not performing a duty placed
on the county by law. Response, p. 8, cites Stanley v. Darlington County School District, 84 F.3d
707, 713 (4th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that when local schools did not desegregate, the
State.was not absolved of responsibility to cure the constitutional violation. However, this dicta
came from a case in which "neither the original plaintiffs nor the United States ever sued the
State," id. at 711, so there was no reason to opine on the State's responsibility. Further, Stanley's
dicta was contemporaneous with the United States Supreme Court's reinvigoration of the Ele-

venth Amendment, which made it clear that private parties could not sue States in Federal Court.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). Needless to say, Stanley's dicta

that the State would be responsible in a Federal Court suit for a school district's constitutional
failings is an outlier that has not been taken up by other Federal Courts of Appeal.
Robertson v. Jackson, 972 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1992), Woods v. United States, 724 F.2d

1444 (9th Cir. 1984), and Kreulle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3rd Cir. 1981),
cited Response, pp. 8-9, do not help Plaintiffs. They involved States' voluntary participation in
Federal social or educational spending programs. The United States can condition acceptance of
Federal funds on the State's consent to suit over the administration of those programs. See discussion in Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
686-87, 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2231 (1999) (Congress may require waiver of State's sovereign immunity or agreement to suit as a condition of acceptance of Federal funds). Federal statutes may allow or require a State officer who administers a Federal spending program to be subject to suit
over State or local administration of the program; that does not mean that the Sixth Amendment
requires the State to have an officer who may be sued over provision of public defense services.
Thus, these cases do not stand for the proposition that "responsibility under the Sixth Amendment lies with the State, which cannot abdicate its constitutional duty by ... delegating administrative responsibility for public defense to the counties," Response, p. 9, because Federal spending programs, not the Sixth Amendment, were at issue in Robertson, Woods, and Kruelle.
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This Court does not have a Federal constitutional command to entertain "litigation that
challenges systemic constitutional deficiencies at the state level," Response, p. 18, when there is
no State officer who, in the words of§ 1983, "deprives" Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.
While it is true that the United States Supreme Court did not require individual prisoners to bring
individual claims for systemic failures in delivery of mental health services in the California prison system, Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S.-, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011), cited Response, p. 19, the systemic failure at issue there was in State prisons (i.e., there was no claim of a systemic failure in
State prisons and in city and county jails), so of course there were State officers responsible for
the entire State prison system who were amenable to suit. There is no such State officer here.
Neither Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 15 N.Y.3d 8, 930 N.E.2d 217 (2010), nor Duncan v.
Michigan, 284 Mich.App. 246, 774 N.W.2d 9 (2009), cited Response, p. 20, create a right to
mount a statewide challenge to the adequacy of public defense services under§ 1983.
Hurrell-Harring (H-H) was a challenge to provision of public defense services in five
'

New York counties, not statewide. 15 N.Y.3d at 15, 25, 26-27. H-H cited the Sixth Amendment,
but § 1983 and its standards for Federal suit were never mentioned, probably because the primary defendant-the State of New York- is not a person who can be sued under§ 1983. The
rationale for suing the only other defendant - the Governor5 -

under § 1983 likewise was not

discussed. Whatever else one can say about H-H, it was not grounded in§ 1983.
Neither was Duncan in the end grounded in§ 1983. Duncans puzzling, history is recounted in Duncan v State, 300 Mich.App. 176, 832 N.W.2d 761 (2012), a 2012 Michigan Court
of Appeals opinion issued two years after the Michigan Supreme Court decisions. The 2009
Court of Appeals decision, 284 Mich.App. 246, 774 N.W.2d 9, cited Response, p. 20, allowed the
State and the Governor to be sued over provision of public defender services. The State was
sued under the Michigan Governmental Tort Liability Act, 284 Mich.App. at 266-71, 774
N.W.2d at 104-06, and the Governor was sued under§ 1983, 284 Mich.App. at 271-76, 774
5

Hurrell-Harringv. New York, 66A.D.3d 84, 86, n.1, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349,350, n.l (2009), aff'das
modified, ·15 N.Y.3d 8, 930 N.E.2d 217 (2010) (Governor added as a defendant without any discussion
why he was an appropriate defendant under Federal law).
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N.W.2d at 106-09, without any discussion of his authority to redress Plaintiffs' claims.
The Court of Appeals was then affirmed, reversed, and affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Michigan in that order. See 486 Mich. 906, 906, 780 N.W.2d 843, 844 (2010) (affirming "result
only of the Court of Appeals majority for different reasons"); 486 Mich. 1071, 1071, 784 N.W.2d
51, 51 (2010) ("The defendants are entitled to summary disposition because, as the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion recognized, the plaintiffs' claims are not justiciable"); and 488 Mich.
957, 866 N.W.2d 407 (2010) ("we REINSTATE our order" cited first in this list), 6 as explained in
300 Mich.App. at 183-84, 832 N.W.2d at 765. Like H-H, § 1983 and its standards for suing the
only named Defendants - the State and the Governor -

are never discussed by the Michigan

Supreme Court, which affirmed the Court of Appeals "for different reasons".
Other States have declined to follow H-H and Duncan. Flora v. Luzerne County, l 03
A.3d 125, 134-37 (Pa.Commw. 2014), noted that H-Hwas a 4-3 decision and that Duncan was
2-1 in the Court of Appeals and concluded that the dissents were better reasoned, in part because:
First, there is no precedent from the United States Supr_eme Court acknowledging
that a constructive denial of counsel claim may be brought in a civil case that
seeks prospective relief in the form of more funding and resources to an entire
office, as opposed to relief to individual indigent criminal defendants. Strickland,
Cronic, and Gideon were all cases where the defendants sought a new trial. As
explained in the Duncan dissent, the "United States Supreme Court in Gideon and
Strickland was concerned with results, not process. It did not presume to tell the
states how to ensure that indigent criminal defendants receive effective assistance
of counsel." Duncan, 774 N.W.2d at 153 (Whitbeck, J., dissenting). It is unclear
that such a claim will be held cognizable in any state.
103 A.3d at 136. Thus, in the end there is no basis for allowing suit against some State officer
just because Plaintiffs have alleged a statewide, systemic problem. Instead, Plaintiffs must show
the grounds for suing the specific State officers named as Defendants. They have not.
6

The last order was issued not long before some members of the majority left office and were replaced with the winners of an intervening election. As a dissenter to the last opinion explained:
The majority has decided to grant the motion for reconsideration, and to reverse our previous
order, without affording disagreeing Justices sufficient time to adequately respond to this decision. Instead, the majority has now decided to expedite the release of its order . . . . . .. The
Court's decision to suddenly expedite this case seems designed to prevent the new Court after January 1, 2011 from considering a motion for reconsideration.
Duncan v. State, 488 Mich. 957, 958, 866 N.W.2d 407, 407-08 (2010) (Corrigan, J., dissenting) .

..
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A.

The Governor Is Not "Connected" to Delivery of Public Defense Services and Cannot Be Enjoined to Provide the Relief Requested; Therefore, the Federal Claims
Against Him Should Be Dismissed for Lack of a Case or Controversy
The Sixth Amendment guarantees at least seven rights in criminal prosecutions. 7 Plain-

tiffs contend that the Governor is responsible for the last one -

assistance o.f counsel- but do

not explain how this responsibility can be cabined off from the rest. The answer, of course, is not
that the Governor is personally responsible for the State meeting all seven Sixth Amendment
constitutional responsibilities, but that he is not personally responsible for any of them. The
Governor does not, in the words of Response, pp. 9-10, "give effect" to the Sixth Amendment.
There is no vicarious liability under§ 1983; to be sued, a Defendant must be actively
connected with the alleged deprivation ofrights. As the Supreme Court said in West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 54-54, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2257-58 (1988), a case involving suit against a State
prison's medical supervisor over whether prisoners received constitutionally required medical
care: "[F]ew of those with supervisory and custodial function are likely to be involved directly
in patient care .... § 1983 is not available under the doctrine of respondeat superior."
What do Plaintiffs say about the Governor's involvement in public defense issues? The
Governor is not mentioned in Complaint~~ 3-84, where Plaintiffs lay out their facts. No amount
of legal argument can overcome this omission: Plaintiffs do not allege any facts personal to
them showing the Governor's deprivation of their right to counsel. Instead, they try to construct
a legal argument to substitute for their lack of facts. That legal argument is not enough.
Defendants begin with Los Angeles County Bar Ass 'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1992).
Response, pp. 9-11. In this judicial tour de force, the Ninth Circuit entertained a Federal claim
by the Los Angeles Bar Association that "challenge[d] the constitutionality of a California statute
'

which prescribe[ d] the number of judges on the Superior Court for Los Angeles County" on the
7

The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a [1] speedy and [2]
public trial, by an [3] impartial jury ... , and to be [4] informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be [5] confronted with the witnesses against him; to have [6] compulsory service for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have [7] the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
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ground that "a shortage of state court judges causes inordinate delays in civil litigation, depriving
litigants of access to the courts." Id. at 699. The Court concluded that neither the Governor, who
could not create judgeships himself, but would appoint judges to newly created judgeships, nor
the Secretary of State, who could not create judgeships herself, but would certify newly created
judgeships in future elections, should be dismissed even though neither could redress the number
of judgeships themselves; instead, the Court found it likely that California Legislature, which
was not a party, would abide by the Court's decision to increase judgeships if it came to that. Id.
at 701. To say that this stretches the notion of redressability that underlies standing is an understatement. But, the Ninth Circuit insulated the extraordinary reach of its standing analysis by
denying relief on the merits, thus precluding the Governor or Secretary of State from obtaining
Supreme Court review because there was no judgment against them.
Later Ninth Circuit decisions are not so expansive. National Audubon Society, Inc. v.

Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 847 (2002) (plaintiffs could not sue Governor and Secretary of State with
no enforcement authority over anti-trapping initiative); Association des Eleveurs de Canards et

d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 398
(2014) (same result for Governor with regard to anti:foi~ gras law). In light of decisions like
these, what legal arguments do Plaintiffs make to connect the Governor with provision of public
defense services_ when they had no factual allegations of his personal involvement?
They say the Governor "[1] appoints a majority of the PDC, ... [2] remains deeply and
directly involved in its work, ... [3] has legal appointment authority over the State Appellate
Defender and [4] boards of county commissioners." Response, p. 11. To quote Gertrude Stein,
"There is no there there." Even if the PDC had the remedial powers that Plaintiffs seek (it does
not), it is a self-governing agency, Idaho Code § 19-849(1 ), not an agency subject to gubernatorial supervision. Its four gubernatorial appointees serve fixed, three-year terms and do not serve
at the pleasure of the Governor. § 19-849(3)(a). Three of its seven members are appointed by
the Legislature or by the Chief Justice,§ 19-849(1)(a)-(b), so there would be serious separationof-powers issues if the PDC were not self-governing and were subject to gubernatorial control.
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Even if the Governor were "deeply and directly involved" in the PDC's work" (there is no such
allegation of fact in the Complaint), that would be beside the point: He has no statutory authority
to tell a s~lf-governing agency what to do. 8
As for the Governor appointing the State Appellate Public Defender, what comes from
that? Nothing, because this is a case about trial defense, not about appellate defense. 9 Lastly, the
Governor can appoint a County Commissioner only when there is a vacancy in office and only
from a list provided by the County Central Committee of the party of the County Commissioner
whose office became vacant. Idaho Code§ 59-906(1). No statute gives the Governor authority
to tell a County Commissioner what to do. Plaintiffs' four observations about the Governor's
powers come to nothing; they do not connect him with trial public defense.
Plaintiffs cite Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
265 (2014), for the proposition that "a governor is a properly-named defendant in systemic reform lawsuits regarding the provision of indigent defense services." Kitchen was a challenge to
Utah's "anti-gay marriage" laws; the Kitchen Court analyzed the Governor's claim of authority
over county clerks and their issuance of marriage licenses to conclude that he had statutory
authority to enforce marriage laws and thus was amenable to that suit. Id. at 1202. Needless to
say, analysis of Utah's domestic relations law does not show that Idaho's Governor has similar
authority over Idaho's county commissioners when it comes to public defense services.

Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988), Response, p. 15, might hel:p Plaintiffs if
not for subsequent developments. The Luckey plaintiffs sued the Governor of Georgia, two chief
judges of Georgia judicial circuits, and "all Georgia judges responsible for providing assistance
8

A Public Defense Commission organizational chart, bearing the name of its since-departed Executive Director Ian Thompson and showing Governor Otter above the seven PDC members, is cited at Response, p. 17. The disgruntled Mr. Thompson's chart and affidavit do not show that "the Governor sits
atop the PDC's organizational hierarchy" or that "the PDC, according to its own records, reports to the
Governor, who bears the ultimate responsibility for the PDC's actions." Response, p. 17. Lines of legal
responsibility for statutory agencies come from statute, not from affidavits and charts.
9
The State Appellate Public Defender is also in the Department of Self-Governing agencies. Idaho
Code § 19-869( 1). Surely, Plaintiffs are not arguing that the Governor is entitled to tell the State Appellate Public Defender how to do her job. But, that would the logical extension of their argument that the
Governor can tell the PDC how to do its job.
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of counsel to indigents criminally accused in the Georgia courts." Id. at 1013. The Eleventh Circuit determined that the defendants were proper because "the governor is responsible for law enforcement ... and is charged with executing the laws faithfully ... [and] has the residual power to
commence criminal prosecutions ... and has the final authority to direct the Attorney General to
'institute and prosecute' on behalf of the state .... Judges are responsible for administering the
system of representation for the indigent criminally accused." Id.at 1016. The Court did not explain how the Governor could wear two hats and be responsible for prosecution and for public
defenders. In the end, however, this case never proceeded to judgment. Four years later the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to abstain from considering the Luckey
complaint and to dismiss. Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992). Like Eu, this is
another case where no Governor was ordered to do anything in the end.
Plaintiffs cite the last two Governors' interests in improving the public defense system as
proof that Governor Otter "has far more than general responsibilities over Idaho's indigent defense system" and "has other substantial and direct connections to Idaho's statewide system."
Response, p. 16. In other words, according to Plaintiffs, when Governors take on the thankless
political task of trying to improve the public defense system, they become legally responsible to
do so. There is no rule of law that Plaintiffs can cite for that proposition, nor should there be the
perverse. incentive that Plaintiffs in effect propose: Governors who do not ignore a problem and
address the problem in the political arena then become subject to suit in the judicial arena.
The Governor's authority to appoint four members of the self-governing Public Defense
Commission, to appoint the appellate public defender, and to fill vacancies in County Commissions are repeated, Response, p. 16, but they are no more persuasive than they were on Response,
p. 11, because they do not give the Governor authority over county public defense services. The
Governor's creation of the Criminal Justice Commission by Executive Order, Response, pp. 1617, should be lauded for what is -

a political commitment to improve the justice system, in-

cluding public defender services -

and not be hung as an albatross around his neck for what it is

not -

a statutory or constitutional obligation to be in charge of public defense services.
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.Plaintiffs cite the Governor's Executive Orders for Sage Grouse Management and Treatment-Resistant Epilepsy to support the proposition that he "has broad executive authority, which
he can use towards reforming Idaho's statewide public defense system." Response, pp. 17-18,
That conclusion does not follow from these Executive Orders. Executive Order 2015-04, Idaho
Administrative Bulletin, Vol. 15-8, p. 16 (August 5, 2015), 2nd Eppink Aff., Ex. 14, directs "all
executive agencies, to the extent consistent with existing state law," to implement a sage grouse
management plan; it is not directed to any county officer. Executive Order 2015-03, Idaho Administrative Bulletin Vol. 15-5, p. 20 (May 6, 2015), 2nd Eppink Aff., Ex. 15, is directed to the
Department of Health & Welfare and instructs it to investigate and implement, if appropriate, expand access to an FDA-approved drug for epilepsy. The Executive Orders, which direct agencies to work within existing law, do not show that the Governor has broad executive authority to
reform the counties' public defender systems in a manner not provided by existing law.
Plaintiffs say: "The Governor's real argument ... seems to be that he should be immune
from this lawsuit because there is no state official who was comprehensively responsible for Idaho's system." Response, p. 18. Almost, but not quite. The Governor adds that there are State
actors who are responsible for county public defender services; they are subject to suit, he is not.
Thus, this case is not like HRPT Properties Trust v. Lingle, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (D.
Haw. 2010), Response, p. 18, where no local official had authority to enforce Act 189 concerning
negotiation of terms in a commercial lease and the Governor "decides whether and to what
extent to enforce Act 189. She has the power to direct or prohibit enforcement, or to advise
agencies or individuals to issue regulations, standards, or directives relating to Act 189." 715 F.
Supp. 2d at 1127. Here, Idaho Code§§ 19-859 through 19-864 place responsibility for the
public defender system on county officials, and the Governor is not a "default" defendant (if
there is such a thing) who can be sued when no one else can be sued. HRPT does not apply. As
noted in the Opening Brief, the Governor cannot be sued under§ 1983 because he cannot
provide the redress that Plaintiffs seek.
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B.

The PDC Does Not Have Statutory Authority to Provide the Relief Requested;
Therefore, the Federal Claims Against Its Members Must Be Dismissed for Lack of
a Case or Controversy
In Idaho, a statutory agency's "powers and jurisdiction derive in entirety from the enab-

ling statutes." United States v. Utah Power & Light Co., 98 Idaho 665, 667, 570 P.2d 1353, 1355
(1977). Thus, one must look to Idaho Code§ 19-849 and§ 19-850 to determine what the PDC's
membe~s may be enjoined to do under§ 1983, i.e., how can PDC members be ordered to exercise their authority under color of State law so as not to deprive or cause a Plaintiff to be deprived of Sixth Amendment rights. The PDC members can be enjoined only if they can "give
effect," Response, pp. 9-10, to the Sixth Amendment in the Plaintiffs' cases.
Plaintiffs cite Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1151 (10th Cir. 2007), for the proposition that the head of a statewide agency can be named as a defendant in a lawsuit involving the
agency's duties. Response, p. 11. Fair enough. The problem in this case, however, is that the
remedies sought in this suit do not involve the PDC's statutory duties. Plaintiffs are correct that
"the PDC has direct, statutory duties to establish rules governing public defenders throughout the
State, LC.§ 19-850(1)(a), and is mandated to make recommendations for system-wide reform,
LC.§ 19-850(1)(b)." Response, p. 11. But, this is the starting point of analysis, not the ending
point. The PDC has rulemaking power in only two areas: "Training and continuing legal education requirements for defending attorneys" and "Uniform data reporting requirements." § 19850(1 )(a)(i)-(ii). Its recommendatory authority is just that: recommendatory.
None of the four named Plaintiffs alleged that they were denied effective assistance of
counsel because their public defenders were not properly trained or were not making uniform
reports. Complaint, 113-7, 63-84. Further, even if their claims were amended to include inadequate training and reporting, the core of their complaints - no representation at initial appearances, high caseloads, insufficient continuing involvement in the case, no access to expert witnesses, inadequate conflict counsel, etc. - would be affected only at the margins (if at all) by
training and reporting rules. The presence or absence of PDC rulemaking in the training and
reporting areas has not deprived or caused any Plaintiff to be deprived of Sixth Amendment
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rights to counsel along the lines of their claims. There is no injunction that the Court can issue to
the PDC members regarding training or reporting that will affect these larger issues. That is
further shown by the absence of enforcement power in the PDC statutes; i.e., even if the PDC
were to adopt rules, the PDC could not compel a county to abide by them.
As for recommendatory authority, the PDC can recommend reforms in every area mentioned i~ the Complaint, but the PDC cannot require the Legislature to enact its recommendations. Thus, failure to recommend is not a deprivation of Sixth Amendment rights because the
causal chain (if any) is broken by the requirement for the Legislature to act. E.g., Galen v. City
of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 2007) (sheriff deputies that make bail recommendations

cannot be sued for denial of Eighth Amendment right to non-excessive bail because a superseding decisionmaker- a judge -

sets bail). Thus, neither the PDC's rulemaking nor its recom-

mendatory authority allows it to address the core Sixth Amendment issues that are the subject of
the Complaint. Its members cannot be enjoined to do what they have no power to do.
Response page 13 returns to the training and reporting themes, but does not explain how
the PDC's training programs (which presumably help with delivery of public defense services)
deprive a Plaintiff of Sixth Amendment rights. Nor does the Response explain how rulemaking
authority over training and reporting give the PDC a legal responsibility for "overseeing indigent
defense reform in Idaho, not just at a policy level, but on a local level as well." Response, p. 13.
The PDC's training and reporting authority do not bootstrap it into authority over all aspects of
public defense in Idaho. While it made sense in Wilbur v. City ofMount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d
1122, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2013), Response, p. 13, to require data reporting by defendants that
provide public defenders services, Wilbur s rationale does not require an agency with authority to
require ~ata reporting to be responsible for public defender services.
Plaintiffs say "the PDC has failed to promulgate rules and provide recommendations that
would have set specific standards for the state's public defense system, and thus has contributed
to the ongoing failure of the system." Response, p. 14. Plaintiffs may offer that opinion as a
matter of political judgment, but this is a Court, not a debating society; the issue is not whether
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the PDC has "contributed" to the problem in some vague manner, but whether an injunction
regarding the PDC's statutory powers will remedy the problems that the Complaint describes.
They will not. No remedial injunction regarding PDC rules or recommendations will give the
Plaintiffs redress. The Federal claims against the PDC members should be dismissed.

Ill. THE STATE LAW CLAIMS AGAINST IDAHO SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, PRUDENTIAL, AND/OR SEPARATION-OF-POWERS
GROUNDS; THE STATE LAW CLAIMS AGAINST THE GOVERNOR AND THE PDC
MEMBERS SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR THE SAME REASONS AS THE FEDERAL
CLAIMS

The section first addresses the State law claims against Idaho itself and explains why they
should be rejected. It then adopts by reference its argument in the Federal claims against the
Governor and the PDC members with some additional comments.

A.

The State Law Claims Against the State Should Be Dismissed

J.

The State Is Entitled to Sovereign Immunity from Suit

"States entered the Union with their sovereign immunity intact." Virginia Office for Prof.

& Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247,253, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1637 (2011). Idaho retains its sovereign immunity unless the Legislature waives it by statute. Sanchez v. State, Dept of Correc-

tion, 143 Idaho 239, 244-45, 141 P.3d 1108, 1113-14 (2006). Thus, the threshold issue in a suit
against the State is: Has statute waived sovereign immunity?
Plaintiffs cite ISSEO II and ISEEO V10 in support of their contention that the State may be
sued for systemic constitutional violations. Response, p. 3, n.2 ("the State itself remains a proper
defendant to the Plaintiffs' state law claims"); p. 19 ("Idaho courts are no strangers to this kind of
systemic reform litigation"); p. 21 (''just as in other systemic reform litigation in Idaho state
courts, the ultimate question ... is not whether implementation in individual local jurisdictions is
adequate, but whether the State has provided an adequate means for local jurisdictions to provide

10

ISEEO II is Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Idaho State Board of Education,
128 Idaho 276,912 P.2d 644 (1996). ISEEO Vis Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v
State, 142 Idaho 450, 129 P.2d 1199 (2005). ISEEO I, which is also discussed in this Reply, is Idaho
Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 570, 850 P.2d 724 (1993).
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constitutionally sufficient services"); p. 23 ("In systemic reform class litigation, ... the Idaho
Supreme Court has recognized a public interest justiciability exception to ensure these kinds of
cases are heard").
Plaintiffs overstate the ISEEO cases. The ISEEO plaintiffs did not have a State constitutional right to bring a claim that there was a systemic failure of "the duty of the legislature of
Idaho, to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common
schools." Article IX,§ 1. When the ISEEO defendants questioned school districts' authority to
sue the State, ISEEO /held that the Legislature had consented to suit by statute. 123 Idaho at
585, 850 P.2d at 739. When the Legislature later enacted the Constitutionally Based Educational
Claims Act, Idaho Code§§ 6-2201 et seq., which withdrew that consent and prohibited suit for
statewide systemic violations of Article IX, § 1, while preserving rights of action for claims involving a school district, Idaho Code§§ 6-2202, 6-2205, and 6-2213, the Idaho Supreme Court
upheld that Act's constitutionality. Osmunson v. State, 135 Idaho 292, 17 P.3d 236 (2000). Thus,
there is no Idaho constitutional right to sue the State over a claimed systemic failure in the public
schools under Article IX, § 1; likewise, there should be no Idaho constitutional right to sue the
State over a claimed systemic failure of public defense services in the counties. The State is
entitled t~ sovereign immunity from suit.

2.

Prudential Considerations Argue Against Allowing tltis Lawsuit to Proceed

Hurrell-Harring and Duncan, discussed at pp. 6-7, supra, do not counsel for this Court to
plunge headlong into a "systemic," Statewide litigation. Both cases involved public defender
services in a small number of counties. This case is much larger in scope, and the Court should
proceed cautiously. One reason to be cautious is that Plaintiffs do not expound their assertions
that (1) "litigating these important issues on a county- or city-level 11

•••

would be inefficient,

duplicative, expensive, and time-consuming" because (2) "Plaintiffs have specifically tailored
the relief they are requesting to avoid imposing an unreasonable burden on either the State or the
11

Defendants are unsure what Plaintiffs refer to here. Cities provide public defender services in
Washington, Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013); they do not in
Idaho. If this remark comes from a generic "canned brief," it does not make sense in Idaho.
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Court" and (3) "the State has in place both the people and programs that would allow it to assign
and complete that work quickly." Response, p. 21. On the contrary, (1) there would be no way
to assure Statewide relief were in place unless every county's public defender services were examined; (2) the relief requested is a shotgun request to "fix everything" and has not been tailored
to specifics; 12 and (3) the State does not know what people and programs are in place that would
allow it to assign and complete the work quickly.
On the last point, if Plaintiffs believe the PDC has the people and programs to assign and
complete the work quickly, that is incorrect. The PDC is a part-time Commission that meets at
least quarterly. Idaho Code § 19-850(1 )(c). Its members include one Senator, one Representative, a former District Judge (now a member of the Court of Appeals) appointed by the Chief
Justice, and representatives of the Appellate Public Defender, the counties, the criminal defense
bar, and the Juvenile Justice Commission. § 19-849(1)(a)-(c). The load that Plaintiffs would put
on the part-time PDC members would be enormous.
There is another reason to be cautious. Plaintiffs make no secret of their goal to bring
criminal prosecutions of all indigent defendants to a halt until the system is completely "fixed".
This Court's declaration that Idaho's system is currently operating
below constitutional thresholds would have a direct effect on the
plaintiff class because it would require tlze State to meet those

12

Prayers B-F, Complaint, p. 53, ask for the following:
B) Declare that the State of Idaho is obligated to provide constitutionally adequate representation to indigent criminal defendants, including at their initial appearances;
C) Declare that the constitutional rights ofldaho's indigent criminal defendants are being
violated by the State on an ongoing basis, and provide a deadline for the State to move
this Court for approval of specific modifications to the structure and operation of the
State's indigent-defense system;
D) Enjoin the State from continuing to violate the rights of indigent defendants by providing
constitutionally deficient representation;
E) Enter an injunction requiring the State to propose, for this Court's approval and monitoring, a plan to develop and implement a statewide system of public defense that is consistent with the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution and Jaws of the State of Idaho;
F) Enter an injunction that requires the State to propose, for this Court's approval and monitoring, uniform workload, performance, and training standards for attorneys representing
indigent criminal defendants in the State ofldaho in order to ensure accountability and to
monitor effectiveness;
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thresholds before it could continue to prosecute indigent criminal
defendants. Class members could obtain immediate further relief
based on the judgment, through stays and other appropriate temporary relief in their criminal proceedings until the State dispatched the resources and rules needed for constitutional compliance.
Response, p. 23 (emphasis added). In other words, this Court would enter an injunction and a
judgment in effect requiring every indigent defendant's criminal proceedings in every State court
in Idaho to be halted "until the State dispatche[s] the resources and rules needed for constitutional compliance." Does that sound like work that can be assigned and completed quickly?
Nothing like that happened in Hurrell-Harring or Duncan. But that is Plaintiffs' goal here.
Plaintiffs are asking this Court to embark upon a path affecting criminal prosecutions in
every county and every judicial district in Idaho -

a path that neither the United States Supreme

Court nor Idaho Supreme Court has required. If ever there is a case in which such a claim should
be denied or dismissed until the appellate courts have had an opportunity to weigh in on the issue, this is it. Further, given that the Defendants cannot provide the reliefrequested because that
relief can come only from the Legislature, the Court may exercise its discretion under Idaho
Code§ 10-1206 and "refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree" that "would not
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding."

3.

Separation of Powers Prevents the Court from Granting the Requested
Remedies

Plaintiffs dismiss Defendants' position that the proper defendants are not before the Court
by arguing that the State "should not be permitted to prevail on technical points about the scope
and duties of certain State-level employees, in an effort to obscure its fundamental obligations to
indigent Idaho defendants." Response, p. 22.
What Plaintiffs call "technical points" are otherwise known as Federalism and Separation
of Powers. With regard to Federalism, Congress has not authorized suits against States under
§ 1983, Will v. Michigan Department ofState Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989), and
suing State officers who cannot provide the relief requested is nothing more than the sham of a
suit against the State. As for State Separation of Powers, this is not technical; it is a part of the

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 18

000448

Idaho Constitution, Article II, § 1, just like Article I, § 13 is a part of the Idaho Constitution.
Plainti~s have asked for relief from Executive Officers that can only be achieved by statutory
changes. See Prayers for Relief C, E and F, n.12, p. 17, supra. Under Article II, § 1, no
Executive officer can exercise the Legislative Power, nor may he or she be enjoined to do so.

B.

Plaintiffs' State Law Claims Against the Governor and the PDC Should Also Be
Dismissed
Plaintiffs' State law claims against the Governor and the PDC members should be dis-

missed for the reasons given for dismissing the Federal claims against the Governor, see pp. 813, supra, and against the PDC members, pp. 13-15, supra.
Some additional State law reasons follow. The Governor and the PDC are described as
part of an "Executive Legislative System," Response, p. 14, in which the PDC wants to keep the
Governor's Office in the loop regarding terms for contracts and possible rulemaking. See 2nd
EppinkAff., Ex. 8. What is the consequence of these allegations about contracts and internal
rulemaking practices (none of which are in the Complaint)? Is any Plaintiff deprived of a constitutional right because the PDC cooperates with the Governor's Office on contracts and does not
hide the ball on rules? The Complaint does not allege so, nor would there be any basis for such a
conclusion oflaw if it had alleged so. Plaintiffs' State law claims against the members of the
PDC are grounded in Article I,§ 13, see Complaint, Second and Fourth Claims for Relief,
~~

174-76 and 181-83, pp. 51-53. The PDC's relationship with the Governor's Office does not

bear on Article I, § 13, and it is no reason to deny the Motion to Dismiss. 13

IV. CONCLUSION
Ordinarily, one concludes a Reply with a simple statement of the relief requested and
ends it with that. The reliefrequested is dismissal of the Complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
This is the unusual case where some further comment on the role of the Judiciary is in

13

Plaintiffs have not sought any relief under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (APA), Idaho
Code§§ 67-5201 et seq., so this Reply does not express any opinion regarding the PDC and the APA.
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order. Plaintiffs contend that it is the Court's "fundamental role to interpret and vindicate core
constitutional rights, to render judgment on the statewide system," Response, p. 2, and that the
question before the Court "is whether a declaratory judgment action may proceed at all. To decide that question, this Court only considers whether the uncertainty about the statewide system's
constitutionality presents 'a real and substantial controversy' or merely a hypothetical one," Response, p. 24 (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs are missing the point of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. A Court's fundamental
role is to issue judgments in cases or controversies between parties. Before a Court can vindicate rights, it must determine that the controversy is between the parties before it, not with some
other parties. "A plaintiff's failure to name the proper defendant is fatal to the claim." HealthNow New York, Inc. v. New York, 739 F. Supp. 2d 286, 295 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) aff'd, 448 F. App'x

79 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation and internal punctuation omitted) (complaint dismissed because New
York Attorney General did not have enforcement power for statute that was the subject matter of
the suit). Likewise, this Complaint should be dismissed for lack of a proper defendant.
No case holds, in Plaintiffs' words, that "if no State ofldaho official is tasked with fulfilling a constitutional responsibility, ... it is the judiciary's job to declare a constitutional violation." Response, pp. 6-7. No case holds that it is a constitutional requirement to create an office
or appoint an officer at the State level who can be sued to implement a constitutional right.
In the end, Plaintiffs' argument is that two constitutional wrongs make a right. Their
claim of constitutionally inadequate public defense services is the first constitutional "wrong" .
The remedy of suing the Executive Officers to obtain Legislative remedies is the second constitutional "wrong". Together, under Plaintiffs' theories, these two constitutional "wrongs" make a
constitutional "right". They do not. The Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiffs have
sued the wrong Defendants -

Defendants who cannot provide the relief they seek.

////////////////////////////////////////

////////////////////////////I//II///////
////////////////////////////////////I/II
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Wellman and Sara B. Thomas

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS -

21

000451

CERTIFI~Alt. OF SERVICE

L

day of December, 2015, I caused to be served a
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Hogan Lovells US LLP
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Denver, CO 80202
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Facsimile: 303-899-7333
[i?'Email: andrew.lillie@hoganlovells.com

Kathryn M. Ali
Hogan Lovells US LLP
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D

Bret H. Ladine
Hogan Lovells US LLP
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San Francisco, CA 94111

D
D
D
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ORIGINAL

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TRACY TUCKER, eta!., on behalf of themselves
·
and all others similarly situated,

vs.

)
) Case No. CV OC 1510240
)
) DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION AND
) MOTION TO STRIKE

STATE OF IDAHO, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

Defendants.

------------------

) NOTICE OF HEARING
)

Defendants (1) the State ofldaho, (2) Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, and (3) the seven
members of the Public Defense Commission (PDC) object to and move to strike Plaintiffs' Affidavits and Exhibits filed in support of Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
ARGUMENT

Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) because "The Complaint Does Not
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State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted" under either Federal or State law. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 7, 11. Thus, "the court does not accept affidavits,"
and "the moving party has the option to test the law and reserve a right to test the facts, i. e., by
making a 12(b)(6) motion, reserving a Rule 56 motion." Stewart v. Arrington Const. Co., 92
Idaho 526,530,446 P.2d 895, 899 (1968). "The only facts which a court may properly consider
on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim are those appearing in the complaint . . . . . ..
[A] trial court in considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, has no right to hear evidence . . . ."
Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273,276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct. App. 1990), reaffirmed by Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,833,243 P.3d 642, 649 (2010) (internal punctuation and cita-

tions omitted).
Defendants stand on their right to bring a pure motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted that is not converted into a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court should grant this Objection and Motion to Strike and not consider any Affidavits or Exhibits filed in support of Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
0RALARGUMENT-NOTICE OF HEARING

The Court may rule on this Objection and Motion to Strike with or without oral argument. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)-(4). If the Court does not rule without oral argument, Defendants hereby
notice argument on their Objection and Motion to Strike for the same time as argument on their
Motion to Dismiss, namely, on Wednesday, December 16, 2015 at 3:00 PM, in the Ada County
Courthouse, 200 West Front Street, Boise, Idaho, before District Judge Samuel A. Hoagland.

II//////II///II//II//I///////////////I///////I/I
///I/////////////I////I///////////////////////II
///I/////////I///I/////////I////////////////////

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE-NOTICE OF HEARING -2

000454

~

DATED this'/!._ day of December, 2015.
STATE OF IDAHO

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAi.

M CHAEL S. GILMORE
Deputy Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants State of Idaho,
Hon. Molly Huskey, Darrel G. Bolz,
Kimber Ricks, Sen. Chuck Winder, and
Rep. Christy Perry

CANTRILL SKINNER WEIS CASEY &
SORENSEN, LLP

a~DANIEL J. SKINNER

Attorney for Defendants William H.
Wellman and Sara B. Thomas
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The defendants ("State") make clear in their reply brief that the motion to dismiss
challenges whether there is a "case or controversy" here. Reply Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to
Dismiss 2 (Dec. 4, 2015) [hereinafter "Reply"] ("Plaintiffs have no case or controversy with
these Defendants"); id at 3 (arguing that the federal claims "SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR A
LACK OF A CASE OR CONTROVERSY"), 8 (same), 13 (same), 20). A "case or controversy"
challenge is a challenge to this Court's jurisdiction. Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508,
512 (2011); Gemtel Corp. v. Community Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 23 F.3d
1542, 1544 n.l (9th Cir. 1994); cf Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 275 (1986) (holding
that Idaho courts interpret their "own rules adopted from the federal courts as uniformly as
possible with the federal cases"). The State, indeed, expressly acknowledges that its motion to
dismiss contends a lack of a "justiciable controversy" based on a "limitation upon .
jurisdiction," in its briefing. Mem. in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss 14, 15-16 (July 8, 2015).
As explained in Gemtel Corp., when a motion to dismiss challenges the existence of a
case or controversy it is a motion to dismiss "for lack of jurisdiction." 23 F.3d at 1544 n.1. Such
motions do not truly seek dismissal for failure to state a claim, id., but instead fall under Rule
12(b)(l)-challenges to subject matter jurisdiction. See Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm 'n, 141
Idaho 129, 133 (2005). A court can and should review a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(l)
if it challenges the court's jurisdiction, even if the moving party incorrectly labels it as a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that case
or controversy challenge must be treated as brought under Rule 12(b )(1 ), "even if improperly
identified by the moving party as brought under Rule 12(b)(6)"); cf Mot. to Dismiss 1 (July 8,
2015) (making motion under "Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)," generally).
Where such motions raise factual disputes, the Court may construe them as Rule 12(b)(1)
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motions and thus "go outside the pleadings without converting the motion into one for summary
judgment." Owsley, 141 Idaho at 133 n.1; St. Clair, 880 F.2d at 201 (holding that the Court may
"rely on affidavits or any other evidence properly before the court" when considering a Rule
12(b)(l) motion). As the State's reply brief makes clear, its motion has raised factual disputes.

E.g., Reply at 4 n.4 (disputing the nature of the Criminal Justice Commission and the import of
its subcommittee's recommendations), 6 & 16 (disputing whether the ACLU cases Hurrell-

Harring v. State of New York and Duncan v. State of Michigan were statewide challenges to
public defense systems, despite that only state officials were sued), IO n.8 (disputing the
significance of the Public Defense Commission's organizational chart), IO n.9 (disputing extent
of gubernatorial influence over the State Appellate Public Defender), 12 (disputing the scope of
prior executive orders), 17 (disputing whether "[t]he load" that systemic reform tasks would put
on the Public Defense Commission is manageable), 18 (disputing whether necessary reforms
could be assigned and completed quickly).
For that matter, even were the State's motion considered under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court
still may properly review public documents, like the ones the plaintiffs have submitted here. 1

Gemtel Corp., 23 F.3d at 1544 n.l ("The court properly considered various public documents ...
. This did not convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment."); see also SB
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2015)
(noting that even in determining Rule 12(b)(6) motions, courts "have allowed consideration of ..
. matters of public record").
Ultimately, this debate is just an academic one, for the plaintiffs could simply amend

Many of the documents attached to plaintiffs' response were produced by defendants to
plaintiffs in response to the discovery requests that the Court ordered defendants to produce at
the October 16, 2015, hearing on the motion for a protective order.
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their complaint to allege all of the facts they learned through the recent Court-ordered discovery
and submitted with their response brief. See Baker v. Holder, 475 F. App'x 156, 157 (9th Cir.
2012) (a plaintiff should be allowed to amend complaint if record, particularly attachments to an
opposition, makes clear that doing so would allow her to defeat a 12(b)(l) motion); SB Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1350 ("Only when the affidavits show that the pleader
cannot truthfully amend to allege subject matter jurisdiction should the court dismiss without
leave to replead.").
In short, the Court may properly consider all of the materials in the record in deciding the
State's motion. In the alternative, the Court should treat the plaintiffs' complaint as implicitly
amended by the materials and testimony obtained after the Court's ruling on the motion for
protective order, allowing the plaintiffs to formally amend the complaint if need be.
ubmitted this 9th day of December, 2015.

Richard Eppink
ACLU OF IDAHO FOUNDATION
Jason D. Williamson
ACLU FOUNDATION
Andrew C. Lillie
Kathryn M. Ali
Bret H. Ladine
Jenny Q. Shen
Brooks M. Hanner
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Michael S. Gilmore
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Scott Zanzig
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By email
Cally A. Younger
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Counsel to the Governor
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Idaho State Capitol Building
700 West Jefferson Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
By email
David W. Cantrill
cantrill@cssklaw.com
Cantrill, Skinner, Lewis, Casey & Sorensen, LLP
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TRACY TUCKER, et al., on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 1510240
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION AND
MOTION TO STRIKE

Defendants file this Reply in Support of Defendants' Objection and Motion to Strike.

First, Plaintiffs argue that the Motion to Dismiss should be decided as a motion under
Rule 12(b)(l) (lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter) and not under 12(b)(6) (failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted), which entitles them to file evidence to supplement the
Complaint. Response to Defendants' Objection and Motion to Strike (Response), p. 2. However,
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Defendants are not challenging the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. The Memorandum in
'

Support of Motion to Dismiss clearly states at page 6 that the Motion to Dismiss is for failure to
state a claim upon relief can be granted, which is a 12(b)(6) Motion:
For the reasons explained in the following Argument, none of these
Prayers for Relief can be granted against any of the named Defendants, so the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted against any of the named
Defendants.
There are further references to failure to state a claim in topic headings, text, or footnotes at pp.
7-11. 1 The Conclusion on p. 19 says: "All of Plaintiffs' Federal and State law claims should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against these Defendants." The Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss is similar. Reply, pp. 3, 19.
One element of failure to state a claim against the Defendants sued in their official capacities is that there was nothing that Defendants could do to provide the redress requested in the
Prayers for Relief. Plaintiffs focus on Defendants' references in the Reply Brief to Plaintiffs
having no case or controversy with Defendants who could not provide relief to contend that the
Motion to Dismiss is (at least in part) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Response, p. 3.
Admittedly, whether there is a case or controversy is often described as "jurisdictional" in
Federal Court rather than as an element of stating a claim upon which relief can be granted. As
Justice Ginsburg explained: "This case concerns the distinction between two sometimes confused or conflated concepts: federal-court 'subject-matter' jurisdiction over a controversy; and
the essential ingredients of a federal claim for relief." Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
503, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1238 (2006). There can be similar confusion here. Defendants are not
contesting this Court's subject-matter jurisdiction to hear cases under § 1983 or under Article I,
§ 13; they are contesting whether Plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief can be granted
Plaintiffs seize upon a quotation from a case in Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss, pp. 15-16, to say that the "State expressly acknowledges that its motion to dismiss contends a
lack of a justiciable controversy based on a limitation upon jurisdiction in its briefing." Response, p. 2
(internal punctuation omitted). The case cited spoke of jurisdiction, but the text of the argument spoke
about redressability in the sense of redressability being an element that must exist in a claim. See page 16
of that Memorandum. The State made no lack-of-subject-matter-jurisdiction argument.
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION & MOTION TO STRIKE -2
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against these Defendants, i.e., do Plaintiffs have a case or controversy with these Defendants in
the sense of: Can these Defendants provide relief to Plaintiffs?
A simple (albeit ridiculous) example shows that failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted and failure to allege a case or controversy with a defendant are not mutually exclusive. Assume a plaintiff petitioned the District Court to be crowned the king of Idaho. That ·
would fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 10, cl. 2
("No State shall ... grant any Title of Nobility"). No matter what State officer the plaintiff sued,
the plaintiff would have no case or controversy with that officer, who would have no authority to
crown him king. But the District Court would have general subject matter jurisdiction to decide
whether a State officer may grant a title of nobility.
When the Reply Brief referred to the absence of a case or controversy with Defendants, it
was referring to Defendants' lack of authority to provide Plaintiffs with relief, which is an part of
determining whether Plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief can be granted against these
Defendants; it was not a challenge to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction under § 1983 or under Article I,§ 13. However, if the Court believes that the Motion to Dismiss presents 12(b)(l)
issues of subject matter jurisdiction, Defendants have a simple solution: They withdraw any
12(b)( 1) issues and present a 12(b)(6) Motion.

Second, Defendants disagree with Plaintiffs' assertion that "As the State's reply brief
makes clear, its motion has raised factual disputes." Response, p. 3. When Defendants filed the
Reply, they were on the horns of a dilemma. Plaintiffs had filed Affidavits and Exhibits with
facts that were not in their Complaint with their Response to the Motion to Dismiss. Defendants
objected and moved to strike, but still had to address the Affidavits and Exhibits:
Defendants cannot know before their argument whether their Objection and Motion to Strike will be granted. Thus, this Reply addresses the Affidavits and Exhibits as a fallback argument in case
the Objection and Motion to Strike is denied in full or in part, but
Defendants' primary argument is that the Affidavits and Exhibits
should not be considered at all.
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 1-2.
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The Reply in Support of the Motion to Dismiss did not concede there were factual issues.

It recognized that Plaintiffs attempted to introduce extra-Complaint facts and dealt with that attempt as best it could: Defendants (1) objected and moved to strike as their primary positon, but
(2) discussed the facts as their fallback if their Objection/Motion were denied.

Third, some things that Plaintiffs describe as "factual" issues are not factual issues at all.
The Complaint seeks statewide relief regarding public defender services. Prayer for Relief
("develop and implement a statewide system of public defense"). Defendants pointed out that
two cases cited by Plaintiffs -

Hurrell-Harring and Duncan 2 -

did not involve statewide relief,

but relief specific to a small number of counties. Plaintiffs do not explain how a factual difference between the relief in Hurrell-Harring and Duncan and the relief sought here creates a factual dispute between Plaintiffs and Defendants. There is no factual dispute between Plaintiffs and
Defendants; both agree that Plaintiffs seek statewide relief.

Fourth, Plaintiffs are attempting to turn issues of law- e.g., what is the Governor's
constitutional or statutory authority or the Public Defense Commission's statutory authority3 into issues of fact that the Court must resolve. They say that they could simply amend their
Complaint to add the necessary allegations that are in their Affidavits and Exhibits, so the Court
should consider their Affidavits and Exhibits in deciding the Motion to Dismiss. Response,
pp. 3-4. However, the Court is not bound by conclusions oflaw in a Complaint. Owsley v. Idaho
Industrial Comm 'n, 141 Idaho 129, 136, 106 P.3d 455,462 (2005). Defendants' Motion to Dismiss presents legal issues including whether the Defendants have the constitutional or statutory
power to exercise the authority that the Prayers for Relief would have the Court order them to
2

Cites to these cases in various appellate courts are found in Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss at pp. 6-7.
3
Although the issue of law of whether the Governor has direct authority to tell the Public Defense
Commission what to do is irrelevant to the issue of the Governor's and/or the Commission's authority or
lack of authority to grant the relief requested, Plaintiffs sought to establish the Governor's "authority"
over the Public Defense Commission through a chart prepared by Commission staff. 2nd Eppink Aff.,
Ex. 13. It is Defendants' position that lines of authority are created by the Constitution or by statute and
that determination of lines of authority is purely an issue of law. Courts, not bureaucrat's charts, determine who has what legal authority. Otherwise, any subordinate officer could expand or contract his/her
authority at will by the simple expedient of making a chart or signing an affidavit.
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exercise. That is a "straight up" issue of law for the Comi to decide, and no tome of Affidavits
and Exhibits will change an issue of Jaw into a contested issue of fact.
Thus, for the reasons given in the Objection ~nd Motion to Strike and in this Reply, the
Court should grant Defendants' Objection and Motion to Strike, decline to consider the Affidavits and Exhibits filed in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, and decide the Motion to Dismiss
solely upon the basis of the factual allegations contained in the Complaint without any factual
supplementation.
·.~
DATED this/'1 day of December, 2015.
STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

ORE

Deputy Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants State of Idaho,
Hon. Molly Huskey, Darrel G. Bolz,
Kimber Ricks, Sen. Chuck Winder, and
Rep. Christy Perry

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

ByCAa~
Attorney for Defendant Governor Otter

CANTRILL SKINNER WEIS CASEY &
SORENSEN, LLP

By~~DANIEL J. SKINNER

Attorney for Defendants William H.
Wellman and Sara B. Thomas
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

oepurv

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

TRACY TUCKER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-OC-2015-10240
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO, eta/.,
Defendants.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed July 8, 2015.
A hearing was held on December 10, 2015, wherein the Court took the matter under advisement.
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

The central clai~ in this case is that the named Plaintiffs, and other indigent criminal defendants
similarly situated in the State of Idaho, are continuously being deprived of their state and federal
constitutional rights to counsel and Due Process of law, by the named Defendants, who are the
State of Idaho, Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, and the Idaho Public Defense Commission.
Plaintiffs seek class action certification 1 and remedial measures by this Court.

1 Plaintiffs

filed a Motion for Class Certification on June 17, 2015, which the parties agreed need not be decided
until Defendants' present Motion to Dismiss was resolved.
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss - '1
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Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that Tracy Tucker, Jason Sharp, Naomi Morley, and Jeremy Payne
(collectively, "Plaintiffs") were arrested and prosecuted, respectively, in Bonner, Shoshone, Ada,
and Payette Counties. Plaintiffs were represented by public defenders in their individual cases.
They allege facts to support claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for lack of representation
'

at initial appearances, and attorneys' failure to communicate with them at times, or to file certain
motions on their behalf, or to properly investigate their cases.

Plaintiffs contend that their individual experiences are representative of "thousands of indigent
defendants across the State, who have been denied their right to effective counsel."2 Plaintiffs
further claim that the "current, patchwork public-defense arrangement in Idaho remains riddled
with constitutional deficiencies and fails, at all stages of the prosecution and adjudication
processes, to ensure adequate representation for indigent defendants in both criminal and
juvenile proceedings in Idaho."3

Plaintiffs claim that the defects in the public defender system can be summarized as follows: (1)
lack of representation at initial appearances, (2) extended and unnecessary pretrial detention, (3)
excessive caseloads, (4) lack of sufficient investigation and expert analysis, (5) lack of sufficient
access to or communication with the public defenders assigned to their cases, (6) continued use
of fixed-fee contracts by some Idaho counties, (7) lack of public defender independence, and (8)
lack of sufficient training, oversight, supervision, and evaluation. 4

2 Pls.'

Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief (hereafter, "Complaint"), ,i 8.

3 Id.

,J9.

4 Id.

,i,i 97-161.
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In Idaho, the legislature has delegated its constitutional duty to provide public defense to the

individual counties. The counties must administer and fund the public defender services. Idaho
Code§ 19-859 states "[t]he board of county commissioners of each county shall provide for the
representation of indigent persons and other individuals who are entitled to be represented by an
attorney at public expense."

Counties are responsible for maintaining an office of public

defender, joining with another county (or counties) to provide a joint office of public defender,
contracting with an existing office of public defender, or contracting with a private defense
attorney for public defender services. 5 Counties are required to "annually appropriate enough
money to administer" its public defender program. 6 Some would call this an unfunded mandate.

The natural result is forty-four different systems with different standards and resources,
managing thousands of cases with varying quality of services. In 2010, the National Legal Aid
and Defender Association (''NLADA") issued a report after studying trial level indigent services
offered in seven Idaho counties, which identified a number of specific areas of concern. 7 The
report stated that "[b]y delegating to each county the responsibility to provide counsel at the trial
level without any state funding or oversight, Idaho has sewn a patchwork quilt of underfunded,
inconsistent systems that vary greatly in defining who qualifies for services and in the level of
competency of the services rendered." 8

5 I.C.
6 I.C.

§ 19-859.
§ 19-862.

7

"These include the widespread use of fixed-fee contracts; extraordinarily high attorney caseloads and workloads;
lack of consistent, effective, and confidential communication with indigent clients; inadequate, and often
nonexistent, investigation of cases; lack of structural safeguards to protect the independence of defenders; lack of
adequate representation of children in juvenile and criminal court; lack of sufficient supervision; lack of
performance-based standards; lack of ongoing training and professional development; and lack of any meaningful
funding from the State." Complaint ,i 1.
8 Complaint ,i 36 (citing National Legal Aid and Defender Association, The Guarantee of Counsel: Advocacy & Due
Process in I~aho's Trial Courts: Evaluation of Trial-Level Indigent Defense Systems in Idaho at 2 (2010)).
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After the NLADA report, the legislature created the Idaho Public Defense Commission
("PDC"). 9

It is a self-governing executive agency with four members appointed by the

Governor, two from the legislature and one from the Supreme Court.

It is tasked with

promulgating rules for training and education for defense attorneys and to create uniform data
reporting requirements that include caseload, workload, and expenditures. 10 The PDC is also
charged with making recommendations to the Idaho legislature by January 20th of each year
(beginning January 20, 2015) regarding requirements for contracts between counties and private
attorneys, qualifications and experience standards, enforcement mechanisms, and funding
issues. 11 The PDC failed to make any recommendations as of January 20, 2015. 12

Plaintiffs argue the PDC is too little, too late, and then it did not even do what it was supposed to
do.

Pointing to past public pronouncements by both the Governor and the Chief Justice,

Plaintiffs claim:
"Despite the State's acknowledgement that significant reform is necessary in this
arena - by, among other things, the creation of various virtually powerless
committees, including the establishment in 2010 of a public-defense
subcommittee of the Criminal Justice Commission, the establishment in 2013 of a
special committee of the legislature to recommend legislative reforms to the
public-defense system, and the 2014 statutory amendments and formation of the
PDC - the State has done little to meaningfully address the myriad problems
plaguing Idaho's indigent-defense system." 13

Plaintiffs emphasize that the State does not provide any funding or supervision to any of the
counties, the public defender commission failed to promulgate any rules as of January 20, 2015,

9 I.C.

§ 19-849
to I.C. §§ 19-849, 19-850.
11 I.C. § 19-850.
12 Complaint ,i 49.
13 Complaint ,i 45.

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss - 4

000471

and the State has failed to sufficiently address the many state and federal constitutional issues
raised by the NLADA report. 14

Unquestionably, the State is ultimately responsible for ensuring constitutionally-sound public
defense. Each branch of government has its responsibility. Each branch also has its limits, due
to the separation of powers. Plaintiffs allege the State has failed to provide a constitutionallysound system of public defense, despite being on notice for over a decade of the deficiencies in
the public defender system, because it provides no training, supervision, oversight, statewide
standards, or funding. 15

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

On June 17, 2015, Plaintiffs filed this Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory
Relief against the State of Idaho, Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, and seven members of the PDC
(collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy the
Defendants' failure "to provide effective legal representation to indigent criminal defendants
across the State of Idaho, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, of Article 1, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution, and Idaho statutes and
regulations." 16

Plaintiffs allege the following claims for relief: (1) violation of the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (right to counsel), (2) violation of Article 1,
14 Id.

15

16

,r,r 46-48, 52.

Id. ,r,r 162-169.
Complaint ,r 3.
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Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution (right to counsel), (3) violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Due Process), and (4)
violation of Article 1, Section 13 (Due Process), by the Defendants' failure to ensure that all
indigent criminal defendants receive meaningful and effective legal representation at all critical

stages of their cases. 17

The relief requested by Plaintiff in this case includes, in relevant part, the following:
A) Certify this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure;
B) Declare that the State of Idaho is obligated to provide constitutionally adequate
representation to indigent criminal defendants, including at their initial
appearances;
C) Declare that the constitutional rights of Idaho's indigent criminal defendants are
being violated by the State on an ongoing basis, and provide a deadline for the
State to move this Court for approval of specific modifications to the structure
and operation of the State's indigent-defense system;
D) Enjoin the State from continuing to violate the rights of indigent defendants by
providing constitutionally deficient representation;
E) Enter an injunction requiring the State to propose, for this Court's approval and
monitoring, a plan to develop and implement a statewide system of public defense
that is consistent with the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution and laws of the
State ofldaho;
F) Enter an injunction that requires the State to propose, for this Court's approval
and monitoring, uniform workload, performance, and training standards for
attorneys representing indigent criminal defendants in the State of Idaho in order
to ensure accountability and to monitor effectiveness;
G) Enter an injunction barring the use of fixed-fee contracts in the delivery of
indigent-defense services in the State ofldaho; .... 18

On July 8, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss along with a Memorandum in Support.
On November 23, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss, along with an

11

Id. fl 170-183.

18

Complaint, p. 53.
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Affidavit of Ian Thompson and Second Affidavit of Richard Eppink. 19 On December 4, 2015,
Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss, along with an
Objection and Motion to Strike.

Plaintiffs filed a Response to Defendants' Objection and

Motion to Strike on December 9, 2015.

Defendants assert that the Complaint should be dismissed because the named Defendants are not
proper parties (i.e. the State of Idaho is not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
Governor Otter and members of the Public Defense Commission cannot be sued under § 1983 or
for alleged violations of constitutional rights as they have no legal authority to make the
sweeping changes to Idaho's public defense system; and the Complaint fails to state a claim for
relief because the Court lacks authority to enjoin the State and there is no justiciable controversy
between the State and Plaintiffs).

Plaintiffs assert that the named Defendants are the proper parties because (1) the State bears the
ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the constitutional rights of Idahoans are protected (the
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that indigent defense is the State's
responsibility, the State has an affirmative duty to ensure Sixth Amendment compliance, the
State's delegation of duties to the counties does not abdicate the State's responsibility); (2) the
Governor and the PDC members are proper defendants because they are the only State officials
who give effect to Idaho's statewide indigent defense system; (3) resolving systematic reform
litigation is a central responsibility of the judiciary; and (4) Plaintiffs' suit complies with Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure 3(b) and 65(d).

19 On November 24, 2015, Plaintiffs filed an "Errata" regarding certain errors in their Response, along with a
Corrected Response.
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LEGAL STANDARD

"A court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) only
when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim
which would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 835 P.2d
1346, 1347 (Ct. App. 1992). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the issue "is not whether the
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the
claims." Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 673, 183 P.3d 758, 761 (2008). "A motion to
dismiss must be resolved solely from the pleadings and all facts and inferences from the record
are viewed in favor of the non-moving party." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832-33, 243
P.3d 642, 648-49 (2010).

To state a claim for relief and survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the pleading "does not need
detailed factual allegations," however, the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level." Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545, 127 S. Ct.
1955, 1959 (2007). Mere "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of a cause of
action's elements will not do." Id. There must be "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Id. at 547, 127 S. Ct. at 1960. Stated differently, "[the] complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). "As a practical
matter, a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be granted only in the unusual case in which
the plaintiff includes allegations showing on the face of the complaint that there is some
insurmountable bar to relie£" Harper, 122 Idaho at 536, 835 P.2d at 1347.
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ANALYSIS

(1) Defendants' Objection and Motion to Strike

Along with their Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs filed an Affidavit of Ian
Thomson and an Affidavit of Richard Eppink. Defendants contend that the Affidavits should be
stricken or disregarded, because this is purely a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion and the Court has no right
to consider outside material.

Plaintiffs contend that the evidence may properly be considered without converting the Motion
to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment, because Defendants' Motion is really a Rule
12(b)(l) Motion challenging the Court's subject matter jurisdiction.

The Court may consider outside evidence on a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion so long as the Court
converts the Motion into one for Summary Judgment.

However, it is within the Court's

discretion to exclude such evidence and treat the Motion as purely a Motion to Dismiss. See
Orthman v. Idaho Power Company, 126 Idaho 960,895 P.2d 561 (1995).

Here, the Motion to Dismiss asserts that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted under federal law (42 U.S.C. 1983) and under state law (Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure 3(b) and 65(d), and the Idaho Constitution). This Motion is subject to Rule 12(b)(6)
and can be decided without considering outside evidence. Therefore, in exercising the Court's
discretion, Defendants' Motion to Strike is GRANTED and the Affidavits filed by Plaintiffs will
not be considered.
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(2) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs have alleged that indigent criminal defendants in Idaho are systematically being
deprived of their constitutional rights to counsel and Due Process of law, due to the Defendants'
failure to provide an adequate public defense system in the State ofldaho.

Defendants assert that the entire action should be dismissed because the State of Idaho, the
Governor and the PDC are entitled to governmental immunity, and the Court lacks authority and
jurisdiction to order relief.

Before addressing the competing arguments on the Motion to Dismiss, underlying constitutional
principles must first be addressed.

One of the founding principles of our system of justice is that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const.
amend. VI.

The landmark 1963 case, Gideon v. Wainwright, made clear that an indigent

criminal defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel even though they lack the financial
means to· hire one. The Court reasoned that the state has the obligation to provide indigent
defendants with counsel:
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us
to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend
vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime.
Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's
interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with
crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and
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present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants
who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The
right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and
essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning,
our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on
procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before
impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This
noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his
accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S. Ct. 792, 796-97 (1963). The Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is applicable to the states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. The Idaho Constitution also guarantees the right to counsel: "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the party accused shall have the right to . . . appear and defend in person and with
counsel." Idaho Const. art. I, § 13.

The United States Supreme Court also held that the constitutional right to counsel includes the
right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 2063 (1984). "The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel
because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system
to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or
appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair." Strickland, 466 U.S. at
685, 104 S. Ct. at 2063. As explained in United States v. Cronic:
The special value of the right to the assistance of counsel explains why "[i]t has
long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective
assistance of counsel." The text of the Sixth Amendment itself suggests as much.
The Amendment requires not merely the provision of counsel to the accused, but
"Assistance," which is to be "for his defence." Thus, "the core purpose of the
counsel guarantee was to assure 'Assistance' at trial, when the accused was
confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public
prosecutor." If no actual "Assistance" "for" the accused's "defence" is provided,
then the constitutional guarantee has been violated. To hold otherwise "could
convert the appointment of counsel into a sham and nothing more than a formal
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss - 11
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compliance with the Constitution's requirement that an accused be given the
assistance of counsel. The Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel
cannot be satisfied by mere formal appointment."

The substance of the Constitution's guarantee of the effective assistance of
counsel is illuminated by reference to its underlying purpose. "[T]ruth," Lord
Eldon said, "is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the
question." This dictum describes the unique strength of our system of criminal
justice. "The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that
partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective
that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free." It is that ''very premise"
that underlies and gives meaning to the Sixth Amendment. It "is meant to assure
fairness in the adversary criminal process." Unless the accused receives the
effective assistance of counsel, "a serious risk of injustice infects the trial itself."

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654-56, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2044-45 (1984) (footnotes

omitted, citations omitted).

"The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel during all 'critical
stages' of the adversarial proceedings against him." Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 149
P.3d 833, 837 (2006); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1931 (1967).
"The commencement of the criminal prosecution, whether by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment, marks the 'critical stage' of the prosecution to
which the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable." State v. Shelton, 129 Idaho 877,
880-81, 934 P.2d 943, 946-47 (Ct. App. 1997). "Thus, under criminal procedures followed in
Idaho, a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered by the filing of a criminal
complaint or an indictment." State v. Tapp, 136 Idaho 354, 363, 33 P.3d 828, 837 (Ct. App.
2001). A critical stage of the proceedings is any stage "where certain rights may be sacrificed or
lost." Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7, 90 S. Ct. 1999, 2002 (1970). Critical stages include,
for example, the preliminary hearing, Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9, 90 S. Ct. at 2003, the pretrial
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lineup, id., the arraignment, Murillo v. State, 144 Idaho 449, 454, 163 P.3d 238, 243 (Ct. App.
2007); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 (2002), and the entry of a plea,
State v. Creech, 109 Idaho 592,602, 710 P.2d 502,512 (1985).

As explained by the United States Supreme Court in Maine v. Moulton:
[T]he Court has also recognized that the assistance of counsel cannot be limited to
participation in a trial; to deprive a person of counsel during the period prior to
trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the trial itself.
Recognizing that the right to the assistance of counsel is shaped by the need for
the assistance of counsel, we have found that the right attaches at earlier,
"critical" stages in the criminal justice process ''where the results might well settle
the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." And,
"[w]hatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a
lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against
him ...." This is because, after the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings,
'"the government has committed itself to prosecute, and ... the adverse positions
of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds
himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in
the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law."'
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170, 106 S. Ct. 477, 484, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985) (citations

omitted).

It is abundantly clear in the authorities cited above that the fundamental right to counsel, and the

right to effective assistance of counsel, is critical not only at a defendant's trial, but also in the
pretrial proceedings.
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A.

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY UNDER§ 1983

Defendants argue that they are not the proper parties to be sued in this suit, because they are not
"persons" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and they cannot provide redress for the claims
made by Plaintiffs. Defendants argue that there is no authority requiring a state or one of its
officers "to be responsible for ensuring that there are constitutionally adequate public defender
services throughout the State."20 Defendants also contend they are not proper parties because
Idaho statutes place responsibility for the public defender system on county officials, not on the
Governor or the PDC.

Plaintiffs have conceded in their Response brief 1 and at oral argument that the State of Idaho is
not a "person" for purposes of injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs conceded that
the federal law claims against the State should be dismissed. 22 Therefore, Counts 1 and 3 must
be dismissed against the State of Idaho. Accordingly, the Court will address only whether the
Governor and the PDC members are "persons" subject to suit under§ 1983.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a remedial statute which provides an avenue of redress to persons injured by
the actions of government which violated federal constitutional rights. The statue provides in
pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
Defs.' Reply Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, p. 4.
See Pls.' Response to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, p. 3, FN 2
22 See Hearing held on December 16, 2015.
20

21
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action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.... 23

In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, the United States Supreme Court specifically

addressed the issue of whether a State, or an official acting in his or her official capacity, is a
person within the meaning of§ 1983. The Court held that "States or governmental entities that
are considered 'arms of the State' for Eleventh Amendment purposes" are not 'persons' under§
1983." Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989).
Will also held that state officials acting in their official capacities are not "persons" within the
meaning of§ 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S. Ct. at 2312.

However, there is an exception that "[w]hen sued for prospective injunctive relief, a state official
in his official capacity is considered a "person" for § 1983 purposes. In what has become known
as part of the Ex parte Young doctrine, a suit for prospective injunctive relief provides a narrow,
but well-established, exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity." Doe, 131 F.3d at 839
(emphasis in original, citation omitted). "The rule of Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy
Clause by providing a pathway to relief from continuing violations of federal law by a state or its
officers." Los Angeles Cty. Bar Ass 'n, 979 F.2d at 704.

Under Ex parte Young, the state officer sued must have some connection with the enforcement of
the allegedly unconstitutional act. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157, 28 S. Ct. 441,453 (1908).
"That connection must be fairly direct; a generalized duty to enforce state law or general
23

Claims under§ 1983 are limited by the scope of the Eleventh Amendment, Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat. Lab.,
131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997), however, the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state courts, Will v.
Michigan Dep't ofState Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-64, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (1989).
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supervisory power over the persons responsible for enforcing the challenged provision will not
subject an official to suit." Ass 'n des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729
F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).

Defendants claim the Governor and PDC only have a "generalized duty" to supervise or enforce
a constitutionally sound public defense system, but no direct or specific authority or
responsibility. Defendants emphasize that the legislature has delegated that duty to the counties,
as well as the duty to collect taxes in support thereof Defendants assert that the Governor and
the PDC members "do not directly control, regulate, administer, or otherwise bear responsibility
for provision of public defender services, and they have no ability to provide the requested
relie£"24 .

Defendants point to Association des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec, a case where
producers and sellers of foie gras brought an action against the State of California, the governor,
and the attorney general, to enjoin the enforcement of a statute that ''bans the sale of products
that are the result of force feeding birds to enlarge their livers beyond normal size." Ass 'n des
Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec, 729 F.3d at 942. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

found that the California Governor was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because his
only connection to the statute was a general duty to enforce state law. Id. at 943. However, the
attorney general was not entitled to immunity, because the statute specifically authorized
enforcement by district and city attorneys and the attorney general has direct supervision and the
same powers as district attorneys. Id.

24

Defs.' Mero. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, p. 11.
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Plaintiffs assert that the Governor and the PDC members have a sufficient connection to public
defense in Idaho. Plaintiffs further contend that the Governor is responsible for indigent defense
and has power to effectuate necessary changes to improve the public defense system. Plaintiffs
assert the Governor appoints the majority of the PDC members, is deeply and directly involved
in its work, and has been in regular communication with the PDC on systemic public defense
issues. Plaintiffs argue that the Governor has legal appointment authority over the PDC, the
State Appellate Public Defender, and boards of county commissioners as well.25 The PDC has
statutory duties to establish rules governing public defenders throughout the State, LC. § 19850(1)(a), and is mandated to make recommendations for system-wide reform, LC. § 19850(1 )(b). 26

Plaintiffs cite Los Angeles County Bar Association, where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the governor was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity where the bar
association was challenging the constitutionality of a statute that prescribed the number of judges
on the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Los Angeles Cty. Bar Ass 'n, 979 F.2d at 704.
There, the Court found that the governor had a specific connection to the challenged statute,
because the governor had the duty to appoint judges to any new positions. Id.

Defendants urge the Court to find that the Governor and the PDC have no responsibility for
public defense in Idaho. The Court disagrees. Contrary to the alleged animal abuse issue
presented in Association des Eleveurs de Canards et d 'Oies du Quebec, the central issue in this
case concerns the continuous and systematic violation of fundamental constitutional human

25

Pls.' Response to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, p. 11.

26 Id.
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rights. Plaintiffs pose serious allegations of widespread systemic violations of constitutional
rights to counsel, to effective assistance of counsel, and to fair judicial proceedings for indigent
criminal defendants across the State ofldaho.

The Defendants would have the Court believe that the plain language set forth in United States
Supreme Court cases mandating that it is the State's responsibility to provide counsel to indigent
criminal defendants does not in fact place any responsibility on the Defendants in this case.

Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, the Court finds that the Governor and the PDC members
have a more than sufficiently close connection or nexus to the enforcement of public defense in
Idaho. The Governor has a duty to ensure that the Constitution and laws are enforced in Idaho.
The Governor also has direct supervisory authority over those responsible to establish standards
for a constitutionally sound public defense system. The PDC was specifically saddled with the
responsibility of creating rules regarding training and education of defense attorneys and making
recommendations to the legislature for improving public defense in Idaho. The fact that the
legislature has delegated public defender services to individual counties does not abdicate the
Defendants' responsibility to indigent criminal defendants in the State ofldaho. (Neither does it
abdicate further legislative responsibility, nor excuse legislative inaction.)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Governor and the PDC members are subject to suit under
42 u.s.c. § 1983.
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B.

JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY

In this case, Plaintiffs seek various forms of declaratory and injunctive relief. "A prerequisite to
a declaratory judgment action is an actual or justiciable controversy." Miles v. Idaho Power Co.,
116 Idaho 635,639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989). The elements ofajusticiable controversy include
the following:

A "controversy" in this sense must be one that is appropriate for judicial
determination. A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or
dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot.
The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of the
parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.

Wylie v. State, Idaho Transp. Bd., 151 Idaho 26, 31, 253 P.3d 700, 705 (2011) (citation omitted).
"Justiciability is generally divided into subcategories-advisory opinions, feigned and collusive
cases, standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions, and administrative questions." Miles,
116 Idaho at 639, 778 P.2d at 761.

In this case, the issues of standing, ripeness, and separation of powers are implicated. 27 Each
issue will be discussed in turn.

27

In Miles v. Idaho Power Company, the Court discussed separation of powers as an element of justiciability.
Miles, 116 Idaho at 639, 778 P.2d at 761 (1989). Accordingly, separation of powers will be addressed as a sub-issue
of the justiciability doctrine.
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1) Standing

Plaintiffs must first establish standing to bring a case. "The doctrine of standing focuses on the
party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated." Miles, 116
Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763. The major aspect of the standing inquiry has been explained as
follows:
The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the parties seeking to invoke the
court's jurisdiction have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions." As refined by subsequent reformulation, this
requirement of a "personal stake" has come to be understood to require not only a
"distinct and palpable injury," to the plaintiff, but also a "fairly traceable" causal
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct.

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S. Ct. 2620, 2630
(1978) (citations omitted). Thus, in order to have standing to bring suit, a plaintiff must have (1)
suffered an injury in fact, (2) causally connected to the conduct complained of, and (3) it is likely
as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. See

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992).

"[T]o satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally must allege or
demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will
prevent or redress the claimed injury." Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763. "In some cases
even though a plaintiff has shown or alleged an 'injury in fact,' standing is denied because of
other factors. For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that 'when the asserted
harm is a 'generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of
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citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction."' Id. (citation
omitted).

"At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's
conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we 'presum[ e] that general allegations embrace
those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim."' Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S. Ct.
at 213 7 (citation omitted).

a. Iniury in Fact

This is an issue of first impression in Idaho, as neither the United States Supreme Court nor the
Idaho Supreme Court has addressed a Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of
counsel claim for declaratory and prospective injunctive relief concerning claimed preconviction systemic injuries resulting from the representation that indigent criminal defendants
are receiving from their publically appointed attorneys.

In this case, Plaintiffs' alleged injury is the violation of their right to effective assistance of
counsel. . As alleged, the injury is specialized and peculiar to each of the named Plaintiffs.
However, Plaintiffs also allege that all indigent criminal defendants are suffering alike from the
current public defender system in Idaho. ·

Here, it is important to note the procedural posture of the Plaintiffs' underlying criminal lawsuits
in this matter. As of the date the lawsuit was filed, none of the Plaintiffs were convicted or
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sentenced in any of their pending criminal cases. On the record presented, it is troubling to the
Court that the Plaintiffs have not yet been convicted of any crime in their underlying cases, nor
pursued or exhausted any appeal rights, nor any post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the Court
fails to see how the Plaintiffs have suffered an injury at the time the Complaint was filed in this
matter. At this point, Plaintiffs have alleged various forms of ineffective assistance of counsel;
however, there is not yet any ascertainable injury - i.e. none of the Plaintiffs have either been
convicted or sentenced. Accordingly, the Court finds the Plaintiffs have not properly alleged an
actual injury.

b. Causal Connection

The second element of standing requires the Plaintiffs to properly allege that the injury suffered
is causally connected to the conduct complained of. In other words, the injury must be "fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action
of some third party not before the court." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S. Ct. at 2136.

Plaintiffs allege that the State, the Governor, and the PDC are ultimately on the hook for public ,
defender services in Idaho. However, the legislature has currently delegated the responsibility
for public defender services to individual counties, none of which are parties to this suit. The
Complaint alleges, and it is commonly accepted in official pronouncements by the highest
officials in all three branches of government that there are widespread systemic problems with
the public defense system. Defendants concede this point. However, it is not clear (or even
properly alleged) that systemic constitutional violations are occurring in every county. Plaintiffs
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allege there is a problem with public defense in the entire State of Idaho, but only provides
examples from a sampling of counties that are not even party to this lawsuit.

Plaintiffs challenge the inaction of the Defendants, but do not acknowledge the legislature and
the county commissioners - the principal bodies with the power to affect the policy (political)
and systemic changes Plaintiffs seek. The connection of the claimed injury to the Governor and
the PDC are too remote to be fairly traceable. Neither has the power and authority to act alone to
redress Plaintiffs' grievances. Certainly, both have moral, political, and public power to pressure
the legislature or the counties to act, but neither have the ability to require it. Accordingly, there
is no fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged inaction.

c. Redressabilitv

Finally, Plaintiffs must show that it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S. Ct. at 2136. In order to
have standing, the Court must be able to redress the problems not merely in an advisory,
hypothetical or speculative way, but concretely.

Here, Plaintiffs seek relief in their individual cases as well as in all other indigent criminal cases
in Idaho. However, there is no basis for the Court to award such relief where the Plaintiffs
themselves have not even been convicted of a crime, nor appealed, nor sought post-conviction or
other relief.
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Instead, Plaintiffs invite the Court to make a variety of largely speculative assumptions: (1) that
the Plaintiffs (and the class members they would represent) will in fact be convicted of a crime,
(2) that the actions or inactions of the Defendants will have caused those convictions (i.e. that the
actions or inactions of Defendants will have been so prejudicial that the Plaintiffs will have been
denied their constitutional right to a fair trial), (3) that the trial courts in each case will be unable
or unwilling to correct such results (e.g., new trial, dismissal, etc.), (4) that the Plaintiffs will be
granted the relief they seek in this case, and that any such remedy would or could truly redress
the problem.

The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is frequently raised in petitions for post-conviction
relief and addressed on a case-by-case basis. In every case, before or after exhausting appeal
rights, every convicted criminal defendant has the right to seek judicial review of the public
defense services provided. The topic has been addressed by the United States Supreme Court
and by the Idaho Supreme Court on a number of occasions.

In Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court laid down a two-part test to
analyze claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Under this test, the petitioner must
demonstrate (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the petitioner was
prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
2064-65 (1984). To establish deficient performance, the applicant must prove that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness. Id.
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In a post-conviction setting, a criminal defendant has the right to challenge the adequacy of his
or her representation, and those cases are decided on a case-by-case basis, with the Court finding
the individual facts of the case based on evidence and testimony, then applying the law to the
facts, which is the traditional exercise of judicial authority. 28 Strickland requires proof of actual
prejudice, and here, there is no showing that any prejudice has been suffered in the Plaintiffs'
underlying criminal cases. Rather, the prejudice suffered by Plaintiffs is merely hypothetical at
this point. Moreover, even if prejudice were actually shown, any relief by this Court would be
advisory or hypothetical since the underlying criminal cases are not before this Court.

Plaintiffs do not contend that the post-conviction procedure is faulty or is systematically failing
criminal defendants in Idaho.

Instead, Plaintiffs ask this Court to basically intervene and

supersede in every single case, and in every court and county and to then make a blanket
determination that every indigent criminal defendant's rights are being violated. This is a giant
step from the case-by-case analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

Plaintiffs

generally request sweeping relief for counties and cases where there might not be any deficiency
in public defense services.

Without a doubt, the Court believes that there are serious problems with public defense in Idaho
that need to be addressed. However, this Court cannot and should not usurp the duties of the
PDC. Essentially, the Plaintiffs request the Court to assume control of public defense in Idaho,
on the basis that a few defendants might have their rights violated. Such relief is too speculative
and fundamentally violates the notion that courts are to decide specific cases and controversies
before them. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs lack standing.
28

Extended even further, there is also the Writ of Habeas Corpus remedy available.
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2) Ripeness

Another subcategory of justiciability is ripeness, which "asks whether there is any need for court
action at the present time." Miles, 116 Idaho at 642, 778 P.2d at 764. A case is not justiciable if
it is not ripe.

Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 801, 53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2002).

"The

traditional ripeness doctrine requires a petitioner or plaintiff to prove 1) that the case presents
definite and concrete issues, 2) that a real and substantial controversy exists, and 3) that there is a
present need for adjudication." Noh, 137 Idaho at 801, 53 P.3d at 1220. A declaratory judgment
action must raise issues that are definite and concrete, and must involve a real and substantial
controversy as opposed to an advisory opinion based upon hypothetical facts. Harris v. Cassia

County, 106 Idaho 513,516,681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984). The purpose of the ripeness requirement
is to prevent courts from entangling themselves in purely abstract disagreements. Abbot Labs. v.

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515 (1967).

In this case, even with the facts in the Complaint construed as true, Plaintiffs have not made
sufficient allegations to sustain a Motion to Dismiss on the first two elements of ripeness,
namely, that there are definite, concrete issues and a real, substantial controversy exists. The
Complaint invites the Court to make speculative assumptions regarding Plaintiffs' conclusions.
For example, although an arraignment is a critical proceeding requiring counsel, there is no
allegation (and the Court would find it hard to believe) that every single indigent defendant is
lacking counsel in every single county and at every single arraignment. As set forth above,
. Plaintiffs have not even pursued any appeal or post-conviction relief in their individual cases.
While it seems Plaintiffs make allegations of present violations of right to counsel, the ultimate
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results in their cases have not yet been determined. Our appeals process determines whether a
defendant received due process on a case-by-case basis. At this time, Plaintiffs' arguments are
based on assumptions that they will be convicted and that their convictions will be due to their
systemic public defense inadequacies.

This case is ultimately not ripe for adjudication. As previously set forth, none of the Plaintiffs'
criminal cases have concluded, no appeals have taken place, and no post-conviction relief has
been sought. In each of their individual cases, Plaintiffs can assert and litigate the claim of lack
of effective assistance of counsel and lack of a fair trial. If it is decided that their constitutional
rights have been violated, then those courts can order a specific remedy, for example, a new trial
or dismissal of the case. Thus, the nature and extent of any real or permanent injury cannot be
determined at this time. Accordingly, the Court finds the case is not ripe for adjudication.

3) Separation of Powers29

As much as anything, this case involves the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The
doctrine permeated the discussion above, and will be discussed further below.

Defendants contend that only the legislature can make the changes requested by Plaintiffs, and
the legislature would not be bound by any injunction entered by the district court in this case.

29 Defendants originally contended in their Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss that although the case
presented a serious separation of powers issue, the issue need not be addressed because under Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure 3(b) and 6S(d) the Court does not have authority to issue an injunction in this case. However, in their
Reply Memorandum and at the hearing held on December 16, 2015, Defendants did not argue for dismissal on the
basis of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, but on the separation of powers doctrine. The Court does not find
Defendants' argument for dismissal on the basis of the Rules 3(b) and 6S(d) persuasive.
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Defendants further assert that neither the Governor nor the PDC members have statutory or
constitutional authority to tell county officers how to operate the public defense system.

Article 2, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution provides for the separation of powers among the three
branches of Idaho's government. Article 3, § 1 provides that the power to pass bills is vested in
the legislature. Article 3, § 15, provides that "[n]o law shall be passed except by bill[.]" "Read
together, these three constitutional provisions stand for the proposition that, of Idaho's three
branches of government, only the legislature has the power to make 'law."' Mead v. Arnell, 117
Idaho 660,664, 791 P.2d 410,414 (1990).

The separation of powers doctrine asks "whether this Court, by entertaining review of a
particular matter, would be substituting its judgment for that of another coordinate branch of
government, when the matter was one properly entrusted to that other branch." Miles, 116 Idaho
at 639, 778 P.2d at 761.

In Idaho Schools for Equal Opportunity v. State, 123 Idaho 573, 850 P.2d 724 (1993) (!SEED I),
the Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs had standing to sue the defendants (including
the State and the Governor) and it also rejected the State's argument that the court was invading
the legislature's authority by declaring that the present level and method of funding for Idaho's
public schools is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court stated:
[W]e decline to accept the respondents' argument that the other branches of
government be allowed to interpret the constitution for us. That would be an
abject abdication of our role in the American system of government.
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Passing on the constitutionality of statutory enactments, even enactment with
political overtones, is a fundamental responsibility of the judiciary, and has been
so· since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1813).

Id. at 583., 850 P.2d at 734. There is no question that the judiciary has the power to "say what
the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). Accordingly, a court is
"not precluded from reviewing the constitutionality of a proposed course of action merely
because both the executive and legislative branches happen to concur in supporting it." Miles,
116 Idaho at 640, 778 P.2d at 762. "Constitutional rights, as well as this Court's duty to
faithfully interpret our constitution and the federal constitution, do not wane before united efforts
of the legislature and the governor." Id.

Here, the Idaho legislature has delegated the duty to provide indigent criminal defense to the
counties. See I.C. § 19-859. Plaintiffs ask the Court to override this system and reshape the
system of indigent criminal defense in Idaho. The Court finds that it would invade the province
of the legislature to do so.

Plaintiffs do not argue that the statute delegating the duty to provide public defense is
unconstitutional.

They simply argue that the county commissioners in some or all of the

counties, and the various systems of public defense, have failed to protect their constitutional
rights to counsel and a fair trial. Instead of filing suit against those counties where they believe
their constitutional rights have been violated, they brought this action against the State, the
Governor, and the PDC. Plaintiffs also do not argue that the statute establishing the PDC is
unconstitutional. They argue, instead, that the PDC is an ineffective and inadequate response by
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the legislature to redress the problem of inadequate or ineffective assistance of public defense
counsel. Instead of seeking to have an act declared unconstitutional, they ask this Court to
declare the inaction to be unconstitutional. Plaintiffs ask this Court to declare the whole system
(or lack of system) to be unconstitutional and to then establish standards or guidelines, based on
previous holdings of other courts, that the Governor, the PDC, the legislature, and all counties
(whom they have not sued at this time), must follow. Plaintiffs ask this Court to mandate that the
Governor and the PDC (and the legislature and counties) must enact as legislation, ordinances, or
rules to meet those standards, and to provide adequate funding therefore. This Court does not
have the power or jurisdiction to do so under the established principles of separation of powers
imbedded in the federal and state constitutions.

To be sure, the Governor, as the "supreme executive power of the state" has the duty to ensure
that the constitution and laws are enforced. Idaho Const. art. IV,§ 5. The Governor also has the
ability to make recommendations to the legislature concerning the public defense system in
Idaho. In addition, the Governor can veto budgets that do not appropriate any funding toward
improving the public defender system in Idaho. Thus, even without the "power of the purse" or
the power to legislate, the Governor has a constitutional duty to ensure a constitutionally sound
public defense system, to the maximum extent of his authority within the limitations of power of
the office.

Moreover, the PDC has direct statutory duties and responsibilities, some of which

were not met more than a year ago.

Under the long-held principles of Marbury v. Madison, this Court has jurisdiction to pass on the
constitutionality of statutory enactments, even enactments with political overtones. This is a
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fundamental responsibility of the judiciary. However, it is not the role of courts, but that of the
political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the
laws and the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court finds the case violates the separation of
powers doctrine.

This case presents troubling allegations regarding problems with the public defender system in
Idaho. The Court is sympathetic with Plaintiffs' plight. However, the case invites the Court to
make speculative assumptions regarding the outcomes of individual cases (that are before other
courts and in other counties), presume that all indigent criminal defendants in all counties are
receiving the same ineffective assistance of counsel, and then issue blanket orders halting all
criminal prosecutions until the issues are resolved. The Court declines to do so as such action
would essentially mandate the Court legislating standards that must be met in every county and
in every case.

Courts can, and do, find, and redress violations of constitutional rights in

individual cases. But, it is not the proper role of the Court to legislate specific standards, nor can
the Court provide funding to enact those standards. Accordingly, the Court finds that this case is
not a proper case or controversy for judicial action.

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' Motion to Dismis
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Case No. CV OC 1510240
)'RACY TUCKER, JASON SHARP, NAOMI
MORLEY, and JEREMY PAYNE, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs- Appellants,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER,
in his official capacity as Governor of Idaho;
HON. LINDA COPPLE-TROUT, in her
official capacity as a member of the Idaho
State Public Defense Commission~ DARRELL
G. BOLZ, in his official capacity as a member
of the Idaho State Public Defense
Commission; SARA B. THOMAS, in her
official capacity as a member of the Idaho
State Public Defense Commission; WILLIAM
H. WELLMAN, in his official capacity as a
member of the Idaho State Public Defense
Commission; KIMBER RICKS, in his official
capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public
Defense Commission; SEN. CHUCK
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WINDER, in his official capacity as a member
of the Idaho State Public Defense
Commission; and REP. CHRISTY PERRY, in
her official capacity as a member of the Idaho
State Public Defense Commission,
DefendantsRespondents.

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, in
his official capacity as Governor of Idaho; HON. LINDA COPPLE-TROUT, in her official
capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission; DARRELL G. BOLZ, in
his official capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission; SARA B.
THOMAS, in her official capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission;
WILLIAM H. WELLMAN, in his official capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public
Defense Commission; KIMBER RICKS, in his official capacity as a member of the Idaho State
Public Defense Commission; SEN. CHUCK WINDER, in his official capacity as a member of
the Idaho State Public Defense Commission; and REP. CHRISTY PERRY, in her official
capacity as a member of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission, AND THE PARTIES'
ATTORNEYS, Steven L. Olsen, Michael S. Gilmore, Shasta Kilminster-Hadley, Scott Zanzig,
Civil Litigation Division, Office of the Attorney General, 954 West Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor,
Boise, Idaho 83702; Cally A. Younger, Counsel to the Governor, Office of the Governor, Idaho
State Capitol Building, 700 West Jefferson Street, Boise, Idaho 83702; and Daniel J. Skinner,
Cantrill, Skinner, Lewis, Casey & Sorensen, LLP, P.O. Box 359, Boise, Idaho 83701, AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

I.

!VfORLEY,

The above-named appellants, TRACY TUCKER, JASON SHARP, NAOMI
and JEREMY PAYNE, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

appeal against the above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the JUDGMENT,
entered January 21, 2016, the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTIN9
MOTION TO DISMISS, entered January 20, 2016, and the ORDER GOVERNING
DISCOVERY, entered October 20, 2015, Honorable Judge Samuel A. Hoagland.
2. ,That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l)
and (2), Idaho Appellate Rules ("1.A.R.").
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3. ! A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal that the appellants intend to assert in
the appeal is as follows:
(a) Did the District Court err in granting the defendants' motion to dismiss?
(b) Did the District Court err in granting the defendants' objection and motion to
strike?
(c) Did the District Court err in granting, in part, the defendants' motion for
protective order staying discovery pending decision on motion to dismiss?

Provided, this list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellants from asserting other
issues on appeal.
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No.
5.

(a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes.
(b) The appellants request the preparation of the following portions of the

reporter's transcript in [] hard copy [] electronic format [x] both:
(i) Status Conference, 8/26/2015
(ii) Hearing on defendants' motion for protective order, 10/16/2015
(iii) Hearing on defendants' motion to dismiss, 12/16/2015

6. The appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:
(a) Affidavit of Jeremy Payne, filed 6/17/2015
(b) Affidavit of Naomi Morley, filed 6/17/2015
(c) Affidavit of Jason Sharp, filed 6/17/2015
(d) Affidavit of Tracy Tucker, filed 6/17/2015
(e) First Affidavit of Richard Eppink, filed 6/17/2015
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(f) Motion to Dismiss, filed 7/8/2015
(g) Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, filed 7/8/2015
(h) Motion for Protective Order Staying Discovery Pending Decision on Motion to
Dismiss, filed 8/21/2015
(i) Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective Order, filed 8/21/2015

U) Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, filed 9/11/2015
(k) Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Protective Order,
filed 9/11/2015
(1) Order Governing Discovery, entered 10/20/2015
(m) Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed 11/24/2015
(n) Second Affidavit of Richard Eppink, filed 11/24/2015
(o) Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,
filed 12/4/2015
(p) Defendants' Objection and Motion to Strike, filed 12/4/2015
(q) Response to Defendants' Objection and Motion to Strike, filed 12/9/2015
(r) Reply in Support of Defendants' Objection and Motion to Strike, 12/14/2015

7.

The appellants request the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or

admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court. (None.)
8. I certify:
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter on whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Name and Address: Christy Olesek, 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 83702.
(b) That the reporter on whom transcripts have been requested has been contacted to
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request the estimated fee for transcript preparation and that the clerk of the district court will be
paid the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript promptly after the estimated fee
is provided to me.
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has been paid.
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED this 25th day of January, 2016.

Richard Eppink
ACLU OF IDAHO FOUNDATION
Jason D. Williamson
ACLU FOUNDATION
Andrew C. Lillie
Kathryn M. Ali
Brooks M. Hanner
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of January, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to each of
the following:
Steven L. Olsen
steven.olsen@ag.idaho.gov
Michael S. Gilmore
mike. gilmore@ag.idaho.gov
Shasta Kilminster-Hadley
shasta.k-hadley@ag.idaho.gov
Scott Zanzig
scott.zanzig@ag.idaho.gov
Civil Litigation Division
Office of the Attorney General
954 West Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83702
Cally A. Younger
cally.younger@gov.idaho. gov
Counsel to the Governor
Office of the Governor
Idaho State Capitol Building
700 West Jefferson Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Daniel J. Skinner
cantrill@cssklaw.com
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No.
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TRACY TUCKER, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
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STATE OF IDAHO, ET AL.,
Defendants-Respondents.
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)
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NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT OF 113 PAGES LODGED
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Appealed from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Ada.
Honorable Samuel A. Hoagland, District Court Judge
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This transcript contains:
8-26-15:
Status Conference
10-16-15: ·Motion for Protective Order
12-16-15:
Motion to Dismiss
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TRACY TUCKER, JASON SHARP, NAOMI
MORLEY, JEREMY PAYNE, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Supreme Court Case No. 43922
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

v.
STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, in
his official capacity as Governor ofldaho; HON.
LINDA COPPLE TROUT, DARRELL G. BOLZ,
SARA B. THOMAS, WILLIAM H. WELLMAN,
KIMBER RICKS, SEN. CHUCK WINDER, and
REP. CHRISTY PERRY, in their official capacities
as members of the Idaho State Public Defense
Commission,
Defendants-Respondents

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 23rd day of March, 2016.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TRACY TUCKER, JASON SHARP, NAOMI
MORLEY, JEREMY PAYNE, on behalfof
themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Supreme Court Case No. 43922
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

v.
STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, in
his official capacity as Governor ofldaho; HON.
LINDA COPPLE TROUT, DARRELL G. BOLZ,
SARA B. THOMAS, WILLIAM H. WELLMAN,
KIMBER RICKS, SEN. CHUCK WINDER, and
REP. CHRISTY PERRY, in their official capacities
as members of the Idaho State Public Defense
Commission,
Defendants-Respondents

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
RICHARD EPPINK
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
CALLY YOUNGER
DANIEL J. SKINNER

BOISE, IDAHO

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS
BOISE, IDAHO
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

TRACY J'UCKER, JASON SHARP, NAOMI
MORLEY, JEREMY PAYNE, on behalfof
themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Supreme Court Case No. 43922
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

v.
STATE OF IDAHO; C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, in
his official capacity as Governor ofldaho; HON.
LINDA COPPLE TROUT, DARRELL G. BOLZ,
SARA B. THOMAS, WILLIAM H. WELLMAN,
KIMBER RICKS, SEN. CHUCK WINDER, and
REP. CHRISTY PERRY, in their official capacities
as members of the Idaho State Public Defense
Commission,
Defendants-Respondents

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State ofldaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules,
as well as those requested by Counsel.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
25th day of January, 2016.

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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